JONES v. FEATHERSTONE CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
QUINCY BERNARD JONES, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-CV-389 (MTT)
)
FEATHERSTONE CONDOMINIUM 	)
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 	)
INC., et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
ORDER
On September 9, 2026, Plaintiff Quincy Bernard Jones, proceeding pro se, filed
his complaint. ECF 1. That same day, he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). ECF 2. For the reasons stated, Jones’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is
GRANTED. But Jones’s complaint lacks important factual allegations that Jones may
have omitted because of his pro se status. Thus, the Court ORDERS Jones to amend
his complaint by October 30, 2026.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Proceed IFP
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) governs motions to proceed IFP. It provides:
[A]ny 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	may 	authorize 	the 	commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person
who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such
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prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor.1
When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “the only
determination to be made by the court is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy
the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citation modified). A plaintiff is not required to show he is “absolutely
destitute.” Id. (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339
(1948)). Rather, “an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant,
because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and
provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Id. “A court may not deny an IFP
motion without first comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine
whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir.,
574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307–08).
However, § 1915(a) “should not be a broad highway into the federal courts.”
Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Rather, it “conveys only a
privilege to proceed without payment to only those litigants unable to pay costs without
undue hardship.” Mack v. Petty, 2014 WL 3845777, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2014).
District courts have “wide discretion” in deciding whether a plaintiff can proceed IFP,
and “should grant the privilege sparingly,” especially in civil cases for damages.
Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306.
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all
persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2004).
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The Court has reviewed Jones’s IFP affidavit. Jones’s affidavit establishes that
he cannot pay the court fees without undue hardship. ECF 2. Thus, Jones’s motion to
proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED.
B. Frivolity Review
Section 1915 does not create an absolute right to proceed IFP in civil actions.
“Where the IFP affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility, the
court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question of whether the
asserted claim is frivolous.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (citation modified). When
allowing a plaintiff to proceed IFP, the Court shall dismiss the case if the Court
determines that the complaint (1) “is frivolous or malicious”; (2) “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted”; or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success,” meaning that it
appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’
or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392,
393 (11th Cir. 1993). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is
governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).”2 Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App’x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, because Jones is
proceeding pro se, his “pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
2 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss,
“all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 843 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.4
(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). Even so, “the district court does not
have license to rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x
863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
1. Failure to Accommodate
Jones alleges that Defendants Featherstone Condominium Homeowners
Association (“Featherstone”), CEO Steven Sieting, Secretary Kannisha Homer, and
CFO Robert King violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., by
failing to provide Jones with a reasonable accommodation. ECF 1 at 1–5. Specifically,
Jones requested a mold study of the exteriors of neighboring units. Id. at 3. “Under the
FHA ... it is unlawful to discriminate against a renter with disabilities by refusing ‘to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling.’” Philippeaux v. Apartment Inv. and Management Co., 598 F. App'x
640, 643–44 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). Jones must plead four
things to establish a failure to accommodate claim: “(1) [he is] disabled within the
meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) the requested
accommodation was necessary to afford him an [equal] opportunity to use and enjoy his
dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to make the accommodation.” Id. at 644
(citation omitted). Nonetheless, “[t]he FHA's reasonable accommodation provision
requires only those accommodations that may be necessary ... to afford equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. (quoting Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island,
544 F.3d 1201, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008)).
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First, Jones alleges that he “has a physical impairment (COPD & asthma) that
substantially limits major life activities (breathing).” ECF 1 at 2 ¶ 1. As defined by the
FHA, a person is handicapped if they have “(1) a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (2) a record of
having such an impairment, or (3) [they are] regarded as having such an impairment.”
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). The Court will assume, without deciding, that Jones's ailments
constitute handicaps under the FHA for the purpose of this screening order. As such,
Jones has adequately pleaded the first element of his claim.
The Court examines the second and third elements together. According to his
complaint, Jones lives in unit 100 of a condominium complex managed by
Featherstone. ECF 1 at 3. Jones says he “can smell mold coming from units 102-108.”
Id. Jones alleges he requested, by text, letter, and email, that a mold test be conducted
on the exterior of those seven units. ECF 1 at 3. He claims that the mold study “would
have directly mitigated and/or ameliorated the impact of his disability on his enjoyment
of the property.” Id. at 2 ¶ 4. Even taking these allegations as true, Jones has not
included enough facts to make the second and third elements of his failure to
accommodate claim plausible. While it is true that no mold study was conducted of the
exterior of the other units, Jones does not plausibly allege why the study is a necessary
and reasonable accommodation. See Philippeaux, 598 F. App'x at 644; Schaw v.
Habitat for Humanity of Citrus Cty., Inc., 938 F.3d 1259, 1270 (11th Cir. 2019). Jones’s
allegations establish that CEO Sieting sent someone to test for mold in Jones’s unit.
ECF 1 at 3–4. Sieting texted Jones that the test showed mold levels within the normal
range and then placed the paperwork confirming the normal results in Jones’s mailbox.
