MEJIA v. CITY OF SPARTA GEORGIA et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
JULIO MEJIA, 	)
)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-cv-560 (MTT)
)
CITY OF SPARTA, GEORGIA, et al., 	)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
ORDER
Plaintiff Julio Mejia claims Defendants City of Sparta, Georgia, City of Sparta
Historic Preservation Commission (“HPC”), Dip Pollaty, Karen West, and John Does 1–
51 violated his equal protection, First Amendment, and procedural due process rights.
ECF 10. The City of Sparta, Sparta-Hancock County Historic Preservation Commission,
and Griffith Pollaty (“Defendants”) move to dismiss Mejia’s complaint. ECF 11. For the
reasons that follow, the Defendants’ motion (ECF 11) is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Mejia owns historic property in Sparta, Georgia and sought to maintain and
improve his property. ECF 10 ¶ 10. In or around 2023, the Defendants “subjected
[Mejia] to heightened scrutiny and enforcement actions.” Id. ¶ 11. Mejia received
1 The Court informed Mejia that filing a recast complaint would render his previous pleadings a “legal
nullity.” See ECF 7 at 1; Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir.
2006) (stating that “[a]n amended pleading supersedes the former pleading”). Mejia lists these defendants
in his “recast second amended complaint.” ECF 10 at 1. Accordingly, the Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to
update CM-ECF to show only these defendants, noting that Dip Pollaty and Griffith Pollaty appear to be
the same person. See ECF 2-1 at 6.
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“citations, restrictions, and threats not imposed on others,” and Karen West and Dip
Pollaty participated in these enforcement actions. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. When Mejia “raised
concerns regarding unequal treatment,” the Defendants’ enforcement actions
intensified. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. The Mayor of Sparta publicly stated Plaintiff was “liable” on
social media. Id. ¶ 18. Mejia was informed firefighters would not respond to a fire at his
property. Id. ¶ 20.
Mejia filed suit in the Superior Court of Hancock County, Georgia, on December
3, 2025. ECF 1-4. His action was removed to this Court on December 29, 2025. ECF 1.
The following day, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. ECF 2. Mejia filed an
amended complaint on January 16, 2026, and the Defendants moved to dismiss the
amended complaint. ECF 4; 5. The Court ordered Mejia to file an Artificial Intelligence
(“AI”) Disclosure which includes “a signed statement fully disclosing the use of AI to
assist in the preparation of and drafting of the pleading” and “certif[ies] that Plaintiff has
verified the accuracy of all facts and all legal authorities cited in the pleading.” ECF 6.
The Court also informed Mejia that his amended complaint was “not a proper amended
complaint” and ordered him to recast his complaint in accordance with the Court’s
instructions.2 ECF 7. The next day, Mejia moved for leave to file a second amended
2 The Court instructed as follows:
In the “statement of claims” section of his recast complaint, Mejia must link any
claims he makes to the named defendant. If Mejia fails to link the named
defendant to a claim, the claim will be dismissed; if Mejia makes no allegations in
the body of his complaint against the named defendant, that defendant will be
removed from the action and dismissed. Mejia must provide enough facts to
plausibly demonstrate that the defendant’s actions or omissions resulted in the
violation of his rights under a specific law. In sum, the recast complaint must state
what each defendant did (or did not do) to violate his rights; when each act or
failure to act occurred; and how Mejia was injured as a result of each defendant’s
actions.
ECF 7 at 1–2.
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complaint. The Court ordered that it “will grant the motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint . . . once the Plaintiff files his AI Disclosure.” ECF 9. Mejia then filed
a “recast second amended complaint” which included his AI Disclosure. ECF 10. The
Defendants moved to dismiss the “recast second amended complaint,” and Mejia
responded. ECF 11; 12. The Court GRANTS Mejia’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint (ECF 8) and now turns to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
“recast second amended complaint” (ECF 10). ECF 12.
II. STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a pleading contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal pursuant to Rule12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter … to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when “the court [can] draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“Factual allegations that are ‘merely consistent with a defendant’s liability’ fall short of
being facially plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.
