PURTER v. HIGHWAY TRANSPORT CHEMICAL, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
LONDON PURTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HIGHWAY TRANSPORT CHEMICAL LLC
and JAMES STANTON,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 4:25-CV-164 (CDL)
O R D E R
This is a straightforward truck wreck case. 	Presently pending
before 	the 	Court 	are 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	to 	strike 	Defendants’
expert 	disclosures, 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	and
Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	another 	discovery 	extension. 	For 	the
reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion (ECF
No. 29) and denies Defendants’ motions (ECF Nos. 30 & 31).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Strike 	Defendants’ 	Expert 	Disclosures
(ECF No. 29) and Defendants’ Motion to Extend Discovery (ECF
No. 31).
Defendants did not timely disclose any experts in this case,
and 	they 	have 	not 	submitted 	any 	expert 	reports 	to 	Plaintiff.
Defendants 	contend 	that 	the 	Court 	should 	reopen 	discovery 	again
and 	give 	them 	more 	time 	to 	conduct 	expert 	discovery. 	Plaintiff
responds 	that 	Defendants 	have 	not 	established 	grounds 	for
reopening 	discovery 	and 	that 	Defendants 	should 	not 	be 	allowed 	to
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rely on any of their expert witnesses to support future motions or
at trial. 	The Court agrees with Plaintiff.
Discovery 	in 	this 	action 	began 	on 	August 	14, 	2025, 	when 	the
Court entered a scheduling order to which the parties agreed. 	See
Scheduling Order, ECF No. 7. 	Under the original scheduling order,
Defendants’ 	expert 	disclosures 	were 	due 	by 	December 	2, 	2025, 	and
discovery 	closed 	on 	January 	30, 	2026. 	Id. 	at 	2, 	4. 	After 	the
original 	discovery 	period 	closed 	and 	after 	the 	original
dispositive 	motion 	deadline, 	the 	parties 	filed 	a 	joint 	motion 	to
amend 	the 	scheduling 	order, 	and 	they 	proposed 	resetting 	every
single 	deadline. 	Although 	the 	Court 	found 	that 	the 	parties 	had
not 	been 	diligent 	in 	seeking 	discovery, 	the 	Court 	reopened
discovery 	and 	granted 	the 	requested 	extension. 	The 	Court 	also
admonished 	counsel 	to 	do 	a 	better 	job 	of 	meeting 	the 	Court’s
reasonable expectations. 	Am. Sched. O. 1-2, ECF No. 14. 	The Court
adopted 	the 	new 	deadlines 	proposed 	by 	the 	parties, 	extending
Defendants’ 	expert 	disclosure 	deadline 	to 	May 	15, 	2026, 	the
discovery 	deadline 	to 	July 	15, 	2026, 	and 	the 	dispositive 	motion
deadline to August 15, 2026.
On July 15, 2026—two months after Defendants’ extended expert
disclosure 	deadline 	and 	on 	the 	day 	extended 	discovery 	closed—
Defendants 	identified 	two 	expert 	witnesses: 	Torrence 	Welch 	and
Susan 	Garrison. 	The 	next 	day, 	Defendants 	identified 	three 	more
expert 	witnesses: 	Emmanuel 	Manuel, 	Kathryn 	Haggerty, 	and 	Barry
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Jeffries. 	The parties agreed to be bound by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), which requires the expert disclosure for a
retained expert to “be accompanied by a written report” containing
details 	about 	the 	witness’s 	opinions, 	qualifications, 	and
compensation. 	The 	Court 	did 	not 	enter 	an 	order 	modifying 	this
disclosure 	requirement. 	Nonetheless, 	Defendants 	did 	not 	include
the 	required 	written 	report 	with 	any 	of 	their 	tardy 	expert
disclosures.
More than a month after the extended discovery period closed,
Defendants 	filed 	a 	motion 	to 	extend 	discovery 	again. 	They
represent that they need more time to complete discovery from third
parties 	and 	to 	complete 	expert 	discovery. 	In 	support 	of 	this
motion, 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	they 	had 	to 	postpone 	Plaintiff’s
deposition 	that 	had 	been 	scheduled 	for 	March 	of 	2026 	because
Plaintiff 	was 	scheduled 	to 	undergo 	surgery 	in 	late 	March—a 	fact
that the parties relied upon when they sought the first discovery
extension. 	Defendants also emphasize that that they did not depose
Plaintiff 	until 	July 	14, 	2026, 	the 	penultimate 	day 	of 	discovery,
and then served follow-up discovery to her medical providers after
the deposition.
