Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
P.R.S., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
WARDEN JASON STREEVAL, et al.,
Respondents.
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CASE NOS.
4:25-cv-330 (P.R.S.)
4:25-cv-337 (J.A.C.C.)
4:25-cv-343 (M.M.M.)
4:25-cv-347 (G.A.G.C.)
O R D E R
Petitioners 	are 	detainees 	at 	the 	Stewart 	Detention 	Center
awaiting removal proceedings. 	They seek habeas corpus relief based
on 	Respondents’ 	refusal 	to 	provide 	them 	with 	a 	bond 	hearing 	and
the 	opportunity 	for 	pre-removal 	release 	while 	the 	removal
proceedings 	are 	pending. 	Respondents 	contend 	that 	Petitioners’
detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and/or 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). 	The above captioned cases involve common questions
of 	law 	and 	fact. 	Therefore, 	they 	are 	consolidated 	pursuant 	to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42.
The 	Court 	has 	previously 	rejected 	Respondents’ 	broad
interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) that detention is mandatory for any
alien who has not been lawfully admitted. 	See J.A.M. v. Streeval,
Case 	No. 	4:25-cv-342 	(CDL), 	2025 	WL 	3050094 	(M.D. 	Ga. 	Nov. 	1,
2025). 	As 	held 	in 	that 	order, 	§ 	1225(b)(2) 	authorizes 	mandatory
detention 	for 	an 	alien 	who 	has 	not 	been 	lawfully 	admitted 	to 	the
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United 	States 	and 	who 	is 	“seeking 	admission.” 	Id. 	at 	*3. 	The
Court 	explained 	that 	“seeking 	admission” 	means 	that 	the 	alien 	is
taking some affirmative act to gain legal admission to the United
States. 	Id. 	In 	light 	of 	this 	interpretation, 	Respondents 	now
argue 	that 	“seeking 	admission” 	should 	be 	read 	broadly 	to 	include
any action by an alien at any time to remain in the United States
and 	that 	each 	Petitioner 	has 	taken 	action 	that 	qualifies 	as
“seeking admission” under the statute. 	This interpretation again
ignores 	part 	of 	the 	statutory 	language 	and 	fails 	to 	consider 	the
entire context of the statutory scheme.
The statute states, in relevant part, that an “alien shall be
detained” 	pending 	removal 	proceedings 	“if 	the 	examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). 	Thus, 	the 	overall 	statutory 	scheme 	contemplates
that 	§ 1225(b)(2) 	mandates 	detention 	in 	the 	context 	of 	an 	alien
who 	is 	“seeking 	admission” 	by 	being 	inspected 	by 	an 	“examining
immigration officer” to determine whether the alien is clearly and
beyond 	a 	doubt 	entitled 	to 	be 	admitted. 	If 	the 	officer 	makes 	a
preliminary 	decision 	that 	the 	alien 	is 	not 	admissible 	based 	on
that 	inspection, 	then 	detention 	is 	mandatory 	pending 	removal.
“Seeking admission” within the context of § 1225(b)(2) necessarily
involves 	inspection 	by 	an 	examining 	immigration 	officer 	upon
arrival. 	This 	Court 	is 	not 	alone 	in 	this 	interpretation 	of 	the
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statute. 	See, e.g., Contreras Alvarez, No. 1:25-CV-1313, 2025 WL
3151948, 	at 	*5 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Nov. 	12, 	2025) 	(Beckering, 	J.);
Rodriguez 	Serrano 	v. 	Noem, 	No. 	1:25-CV-1320, 	2025 	WL 	3122825, 	at
*5 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Nov. 	7, 	2025) 	(Jarbou, 	J.); 	Pu 	Sacvin 	v. 	De 	Anda-
Ybarra, 	No. 	2:25-CV-01031-KG-JFR, 	2025 	WL 	3187432, 	at 	*3 	(D.N.M.
Nov. 14, 2025).
Applying 	this 	interpretation 	to 	the 	facts 	of 	each 	of 	the
consolidated 	cases, 	the 	Court 	grants 	the 	petitions 	for 	habeas
corpus 	relief 	in 	cases 	4:25-CV-330 	(P.R.S.) 	and 	4:25-CV-337
(J.A.C.C.) because Respondents did not point to any evidence that
an “examining immigration officer” inspected Petitioners when they
arrived in the United States and determined that Petitioners were
not 	clearly 	and 	beyond 	a 	doubt 	entitled 	to 	be 	admitted. 	Rather,
Respondents 	contend 	that 	these 	Petitioners 	entered 	the 	United
States 	without 	inspection 	and 	are 	“seeking 	admission” 	based 	on
recent 	conduct 	that 	occurred 	years 	after 	Petitioners 	arrived 	in
the United States and not in the context of a § 1225(b)(2) arrival
inspection. 	The 	Petitioner 	in 	4:25-CV-330 	entered 	the 	United
States 	without 	inspection 	in 	2014 	and 	filed 	a 	Form 	EOIR-42B 	in
November 	2025. 	The 	Petitioner 	in 	4:25-CV-337 	entered 	the 	United
States 	without 	inspection 	in 	1999 	and 	filed 	a 	Form 	EOIR-42B 	in
April 2022.
