United States Trustee v. Stanley J. Kakol, Jr. and the Law Office of Stanle

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF: 	)
) 	MISCELLANEOUS
STANLEY J. KAKOL, JR. and 	) 	PROCEEDING
the LAW OFFICES OF 	) 	NO. 24-00502-JRS
STANLEY J. KAKOL, JR., LLC 	)
)
GUY A. VAN BAALEN, 	)
ACTING UNITED STATES 	)
TRUSTEE, 	)
)
PLAINTIFF, 	)
)
vs. 	)
)
STANLEY J. KAKOL, JR. 	)
and the LAW OFFICES OF 	)
STANLEY J. KAKOL, JR., LLC, )
)
DEFENDANTS. 	)
ORDER ON COMPLAINT FOR SANCTIONS
_______________________________________________________________
IT IS ORDERED as set forth below:
_____________________________________
James R. Sacca
U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge
Date: June 26, 2026
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This 	miscellaneous 	proceeding1 	concerns 	Attorney 	Stanley 	J.
Kakol’s (“Attorney Kakol”) representation of debtors in eighteen Chapter
13 cases and one Chapter 7 case. 	In these cases, Attorney Kakol’s fee
was paid by a prospective purchaser of property based on a prearranged
agreement 	between 	Attorney 	Kakol 	and 	the 	purchaser, 	but 	the
agreement 	was 	not 	disclosed 	to 	the 	Court 	as 	required 	by 	law.2
Additionally, 	these 	nineteen 	cases 	were 	filed 	with 	no 	intention 	of
prosecuting them other than merely filing a bankruptcy petition to stop
a foreclosure. 	This was done to give the purchaser who paid Attorney
Kakol’s fee enough time to close the sale of the property.
Attorney Kakol also made no effort to analyze the debtors’ financial
condition and provided no counseling to the debtors as to their rights and
options to maximize the value of the properties. This failure resulted in
1 Although most of the underlying Chapter 13 cases that are the subject of this miscellaneous
proceeding were assigned to other judges, these cases were reassigned to this Court for purposes of
this miscellaneous proceeding. Additionally, this miscellaneous proceeding has been assigned to this
Court after consultation with the Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy Court for administrative convenience
because of the similarity of the issues here with those this Court heard in Townson v. Kakol (In re
Day), Ch. 13 Case No. 23-52197, 2024 Bankr. LEXIS 851, 2024 WL 1506751 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 5,
2024).
2 Attorney Kakol has been sanctioned numerous times by this Court for not making proper fee
disclosures to the Court as required by law. In some of the cases subject to this miscellaneous
proceeding, Attorney Kakol continued to make knowingly and materially false disclosures even after
the United States Trustee commenced an investigation into his handling of the Day case, discussed in
footnote 1, which involved his failure to file the required fee disclosure and also after the United States
Trustee filed a motion for sanctions regarding the conduct in Day. All of this will be discussed in detail
below.
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the potential for, if not actual, serious harm to some or all of these debtors
who Attorney Kakol should have been protecting.
This 	miscellaneous 	proceeding 	is 	not 	Attorney 	Kakol’s 	first
disciplinary proceeding. 	Attorney Kakol has an extensive disciplinary
history by this Court and the State Bar of Georgia. A summary of
Attorney Kakol’s disciplinary proceedings and orders is attached to this
Order as Appendix A.3 	Portions of Appendix A are discussed below to
provide additional context for this Order.
After serving a three-year suspension of his law license from 1998
to 2001 from the State Bar of Georgia4 arising from nine disciplinary
matters pursuant to two separate notices, Attorney Kakol was sanctioned
at least eight times by this Court between 2004 and 2009. The sanctions
from this Court included an order that suspended Attorney Kakol from
filing cases in this Court for six months and another that limited him to
filing no more than two cases per month for eighteen months. The latter
case led to the State Bar of Georgia restricting Attorney Kakol’s ability
3 Attorney Kakol’s prior disciplinary proceedings are important to the Court’s consideration of the
Complaint for Sanctions against him in this miscellaneous proceeding. There may be other orders
sanctioning Attorney Kakol of which the Court is not aware.
4 Attorney Kakol testified that he was suspended from 1998 to 2001 by the Georgia Bar. Apr. 1, 2026,
Hearing at 11:19 AM, In re Kakol, Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-00502 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.).
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to practice for two years, including restrictions on signing and filing
pleadings and appearing in court.
At a disciplinary hearing in this Court in 2009, Attorney Kakol
admitted through counsel that he “determined that running a business
of his own is beyond his capabilities and [he] is very aware of the
problems he’s encounter [sic] over the years and decided that it’s best to
go work for somebody else.” Transcript of Motion to Show Cause Hearing
on February 19, 2009, 4:21-25, In re Hill, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-67074-CRM
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2009), Dkt. No. 65.
After Attorney Kakol closed his law office, he worked as an intake
attorney for a bankruptcy firm with no case or courtroom responsibility
according to the terms of his two-year suspension by the State Bar of
Georgia before becoming an associate with case and courtroom duties for
another firm. 	During the brief time he was an associate for the latter
firm, Attorney Kakol was sanctioned by this Court at least once.
Attorney Kakol’s employment as an associate was terminated in
2015. 	After that, he did not practice law again for four years until he
reopened a law office in 2019. By the time Attorney Kakol reopened his
own law practice, the judges in this Court who had previously entered
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the sanctions orders before 2015, discussed in Appendix A, had all
retired.
The new generation of judges in this Court have likewise frequently
disciplined Attorney Kakol. 	From 2020 to 2026, Attorney Kakol was
sanctioned at least twelve more times by this Court including one order
that limited him to filing no more than fifteen Chapter 13 cases a month
for three months. 	Another order suspended Attorney Kakol from filing
any new cases in this Court for one year. 	At least two of those cases in
which 	he 	was 	disciplined 	by 	this 	Court 	in 	2024 	have 	resulted 	in
proceedings against him with the State Bar of Georgia which are still
pending.
