FAIRCLOTH v. BIBB COUNTY GEORGIA et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
STEVEN TODD FAIRCLOTH, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-440 (MTT)
)
BIBB COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
ORDER
Plaintiff Steven Faircloth filed this pro se lawsuit and contemporaneously moved
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 1; 2. On November 10, 2025, the
Court granted Faircloth’s motion to proceed IFP and found his complaint deficient
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). ECF 3. Faircloth was thus ordered to recast and has
since filed an amended complaint and second amended complaint without the Court’s
leave. ECF 3; 6; 8. Faircloth also filed a motion to compel and motion for preservation
order. ECF 7. Because Faircloth is proceeding IFP, the Court must screen and dismiss
his amended complaint: (1) if it is frivolous or malicious; (2) if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (3) if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “A dismissal under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard as a
dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Thomas v. Harris, 399
F. App'x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
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Faircloth is suing Judge Sarah S. Harris in her individual and official capacities,
Probate Court Clerk Elizabeth Whitby in her individual and official capacities, Captain
Wilton R. Collins in his individual and official capacities, Sheriff David J. Davis in his
official capacity, Sgt. Darius Inzar in his individual capacity, Deputy Dalton Palmer in his
individual capacity, Detective Shaun Bridger in his individual capacity, Deputy J.
Callaway in his individual capacity, Christopher C. Patterson in his individual capacity,
Jodi Faircloth Adams, Jill F. Gillespie, Cherie H. Bland, Frances Adams Hawk, Jon
Selby Reynolds Hawk, and five John Does. ECF 8 at 1. While Faircloth lists Counts in
his second amended complaint (id. at 4-5), he does not specify which defendants his
claims are asserted against. The Court has afforded liberal construction to Faircloth’s
second amended complaint.
A. Claims against Defendants Bridger, Patterson, Gillespie, Bland, Frances Hawk,
and Jon Hawk
Despite naming them as Defendants, Faircloth fails to plead facts linking
Defendants Bridger, Patterson, Gillespie, Bland, Frances Hawk, and Jon Hawk to any of
the constitutional violations he alleges. Aside from Gillespie,1 Frances Hawk, and
possibly Jon Hawk,2 Faircloth does not mention any of these Defendants in the body of
his second amended complaint. Accordingly, Faircloth’s claims against Defendants
Bridger, Patterson, Gillespie, Bland, Frances Hawk, and Jon Hawk are
1 The only reference to Defendant Gillespie in the second amended complaint is as follows: “Plaintiff's
sisters Jodi Adams and Jill Gillespie did not reside at 115 High Ridge Dr. at any relevant time.” ECF 8 ¶ 8.
2 As to Defendants Frances Hawk and Jon Hawk, the only factual allegation is as follows: “During the
incident [of September 11, 2023], Jodi Adams, while on multiple simultaneous phone calls, asked: ‘Jon,
Mason said what?’ Frances Hawk responded: ‘An Order to Apprehend.’” ECF 8 ¶¶ 34, 35. This lone
allegation, including a passing reference to “Jon” which the Court assumes is Jon Hawk, offers sparse
insight. Despite the Court’s instructions (ECF 3 at 5), Faircloth fails to explain how these two individuals
participated in any alleged constitutional violation(s).
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DISMISSED. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we do
not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with
some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”).
B. Claims Against Defendants Judge Harris and Probate Court Clerk Whitby
Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from liability for acts performed
while acting in their judicial capacities. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.
2000). Judicial immunity applies to all judicial acts, even if such acts are alleged to be in
error, malicious, or in excess of the judge's authority, unless done in the clear absence
of all jurisdiction. Id. at 1239; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28
(1976). “Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity
depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2)
the events occurred in the judge's chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy
involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately
out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1071
(11th Cir. 2005). Here, Faircloth alleges that Judge Harris signed an OTA on September
11, 2023. ECF 8 ¶ 26. While Faircloth asserts that “Judge Harris’s actions were
administrative and non-judicial in nature” (id. ¶ 33), they were clearly made in her
judicial capacity. See William B. Cashion Nev. Spendthrift Trust v. Vance, 552 Fed.
App’x 884, 886-87 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Entering orders is a normal judicial function
occurring in judicial chambers.”). Thus, Judge Harris is entitled to absolute judicial
immunity, and Faircloth’s claims against Judge Harris are DISMISSED.
Faircloth’s allegations regarding Probate Court Clerk Whitby are threadbare and
lack sufficient facts to associate her with a constitutional violation. In any event, she is
immune from suit. “Court clerks enjoy ‘a narrower ambit of immunity than judges.’”
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Hyland v. Kolhage, 267 F. App’x 836, 842 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Tarter v. Hury, 646
F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981))3. But, “[n]onjudicial officials have absolute [quasi-
judicial] immunity for their duties that are integrally related to the judicial process.”
Jenkins v. Clerk of Court, U.S. Dist. Court, So. Dist. Of Fla., 150 F. App'x 988, 990 (11th
Cir. 2005). Faircloth alleges that “Probate Clerk Elizabeth Whitby stated that only
Captain Wilton Collins is authorized to enter an OTA into the law-enforcement system.”