Although the Petitioners in these cases have not been lawfully
admitted 	and 	at 	various 	times 	took 	some 	action 	that 	would 	allow
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them 	to 	lawfully 	remain 	in 	the 	United 	States, 	these 	actions 	were
taken 	outside 	the 	context 	of 	§1225(b)(2)’s 	“seeking 	admission”
requirement. 	They did not involve a preliminary examination by an
examining 	immigration 	officer 	upon 	initial 	entry 	to 	the 	United
States, 	nor 	did 	they 	occur 	in 	close 	temporal 	proximity 	to 	their
initial 	arrival. 	Accordingly, 	mandatory 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2) is not authorized in these cases.
The 	Court 	also 	finds 	that 	mandatory 	detention 	is 	not
authorized 	in 	4:25-CV-343 	(M.M.M.). 	In 	that 	case, 	Petitioner
M.M.M. was inspected by an examining immigration officer upon entry
into the United States in 2014. 	Petitioner M.M.M. was determined
to be inadmissible and was ordered to be removed. 	Then, Petitioner
M.M.M. 	sought 	asylum 	and 	claimed 	a 	fear 	of 	persecution. 	He 	was
released 	on 	bond 	pending 	removal 	proceedings, 	which 	encompassed
his 	asylum 	petition 	and 	assertion 	of 	a 	fear 	of 	persecution. 	Ten
years 	later, 	in 	2024, 	the 	Government 	dismissed 	the 	removal
proceedings 	against 	Petitioner, 	concluding 	that 	they 	were 	no
longer 	in 	the 	Government’s 	best 	interest. 	This 	year, 	Petitioner
was 	arrested, 	and 	the 	Government 	initiated 	new 	removal
proceedings. 	Respondents 	argue 	that 	Petitioner 	M.M.M. 	must 	be
detained 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 	which 	provides
that 	alien 	who 	seeks 	asylum 	or 	claims 	a 	fear 	of 	persecution 	must
be 	detained 	“pending 	a 	final 	determination 	of 	credible 	fear 	of
persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.”
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Respondents 	argue 	that 	when 	Petitioner 	M.M.M. 	was 	arrested 	this
year, 	he 	entered 	custody 	in 	the 	same 	posture 	as 	when 	he 	was
initially 	released 	from 	custody 	on 	bond 	in 	2014. 	But 	the
Government 	dismissed 	the 	removal 	proceedings 	that 	were 	initiated
when 	Petitioner 	was 	deemed 	inadmissible 	in 	2014, 	so 	those
proceedings—and 	the 	associated 	asylum 	application—are 	no 	longer
pending. 	Instead, 	the 	Government 	initiated 	new 	removal
proceedings 	after 	it 	arrested 	Petitioner 	M.M.M. 	this 	year.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Petitioner 	M.M.M. 	is
detained 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1226(a), 	not 	§ 	1225(b)(1), 	and 	that
Petitioner 	M.M.M. 	is 	not 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention. 	Thus,
Petitioner M.M.M. is entitled to a bond hearing.
Case 4:25-CV-347 (G.A.G.C.), however, is distinguishable from
the other three cases. 	Petitioner G.A.G.C. was initially detained
shortly 	after 	his 	illegal 	entry 	into 	the 	United 	States, 	and 	upon
his 	detention, 	he 	sought 	to 	lawfully 	remain 	based 	on 	allegations
that he was entitled to asylum. 	Although Petitioner G.A.G.C. was
released 	from 	detention 	pending 	a 	decision 	on 	his 	asylum
application, 	his 	removal 	proceedings 	were 	never 	dismissed. 	The
Government 	has 	now 	dismissed 	his 	asylum 	application, 	and 	an
immigration 	officer 	recently 	concluded 	that 	Petitioner 	G.A.G.C.
does 	not 	have 	a 	credible 	fear 	of 	persecution. 	Respondents 	thus
contend 	that 	his 	detention 	is 	mandatory 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). 	Importantly, 	Petitioner 	was 	inspected
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by an examining immigration officer upon his initial entry and was
subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	while 	his 	asylum 	claim 	was
considered. 	The 	fact 	that 	he 	was 	released 	while 	that 	claim 	was
considered does not eliminate Respondents’ authority to detain him
without 	a 	bond 	hearing. 	They 	did 	not 	waive 	the 	right 	to 	detain
him 	by 	failing 	to 	follow 	the 	mandatory 	detention 	requirements 	of
the 	statute. 	Under 	these 	circumstances, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that
Petitioner G.A.G.C. has not established that he is entitled to the
relief 	he 	seeks, 	and 	his 	petition 	for 	habeas 	corpus 	relief 	is
denied.
SUMMARY
The following Petitions for habeas corpus are granted to the
extent that the Court orders Respondents to provide each petitioner
with 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	determine 	if 	they 	may 	be 	released 	on 	bond
under 	§ 1226(a)(2) 	and 	the 	applicable 	regulations. 	See 	8 	C.F.R.
§§ 236.1 & 1236.1: 	4:25-cv-330 (P.R.S.), 4:25-cv-337 (J.A.C.C.),
and 4:25-cv-343 (M.M.M.).
The following Petition for habeas corpus is denied: 4:25-cv-
347 (G.A.G.C.).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of November, 2025.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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