Attorney Kakol was sanctioned by this Court as recently as (a) June
24, 2026, for failing to advise a client of a settlement which caused the
client to needlessly appear at an in-person hearing and then failing to
appear at a subsequent hearing in the case and (b) earlier in 2026 for
filing a bankruptcy case for two debtors during a two-year period in which
those debtors were prohibited from refiling a case.
Like 	many 	of 	the 	cases 	for 	which 	Attorney 	Kakol 	has 	been
previously disciplined by this Court, the cases in this miscellaneous
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proceeding involve his knowing violations of required disclosure to the
Court under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2016 (“Rule 2016”)
and his failure to review with the debtor the required Rights and
Responsibilities 	Statement 	Between 	Chapter 	13 	Debtors 	and 	Their
Attorneys (“Rights and Responsibilities Statement”). 	But like Attorney
Kakol’s conduct in Day, the cases in this miscellaneous proceeding also
involve serious violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
and the Local Rules and General Orders of this Court, such as conflicts
of 	interest, 	lack 	of 	diligence 	in 	the 	representation 	of 	debtors, 	and
improper limitation of the scope of the representation of debtors.
In addition to Attorney Kakol’s prior extensive disciplinary history,
the Court has considered all matters of record in this miscellaneous
proceeding, including: (a) the testimony at trial of Attorney Kakol,
Angela Jones (“Jones”), and William Eakin (“Eakin”); (b) more than 100
exhibits admitted at trial; (c) the deposition transcripts of Attorney
Kakol, members of his staff (Jones, Yolonda Hood (“Hood”), and Eakin),
and 	representatives 	of 	CMNC 	Homes, 	LLC 	(Christopher 	Burrow
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(“Burrow”) and Kyle Edwards (“Edwards”));5 plus (d) the evidence the
Court considered in the Day case, a similar case in which Attorney
Kakol’s misconduct resulted in this Court suspending him from filing
further cases in this Court for one year.
Ultimately, the Court has determined the appropriate sanction is
to permanently disbar Attorney Kakol from the practice of law in the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia and permanently
prohibit his law firm, the Law Offices of Stanley J. Kakol, Jr., LLC, from
filing cases and representing parties in cases in the Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Georgia. 	In arriving at its decision, the Court
has considered the facts in this miscellaneous proceeding and applied the
ABA 	Standards 	for 	Imposing 	Lawyer 	Sanctions, 	including 	any
aggravating and mitigating factors, as utilized by the Georgia Supreme
Court in these types of cases.
I. 	Facts
A. The initial Motion for Sanctions filed by the United
States Trustee in Day
5 The parties agreed to admit the deposition transcripts and the exhibits to the deposition transcripts
into evidence. See Apr. 1, 2026, Hearing at 10:06 AM, In re Kakol, Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-00502
(Bankr. N.D. Ga.).
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The United States Trustee (“UST”) filed a Motion for Review and
Disallowance of Attorney Fees and for Imposition of Other Sanctions in
Day against Attorney Kakol and his law firm, the Law Offices of Stanley
J. Kakol, Jr., LLC, on September 28, 2023 (“Day Sanctions Motion”).
Motion for Review and Disallowance Attorney Fees and Imposition of
Other Sanctions, In re Day, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-52197, (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
Sept. 28, 2023), Dkt. No. 28. 	At the conclusion of the trial on the Day
Sanctions 	Motion, 	the 	UST 	announced 	its 	intention 	to 	file 	a
miscellaneous proceeding to cover other cases involving Attorney Kakol
and CMNC Homes, LLC (“CMNC”) which were discovered shortly before
the trial in Day.
Based on the evidence the Court heard at the trial in Day, an order
was entered on January 19, 2024, requiring Attorney Kakol to produce to
the UST within three weeks all case files and documents for bankruptcy
cases involving his firm and CMNC filed on or after December 1, 2022.
Interim Order, In re Day, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-52197, (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
Jan. 19, 2024), Dkt. No. 40. 	The UST had previously requested these
case files a few weeks prior to the Day trial, but Attorney Kakol failed to
respond. 	Attorney Kakol had likewise failed to respond when the UST
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requested documents involving CMNC and James Day in May 2023 but
instead stonewalled the UST, which necessitated the filing of the Day
Sanctions Motion. 	In response to the Court’s order to produce files,
Attorney Kakol’s law firm produced client files for some of his bankruptcy
cases involving CMNC to the UST on February 9, 2024.6
The result of the Day Sanctions Motion was that Attorney Kakol
and his law firm were suspended for one year7 from filing any new cases
in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia beginning
on April 11, 2024. 	Townson v. Kakol (In re Day), Ch. 13 Case No. 23-
52197, 2024 Bankr. LEXIS 851, 2024 WL 1506751, at *37 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Apr. 5, 2024). 	The basis of that suspension was, inter alia, (1)
Attorney Kakol’s violations of various Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct; 	and 	(2) 	his 	failure 	to 	follow 	applicable 	provisions 	of 	the
Bankruptcy Code and Rules, including Rule 2016, and this Court’s
General Orders. 	See id. at *16-31, *37. 	This Court reserved for future
6 A handful of the case files did not get produced until shortly before the trial of this miscellaneous
proceeding, almost two years later. Case files were never produced for the cases of Wade Butler,
Leonard Henderson, and Joshua Back.
7 The Court believed at the time that the matters involved in this miscellaneous proceeding could be
concluded within the one-year suspension. But its estimate was not correct, in part due to discovery
delays, a partial government shutdown which necessitated the continuance of the trial, and other
continuances for the parties to work on stipulations of fact and exhibits.
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ruling any discipline on account of any potential misconduct in the cases
in this miscellaneous proceeding. 	Id. at *36.
