UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MURRAY

IN THE U NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
U NITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v .
JOHNNY WILL MU RRAY, JR.,
Defendant .
ORDER
CASE NO :
7:23-cr-24-WLS-ALS
B efore the Court are the follow ing motions filed by D efendant , Johnny Will Murray,
Jr ., as well as the Government's responses , and D efendant's reply briefs, if any , with respect
to each motion :
1. 	Motion to D ismiss Count T wo and Count TI1ree (Doc . 74) 	("Motion to
Dismiss"), Government's response (Doc . 82), and D efendant's reply (Doc . 92);
2. 	Motion in Limine to Exclude all References to any Alleged "Controlled Buys" in
this Case (Doc. 75) ("Controlled Buys Motion ") and Government's response (D oc . 83);
3. 	Motion in Limine to E xclude all Jail Calls (D oc . 76) ("Jail Calls Motion ") and
G overnment's response (Doc . 84); and
4. 	Motion in Limine to E xclude all References to Mr . Murray's P rior Criminal
Histo ry / Agreement to Stipulate as to Status as Convicted Felon (Doc. 7 7) (" P rior Convictions
Motion" and together with the Motion to D ismiss, Controlled Buys Motion , and Jail Calls
Motion , the " Defendant's Motions "), Government's response (Doc . 86), and D efendant's
reply (Doc . 93).
The Defendant's Motions are fully briefed, ripe for decision , and are each addressed in
turn below.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HI STORY
On March 12, 2025, 	the Grand Jury handed down a three - count Superseding
Indictment (Doc . 63) against D efendant charging him with : Count One-P ossession with
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Intent to D is tribute Methamphetaminein violation of21 U .S.C. § 841 (a)(1) and 841(6)(1)(A ), 1
Count Two-P ossession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon in violation of 18 U .S.C. §§
922 (g) (1) and 924 (a) (2) , 2 and Count Three- 	Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug
Trafficking Crime in violation of 18 U .S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A). After his arrest on the original
Indictment, Defendant consented to detention in light of a state sentence. 	(Doc. 	15).
Defendant was arraigned on the Superseding I ndictment on March 26, 2025, and again
ordered to be detained. (Doc . 67).
After resolution of pretrial motions , including a motion to compel and motion to
suppress , a pretrial conference was held on October 1, 2025. The trial of this matter is
scheduled to begin Monday, November 3, 2025 , at 8:30 a.m . in Valdosta , Georgia.
II. 	LAW AND ANALYS IS
A. 	Mo tion to Dis miss
Defendant seeks to have the Court dismiss the Counts inv olving firearms (Counts Two
and Tiiree) because the Governmen t destroy ed the firearms allegedly recov ered in this case
prior to filing the Indic tment . The firearms were destroy ed pursuant to a state court order
requiring that " [t] he firearms ... be destroy ed in accordance with the local policy of the
appropriate agency that has custody of the firearms." (Doc . 74 at 2-3). D efendant contends
that the destruction of the firearms denies him a constitutional guarantee of access to evidence ,
and that the Governmen t had a duty to preserve the evidence for trial and sentencing
purposes . (Id at 3). Defendant contends that the destruction of the firearms deprives him of
the "opportunity to have the firearms examined for fingerprints or DNA evidence which may
have established that he never handled any firearms ." (Id at 15). Further, D efendant asserts
there are material misrepresentations in police reports involving t he firearms, that only two of
the four firearms were photographed, and there are no photos showing the location where the
firearms were found . Defendant requests t ha t the Gov ernment's evidence regarding the
1 The original Indictment was handed down on March 14, 2023. The Superseding Indictment charges the same
offenses, except in Count One of the original Indictment Defendant was charged under § 841 (b) (1) (g instead
of § 841(b)(l ) (A).
2 Defendant is alleged to have had four firearms in his possession: (1) a Norinco, Model: SKS, Rifle, Serial
Number: 7103990, (2) a Ruger, Model: E C9s, Serial N umber: 454-56803, (3) a Bushmaster Model: XM15-E2S
Rifle, Serial Number: B Kl 910017, and (4) a Jenning, Model: Bryco 59, Serial Number : unknown/ obliterated.
