JACKSON v. BURSLESON et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
DERRICK BERNARD JACKSON, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 5:25-cv-333 (MTT)
:
JUDGE ALISON BURLESON, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
________________________________
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is a Complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff Derrick Bernard Jackson,
an inmate at the Valdosta State Prison in Valdosta, Georgia, which seeks relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has paid the filing fee in this matter. Plaintiff also filed three
motions for declaratory judgment (Docs. 2, 3, 11), four motions for preliminary injunctive relief
(Docs. 4, 6, 10, 12), a motion for an emergency hearing (Doc. 5), a motion to amend or correct his
Complaint (Doc. 9), a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 15), and a motion for a case status
update (Doc. 16). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to amend is GRANTED, and his
motion for a status update is DENIED as moot, but it is RECOMMENDED that his Complaint
be DISMISSED without prejudice and that his remaining pending motions be DENIED as moot.
PRELIMINARY SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
I. 	Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) directs courts to conduct a preliminary
screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity,
official, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “Pro se filings are generally held to a less stringent
standard than those drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed.” Carmichael v. United States,
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966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner
complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald,
541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). On preliminary review, the Court may
dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and “claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (citations omitted). A claim can be dismissed as malicious if
it is knowingly duplicative or otherwise amounts to an abuse of the judicial process. Daker v.
Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of duplicative complaint
“in light of [prisoner’s] history as a prolific serial filer.”).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations [in a
complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission
deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the
United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state
law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy
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these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the
complaint is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176-77 (11th Cir.
2011) (affirming dismissal of certain claims at preliminary screening because prisoner failed to
allege sufficient facts to show a violation of his rights), abrogated on other grounds by Wade v.
McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
II. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff has the right to amend his Complaint once as a matter of course at this stage of the
litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). Plaintiff’s motion to amend is therefore GRANTED.
(Doc. 9). In this motion, Plaintiff states that he intends to sue Defendant Burleson “for a declaratory
judgment while committing acts and omissions in her official capacity.” Id. at 2. He also states
that he intends to sue the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, Tyrone Oliver,
for declaratory and injunctive relief in his official capacity. Id. The Clerk of Court is therefore
DIRECTED to correct the docket to reflect that Defendants Burleson and Oliver are the only two
Defendants in this action.
As best as the Court can tell from Plaintiff’s filings, Plaintiff was arrested on November
20, 2024 and charged with theft by deception. (Doc. 13, at 2). Plaintiff was released on bail on
December 4, 2024, and he contends he “complied with every term and condition of bail such as
promptly appearing in court for motion hearings, arraignment, and trial.” Id. Plaintiff also
professes he avoided the “purported victim” in this case “and would not respond to her calls or
text messages.” Id. at 3.
The jury returned a guilty verdict against Plaintiff on May 9, 2025. (Doc. 13, at 3). Plaintiff
contends Defendant Burleson—the trial judge—“placed plaintiff in custody immediately without
consideration of his bail status and sentenced plaintiff to 20 years imprisonment.” Id. That same
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day, “Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial along with a request for supersedeas of sentence and
supersedeas bond as required by law.” Id. Plaintiff contends “Defendant Burleson ignored the
requests” and placed him in Georgia Department of Corrections’ custody. Id. Plaintiff is currently
housed at Valdosta State Prison, which is a “level five prison . . . where violence and murder is the
norm.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends he was “nearly stabbed by a violent murderer” once at this
prison, and he fears future harm. (Doc. 14, at 4-5).
After Plaintiff filed this case, Defendant Burleson issued “a supersedeas of the sentence
. . . on August 15, 2025,” but she declined to grant a supersedeas bond. (Doc. 13, at 3-4, 9-10).
Plaintiff, however, contends he is entitled to a supersedeas bond—and his subsequent release—
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-47(a), which provides:
It shall be the right of any person convicted of a crime which is bailable under the
law, and in which case a motion for new trial has been filed as provided by law, to
give a supersedeas bond immediately upon the filing of the motion for new trial
without having to wait for the filing of a notice of appeal.
Id. at 9.1 Despite his alleged entitlement to release, Plaintiff contends Defendant Oliver—the
Commissioner for the Georgia Department of Corrections—will not release Plaintiff. Id. at 4.
He contends his imprisonment therefore violates his constitutional rights, and as a result he seeks
declaratory relief, preliminary injunctive relief and/or a temporary restraining order, an emergency
hearing, and his “immediate release.” (Doc. 1-1, at 6-7).
1 To be precise, Plaintiff cites O.C.G.A. § 5-5-46 in support of his contention that he has a right to a supersedeas bond.
(Doc. 13, at 9). However, that provision states that a “rule nisi on a motion for a new trial in a criminal case shall not
operate as a supersedeas unless it is so ordered by the court.” O.C.G.A. § 5-5-46(a). Based on Plaintiff’s argument,
the correct code section is O.C.G.A. § 5-5-46.
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III. 	Plaintiff’s Claims
It appears the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are still proceeding.2 Therefore,
doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) bars Plaintiff’s claims. In Younger, the
Supreme Court of the United States explained that federal courts must refrain from intervening
with pending state criminal proceedings when the party requesting federal intervention has an
adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury. Id. at 53-54. Younger abstention is
thus required where (1) state judicial proceedings are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve
important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the
constitutional issue. See, e.g., Newsome v. Broward Cnty. Pub. Defs., 304 F. App’x 814, 816 (11th
Cir. 2008) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982)); see also Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir. 1985) (extending Younger to
§ 1983 actions and holding that abstention would be appropriate where plaintiff’s criminal case
was on appeal at the time he filed his § 1983 case).