B. The UST’s Complaint for Sanctions and the debtors at
issue in this miscellaneous proceeding
The UST filed a Complaint for Sanctions (“Complaint”) against
Attorney Kakol and the Law Offices of Stanley J. Kakol, Jr., LLC in this
miscellaneous proceeding on June 17, 2024. 	(Compl., Dkt. No. 16). 	The
Complaint alleged inter alia that Attorney Kakol’s representation of
twenty-two debtors involved numerous violations of the Georgia Rules of
Professional 	Conduct; 	that 	he 	failed 	to 	timely 	file 	Rule 	2016(b)
statements and then filed materially inaccurate Rule 2016(b) statements;
that he failed to comply with this Court’s General Orders; and that he
violated Bankruptcy Code sections such as 11 U.S.C. §§ 526 and 528.
(See id. ¶¶ 68-87).
The UST asserted three counts in its Complaint: (1) civil penalty
under 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(5)(B); (2) exercise of Court’s inherent power; and
(3) sanctions under 11 U.S.C. § 105. (Id. at 22-28). Ultimately, the UST
sought monetary and non-monetary sanctions and the imposition of a
civil penalty under 11 U.S.C. 526(c)(5)(B) against Attorney Kakol. 	(See
id. ¶¶ 69, 74, 88).
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The debtors in the table below are derived from page six of the
Complaint. These debtors, excluding Leonard Henderson, Yung Lai, and
Gunther Czarnecki,8 are hereinafter jointly referred to as the “CMNC
Debtor cases” or “CMNC Debtors.”
Table A
Debtors Listed on Page Six of Complaint
Debtor 	Case Number 	Date Case
Filed
Date Rule
2016(b)
Statement
Filed
Richard Antrican 	22-40413 	4/4/22 	12/28/23
Christy Fowler 	22-11088 	9/30/22 	12/28/23
Amanda Gutierrez 	22-57866 	10/3/22 	12/28/23
David Jennings 	22-57898 	10/3/22 	12/28/23
8 Leonard Henderson is excluded from this defined group because CMNC did not pay Attorney Kakol’s
fees and costs for Leonard Henderson’s bankruptcy case. Attorney Kakol did file statements,
schedules, and a Rule 2016 fee disclosure statement in Leonard Henderson’s case. The case was still
ultimately dismissed. Based on UST Exhibit 77 and a review of the case docket, it appears CMNC
purchased Leonard Henderson’s home while his bankruptcy case was pending without Court approval.
Yung Lai and Gunther Czarnecki are excluded from this defined group because CMNC stated it had
no involvement in the bankruptcy cases and did not pay Attorney Kakol’s fees and costs for their
bankruptcy cases even though it did purchase their homes. Yung Lai’s and Gunther Czarnecki’s cases
were dismissed for failing to cure filing deficiencies. CMNC purchased Yung Lai’s and Gunther
Czarnecki’s homes after their bankruptcy cases were dismissed and resold them for a substantial
profit. Despite the fact that those cases may follow a slightly different path than the others, the Court
has concerns about the way those cases were handled and requested production of documents for Yung
Lai’s case and Gunther Czarnecki’s case shortly prior to trial because Attorney Kakol did not produce
those case files to the UST. If the Court ordered a lesser sanction here, the Court would initiate a show
cause proceeding with respect to Attorney Kakol’s handling of those three cases to determine if
additional sanctions are merited after obtaining additional evidence because the focus of the parties
at trial in this proceeding was on the CMNC Debtor cases in which CMNC paid Attorney Kakol’s
attorney fees and the filing fee for the bankruptcy case.
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Jerome Davis 	22-58779 	10/31/22 	12/28/23
Glynetta Anderson 	22-59814 	12/3/22 	12/28/23
Shanterri Slaton 	22-59817 	12/3/22 	12/28/23
Wade Butler9 	22-60648 	12/30/22 	12/29/23
Teresa Blythe 	22-60652 	12/30/22 	12/29/23
Tavius Maddox, Jr. 	22-60665 	12/31/22 	12/28/23
Yung Lai 	23-50013 	1/2/23 	Never filed
Lottie Harmon 	23-51143 	2/5/23 	12/29/23
Sandra Byrd 	23-52093 	3/3/23 	12/15/23
Gunther Czarnecki 	23-52149 	3/6/23 	Never filed
Kareem Kenyada 	23-52198 	3/6/23 	12/15/23
Callie Moore 	23-53145 	4/3/23 	12/28/23
Leonard Henderson 	23-53168 	4/3/23 	4/3/23
Demetrias Benton 	23-57235 	7/30/23 	Orig. 8/7/23;
Amend.
12/29/23
Joshua Back 	23-57312 	7/31/23 	Orig. 8/7/23;
Amend.
12/29/23
Johnny Hudson 	23-58584 	9/4/23 	12/29/23
Roosevelt Williams 	23-59585 	9/30/23 	Orig.
9/30/23;
9 Wade Butler’s case is the sole Chapter 7 case at issue in this miscellaneous proceeding.
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Amend.
12/29/23
Gary Hartsell 	23-62018 	12/4/23 	Orig.
12/6/23;
Amend.
12/29/23
C. The connection between CMNC and Attorney Kakol
1. CMNC, 	Attorney 	Kakol, 	and 	the 	Law 	Offices 	of
Stanley J. Kakol, Jr., LLC
CMNC is a Georgia single member LLC with Burrow as the sole
member and manager. 	The main individuals from CMNC who are
relevant to this miscellaneous proceeding are Burrow and Edwards.
CMNC is in the business of buying distressed homes, often in foreclosure,
and reselling them for a profit. 	CMNC “rehabs” these homes before
reselling them. This “rehabbing” ranges from merely removing trash and
cleaning some homes to purportedly expending tens of thousands of
dollars renovating the homes.