ECF 8 ¶ 27. Faircloth does not allege that Whitby was not engaging in duties integrally
related to the judicial process, and thus she is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity.4 Accordingly, Faircloth’s claims against Probate Court Clerk Whitby are
DISMISSED.
C. Claims Against Defendants Deputy Callaway and Deputy Palmer
Faircloth asserts claims for unlawful warrantless entry and unlawful seizure under
the Fourth Amendment. ECF 8 at 4. The Fourth Amendment protects people from
unreasonable seizures. Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing
Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 905 (11th Cir. 2011)). “Mental-health seizures are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the officer has probable cause to
believe that the seized person is a danger to himself or to others.” Id. The Fourth
Amendment also prohibits an officer’s warrantless entry into a person’s home, except in
3 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered
prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
4 See Johnson v. Brown, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100126, at *6-7, 2022 WL 1907584 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11,
2022) (“[C]ourt clerks, as court employees clearly engaging in court business, enjoy absolute quasi-
judicial immunity for their actions.”); Palacios v. Fresno Cnty. Superior Ct., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8034, at
*6, 2008 WL 314337 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2008) (court clerk entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for
allegedly providing plaintiff with misinformation).
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certain circumstances. Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 905 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam). This protection extends to hotel rooms.5
Faircloth alleges that on January 24, 2023, “Deputy J. Callaway entered
Plaintiff’s hotel room using a master key provided by a hotel employee, without a
warrant or exigent circumstances,” and then arrested him for criminal trespass. Id. ¶¶
17, 19. Faircloth alleges that he was “coherent, oriented, and not suicidal or homicidal.”
Id. ¶ 18. He further alleges that the “Defendants acted individually and in concert to
deprive Plaintiff of liberty without probable cause.” Id. ¶ 2. These allegations are thin,
but the Court finds that at this early stage of the litigation, Faircloth has stated unlawful
warrantless entry and unlawful seizure claims against Deputy Callaway.
As to Deputy Palmer, Faircloth alleges that on September 11, 2023, “Deputy
Palmer entered Plaintiff’s home without a warrant or served OTA, relying on purported
consent from Jodi Adams.” Id. ¶ 29. Faircloth alleges that he—the only present
occupant of the home—refused to consent to Deputy Palmer’s entry. Id. ¶ 30. While
these allegations are likewise sparse, the Court finds that Faircloth has stated a claim
for unlawful warrantless entry against Deputy Palmer.
D. Claims Against Supervisory Defendants Captain Collins, Sergeant Inzar, and
Sheriff Davis
Liberally construing his second amended complaint, Faircloth asserts a “Monell
Liability” “Policy, custom, Failure to Train” claim against Supervisory Defendants
Captain Collins, Sergeant Inzar, and Sheriff Davis. ECF 8 at 5. He alleges that “[t]he
5 “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, a guest in a hotel
room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964); United States v. Newbern, 731 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[A
person's] use of [a] motel room strictly for lodging provides the same expectation of privacy as would their
home.”).
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repeated misuse of OTA authority, failure to verify activation status, and routine reliance
on prior mental-health labels reflect a custom and practice within the Bibb County
Sheriff’s Office of bypassing statutory safeguards, known to supervisory defendants
Collins, Inzar, and Davis and left uncorrected.” ECF 8 ¶ 47. Aside from this conclusory
assertion, Faircloth does not allege any facts to support supervisory liability for these
defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th
Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of claims against supervisory defendants where plaintiffs
failed to allege the causal connection required to impose supervisory liability).
Accordingly, Faircloth’s supervisory liability claims are DISMISSED.
E. Claim Against Jodi Adams
Liberally construing his second amended complaint, Faircloth asserts a “42
U.S.C. § 1983 Conspiracy” claim against Jodi Adams. ECF 8 at 5. He alleges that on
April 13, 2022, his sister “Jodi Adams initiated a 1013 affidavit without having seen or
spoken to Plaintiff in approximately seven years.” ECF 8 ¶¶ 8, 9. He further alleges, as
described above, that on September 11, 2023, “Deputy Palmer entered Plaintiff's home
without a warrant or served OTA, relying on purported consent from Jodi Adams.” Id. ¶
29.
“A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights
by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying
constitutional right.” Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th Cir.
2010) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir.
1998)). “The plaintiff attempting to prove such a conspiracy must show that the parties
‘reached an understanding’ to deny the plaintiff his or her rights. The conspiratorial acts
must impinge upon the federal right; the plaintiff must prove an actionable wrong to
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support the conspiracy.” Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted). This requires that the plaintiff “plead in detail, through reference to
material facts, the relationship or nature of the conspiracy between the state actor(s)
and the private persons.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133 (11th Cir. 1992);
Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A] defendant must be
informed of the nature of the conspiracy which is alleged. It is not enough to simply aver
in the complaint that a conspiracy existed…. A complaint may [] be dismissed because
of the conclusory, vague and general nature of the allegations of conspiracy.” (internal
citations omitted)).