Any decision by this Court with respect to the constitutional issues raised by Plaintiff
would substantially interfere with, and perhaps undermine, the decisions reached by the state
courts in his pending criminal proceedings. See Newsome, 304 F. App’x at 816 (noting that the
relevant inquiry with respect to the first Middlesex factor is “whether the federal proceeding will
interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding” (citation omitted)); see also Watson v. Fla. Jud.
Qualifications Comm’n, 618 F. App’x 487, 490 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The plaintiff’s requested relief
can interfere with the state proceeding if it would disrupt the normal course of action in the state
2 A docket search reveals that criminal proceedings against Plaintiff remain active in the Baldwin County Superior
Court of Georgia. https://peachcourt.com/Search (choose “Baldwin” and “Superior,” then “Search by Party Name,”
enter “Jackson, Derrick,” and click on Case Number SUCR2025000074) [https://perma.cc/WW6Z-XXYJ] (last
visited Dec. 16, 2025) (showing that Plaintiff’s motion for new trial is pending and that Plaintiff has filed documents
as recently as October 22, 2025).
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proceeding, even if the relief sought would not terminate an ongoing proceeding.” (citation
omitted)). The pending criminal proceedings against Plaintiff also implicate the state’s important
interest in prosecuting those who have violated its criminal laws. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (recognizing important state interest in the enforcement of its laws).
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing that the state proceeding will
not provide him with an adequate opportunity to raise his claims that he did not receive a
supersedeas bond. See Watson, 618 F. App’x at 490 (noting that federal courts should assume that
the state procedures provide an adequate remedy absent “unambiguous authority to the contrary”
(citation omitted)). Georgia law provides that Plaintiff may challenge the denial of a supersedeas
bond in state court. See Ingram v. Grimes, 213 Ga. 652, 653-54, 100 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. 1957)
(affirming denial of state habeas corpus petition contending trial court wrongfully denied bail to
individual convicted of bribery after filing of motion for new trial and granting of supersedeas
because “the granting of bail after conviction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court”).
Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that an exception to the
Younger abstention doctrine applies. Younger abstention may not be required where “(1) there is
evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury would occur, or
(3) there is no adequate state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised.” Hughes v. Att’y
Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff has not shown that any special
circumstances exist which create a threat of irreparable harm if this Court fails to intervene in his
ongoing criminal prosecution or that he will be somehow deprived of an adequate forum where
his constitutional challenges can be addressed. The fact that Plaintiff is being required to serve his
sentence after conviction cannot show irreparable injury, and as noted above, the state court system
allows for a challenge to the denial of a supersedeas bond. See Ingram, 213 Ga. at 653-54.
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In addition, while Plaintiff has alleged facts tending to show that Valdosta State Prison may be
dangerous, he has not alleged any specific facts showing that he has been harmed or that he is
being particularly targeted for harm.3
Claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are properly dismissed when Younger applies.
See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973) (noting that, “under ordinary circumstances,”
declaratory and injunctive relief are “forbid[den]” during state criminal proceedings); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-69, 73 (1971) (holding that “where an injunction would be impermissible
under [the principles set forth in Younger], declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well”).
Plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief. (Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 1-1, at 6-7). Therefore,
his Complaint should be dismissed.4
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 9) is GRANTED, and his
motion for a case status (Doc. 16) is DENIED as moot, but it is RECOMMENDED that his
Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice and that his remaining pending motions (Docs. 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15) be DENIED as moot.
3 Plaintiff may file a separate complaint seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if he wishes to challenge the
current conditions of his confinement, including any alleged failure to keep him safe at the prison.
4 Once Plaintiff completely exhausts his remedies in the state courts, he may also be able to bring a claim in federal
habeas corpus. As a general rule, “any challenge to the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement is properly treated
as a habeas corpus matter, whereas challenges to conditions of confinement may proceed under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983[.]”
McKinnis v. Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Johnson v. Hardy, 601 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1979)). In other words, “[f]ederal habeas corpus relief is appropriate when a petitioner alleges that his custody itself
is illegal.” Jones v. Augusta State Med. Prison, No. CV 313-012, 2013 WL 1736782, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2013)
(citing Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). But “when a prisoner alleges that he has been deprived of his
rights under federal law by prison officials, the proper cause of action is § 1983.” Id. (citing McKinnis, 693 F.2d at
1057). Plaintiff is advised that he cannot obtain the dismissal of pending charges or a speedier release through a § 1983
action, and he cannot seek monetary compensation in a federal habeas corpus action. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487,
489. It should also be noted that federal courts generally lack the “power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state
courts and their judicial officers in the performance of their duties where mandamus is the only relief sought.” Moye
v. Clerk, DeKalb Cnty. Superior Ct., 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).
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OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this
Recommendation with the Honorable Marc T. Treadwell, United States District Judge, WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. 	The parties
may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an
extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance
with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge’s order
based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R.
3-1.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing
to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and
recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions
if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for
failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal
for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED, this 17th day of December, 2025.
s/ ALFREDA L. SHEPPARD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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