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Id. at 3–4; ECF 1-1 at 2. Still, Jones complains that the mold report did not include an
“outdoor baseline sample” and that “mold naturally drifts inside.” ECF 1 at 7. But the
samples taken inside Jones’s unit revealed levels within normal range. ECF 1-1 at 2.
Jones does not allege any facts explaining why, despite those results, testing the
exteriors of neighboring units was necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to use
and enjoy his dwelling. Thus, Jones does not plausibly allege that the requested
accommodation was necessary or reasonable.
Finally, Jones alleges that Defendants Secretary Homer and CFO King never
responded to his email requests for accommodation. ECF 1 at 3. “The FHA does not
demand that housing providers immediately grant all requests for accommodation.”
Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285–86 (11th
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). However, “[t]he failure to make a timely determination after
meaningful review amounts to constructive denial of a requested accommodation, ‘as
an indeterminate delay has the same effect as an outright denial.’” Id. at 1286 (quoting
Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 199 (5th Cir. 2000)). As noted
above, though, Sieting responded to Jones’s requests, sent someone to inspect Jones’s
property, responded to Jones’s texts regarding the results of the study, and provided
Jones with a copy of the report indicating the mold was within normal range. ECF 1 at
3–5; ECF 1-1. Thus, Jones’s request received a timely determination. Although
Defendants did not conduct the specific mold study Jones requested, their failure to do
so does not, without more, establish a violation of the FHA.3
3 Jones also includes an allegation that the “mold tester” saw water damage on the exterior of Jones’s
unit and that Featherstone failed to repair or fix it. ECF 1 at 3–4. But Jones does not explain how water
damage to a unit found to be free of mold relates to his request for mold testing in other units or his
retaliation claim.
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2. Retaliation
Jones also asserts a claim for retaliation under § 3617 of the FHA. ECF 1 at 4–5.
Section 3617 prohibits retaliation for the exercise of a right protected by the FHA. 42
U.S.C. § 3617 (“It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
person ... on account of his having exercised or enjoyed ... any right granted or
protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.”). “To establish a prima facie
case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2)
the defendant subjected him to an adverse action; and (3) a causal link exists between
the protected activity and the adverse action.” Philippeaux, 598 F. App'x at 644 (quoting
Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001)). Protected activities
include, as the HUD regulation states, having “made a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in a proceeding under the Fair Housing Act.” 24 C.F.R. §
100.400(c)(5).
Even assuming Jones’s conduct meets the first element, he fails to allege that
the defendants took any adverse action against him. ECF 1 at 1–8. The relevant
question is whether Featherstone's conduct qualifies as coercion, intimidation, threats,
or interference. Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos., Inc., 627 F.3d 849, 858 (11th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the plaintiffs must prove that defendants “coerce[d], intimidate[d],
threaten[ed], or interfere[d]” with the exercise of a right protected by the FHA). In other
words, the adverse action must be sufficiently harmful to deter a reasonable person in
the plaintiff's circumstances from engaging in the protected activity. See Bone v. Vill.
Club, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1218–19 (M.D. Fla. 2016). “While the Eleventh Circuit
has not prescribed the precise magnitude of conduct required by § 3617, it did hold that
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a cause of action arose where plaintiff's neighbors threatened ‘to break [him] in half if he
did not get out of the neighborhood’ and hit his truck while shouting obscenities and
spitting at him.” Dulworth Fam. L.P. v. 400 LA Peninsula Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 2012 WL
11794802, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2012) (quoting Sofarelli v. Pinellas Cnty., 931 F.2d
718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991)). “At the other end of the spectrum, complaints for violating
community rules and towing a car that was leaking oil do not rise to the level of conduct
required by § 3617.” Id. (citing Wood v. Briarwinds Condominium Ass'n Bd. of Dirs., 369
F. App'x 1, 3–4 (11th Cir. 2010)).
“Regardless of where the line is drawn, it is clear that a plaintiff must allege at
least some egregious conduct that interfered with the exercise of his or her Fair Housing
Act rights. This conduct, of course, must be something more than the mere violation of
§§ 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606.” Id. “Otherwise, ‘every allegedly discriminatory denial of
housing under § 3604(a) [or any other enumerated section] would also constitute a
violation of § 3617 in that the denial ‘interfered’ with [the plaintiff's] Fair Housing Act
rights.’” Id. (quoting Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 834 (2d Cir. 1994)). “Congress
did not intend ‘such a statutory overlap.’” Id.; see also Solodar v. Old Port Cove Lake
Point Tower Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 2012 WL 1570063, at *8 (S.D. Fla. May 2, 2012)
(dismissing retaliation claim that was simply a “recast” of the plaintiffs’ § 3604 claim).