Attorney Kakol is the sole attorney at his law firm. Attorney Kakol
started his firm in 2019 after not being employed as a lawyer since 2015
when he was terminated by C. Golden & Associates (“Golden”).10 	(See
10 The Golden law firm was plagued by poor practice habits and closed its practice in early 2016.
During its brief tenure, it was not uncommon for that law firm’s fees to be reduced on account of its
poor performance.
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Attorney Kakol Dep. 17:15-20:19). During those four years, he worked at
Walmart or in the poultry farms in North Georgia. 	(See id. 19:1-14).
Prior to Attorney Kakol’s time at the Golden law firm, he worked at
Sandberg 	Law 	Firm 	LLC 	(“Sandberg”) 	as 	an 	intake 	attorney. 	As
previously discussed, Attorney Kakol had his own firm before working for
Sandberg, but Attorney Kakol was precluded by the State Bar of Georgia
from continuing to manage his own law practice for a period of two years
as part of a prior disciplinary proceeding. 	See In re Kakol, 689 S.E.2d
308, 309-10 (Ga. 2010).
Eakin, a former employee of the now defunct law practices of
Golden 	and 	Talitha 	Fleming 	& 	Associates, 	(Eakin 	Dep. 	11:13-25),
approached Attorney Kakol and helped him start his own firm with
Eakin as its office manager. 	(Attorney Kakol Dep. 22:15-23:17; Eakin
Dep. 9:11-13). 	Eakin and Attorney Kakol knew each other from their
time at King and King. (Eakin Dep. 12:22-25).
Attorney Kakol had various staff at his firm during the CMNC
Debtor cases. The main individuals at Attorney Kakol’s law firm who are
relevant to this miscellaneous proceeding are Jones, Hood, and Eakin.
Jones, Hood, and Eakin are not attorneys.
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2. CMNC discovers Attorney Kakol, and they reach an
agreement regarding bankruptcy case filings.
Because 	CMNC 	is 	in 	the 	business 	of 	acquiring 	homes 	facing
foreclosure, including homes of deceased people whose assets would also
have to be probated, CMNC wanted to see if the bankruptcy of an heir
could stop the foreclosure process. The bankruptcy stay of the foreclosure
would give CMNC time to probate the property and close the sale, but
there would be no intention of prosecuting the bankruptcy case and it
would be quickly dismissed by the court. 	In Edwards’ search for a
bankruptcy attorney who would file such a case, he came across Attorney
Kakol.
Edwards called Attorney Kakol to discuss stopping foreclosures by
filing bankruptcy to allow CMNC time to purchase homes, including
when the borrower was deceased, with CMNC agreeing to pay the
attorney fees and costs for the bankruptcy case. 	Burrow participated in
this phone call. Burrow testified regarding this call:
[W]hen we reached out and talked to Stan, we - -
we asked questions and asked is this possible . . . .
And I remember asking the question is there
any conflict of interest if we pay for this. 	And his
response was absolutely no as long as things are
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done properly by me, meaning Stan, and disclosed.
. . .
But we absolutely relied on his expertise
and, 	I 	guess, 	license 	to 	direct 	us 	to 	what’s
appropriate or what’s not.
(Burrow Dep. 78:20-79:13).
Attorney Kakol ultimately reached an agreement with CMNC
pursuant 	to 	which 	Attorney Kakol would 	file 	bankruptcy cases 	for
individuals referred to him by CMNC to stop pending foreclosures on
homes CMNC had contracted to buy in order for CMNC to have time to
purchase the homes. 	CMNC would directly pay Attorney Kakol’s law
firm $1,000 for each CMNC Debtor bankruptcy case,11 and CMNC would
pay the filing fee of $313 for each bankruptcy case.12 	Attorney Kakol
testified 	that 	he 	negotiated 	the 	$1,000 	price 	per 	CMNC 	Debtor
bankruptcy 	case 	with 	Edwards. 	(Attorney 	Kakol 	Dep. 	86:14-19).13
Attorney Kakol further testified that this is the going rate for a “front-
11 Attorney Kakol would be paid an additional $1,000 by CMNC if the bankruptcy case had to be refiled
to provide CMNC more time to close the sale of the home. CMNC would also pay the filing fee for the
refiled bankruptcy case.
12 The Court’s calculation is that Attorney Kakol was paid attorney fees of $22,000 for the CMNC
Debtor cases, not including the two cases he filed for James Day. This is based upon Attorney Kakol
filing bankruptcy twice for three CMNC Debtors and filing bankruptcy once for the remaining sixteen
CMNC Debtors.
13 There is no evidence that Attorney Kakol received anything from CMNC other than the $1,000 fee
and the payment of the $313 filing fee for each CMNC Debtor case Attorney Kakol filed.
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page-only” filing14 and that other firms charge the same amount for front-
page-only filings. (Attorney Kakol Dep. 76:14-21).
D. Process utilized by CMNC and Attorney Kakol for the
CMNC Debtors
1. CMNC finds the CMNC Debtors and CMNC’s real
estate purchase contracts with them
CMNC’s employees would check upcoming foreclosure sales and
would go to the home being foreclosed and attempt to speak to the
inhabitants. 	If no one was home, a CMNC employee, such as Edwards,
would leave a flyer stating the home was being foreclosed and CMNC
wanted to purchase it. If inhabitants of the home were present, Edwards
or another CMNC employee would generally go into the home being
foreclosed and do a visual inspection of the home. If a purchase price was
agreed upon the seller, here the CMNC Debtors, would sign a real estate
purchase contract with CMNC.15
14 A front-page-only filing is the filing of a bankruptcy petition with no intention to file anything further
or to otherwise prosecute the bankruptcy case so that the case will be dismissed automatically by the
Court within thirty days or so after the filing of the case for failure to file other required information
within the time set forth in an order entered by the Court.
