Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
S.S., 	:
:
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:25-cv-45-CDL-AGH
: 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
PAM BONDI, et al., 	:
:
Respondents. 	:
_________________________________
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner’s application for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). For the reasons explained
below, it is recommended that Petitioner’s application for habeas relief be granted.1
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a sixty-two-year-old native of the Soviet Union and a citizen of
Russia. 	Pet. 4, 8, ECF No. 1; Erickson Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 4-1. 	On September 24,
1992, Petitioner entered the United States at New York, New York as a refugee.
Pet. 4; Erickson Decl. ¶ 5. On March 8, 1994, Petitioner became a lawful permanent
resident of the United States. 	Pet. 4; Erickson Decl. ¶ 6; Resp’ts’ Resp. Ex. A, ECF
No. 4-2.
1 Petitioner also filed a motion to compel (ECF No. 11) and an emergency motion to rule on his
application for habeas relief (ECF No. 16). The Court construed Petitioner’s motion to compel as a
motion seeking additional evidence from Respondents and directed Respondents to provide a status
update. 	Text-only Order, ECF No. 12. 	Consequently, Petitioner’s motion is granted. 	Further,
Petitioner’s motion requesting a ruling on his habeas petition is granted to the extent the Court files
this Report and Recommendation recommending a ruling on his petition.
Case 4:25-cv-00045-CDL-AGH Document 17 Filed 01/12/26 Page 1 of 9

2
Following 	his 	status 	adjustment, 	Petitioner 	received 	multiple 	criminal
convictions under Georgia law. 	Pet. 4; Erickson Decl. ¶ 7-8. 	On December 2, 1996,
Petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence. 	Erickson Decl. ¶ 7. 	On
March 30, 1999, he was convicted of simple battery, criminal interference with
government property, battery, and criminal trespass. 	Id. 	On June 4, 2010, he was
convicted of willful obstruction of law enforcement officers. 	Id. Finally, on May 17,
2011, he was convicted of attempted murder, two counts of aggravated assault,
aggravated battery, two counts of first-degree arson, and burglary. Pet. 4; Erickson
Decl. ¶ 8.
On July 7, 2011, the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging Petitioner as removable under the Section
237(a)(2)(A)(iii) 	of 	the 	Immigration 	and 	Nationality 	Act 	(“INA”), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of aggravated felonies. Erickson Decl.
¶ 9; Resp’ts’ Resp. Ex. C, at 1, 3, ECF No. 4-4. 	On March 6, 2014, an immigration
judge (“IJ”) ordered Petitioner’s removal. Erickson Decl. ¶ 10; Resp’ts’ Resp. Ex. D,
ECF No. 4-5. Both parties waived appeal, rendering Petitioner’s removal order final
the same day. Id.
After serving his term of imprisonment with the Georgia Department of
Corrections, Petitioner entered immigration custody on June 26, 2024. 	Erickson
Decl. ¶ 11. 	On August 14, 2024, officials at the Russian Consulate interviewed
Petitioner. 	Id. ¶ 12. 	On August 19, 2024, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”), Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) submitted a travel document
Case 4:25-cv-00045-CDL-AGH Document 17 Filed 01/12/26 Page 2 of 9