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firearms (photos and written report) be suppressed. (Doc . 74 at 15). Tiiis statement makes it
unclear whether D efendant intended to make an alternate argument as to suppress ing such
evidence, but a formal motion to suppress the police report and photographs was not filed.
The Gov ernment contends that the issue of possession of the firearms, or lack thereof,
is a jury question. TI1e Government asserts Counts Two and Three are sufficient to apprise
Defendant of the alleged charges so he can prepare a defense , that the Gov ernment is not
required to produce the firearms at trial and can present proof by testimony of witnesses or
otherwise , and Counts Two and Three should not be dismissed merely because D efendant
alleges the Government will fail to produce sufficient evidence to prove the charges.
Also relev ant here is that on August 16 , 2022 , the D istrict Attorney' s Office in the
Southern Judicial Circuit filed a motion for order of forfeiture in the Superior Court of
Colquitt County, Georgia , seeking forfeiture of property including $5,600 in U nited States
currency and four firearms identified as one SKS 7. 62 Rifle (S/ N 7103980), one Ruger 9mm
pistol (S/ N 454-56803), one Bushmaster Rifle (S/ N BK19100 1 7) , and one Jennings 9mm
pistol (S/ N undetermined) (together , the " Forfeited P roperty") that was seized from the
Defendant's residence on November 11, 2021. TI1e state forfeiture action was brought against
Defendant as the Purported Owner / I nterest Holder of the Forfeited P roperty. The motion
was served on D efendant (Doc . 74-2 at 7, 13), and a motion to intervene was sent to the
District Attorney' s Office by attorney Gary L amar , Jr ., on behalf of Ella Mae Randall,
Defendant's domestic partner (Id. at 13). Eventually, a consent agreement of forfeiture was
entered into among the State of Georgia, Defendant, and Ms. Randall. Therein, D efendant
and Ms . Randall relinquish all rights they have in the "seized four firearms found witliin [their]
residence." (Id ). With respect to the cash , tl1e parties agreed that $3,000 would be turned over
to Mr . L amar to be held in trust for Ms . Randall's benefit and tl1e remaining $2,600 would be
forfeited to the State . (Id ) Defendant signed the consent agreement as "Interest Holder, " Ms.
Randall signed as " Intervenor/ Interest H older ." (Id at 14). Although Defendant states in his
Motion to D ismiss that he was not represented by counsel witl1 respect to the consent
agreement , Mr . L amar signed the agreement twice as " Attorney for I nterest H older" beside
both tl1e Defendant's and Ms . Randall's signatures. (I d).
" [C]riniinal prosecutions 	must comport witl1 prevailing notions 	of fundamental
fairness[,]" wliich requires that "criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to
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present a compl ete defense. To safeguard that right, the [Supreme] Court has developed 'what
might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence. "' C alifornia
v. T rombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 ( 1984) (citation omitted) . One of these guarantees requires that
exculpatory evidence must be turned over to a criminal defendant. Id 	In T rombetta, the
Supreme Court considered for the first time the extent of the government's duty to take
affirmative steps to preserve evidence on behalf of criminal defendants. Id 	at 486 . The
Supreme Court held:
Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence , that
duty must be limi ted to evidence that might be expected to play a significant
role in the suspect's defense . To meet this standard of constitutional materiality,
evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.
Id. at 488- 89 . I n Trombetta, the defendants moved to suppress incriminating breathaly zer tests
because California had not retained their breath samples. Th eir motions were denied at the
trial level. Th e California Court of Appeals reversed that decision , the California Supreme
Court denied certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. D efendants
each asserted that if his breath sample had been preserved, he would have been able to
impeach the incriminating breathalyzer test. Id. at 483- 84. Th e breath samples were not
preserved per California's policy which the Supreme Court found was not constitutionally
defective . Id at 488. There was no evidence that California authorities destroy ed the breath
samples in a calculated effort to prevent disclosure requirements or because of any animosity
towards the defendants . Id R ather , in failing to preserve the samples , the officers were acting
in good faith and in accordance with their normal procedures . Id. The Supreme Court noted
that while preservation of the breath samples might conceivably had contributed to the
defendants' defense, given the information as to the reliability of the testing instrument, those
chances were low. Id. at 489. The Court noted that even if the breath samples might have been
exculpatory, 	"it 	does 	not 	fo ll ow 	that 	[defendants] 	were 	without 	alternate 	means 	of
demonstrating their innocenceL]" including exercising their rights to cross - examine the
government's witnesses in an " attempt to raise doubts in the mind of the factfinder whether
the test was properly administered." Id. at 490 .