15 Under Georgia law, non-judicial foreclosures can be accomplished in as little as four weeks from the
day the first foreclosure advertisement appears. The contracts with the CMNC Debtors were generally
signed in the middle of a month, which would be about two weeks before foreclosure day (the first
Tuesday of the month). See G A. C ODE A NN . § 9-13-161(a); G A. C ODE A NN . § 44-14-162(a). A property
put under contract this quickly while a foreclosure is pending would typically not be considered a fair
market value sale because the marketing period is too short and the seller is distressed.
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The majority of the real estate purchase contracts in the CMNC
Debtor cases contained provisions that required the CMNC Debtors to
file probate as an heir of the homeowner and to also individually file
bankruptcy and use Attorney Kakol’s law firm for the bankruptcy case.
This probate aspect is important because many of the CMNC Debtors
were not legally responsible for the mortgage.16 There is no evidence the
CMNC Debtors consulted with either a probate attorney or bankruptcy
attorney before signing these real estate purchase contracts.17
2. Three-way phone calls between Edwards, Attorney
Kakol, and CMNC Debtors
After entering into a real estate purchase contract with CMNC,
each CMNC Debtor would have a three-way phone consultation with
Attorney Kakol and Edwards about filing bankruptcy. Edwards testified
16 Attorney Kakol testified that during a phone call with Edwards he advised CMNC that the CMNC
Debtors, as an heir of the decedent homeowner, held an equitable title in the real property CMNC had
contracted to purchase, which interest could be protected by the filing of a bankruptcy. See (Attorney
Kakol Dep. 83:12-84:1). The Court does not recall any testimony that Attorney Kakol provided the
advice of equitable title to any of the CMNC Debtors.
17 Although Yung Lai is not defined as a CMNC Debtor, Attorney Kakol filed bankruptcy on her behalf
and then referred her to CMNC. 	Burrow testified that Attorney Kakol’s law firm reached out to
Edwards to let him know that “this individual [Yung Lai] wants to sell the property and is up against
foreclosure. Give them a call. See what you can do.” (Burrow Dep. 117:22-118:3). CMNC purchased
her home and subsequently sold it for a $111k profit. Attorney Kakol could not specifically recall this
case at trial but did testify that under a hypothetical fact situation similar to what the Court described
above, the case probably should have been converted to Chapter 7 or refiled as a Chapter 13. See Apr.
1, 2026, Hearing at 2:41-2:42 PM, 2:50-2:52 PM, In re Kakol, Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-00502 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga.). The Court is not considering her bankruptcy case in determining the sanction on Attorney
Kakol because the parties focused on the CMNC Debtor cases in which CMNC paid his fee.
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that each call lasted around five minutes, but some could last longer if
the CMNC Debtor had questions for Attorney Kakol. 	(Edwards Dep.
42:3-8; 73:1-16). Although Attorney Kakol knew the CMNC Debtors had
signed a real estate purchase contract with CMNC to purchase their
homes, he did not receive copies of the real estate purchase contracts, did
not know the specific terms of the real estate purchase contracts, nor did
he ask the CMNC Debtors about the real estate purchase contracts they
entered into with CMNC. (See Attorney Kakol Dep. 110:2-17).
Attorney Kakol also did not obtain from the CMNC Debtors other
fundamental and customary information a bankruptcy attorney would
obtain to provide the required advice and consultation about the debtor’s
financial affairs, the advisability of bankruptcy and, if advisable, the
appropriate Chapter (7 or 13) under which they should seek relief. This
information at a minimum would include matters such as the amount of
the mortgage, the arrearage or cause of default, the value of the property,
the amount the debtor would get from the sale, the debtor’s income and
expenses, and other assets and liabilities.
Attorney Kakol even testified at his deposition that he would not
have taken the CMNC Debtor cases if the CMNC Debtors had asked him
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to look at their real estate purchase contracts with CMNC. (See Attorney
Kakol Dep. 129:25-130:7). 	Attorney Kakol’s deposition testimony is
similar to his testimony in the Day trial where he testified about not
advising Mr. Day whether he should sell his home to CMNC:
I’m certainly not going to take Kyle Edwards’
money to get involved in—if he would’ve said—I
would’ve stopped the train and said wait a second,
we have a conflict of interest here. If you don’t
want to go through with this thing, you need to tell
me. So, I would have stopped it right there.
See Jan. 11, 2024, Hearing at 12:04 PM, In re James Day (II), Ch. 13 Case
No. 23-52197 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.).
According to Attorney Kakol, a real estate purchase contract had
already been signed to sell the property to CMNC, and the scope of his
representation, he says, was limited to merely stopping a foreclosure to
allow that contract to close. 	Attorney Kakol maintained that he did not
have to provide the CMNC Debtors with any analysis of their financial
condition and options or alternatives, even though the CMNC Debtors
would have gained the benefit of and breathing spell from the automatic
stay of bankruptcy instead of selling a property under the threat of an
imminent foreclosure.
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3. Bankruptcy petitions filed by Attorney Kakol in the
CMNC Debtor cases
After the initial phone call, Attorney Kakol’s staff would sometimes
pull a credit report for the CMNC Debtor. Some credit reports pulled for
CMNC Debtors showed no creditors, such as David Jennings18 	and
Demetrias Benton, but bankruptcy cases were filed for them anyway. In
other CMNC Debtor cases, Attorney Kakol’s staff pulled credit reports
that showed creditors that were not listed in the bankruptcy petition
filed, such as Christy Fowler and Amanda Gutierrez. 	For the CMNC
Debtor cases where a credit report was pulled, it is clear that Attorney
Kakol did not review or seriously consider the credit reports. Other
bankruptcy cases were filed for CMNC Debtors for whom no credit report
was pulled and who may not have had any creditors.
Additionally, after the initial phone call, Attorney Kakol’s staff
would sometimes pull online value estimates for the real property at
issue—normally from Zillow.com or Realtor.com. 	The real estate value
estimates Attorney Kakol’s staff pulled were higher than the purchase
price paid by CMNC to the CMNC Debtors. But Attorney Kakol did not
18 Attorney Kakol did not list any creditors in the bankruptcy petition for David Jennings.
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know what the CMNC Debtors were being paid, nor does it appear that
Attorney Kakol looked at the real estate value estimates, which were
important information.