2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
At the motion to dismiss stage, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and
the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com., 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)). But
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
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masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis,
297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). The complaint must “give the defendant fair
notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. Where there are dispositive issues of law, a court may dismiss a claim
regardless of the alleged facts. Patel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 904 F.3d
1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018).
III. DISCUSSION
Mejia’s recast second amended complaint fails to state a claim because it does
not “give the [Defendants] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. It is unclear from the face of the complaint
which Defendant(s) would be liable on which causes of action, and why they would be
liable, because each count generically refers to “Defendants.” ECF 10 at 2. And Mejia
fails to provide factual support for any of his claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(“‘[N]aked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” do not suffice.”)
(alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Mejia claims in Count I that “Defendants treated Plaintiff differently from similarly
situated property owners without rational basis” and “violated Plaintiff's right to equal
protection.” ECF 10 at 2. He does not allege that he is a member of an identifiable
group but rather appears to allege that he was singled out as a class of one. In class-of-
one cases, the plaintiff must still allege that he was treated differently from others who
were similarly situated with “some specificity,” and a comparator “must be prima facie
identical in all relevant respects.” Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2006). Mejia has not stated a plausible equal protection claim because he
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summarily alleges that he was treated differently from similarly situated property owners
through “heightened scrutiny and enforcement actions” without providing any facts in
support. See ECF 10 at 1–2.
Mejia claims in Count II that he “engaged in protected speech” and “Defendants
retaliated through adverse actions.” Id. at 2. He alleges that “after [he] engaged in
protected speech, enforcement actions intensified.” Id. He alleges “[t]he Mayor of Sparta
publicly stated Plaintiff was ‘liable’ on social media” and he was “informed firefighters
would not respond to a fire at his property,” which he “reasonably perceived . . . as
retaliation.” Id. at 1–2. Mejia does not allege any facts about his purported protected
speech or facts which support a causal connection between his protected speech and
the adverse actions taken against him. See Warren v. DeSantis, 631 F. Supp. 3d 1188,
1195 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2022) (“The elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim
are (1) speech or activity protected by the First Amendment, (2) an adverse action, and
(3) a causal connection between the protected speech or activity and the adverse
action.”) (citing Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Mejia claims in Count III that “Defendants deprived Plaintiff of property interests
without due process.” ECF 10 at 2. This claim does not have any supporting factual
allegations whatsoever. Mejia does not allege what property interest he was deprived
of, what state action was taken, or how any process was constitutionally inadequate.
See Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (“In this circuit, a §
1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements:
(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state
action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.”) (citation modified).
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In sum, Mejia fails to distinguish which Defendants he is bringing any particular
claim against, fails to allege facts with specificity, and fails to support his bare legal
conclusions. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (ECF 11) is
GRANTED and Mejia’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.3
SO ORDERED, this 24th day of April, 2026.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3 In his response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mejia states: “If any deficiency exists, Plaintiff
respectfully requests leave to amend.” ECF 12 at 2. First, Mejia’s request in a responsive brief is not a
proper motion to amend. See Newton v. Duke Energy Fl., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2018)
(“Where a request for leave to file an amended complaint simply is imbedded within an opposition
memorandum, the issue has not been raised properly.”). Second, Mejia filed his recast second amended
complaint after the Court explained in detail what he needed to do to draft a proper complaint. See ECF
7. He ignored those instructions. Accordingly, Mejia’s request to amend is DENIED.
The Court dismisses Mejia’s claims as to all defendants because, for the reasons explained above,
Mejia’s recast second amended complaint fails to provide any defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests” and fails to provide factual support for any claim. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. Accordingly, although Karen West did not join the motion to dismiss, she is similarly situated
to the defendants who moved to dismiss. Mejia had an opportunity to respond to the arguments raised in
the motion to dismiss and he was on notice that failure to cure his pleading deficiencies would result in
dismissal. See ECF 7; 12; Courboin v. Scott, 596 F. App'x 729, 735 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that
dismissal of non-moving defendants was not unfair because the non-moving defendants were similarly
situated to the moving defendants and the opposing party had an opportunity to respond to the issues
raised by the moving defendants).
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