3
request to the Russian Consulate. 	Id. ¶ 13. 	On September 16, 2024, the Russian
Consulate requested additional forms, which ERO completed and submitted on the
same date. Id. ¶ 14.
On September 26, 2024, ICE/ERO completed a 90-Day Post-Order Custody
Review (“POCR”), and on October 16, 2024, ICE/ERO served petitioner with a letter
explaining its decision that Petitioner remain in custody. Id. ¶ 15; Resp’ts’ Resp. Ex.
E, ECF No. 4-6. 	ICE/ERO declined to release Petitioner because he “[did] not
established to ICE’s satisfaction that [he] is not a flight risk or danger to the
community or U.S. security.” 	Resp’ts’ Resp. Ex. E, ECF No. 4-6. 	On November 1,
2024, the Russian Consulate requested additional forms and Petitioner’s valid photo
identification. 	Erickson 	Decl. 	¶ 	16. 	In 	January 	2025, 	ICE/ERO 	completed
Petitioner’s 180-Day POCR, and on January 16, 2024, ICE-ERO served Petitioner
with a letter explaining its decision to continue his detention. Lasker Decl. ¶ 6, ECF
No. 4-8. 	At the time, the Russian Consulate was still attempting to confirm
Petitioner’s identity. Lasker Decl. ¶ 7.
Petitioner filed his application for habeas relief on February 5, 2025, seeking
relief under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), because he is subject to a final
order of removal and has been held in detention for over six months. 	Petitioner
alleges that he has “cooperated with ICE[’s] efforts to remove him from the U.S.” and
that those efforts have been unsuccessful. Pet. Attach. 4, ECF No. 1-1. Furthermore,
Petitioner alleges that he “spoke with Russian Embassy Counsel Nikita Sergeevich,
he confirm[ed] that the Russian Government can’t provide the travel document to
Case 4:25-cv-00045-CDL-AGH Document 17 Filed 01/12/26 Page 3 of 9

4
Petitioner, because[e] they don’t have any record of Petitioner, and his removal to
Russia in the near future is impossible.” Id. Respondents filed an initial response on
February 27, 2025, asserting that Petitioner “presents no evidence to show that he is
not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future[;]” thus, his Petition
should be denied. 	Resp’ts’ Resp. 5. 	Respondents further argue that “a significant
likelihood of [Petitioner’s] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future exists”
because “[r]emovals to Russia are taking place and can be accomplished under the
circumstances presented by Petitioner’s lack of identification.” Id. at 8.
Petitioner filed a reply on March 25, 2025, wherein he reasserted his Zadvydas
claim. Pet. Reply. 1-10, ECF No.7. On November 14, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion
to compel, in which he attached an alleged letter from the Russian Embassy claiming
that the “Consular Section is not in a position to issue a travel document [to
Petitioner]” because “it was not possible to confirm that [Petitioner] holds Russian
citizenship.” Pet.’s Mot. to Compel Attach. A, ECF No 11-1.
The Court ordered Respondents to respond to Petitioner’s motion to compel,
wherein they were required to “outline any efforts at removal since February 2025
and specifically provide whether they have received travel documents for Petitioner.”
Text-Only Order, Nov. 18, 2025, ECF No. 12. 	Respondents filed their response on
December 10, 2025. Resp’ts’ 2d Resp., ECF No. 15. ICE Supervisory Detention and
Deportation Officer (“SSDO”) Tartanger L. Stephens averred that ICE/ERO and the
Removal and International Operations (“HQ-RIO”) division at ICE Headquarters
have been working since February 2025 to obtain a travel document for Petitioner
Case 4:25-cv-00045-CDL-AGH Document 17 Filed 01/12/26 Page 4 of 9

5
and facilitate his removal. Stephens Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 15-1. According to Stephens,
“the Russian consulate indicated they could not verify [Petitioner’s] citizenship;
therefore, they could not issue a travel document.” Id. ¶ 9. As of December 9, 2025,
Stephens claimed that HQ-RIO was working to remove Petitioner to a third country.
Id. ¶ 11-12.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to release under Zadvydas because he has
been detained longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month period and his
removal is not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	As discussed below, the
Court agrees. 	Petitioner’s application for habeas relief should consequently be
granted.
I. 	Legal Framework for Post-Final Order of Removal Detention
Because Petitioner has a final order of removal, Petitioner’s detention is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Under § 1231(a), “when an alien is ordered removed,”
the Attorney General “shall” remove the alien within ninety days. 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). This removal period begins to run on, as relevant here, “the date the
order of removal becomes administratively final,” or “[i]f the alien is detained or
confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from
detention or confinement.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii). 	Detention during the
ninety-day removal period is mandatory. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). The removal period
shall be extended “if the alien fails or refuses to make timely application in good faith
for travel or other documents necessary to the alien’s departure or conspires or acts
Case 4:25-cv-00045-CDL-AGH Document 17 Filed 01/12/26 Page 5 of 9