Ultimately, Attorney Kakol would have his staff obtain the CMNC
Debtor’s electronic 	signature on 	a bankruptcy 	petition 	and file 	the
bankruptcy petition. 	Because these were what Attorney Kakol referred
to as front-page-only filings, the bankruptcy petitions generally only
listed the mortgage lender or servicer as a creditor, but did not include
statements of financial affairs, schedules of assets and liabilities, or the
disclosure of the attorney fee agreement and payment as required by
Rule 2016. But Attorney Kakol’s staff did have the CMNC Debtors take
a credit counseling course, and then Attorney Kakol’s staff filed the
statutorily required credit counseling certificates.19
The CMNC Debtor cases would subsequently be dismissed in about
thirty days by the Court for failing to cure filing deficiencies such as
19 It would have looked very unusual for an attorney to file a consumer bankruptcy case without
contemporaneously filing the certificate of completion of an approved credit counseling course.
Attorney Kakol testified that his law firm had the CMNC Debtors take the credit counseling class
because they thought they could not electronically file a consumer bankruptcy case without doing so,
but that is simply not true. If the credit counseling certificate is not filed with the petition, it merely
causes the Clerk’s Office to generate a deficiency notice that the case may be dismissed if it is not filed
within fourteen days, just like if the required statements, schedules and Form 2030 required by Rule
2016 statement were not filed with the petition.
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failing to file the statement of financial affairs, schedules of assets and
liabilities 	and 	other 	schedules, 	and 	the 	Rule 	2016 	fee 	disclosure
statement.20 	Sometimes, CMNC would pay Attorney Kakol to refile the
dismissed bankruptcy cases on behalf of the CMNC Debtors to give
CMNC even more time to purchase the homes.21
4. CMNC’s 	purchase 	of 	CMNC 	Debtors’ 	homes 	and
CMMC’s profit
In most cases, CMNC would eventually purchase the home in which
the CMNC Debtors had an interest, either directly as owner or as an heir,
and subsequently sell them at a profit, sometimes substantial. Edwards
testified regarding the necessity of CMNC Debtors’ bankruptcy cases
being dismissed before CMNC purchased the homes as follows:
Q. If the court needed - - if the Bankruptcy Court
needed to become involved in approving the sale,
do you believe that would complicate and delay
things 	regarding 	CMNC’s 	ability 	to 	acquire
ownership of the property?
. . . .
A. Yes, if we had to get bankruptcy approval, then
it would delay the closing.
20 Counsel in this miscellaneous proceeding stipulated that for the CMNC Debtor cases, after the
bankruptcy petitions were filed, Attorney Kakol never intended to file anything else or expend any
effort to get the information to complete these documents. See (Jones Dep. 72:7-18).
21 Examples of this include Callie Moore (case nos. 22-59917 and 23-53145), Roosevelt Williams (case
nos. 23-56326 and 23-59585), and Lottie Harmon (case nos. 22-58666 and 23-51143).
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Q. 	And so optimally, the cases needed to be filed
and 	dismissed 	relatively 	quickly 	to 	stop 	the
foreclosure, but also to allow CMNC to acquire the
properties without court intervention?
. . . .
A. The bankruptcy - - the foreclosure needed to be
- - the bankruptcy needed to stop the foreclosure
long enough for the probate to complete, but, yes,
we would - - it would need to end before we could
purchase.
Q. 	Correct. 	And so the way Mr. Kakol handled
these cases by filing a petition, but by there being
no further activity in the case facilitated the needs
not just of CMNC, but also the sellers to sell these
properties to CMNC without court oversight and
approval?
. . . .
A. Yes, I would assume so.
(Edwards Dep. 176:11-177:16).22
22 Attorney Kakol’s counsel objected to each question asked in the block quote, but the objection to each
question was merely “Object as to form.” This objection is not sufficient because it does not identify
the specific basis for the objection (e.g., leading, compound, calls for a legal conclusion, etc.). Therefore,
Attorney Kakol has waived these objections, and the Court overrules these objections. See Henderson
v. B & B Precast & Pipe, LLC, Case No. 4:13-CV-528, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112441, 2014 WL 4063673,
at *1-2 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2014) (overruling a party’s “object to form” objections in a deposition and
noting that “if a question is propounded in an improper form, the objection should be stated concisely
on the record during the deposition in a manner that provides the questioner with a reasonable
opportunity to correct the form of the question. 	Failure to do so waives the objection.”); J.S.X. v.
Foxhoven, Case No. 4:17-cv-00417, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 242440, 2019 WL 13167146, at *8 (S.D. Iowa
May 23, 2019) (noting that the court joined “other federal district courts that have found that merely
objecting to a question's ‘form’ is insufficient to preserve the objection under FRCP 32(d).” (citations
omitted)); FED. R. B ANKR. P. 30 (providing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 is applicable to
bankruptcy proceedings); FED. R. B ANKR. P. 32 (providing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 is
applicable to bankruptcy proceedings).
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The following is a chart illustrating CMNC’s net profit on the
CMNC Debtors’23 homes:
Table B
Amount CMNC Paid to CMNC Debtors and CMNC Profit
Debtor
(D.)
CMNC
Buy
CMNC
Costs24
CMNC
Sale
Price
CMNC
Net
Profit
CMNC
Return
How
Much D.
