MCCONNELL v. ADAMS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
JAHMALIEK MCCONNELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
SONJA ADAMS, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
5:24-cv-00461-TES
ORDER
On December 10, 2024, pro se Plaintiff Jahmeliek McConnell filed a complaint
bringing myriad claims against Defendants Sonja Adams, Rebecca Galeazzo,
Guadalupe Ortiz, and Kenneth Hester, all related to actions taken that November.
[Doc. 1]. Plaintiff’s claims survived frivolity review and proceeded into discovery; so,
the Court instructed the parties to file a proposed scheduling/discovery order. [Doc. 6];
[Doc. 19]. They did. [Doc. 20]. The Court issued the order on July 24, 2025. [Id.].
Ever since that first scheduling order, discovery has been long and troublesome.
Following Plaintiff’s failure to obey this Court’s order compelling discovery—his
second failure to appear for his deposition—Defendants moved to request that this
Court find dismiss his action with prejudice. [Doc. 28]. This Court now carefully
considers and grants Defendants’ motion.
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A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 10, 2024, [Doc. 1]. This Court first
issued a scheduling and discovery order on July 24, 2025, ordering discovery to be
complete by January 20, 2026. [Doc. 20].
This case never got its discovery legs under it and has aimlessly floundered
about. First, pursuant to Defendants’ motion, this Court amended its discovery order,
extending discovery to April 20, 2026. [Doc. 22]. At that point in the case, Plaintiff’s
deposition was scheduled for April 16, 2026. [Doc. 23, ¶ 2]. But, because Plaintiff
requested time to obtain an attorney, [Id. at ¶ 3], Defendants moved to amend the
scheduling order again. [Doc. 23]. Granting their motion, the Court again extended
discovery, ordering that it be complete by June 4, 2026. [Doc. 24].
But even this second extension proved insufficient. Concerned that Plaintiff may
not be writing his pleadings,1 Defendants set out to take his deposition in person,
instead of virtually. [Doc. 25]. When Plaintiff refused to be deposed in person and did
not show up for his June 3, 2026, deposition, Defendants filed a motion to compel his in-
person deposition in the forum where he chose to sue—Macon, Georgia. [Id.]. On
August 4, 2026, this Court granted that motion. [Doc. 27]. The Court compelled Plaintiff
1 Defendants’ concerns were not without reason. They noticed that the language and structure of
Plaintiff’s complaint were apparently identical to the language and structure of non-party Willie Wright’s
answer and counterclaim to Animal Services’ cost-of-care petition, [Doc. 25, pp. 2–3], and Defendants
asserted that the handwriting in Plaintiff’s and Wright’s filings both matched the handwriting of a rental
agreement drafted by Wright. [Id. at p. 3].
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to “appear in person for his deposition on a date agreeable to the parties before the end
of August or when properly noticed” and extended the discovery deadline—yet
again—to August 31, 2026. [Id.].
For the second time, Plaintiff refused to be deposed. [Doc. 28, p. 2]. Defendants
sent Plaintiff a notice rescheduling his deposition for August 27, 2026. [Id.]. This time,
Plaintiff went to defense counsel’s office to be deposed. [Id.]. However, he brought his
mother, Tiffani Blash. [Id.]. Ms. Blash is neither a party to this action nor a lawyer.
Defense counsel explained to Plaintiff that—despite his mom’s insistence she be
allowed to attend the deposition with her grown son—he could not have his mother in
the room during the deposition. Plaintiff refused to be deposed without his mother and
left the building. [Id.]. The court reporter issued a Certificate of Non-Appearance to
defense counsel. [Id.]; [Doc. 28-5].
It is important to recall that the Court has recently and repetitively warned
Plaintiff that continued flouting of the rules would result in dismissal of his case. See,
e.g., [Doc. 27, pp. 5–6]. He was specifically warned that, although courts show leniency
to pro se litigants, pro se litigants who ignore discovery orders are subject to sanctions
like any other litigant. He was told in no uncertain terms that “[s]hould he [refuse to sit
for his deposition] again, he runs a very real risk that the Court could dismiss his case.”
[Id.]. Plaintiff was told he “should heed the Court’s warning.” [Id. at p. 6].
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Defendants now request that this Court find Plaintiff in contempt of court for
twice failing to appear for his noticed deposition and for his failure to obey a court
order compelling discovery. [Doc. 28]. They also request that this Court dismiss
Plaintiff’s action with prejudice. [Id.].
B. Motion to Dismiss
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant courts wide discretion to dismiss an
action where the “plaintiff fails to . . . comply with these rules or a court order.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b). The Rules also—separately—state that, when the district court where a
deposition is to be taken issues an order compelling a deposition, failure to obey the
order constitutes contempt of court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1), upon which the court may
dismiss the plaintiff’s action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
Indeed, the “power of a court to dismiss a claim is inherent in a trial court’s
authority to enforce its orders and ensure prompt disposition of legal actions.” Zocaras
v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 490 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 526,
630–31 (1962)). This type of broad discretion is warranted to ensure that a court is
empowered to “manage its docket with a view toward the efficient and expedient
resolution of cases[.]” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 41 (2016) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co.,
299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).
Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate where there is a “clear record of
‘willful’ contempt and [a finding] that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Gratton v.
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Great Am. Comms., 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d
1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985)). Willful contempt is more than mere delay; rather, it is
willful delay that prolongs the case. Jacobs v. Clayton Cnty. Solic. Gen. Off., 685 F. App’x
824, 826–27 (11th Cir. 2017). Additionally, “dismissal upon disregard of an order,
especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is [within the court’s
discretion].” Id. (quoting Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also
Lyle v. BASF Chemistry, Inc., 802 F. App’x 479 (11th Cir. 2020); Jenkins v. Sec. Eng’rs, Inc.,
798 F. App’x 362 (11th Cir. 2019).
Rule 37(b)(2), meanwhile, “provides generally for sanctions against parties or
persons unjustifiably resisting discovery,” and district courts have broad discretion to
control discovery and any potential sanctions for “uncooperative litigants.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1970 Amendment; Phipps v. Blakeney, 8 F.3d
788, 790 (11th Cir. 1993). The rule specifically permits sanctions against a party who fails
to attend his own deposition, up to and including dismissal of the action. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(d) (providing that “[s]anctions may include any of the orders listed in Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi),” where Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v) permits “dismissing the action or
proceeding in whole or in part”).
Here, Plaintiff’s repeated refusal to appear for his own deposition in the county
where he brought this claim demonstrates the appropriateness of dismissal as a
sanction pursuant to Rule 37. Plaintiff’s refusal to sit for his deposition clearly and
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obviously prejudices Defendants’ ability to defend against his claims: exactly the sort of
problem Rule 37 sanctions are intended to prevent. Gratton, 178 F.3d at 1374 (“Rule 37
sanctions are intended to prevent unfair prejudice to litigants and [e]nsure the integrity
of the discovery process.”).
Dismissal is also appropriate under Rule 41(b).2 Here, there is a clear record of
Plaintiff’s willful contempt, and lesser sanctions will not suffice. Plaintiff blatantly
refused to obey this Court’s order to appear for his in-person deposition. Although he
physically appeared at defense counsel’s office, he immediately left before the
deposition could begin when told he could not have his mother—a non-attorney and
non-party—in the room with him.
“While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an
order, especially when the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of
discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff’s status as a
pro se litigant doesn’t grant him a license to ignore the court’s rules and orders; nor
does it shield him from the consequences of his failure to comply. The Eleventh Circuit
2 Defendants do not request, in their motion, for this Court to dismiss under Rule 41(b). See [Doc. 28].
However, the Court retains the ultimate authority to control its own docket, and may sua sponte consider
dismissal under this rule in addition to considering the cited Rule 37(b). See Brutus v. Internal Revenue
Serv., 393 Fed. App’x 682, 683 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a pro se plaintiff’s failure to comply with a
court order warranted sua sponte dismissal of his action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), and that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by opting to so dismiss); see also Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA,
432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a district court may, in general, sua sponte dismiss a case
under Rule 41(b) in circumstances that would otherwise justify dismissal on motion by a party). Because
Plaintiff not only failed to cooperate in discovery, but also failed to follow a court order, the Court
discusses both grounds for potential dismissal of his action.
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has consistently held that even pro se litigants must “conform to procedural rules,” just
like parties with counsel. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). And,
since a pro se litigant has necessarily chosen to act as his own lawyer, he “is and should
be subject to sanctions like any other litigant.” Moon, 863 F.2d at 837. Eleventh Circuit
precedent is clear: if a pro se litigant does not follow the commands of court orders and
rules of procedure, dismissal is appropriate. See McIntosh v. Gauthier, 182 F. App’x 884
(11th Cir. 2006); Birdette v. Saxon Mortg., 502 F. App’x 839 (11th Cir. 2012); Brutus v. IRS,
393 F. App’x 682 (11th Cir. 2010); Novero v. Duke Energy, 753 F. App’x 759 (11th Cir.
2018).
The Court has patiently and consistently tried to get Plaintiff to properly
participate in his own case. Now, considering the course of litigation and Plaintiff’s
refusal to participate in discovery or obey court orders, the Court is left with the firm
and clear conviction that no other sanction will suffice. The rules of litigation seek to
provide the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. This case is among those extreme circumstances where
dismissal is not only warranted, but mandated and appropriate.
C. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, the Court exercises its considerable discretion and
GRANTS the Defendants’ request for dismissal as a sanction pursuant to Rule 37 and
DISMISSES this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 37 and Rule 41. The Clerk of
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Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED, this 15th day of October, 2026.
S/ Tilman E. Self, III
TILMAN E. SELF, III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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