A schedule “may be modified only for good cause and with the
judge’s 	consent.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	16(b)(4); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
6(b)(1)(B). 	To 	establish 	good 	cause, 	the 	party 	seeking 	the
extension must show that the schedule could not be met despite the
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party’s 	diligence. 	E.g., 	Oravec 	v. 	Sunny 	Isles 	Luxury 	Ventures,
L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). 	Here, Defendants did
not 	explain 	why 	they 	could 	not 	obtain 	the 	third-party 	discovery
they now seek during the extended discovery period. 	They also did
not 	explain 	why 	they 	could 	not 	take 	Plaintiff’s 	deposition 	until
the day before discovery closed. 	Again, Defendants knew when they
sought the first discovery extension in March 2026 that Plaintiff
was 	scheduled 	to 	undergo 	surgery 	later 	that 	month, 	and 	they
proposed 	a 	new 	expert 	disclosure 	deadline 	of 	May 	15, 	2026, 	and 	a
new 	discovery 	deadline 	of 	July 	16, 	2026. 	Defendants’ 	present
motion for an extension does not explain why Defendants could not
meet 	the 	extended 	deadlines 	that 	they 	proposed. 	For 	all 	these
reasons, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Defendants 	did 	not 	establish 	good
cause 	for 	another 	extension 	of 	the 	expert 	disclosure 	deadline 	or
the discovery deadline. 	Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’
motion 	for 	another 	discovery 	extension. 	In 	addition, 	Defendants
did 	not 	properly 	disclose 	any 	of 	their 	expert 	witnesses 	by
submitting the required expert reports, and they did not establish
that 	their 	failure 	to 	do 	so 	was 	substantially 	justified 	or 	is
harmless. 	The 	Court 	thus 	grants 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	to 	strike
Defendants’ 	experts 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure
37(c)(1); 	Defendants 	shall 	not 	be 	permitted 	to 	use 	any 	of 	the
expert witnesses to supply evidence on a motion or at trial.
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II. 	Defendants’ Partial Summary Judgment Motion (ECF No. 30)
Defendants 	seek 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	on 	Plaintiff’s
direct 	claims 	against 	Highway 	Transport 	Chemical, 	LLC 	and 	on
Plaintiff’s 	claims 	for 	punitive 	damages 	and 	attorney’s 	fees.
Summary 	judgment 	may 	be 	granted 	only 	“if 	the 	movant 	shows 	that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
In 	determining 	whether 	a 	genuine 	dispute 	of 	material 	fact 	exists
to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in
the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	party 	opposing 	summary 	judgment,
drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party’s favor.
Anderson 	v. 	Liberty 	Lobby, 	Inc., 	477 	U.S. 	242, 	255 	(1986). 	A
fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of
the suit. 	Id. at 248. 	A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence
would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. 	Id.
A summary judgment movant must support its factual positions
by 	“citing 	to 	particular 	parts 	of 	materials 	in 	the 	record” 	or
showing “that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence”
to support a fact. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 	The Court’s local rules
require 	a 	summary 	judgment 	movant 	to 	“attach 	to 	the 	motion 	a
separate and concise statement of the material facts to which the
movant 	contends 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	dispute 	to 	be 	tried.” 	M.D.
Ga. R. 56. 	“Material facts not supported by specific citation to
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particular 	parts 	of 	materials 	in 	the 	record 	. . . 	will 	not 	be
considered 	by 	the 	court.” 	Id. 	“Affidavits 	and 	the 	introductory
portions 	of 	briefs 	do 	not 	constitute 	a 	statement 	of 	material
facts.” 	Id.
Here, Defendants summarily argue that there is no evidence to
support 	Plaintiff’s 	claims, 	contending 	that 	there 	is 	a 	bona 	fide
controversy as to liability and that Highway Transport adequately
vetted, 	trained, 	and 	supervised 	its 	driver. 	But 	Defendants 	did
not 	comply 	with 	the 	Court’s 	local 	rule 	requiring 	a 	separate 	and
concise 	statement 	of 	material 	facts 	supported 	by 	specific
citations 	to 	particular 	parts 	of 	materials 	in 	the 	record. 	The
Court 	is 	not 	required 	to 	consider 	Defendants’ 	introductory 	fact
statement in its brief (which is, in any event, extremely light on
facts 	relevant 	to 	Defendants’ 	arguments 	and 	even 	lighter 	on
citations 	to 	evidence). 	Without 	evidence 	to 	show 	a 	bona 	fide
controversy 	or 	adequate 	vetting, 	training, 	and 	supervision, 	the
Court cannot find that Defendants met their burden of showing that
the record evidence establishes that they are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claims.1 	For these reasons, the
1 Even if the Court considered the two exhibits Defendants cited in their
brief (a September 2024 police report concluding that James Stanton was
at fault for the wreck with Plaintiff and a May 2024 motor vehicle record
for James Stanton), the exhibits 	do 	not demonstrate 	that there are 	no
genuine 	fact 	disputes. 	Moreover, 	Plaintiff 	complied 	with 	the 	Court’s
local 	rule 	and 	submitted 	a 	statement 	of 	material 	facts 	supported 	by
specific 	citations 	to 	materials 	in 	the 	record. 	That 	evidence, 	viewed
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, rebuts Defendants’ conclusory
argument that no genuine fact disputes exist.
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Court denies Defendants’ partial summary judgment motion (ECF No.
30).
CONCLUSION
As 	discussed 	above, 	the 	Court 	grants 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	to
strike 	Defendants’ 	expert 	disclosures 	(ECF 	No. 	29), 	denies
Defendants’ 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	motion 	(ECF 	No. 	30), 	and
denies Defendants’ motion for another discovery extension (ECF No.
31). 	This action will be tried during the Court’s March 2027 trial
term.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 8th day of October, 2026.
s/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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