WEEKS v. COLQUITT COUNTY GEORGIA et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
AMANDA WEEKS, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CASE NO.: 7:23-CV-77 (LAG)
:
COLQUITT COUNTY, GEORGIA, :
COLQUITT COUNTY SHERIFF’S :
OFFICE, SHERIFF ROD HOWELL, :
individually and in his official capacity as :
Sheriff of Colquitt County, Deputy Kyle :
Jones, individually and in his official :
Capacity as an employee of the Colquitt :
County Sheriff’s Office, :
:
Defendants. :
:
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc 48). Plaintiff filed a
Complaint in the Superior Court of Colquitt County, Georgia on May 31, 2023, seeking
monetary damages as compensation for various torts committed by Defendant Deputy Kyle
Jones, an employee of the Colquitt County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 1-2). As of October 3,
2023, all Defendants have answered or otherwise responded to the Complaint. (See Doc.
27, 28). This Court, on March 24, 2025, granted in part and denied in part Defendant Jones’
Motion to Dismiss and granted Defendants Colquitt County and Sheriff Rod Howell’s
Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 40). In so doing, the only remaining claims exist against
Defendant Jones in his individual capacity. (See Doc. 40 at 26–27). Plaintiff, without
stipulation of dismissal from Defendants, “requests this action be dismissed.” (Doc. 40 at
2). Plaintiff represents that since this Court’s March 24, 2025, Order “Plaintiff has
successfully negotiated a settlement with one of the previously named Defendants and the
settlement is a full resolution of the dispute at issue in this litigation.” (Doc. 48 at 1). The
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only remaining Defendant, Defendant Jones, did not respond nor object to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Dismiss. (See Docket).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides that “except as provided in Rule
41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms
that the court considers proper.” “[T]he decision whether or not to grant [a voluntary]
dismissal is within the sound discretion of the district court . . . .” Fisher v. P.R. Marine
Mgmt., Inc., 940 F.2d 1502, 1503 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (citing LeCompte v. Mr.
Chip, Inc., 428 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); see also Arias v.
Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A district court enjoys broad discretion
in determining whether to allow a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2).” (citations
omitted)). Furthermore, “in most cases a voluntary dismissal should be allowed unless the
defendant will suffer some plain prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second
lawsuit[.]” Fisher, 940 F.2d at 1502– 03. Here, as Defendants will not suffer plain prejudice
as a result of the dismissal, Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 48) is therefore
GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED, this 9th day of January, 2026.
/s/ Leslie A. Gardner
LESLIE A. GARDNER, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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