6
to 	prevent 	the 	alien’s 	removal 	subject 	to 	an 	order 	of 	removal.” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§
1231(a)(1)(C). Finally, inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, and those who pose a risk
to the community or of non-compliance with a removal order “may be detained beyond
the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in [§
1231(a)(3)].” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
Section 1231(a)(6) does not limit the length of post-final order detention. 	In
Zadvydas, however, the United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance to “read an implicit limitation into the statute.” 533 U.S. at
689. 	The Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) authorizes post-removal-order
detention only for a period “reasonably necessary” to accomplish the alien’s removal
from the United States. 	Id. at 699-700. 	The Court recognized six months as a
presumptively reasonable period of time to allow the government to accomplish such
removal. Id. at 701. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently explained that in order “[t]o
state a claim under Zadvydas . . . an alien must show that: (1) he has been detained
for more than six months following the final order of removal and (2) there is good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” 	Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 782 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing
Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n order to state a claim
under Zadvydas the alien . . . must show post-removal order detention in excess of six
months [and] also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”)).
Case 4:25-cv-00045-CDL-AGH Document 17 Filed 01/12/26 Page 6 of 9

7
II. 	Petitioner is Entitled to Release Under Zadvydas
As explained above, a claim under Zadvydas typically requires two showings:
(1) post-final order detention longer than six months; and (2) no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052.
Petitioner came into immigration custody on June 26, 2024. 	Erickson Decl. ¶ 11.
Petitioner filed his application for habeas relief on February 5, 2025, well beyond the
six-month presumptively reasonable period under Zadvydas. There is consequently
no dispute that the first element of Petitioner’s claim has been met.
The second Zadvydas prong requires a petitioner to show “there is good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” 	Vaz, 634 F. App’x at 782. 	Petitioner has clearly made this
showing. The undisputed evidence establishes that Petitioner came into immigration
custody in June 2024. Erikson Decl. ¶ 11. ICE then began the process of obtaining
a Russian travel document for Petitioner. Erickson Decl. ¶¶ 12-13. But, on July 11,
2025, the Russian consulate informed ICE that it could not confirm Petitioner’s
citizenship and would not issue a travel document. 	Stephens Decl. ¶ 9. 	In August
2025, a deportation officer sent an inquiry to ICE Headquarters, Removal and
International Operations, to see if Petitioner would be processed for removal to a
third party. Id. ¶ 10. ICE must work through the Department of State to effect third-
country removals, and ICE is still waiting for information regarding whether
Petitioner will be identified for removal to a third country. Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
Case 4:25-cv-00045-CDL-AGH Document 17 Filed 01/12/26 Page 7 of 9

8
This evidence shows that Petitioner has been in ICE custody for over 18
months and no travel document has been obtained for Petitioner. 	To the contrary,
ICE was told six months ago that Russia would not issue a travel document for
Petitioner. In those last six months, ICE continued to detain Petitioner but has not
affirmatively 	identified Petitioner as 	an 	individual 	who 	can be 	removed to 	a
third-party country. In other words, no affirmative steps to remove Petitioner have
been taken since August 2025.
Respondents, 	however, 	argue 	that 	there 	is 	a 	significant 	likelihood 	of
Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future because ICE “has pursued
removal to a third country” and the “Executive Branch . . . believes this process will
bear fruit in the foreseeable future[.]” Respt’s Resp. to Ct. Order 5, ECF No. 15. But
this assertion is wholly unsupported by the record. There is no evidence that ICE has
done anything to pursue a third-country removal other than submit a request, and
that request has not even been approved. Stephens Decl. ¶ 12. Zadvydas states that
“once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with
evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (emphasis
supplied). 	Respondents have failed to do that here. 	Consequently, Petitioner’s
application for habeas relief should be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Petitioner’s application for
habeas relief (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. Petitioner’s motion to compel (ECF No. 11)
Case 4:25-cv-00045-CDL-AGH Document 17 Filed 01/12/26 Page 8 of 9

9
and motion for an emergency ruling (ECF No. 16) are GRANTED. 	Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this
Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14)
days after being served with a copy hereof. 	The district judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made.
All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1,
“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the
time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the
absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 12th day of January, 2026.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 4:25-cv-00045-CDL-AGH Document 17 Filed 01/12/26 Page 9 of 9