The Government cites P ark erv. U nited States, 801 F.2d 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1986) as support
for its argument that it is not required to put the firearms into ev idence at trial and that it can
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rely on eye-witness testimony. In Park er, the Government did not produce the weapon
defendant carried during an armed bank robbery but offered only the testimony of the two
bank employees who witnessed the crime and described the firearm carried by defendant . Id
at 1383. The D .C. Circuit affirmed that the testimony of the bank employ ee eye-witnesses-
as opposed to an expert on firearms- 	was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to infer that
defendant was carrying a firearm and affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion
for judgment of acquittal . 3
Similar to To mbetta, the G overnment contends the firearms here were destroy ed in
accordance with an order of distribution entered in accordance with the forfeiture motion and
consent agreement of the D efendant , Ms . Randall, and the State of Georgia . P er that order,
" all four firearms shall be destroy ed in accordance with l ocal policy of the appropriate agency
in custody of said firearms." 4 (D oc . 82 at 3). At this time , there is no evidence of animosity
between the state officials and the D efendant or that the firearms were destroyed to prevent
the state from being required to produce them to D efendant . While showing D efendant's
fingerprints were not on the firearms might conceiv ably have contributed to his defense here ,
there is no evidence that a federal action was expected to be filed at the time state officials
destroy ed 	the 	firearms. 	Further, 	the 	exculpatory value 	of ev idence 	that 	D efendant's
fingerprints were not on the firearms would likely be low as actual possession of a firearm is
not the sole method of possession for purposes of establishing the el ements of the firearm
charges against the D efendant . S ee Trombetta, 467 U .S. at 489- 90.
Also as noted by the Government, and as found in To mbetta, D efendant is not without
alternate means of demonstrating his innocence, including exercising his right to cross -
examine the Government's witnesses in an attempt to raise doubts in the mind of the jury that
the police report misrepresents his statements regarding ownership of the firearms and in
3 The G overnment also cites U nited States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1998) as support for its assertion
that it can present proof of possession of the firearm through means other than producing the actual firearm.
(Doc . 82 at 5). In doing so, the Government attributes the following quote to Adams: " The government was
not required to produce an actual firearm at trial or prove the specific manufacturer or serial number of the
firearm in question." ( Id. citing Adams, 137 F.3d at 1299- 1300) . H owever, that quote is not found in the text
of the Adams decision. Further, because the firearm was in evidence in Adams, the quote would arguably have
been dicta because it was not relevant to the Adams court's decision. See Adams, 137 F. 3d at 1300 n.2. The issue
in Adams was whether a firearm had to be operable for purposes of § 922(g)(l ).
4 Although copies of the motion for forfeiture and consent agreement are attached to the Motion to D ismiss,
neither party provided a copy of the order of distribution.
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raising questions as his assertions that the G overnment's photographs are incomplete or fail
to depict all the firearms. In his Motion to D ismiss, the D efendant requests the Court take on
the role of the jury and determine the weight and credibility of the Government's evidence as
to Counts Two and Three. The Court declines to do so.
Accordingly, D efendant's Motion to D ismiss Count Two and Count Three (D oc. 74)
is DENIED .