Received
Back 	$146,915 	$71,595 	$499,370 	$280,858 	129% 	$15,000
Davis 	$86,048 	$4,410 	$161,994 	$71,535 	79% 	$10,000
Antrican 	$98,400 	$53,481 	$258,210 	$106,328 	70% 	$6,000
Jennings 	$78,146 	$66,326 	$213,496 	$69,022 	48% 	$5,000
Harmon 	$146,472 	$81,999 	$336,275 	$107,802 	47% 	$2,500
Slaton 	$130,692 	$83,809 	$298,686 	$84,185 	39% 	$15,000
Gutierrez 	$109,039 	$15,710 	$170,028 	$45,278 	36% 	$97,000
Fowler 	$123,436 	$6,111 	$170,568 	$41,020 	32% 	$5,000
Blythe 	$210,782 	$74,290 	$362,468 	$77,395 	27% 	$50,000
Anderson 	$144,000 	$3,517 	$165,084 	$17,566 	12% 	$10,000
Kenyada 	$235,786 	$3,174 	$262,000 	$23,038 	10% 	$2,000
Edwards 	testified 	that 	the 	reason 	CMNC 	stopped 	referring
bankruptcy cases to Attorney Kakol after the last of the CMNC Debtor
cases was filed was because Edwards became aware that there were
23 Wade Butler, Tavius Maddox, Jr., Sandra Byrd, Demetrias Benton, and Roosevelt Williams are not
listed in Table B because CMNC did not purchase their property. Johnny Hudson is not listed in Table
B because although CMNC purchased his home, CMNC’s ultimate sale price was not clear. Callie
Moore is not listed in Table B because although CMNC purchased the home, CMNC has not yet sold
the home so no profit can be determined. Gary Hartsell is not listed in Table B because there is no
evidence of what the rehab costs were on the property. Yung Lai and Gunter Czarnecki are not listed
in Table B because they do not fit the definition of a CMNC Debtor nor is there any evidence of rehab
costs. Leonard Henderson is not listed in Table B because he does not fit the definition of a CMNC
Debtor. Additionally, although CMNC purchased Leonard Henderson’s home, it was not clear what
he was paid by CMNC after the mortgage was paid off.
24 CMNC’s costs include fees and costs paid for bankruptcy and probate cases.
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issues raised with Attorney Kakol’s handling of the cases that CMNC was
referring to him. 	See (Edwards Dep. 136:23-137:5).
E. Attorney Kakol’s case files for the CMNC Debtors
Attorney Kakol ultimately produced nineteen case files for the
twenty-two cases listed in this miscellaneous proceeding.25 	These case
files varied in length and as to what they contained. For example, only
two case files had the Rights and Responsibilities Statement required
under General Order 42-2020, which will be explained in detail later in
this Order.26 	Also, as noted above, some of the case files had a credit
report for the CMNC Debtor and real estate value estimates from a
website such as Zillow.com for the home CMNC was purchasing, but
others did not. Other important contents are discussed below.
1. Attorney Kakol’s inter-office notes and his staffs’
checklists
Attorney Kakol would take notes on a yellow legal pad concerning
the CMNC Debtors. 	Many of Attorney Kakol’s notes state that the case
is an Edwards’ referral, that there is a foreclosure, and that it is a FPO
25 Attorney Kakol did not produce case files for Wade Butler’s case, Leonard Henderson’s case, and
Joshua Back’s case. It is obviously troubling that Attorney Kakol could not produce case files for these
recently filed cases.
26 These two case files were Yung Lai and Demetrias Benton. 	The Rights and Responsibilities
statement was filed with the bankruptcy petition in Leonard Henderson’s case.
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case, which means front-page-only. 	Attorney Kakol’s notes do not have
any analysis of the CMNC Debtors’ financial situation.
Additionally, Attorney Kakol’s staff had checklists they would write
notes on. Many of these checklists would note that the case was from
Edwards and that the case was FPO.
2. Attorney 	Kakol’s 	attorney-client 	fee 	agreements
with CMNC Debtors
Of the seventeen case files produced for CMNC Debtors, only four
of 	them 	did 	not 	have 	attorney-client 	agreements.27 	Some 	of 	these
attorney-client agreements listed an erroneous amount for the cost of the
representation. For example, the attorney-client agreement in Demetrias
Benton’s case file lists the attorney fee amount as $5,653 when in reality
it was only $1,000. (UST Ex. 88, 4).
Even 	though 	Attorney 	Kakol 	has 	taken 	the 	position 	that 	his
representation 	of 	the 	CMNC 	Debtors 	was 	limited 	to 	just 	filing 	a
bankruptcy petition and not prosecuting their cases, Attorney Kakol’s
attorney-client agreements with the CMNC Debtors contain no such
limitation.
27 The four case files which did not have attorney-client agreements were Christy Fowler, David
Jennings, Teresa Blythe, and Tavius Maddox, Jr.
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The attorney-client agreements Attorney Kakol had with CMNC
Debtors were largely the same for each CMNC Debtor. 	The description
of “Base Fee Services” was the same in each attorney-client agreement
and included the following:
In return for the above-described Base Fee,
attorney agrees to render legal services for the
bankruptcy case, including analysis of the client’s
financial situation, and rendering advice to the
client in determining whether to file a petition in
bankruptcy; preparation and filing of any petition,
schedules, statements of affairs, and plan which
may be required; representation of the client at the
meeting of creditors and confirmation hearing, and
any adjourned hearings thereof; stopping creditor
actions 	against 	client 	pre 	confirmation;
preparation 	of 	any 	pre-confirmation 	Motion 	to
Extend 	or 	Impose 	Stay; 	preparation 	of 	any
response to a pre-confirmation Motion for relief
from Stay; preparation of the employer deduction
order; 	preparation 	of 	any 	lien 	avoidances
necessary to confirm the plan; preparation of any
Motion to strip any second mortgage, if applicable;
preparation 	of 	any 	amendments 	necessary 	to
confirm 	plan; 	preparation 	of 	any 	objections 	to
claims necessary to confirm plan; preparation of
objections to any late filed claim; bar date reviews
of 	claims, 	filing 	certification 	and 	resulting
pleadings; preparation of any change of address
forms; 	helping 	client 	obtain 	pre-filing 	credit
counseling; helping client obtain tax transcripts,
initial 	intake; 	pre-confirmation 	turn-over
proceedings; helping client obtain pre-discharge
financial counseling certificates; and preparation
of post-confirmation amendments to add creditors.