Here, Jones asserts the conclusory statement that “[i]t’s further app[are]nt that
Mr. Sieting retaliated against [Jones] due to [Jones] requesting a reasonable housing
accommodation.” ECF 1 at 4. The only other allegation that might conceivably be
construed as an adverse action is that Sieting somehow “rigged up the mold test” and
then refused to continue texting about the matter after Jones sent Sieting several texts
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demanding more information. Id. at 4–5. But Jones does not include any plausible
allegations that the report was fraudulent. He only asserts that because Sieting would
not provide him with the name of the individual who conducted the test, Jones has “no
other reason but to believe the mold test is questionable, incomplete and invalid.” Id. at
4. But Jones admits that Sieting gave him the report, which is attached to his complaint
and includes the company's name, address, and the name of the Laboratory Manager
who approved the results. ECF 1-1 at 1. Regardless, being ignored is not enough to
state a claim under the FHA retaliation provision. Wood, 369 F. App’x at 3–4. Thus,
Jones fails to state a claim for retaliation under the FHA.
3. Remaining State Law Claims
Jones also asserts a claim under the Georgia Fair Housing Act (“GFHA”),
O.C.G.A. § 8-3-200 et seq. ECF 1 at 1. “Under the [GFHA,] it is a discriminatory housing
practice to ‘refus[e] to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or
services when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’” Leslie v. 1125 Hammond, LP, 368 Ga. App.
793, 795 (2023) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 8-3-202(a)(7)(B)(ii)). “Given that the [GFHA] and
the FHA are nearly identical, [Georgia courts] consider federal cases construing the
FHA persuasive precedent when considering a claim under the [GFHA].” Id. at n.3.
Thus, Jones’s GFHA claim fails for the same reasons his FHA claims do.4
In sum, although Jones provides some factual allegations, he fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (stating that a
4 Near the end of his complaint, Jones includes the line “Breach of Fiduciary Duty: (Ga Code § 14-3-
830).” ECF 1 at 7. To the extent that he intends to assert a state law breach of fiduciary duty claim, he
fails to allege any facts supporting that claim. Thus, he fails to state a claim for relief.
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court is required to dismiss a case brought by a pro se plaintiff if it (1) is frivolous, or
malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief). However, given
Jones’s pro se status, the Court will afford him an opportunity to amend his complaint to
state viable claims. See Duff v. Steub, 378 F. App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (“When it appears a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, if more carefully drafted, might
state a claim, the district court should give the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend
his complaint instead of dismissing it.”).
For these reasons, Jones is ORDERED to amend his complaint to include all
facts that he wishes to make a part of these proceedings and cite the appropriate
statutory or constitutional authority for bringing his claims. Jones shall have until
October 30, 2026 to file his amended complaint.
In the “statement of claims” section of his amended complaint, Jones must link
any claims he makes to a named defendant. If Jones fails to link a named defendant to
a claim, the claim will be dismissed; if Jones makes no allegations in the body of his
complaint against a named defendant, that defendant will be removed from the action.
Jones must provide enough facts to plausibly demonstrate that each defendant’s
actions or omissions resulted in the violation of his rights under a specific law. It is also
recommended that, when drafting his “statement of claims,” Jones list numbered
responses to the following questions (to the extent possible) along with the name of
each defendant:
(1) What did each defendant do (or not do) to violate his rights?
(2) When did each action occur?
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(3) How was Jones injured as a result of each defendant’s actions?
The amended complaint will take the place of and supersede Jones’s original
complaint. Schreane v. Middlebrooks, 522 F. App’x 845, 847–48 (11th Cir. 2013). Jones
may not refer to, or incorporate by reference, his previous complaint. The Court will not
look back to the facts alleged in the original complaint once the amended complaint is
filed; the Court will only consider the facts in the amended complaint when it conducts
the frivolity review required by § 1915(e)(2)(B). Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271,
1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the filing of an amended pleading renders the
previous pleading a “legal nullity”).
After Jones files his amended complaint, the Court will conduct a frivolity review
and, if necessary, dismiss any claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). No
defendant shall be served until after the Court completes its frivolity review of the
amended complaint.
C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Obligations
The Court informs Jones of his obligations under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 11(b), which governs Jones’s representations to the
Court.
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—
whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:
(1) 	it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) 	the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
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(3) 	the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, 	will 	likely 	have 	evidentiary 	support 	after 	a 	reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) 	the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
D. Artificial Intelligence
Finally, the Court has seen a marked increase in the use of artificial intelligence
(“AI”) by unrepresented parties, who may not understand fully their pleading obligations.
It is common knowledge that AI can produce what have become known as
hallucinations. This happens frequently in responses to legal-related prompts. AI often
provides false legal citations and inaccurate summaries of legal authorities and
principles. Courts have severely sanctioned lawyers and litigants who have included
hallucinations in their filings. To assist Jones in meeting his pleading obligations, the
Court ORDERS the following:
In all pleadings, including Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Plaintiff shall
include a signed statement certifying that Plaintiff has verified the accuracy of all
facts and all legal authorities cited and legal theories advanced in the pleading.
Failure to comply with this paragraph shall result in sanctions, including, if
appropriate, dismissal of this lawsuit.
II. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and for the reasons set forth above, Jones’s
motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED, and Jones is ORDERED to amend his
complaint no later than October 30, 2026.
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SO ORDERED, this 9th day of October, 2026.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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