B. 	Motions in Limine
The true purpose of a motion in limine is to avoid the introduction of evidence at trial
that is "clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds" and could irretrievably impact the
fairness of trial. Roya/Marco Point 1 Co ndo. Ass'n v. QBE I ns., No. 2:07- cv-16, 2011 \VL 470651,
at *2 (M.D . Fla. Feb. 2, 2011) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984)). But the
context at trial often determines the admissibility of evidence and, for this reason, "i[n] limine
rulings to admit or exclude evidence are always preliminary and conditioned on what the
evidence shows at trial." Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 757 n.3 (2000). F urthermore, a
trial court can promptly instruct a jury to disregard improper testimony or inadmissible
evidence, and "[i]n many such cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions
to disregard such information." United S fates v. Astling, 733 F .2d 1446, 1455 ( 11th Cir. 1984);
United States v. F uentes, 521 F. App'x 911, 911 (11th Cir. 2013). A motion in limine ruling has
no impact on counsel 's duty to make proper and contemporaneous objections at trial as to
any evidence or argument they consider inadmissible or improper. See Ceph us v. CSX Transp.,
I nc., 771 F. App'x 883, 894-95 (11th Cir. 2019). As such, tl1e Court disfavors motions in limine.
No counsel, party, or witness may reference excluded evidence before counsel first
notices tl1e Court and opposing counsel outside of the presence of tl1e jury and obtains tl1e
Court's ultimate ruling regarding tl1e same. Counsel shall also accordingly instruct their
witnesses. Counsel shall make proper and timely objections at trial as to any evidence or
argument they consider inadmissibl e.
Witl1 these factors in mind, the Court addresses each motion in limine in turn.
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1. 	Co n trolled Buys Motio n
D efendant seeks 	to 	exclude all references 	to any alleged controlled buys. The
G overnment states it has not char ged D efendant with any offenses related to the controll ed
buys conducted p rior to the search warrant in this case. Th e G overnment does not intend to
refer ence the controll ed buys at trial unless D efendant opens the doo r. The G overnment
points out that D efendant has made several refer ences to the controlled buys in D efendant's
Motion to D ismiss. I n 	the event D efendant refer ences 	the 	controlled buys in cross -
examination or in his case in chief, then the G over nment may seek to rebut issues as needed .
B ased on the Government's statements, the D efendant acknowl edged that the Controlled
Buys Motion is moot, but reserves the right to request reconsideration if this issue arises during
the trial. (5 ee D oc . 109).5
B ased on the foregoing, the Court finds 	the Controlled Buys Motion is moot.
Accordingly, D efendant's 	Motion in 	Limine to 	E xclude all References 	to any Alleged
"Controlled Buy s" in this Case (Doc. 75) is DE N IED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as
MOOT.
2. 	Ja il Calls Mo ti on
D efendant states the G over nment has served D efendant with hundreds of reco r ded
jail calls from Ap ril 2023 through August 2024. D efendant contends that none of the calls
include evidence that is rel evant to the charges against D efendant and seeks to p r eclude the
G overnment from introducing any audio of jail calls at trial.
P er the G overnment , it has not identi fi ed any particular calls it anticipates using, and it
is not required to do so . TI1e Government contends the motion to exclude all the calls without
reference to any specific calls is premature. TI1e G overnment suggests that it is appropr iate to
hold the motion in abeyance so the Court can address the issue when, and if, a call is tendered .
At that time , the Court can r eview the content of the call, the purpose fo r which it is being
offered, and assess the propriety of it admission . B ased on the G over nment's statements, the
D efendant acknowledged that the Jail Calls M otion is moot, but reserves the r ight to r equest
reconsideration if this issue arises during the trial. (5ee D oc . 109).
5 J oint Response to Court Order D ated August 19, 2025 (D oc. 109) filed September 2, 2025.
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Based on the forego ing, the Court finds the Jail Calls Motion is moot. Accordingly,
Defendant's Motion in I.imine to Exclude all Jail Calls (Doc. 76) is DENIED, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, as MOOT.
3. 	Prior Convictions Motion
On June 27, 2025, the Government filed a Notice of In tent to I ntroduce E vidence of
Defendant's P rior Convictions (Doc. 85). With respect thereto, Federal Rule of E vidence 404
provides :
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
(1) Prohibi ted Uses . E vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character .
(2) Permi tted Uses . This evidence may be admissible for another purpose,
such as proving motive , opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
(3) Notice in a Criminal Case . In a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of any such evidence that the prosecutor
intends to offer at trial, so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to
meet it;
(B) articulate in the notice 	the permitted purpose 	for 	which the
prosecutor intends to offer the evidence and the reasoning that supports
the purpose; and
(C) do so in writing before trial--or in any form during trial if the court,
for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.