Faircloth has not alleged any facts to establish the relationship or nature of the
conspiracy between Adams and any other person. More specifically, he does not allege
any communications between Adams and any alleged state actors to show the parties
“reached an understanding” to violate Faircloth’s rights, besides a stand-alone
allegation that Deputy Palmer entered Faircloth’s home relying on Adams’ consent.
Because Faircloth has not adequately alleged the nature of the conspiracy, his claim
against Adams is DISMISSED.
F. Claim Against John Doe Jail Nurse
Faircloth asserts a “Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement” claim,
alleging that he was “denied water and food while detained [at Bibb County Jail]” for an
unspecified amount of time and “assaulted by other detainees while yelling for
assistance, and jail staff had a clear line of sight yet failed to intervene.” ECF 8 ¶¶ 19-
21. The only jail defendant Faircloth identifies is a “John Doe Jail Nurse.” Id. at 1.
The Eleventh Circuit historically has applied the same standard for pretrial
detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims and convicted
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prisoners’ Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims. See Patel v. Lanier
Cnty. Ga., 969 F.3d 1173, 1188 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749
F.3d 1034, 1044 n.35 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that “the standard for providing basic
human needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under both the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments”) (quotations omitted). To state a conditions-of-
confinement claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) a substantial risk of serious
harm; (2) deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation. Goodman v. Kimbrough,
718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013); Bowen v. Warden Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d
1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016). Faircloth fails to set forth sufficient facts to plausibly allege
a substantial risk of serious harm6 or that the John Doe Jail Nurse, or any other
defendant, was deliberately indifferent to any such risk.7
G. Claim Against John Doe Medical Doctor and John Doe Sedation Nurse
Liberally construing his second amended complaint, Faircloth asserts a
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim8 for violation of his right to bodily
integrity against a “John Doe Medical Doctor” at Atrium Health Medical Center and a
“John Doe Sedation Nurse” at River Edge Behavioral Health. ECF 8 at 1, 5. Faircloth
alleges that on April 13, 2022, he was “transported to River Edge Behavioral Health,
6 To establish a substantial risk of serious harm, a plaintiff must allege “conditions that were extreme and
posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or safety.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d
1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016)); Chandler v.
Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
7 To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant: (1) “was
subjectively aware that the inmate was at risk of serious harm”; (2) “disregarded that risk”; and (3) “acted
with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.’” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2024) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994)).
8 Faircloth also asserts a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court
cannot tell which allegations, if any, support this claim. ECF 8 at 5.
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which declined admission due to lack of qualifying criteria.” Id. ¶ 13. He alleges that he
was transported to Atrium Health Medical Center and forcibly sedated against his will
without examination. Id. ¶ 14. He alleges that he was forcibly sedated again on January
24-25, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.
In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990), the United States Supreme
Court held that “forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body
represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty.” However, in a § 1983
substantive due process lawsuit, “even if a plaintiff alleges that executive action violated
a fundamental right, the plaintiff must first show that the action ‘shock[ed] the
contemporary conscience.’” Littlejohn v. Sch. Bd. of Leon Cnty., Fla., 132 F.4th 1232,
1240 (11th Cir. 2025). “Only the most egregious conduct is sufficiently arbitrary to
constitute a substantive due process violation.” Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283,
1292 (11th Cir. 2017).
Faircloth does not allege that any person at River Edge Behavioral Health or
Atrium Health Medical Center was acting under color of state law to establish liability
under § 1983. Even if he did, his complaint lacks factual details to establish conscience-
shocking conduct. He does not describe any of the circumstances of his forcible
sedation beyond the dates they occurred. Accordingly, his substantive due process
claim is DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the unlawful warrantless entry and unlawful seizure claims against
Deputy Callaway and the unlawful warrantless entry claim against Deputy Palmer will
proceed for factual development. Faircloth’s remaining claims are DISMISSED.
It is ORDERED that service be made on Deputy Callaway and Deputy Palmer by
the United States Marshal Service.
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Faircloth is advised that he must serve upon opposing counsel (or Deputy
Callaway and Deputy Palmer if they are not represented by counsel) copies of all
motions, pleadings, discovery, and correspondence (including letters to the Clerk or to a
judge) filed with the Clerk of Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Faircloth shall include with any
paper which is filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true
and correct copy of that paper was mailed to Deputy Callaway and Deputy Palmer or
their counsel. The Clerk of Court will not serve or forward to Deputy Callaway and
Deputy Palmer or their counsel copies of any materials filed with the Court.
In addition, the following limitations are imposed on discovery: except with written
permission of the Court first obtained, (1) interrogatories may not exceed twenty-five to
each party (Local Rule 33.1), (2) requests for production of documents and things under
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed ten requests to each
party (Local Rule 34), and (3) requests for admissions under Rule 36 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed fifteen requests to each party (Local Rule 36).
Faircloth is responsible for diligently prosecuting his complaint, and failure to do
so may result in dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Faircloth is required to keep the Clerk of Court advised of his current address during the
pendency of this action. Failure to promptly advise the Clerk of any change of address
may result in the dismissal of this action.
SO ORDERED, this 28th day of January, 2026.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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