Fed . R. E vid . 404(6). The Government intends to offer evidence of the following two
convictions of Defendant : (1) on March 8, 2007, Defendant pled guilty to a lesser included
offense of Pos session of Cocaine and was sentenced to four years imprisonment (see D oc . 85
at 3 & Doc. 85-1 at 2-4); and (2) on May 6, 2021, Defendan t pled guilty to Pos session of
Methamphetamine and Pos session of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon and was sentenced to
eight years imprisonment (see Doc . 85 at 3 & Doc . 85-2 at 1- 2).
In the Prior Convictions Motion, Defendant indicates he "is willing to stipulate that he
was a convicted felon at the time of the charges in this case and that he knew of his status as
a convicted felon." (Doc . 77 at 2). TI1erefore, Defendant argues that all references to his prior
criminal history should be excluded as prejudicial. TI1e Government agrees that if Defendant
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stipulates to his prior conviction in order to prove elements 2 and 3 6 of Count Two of the
Super seding 	I ndictment-P ossession 	of 	a 	Firearm 	by 	a 	Convicted 	Felon- 	then 	the
Government will not move to admit evidence of his prior criminal history for that purpose.
(Doc. 86 at 3).
In addition, the Government contends that D efendant's prior criminal history may be
relevant at trial for impeachment purposes or as evidence to prove knowledge, intent, and lack
of mistake or accident . The Government re serves the right to seek to introduce evidence of
Defendant's prior convictions for such other purposes, if appropriate. As to such other
purposes, the Court find s that it would be unwise to make any ruling or findings as to the
admissibility of the Defendant's prior criminal conduct, where the admissibility of such
evidence will depend on the circumstances under which it is offered and the purpose for which
it is offered. R ather, the Court will rule on the issue of admissibility at the appropriate time.
If the Government seeks to introduce any information related to Defendant's prior
criminal history or conduct for purposes other than as is apparently to be stipulated as noted
above, it shall lay the proper foundation tl1at s uch evidence is relevant and admissible. TI1at
foundation shall be presented upon proper notice to opposing counsel and the Court , and
outside of the hearing of the jury. If, at that time, the Court deems Defendant's prior criminal
history or conduct admissible for certain purposes, it will give an appropriate limiting
instruction or instructions to the jury if, and when, the evidence is introduced, and in the final
charge.
III. 	C O NCL US I ON
In summary, the re solution of the Motions is as follows:
1. 	Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count T wo and Count Three (Doc. 74) 1s
DE N IED, WITH PREJUDI CE.
6 The Government did not set out the elements of the offense of Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon
in its response to Defendant's motion to exclude his prior criminal history (Doc. 86), but it did set out those
elements in its response to Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts Two and Three (Doc. 82 at 4) . In that
do cument, elements 2 and 3 are: "(2) before possessing the firearm or ammunition, the Defendant had been
convicted of a felony - a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; and (3) at the time the
Defendant possessed the firearm or ammunition, the Defendant knew he had previously been convicted of a
felony."
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2. 	D efendant's Motion in 	Limine to E xclude all R eferences 	to any Alleged
"Controlled B uys" in this Case (Doc. 75) is DENIED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as
MOOT .
3. 	D efendant's Motion in I.imine to E xclude all Jail Calls (Doc. 76) is DENIED,
WITHOUT PREJ U DICE, as MOOT .
4. 	If D efendant stipulates, as noted, then for purposes of D efendant's knowledge
that he was a convicted felon, D efendant's Motion in I.imine to E xclude all R eferences to Mr.
Murray's P rior Criminal Hi story/ Agreement to Stipulate as to Status as Convicted Felon (Doc.
77) is DENIED, WITHO U T PREJ U DICE, as MOOT . R esolution of the admissibility of
D efendant's prior criminal history for other purposes is held in abeyance and the Court will
rule on its admissibility for such purposes at the appropriate time and outside the presence of
the jury.
SO ORDERED , this 27th day of October 2025.
Isl W. Louis Sands
W . LO U IS SANDS, SR. JU DGE
U NITED STATES DISTRICT CO U RT
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