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These attorney-client agreements were typically signed by both
Attorney Kakol and the CMNC Debtor.
3. Attorney Kakol’s staffs’ Best Case notes regarding
the CMNC Debtor cases
Attorney 	Kakol’s 	staff 	would 	input 	notes 	in 	their 	Best 	Case
software concerning the CMNC Debtor cases.28 	Many of these entries
noted that the case was from Edwards, that the case was FPO, that no
schedules were needed because it was a “Kyle Edwards case,” (UST Ex.
59, 44), and that the case was supposed to dismiss since it was an
“Edwards FPO,” (UST Ex. 65, 24). 	There were also some entries that
evidenced some of the CMNC Debtors did not understand what was
occurring. There was even one entry where Attorney Kakol’s staff noted
that the staff member called Edwards—not the CMNC Debtor—to see if
Edwards wanted them to refile the bankruptcy for the CMNC Debtor.
Examples of Best Case entries by Attorney Kakol’s staff showing
that the CMNC Debtor cases were FPO Edwards’ cases that did not need
things such as schedules or were an Edwards’ case that was supposed to
dismiss are Lottie Harmon, Roosevelt Williams, and Sandra Byrd. In
28 Best Case is a software program used by many consumer bankruptcy attorneys.
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Lottie Harmon’s case, a member of Attorney Kakol’s staff entered a note
on February 5, 2023, that was titled “FPO (KE),” and the body of the note
stated “No schedules completion needed. Kyle Edwards case.” (UST Ex.
59, 44). In Roosevelt Williams’ case, a member of Attorney Kakol’s staff
entered a note on September 30, 2023, that was titled “KE Case,” and the
body of the note stated “No schedules completion or MTE29 needed.”
(UST Ex. 103, 49). In Sandra Byrd’s case, a member of Attorney Kakol’s
staff entered a note on April 4, 2023, that stated “This was a Kyle
Edwards FPO, it was supposed to dismiss.” (UST Ex. 65, 24).
Entries made by Attorney Kakol’s staff in Best Case regarding
Richard Antrican’s case and Sandra Byrd’s case evidence these debtors
did not understand what was occurring in their bankruptcy cases. 	In
Richard Antrican’s case, a member of Attorney Kakol’s staff entered a
note on June 8, 2022, that stated in part the staff member spoke with
Richard Antrican on that day and the day before and let him know that
his bankruptcy case was dismissed on May 3, 2022. (UST Ex. 5, 39). This
note also stated “Client does not appear to know or understand what is
happening.” 	(Id.). 	In Sanda Byrd’s case, a member of Attorney Kakol’s
29 The Court believes MTE would mean a Motion to Extend the time to file such papers.
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staff entered a note on April 12, 2023, that stated in part “Client called
crying and upset because she is confused.” 	(UST Ex. 65, 24). Sandra
Byrd’s bankruptcy case was previously dismissed. (Id.).
Entries made by Attorney Kakol’s staff in Lottie Harmon’s case and
Sandra 	Byrd’s 	case 	also 	indicate 	that 	Edwards 	was 	directing 	the
representation. 	In Lottie Harmon’s case, a member of Attorney Kakol’s
staff entered a note on October 24, 2022, that was titled “Foreclosure
Case-Kyle Edwards wants filed by Oct 24th or 25th.” 	(UST Ex. 59, 44).
In Sandra Byrd’s case, a member of Attorney Kakol’s staff entered a note
on April 12, 2023, that was titled “Called Kyle to inquire as to whether
he wants us to refile this client.” (UST Ex. 65, 24).
F. Communications 	between 	Edwards 	and 	CMNC
Debtors
CMNC produced to the UST text messages between Edwards and
some of the CMNC Debtors which show how involved CMNC was with
the CMNC Debtor cases. 	These text messages show Edwards advising
some CMNC Debtors on whether they needed to refile bankruptcy,
advising some CMNC Debtors that it was okay to fill out bankruptcy
documents and that they would call Attorney Kakol together. This shows
Edwards was serving as the intermediary between Attorney Kakol and
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some CMNC Debtors. 	There were also text messages showing Edwards
threatening legal action against one of the CMNC Debtors—while the
bankruptcy was pending—if she did not sell her home to CMNC.
The following are examples of text messages between Edwards and
some CMNC Debtors30:
• 	Teresa 	Blythe 	(Bankruptcy 	filed 	December 	30, 	2022;
dismissed January 24, 2023)31
o 	January 17, 2023: Edwards texts Teresa Blythe that he
recorded a legal document against her property and
threatened 	her 	with 	litigation 	while 	she 	is 	in
bankruptcy if she does not sell the house to CMNC.
o 	January 18, 2023: Teresa Blythe texts Edwards that
she wants to keep her house instead of selling it because
she has no place to go and the purchase price will not
last long.
• 	Callie Moore (Bankruptcy filed April 3, 2023; dismissed
April 28, 2023)32
o 	March 28, 2023: Edwards texts Callie Moore to call him
today as “we need to get the bankruptcy refiled.”
o 	March 29, 2023: Edwards texts Callie Moore that he has
been trying to reach her as her bankruptcy needs to be
refiled to stop the foreclosure.
o 	March 30, 2023: Edwards texts Callie Moore that he
will call her with the attorney.
o 	March 31, 2023: Edwards texts Callie Moore that “if we
don’t 	get 	this 	bankruptcy 	refiled, 	your 	house 	will
30 In each of these cases, the CMNC Debtor had already spoken to Attorney Kakol (or his staff),
Attorney Kakol had already filed bankruptcy for them, or Attorney Kakol’s staff was attempting to
contact the CMNC Debtor for information to file the bankruptcy. For Callie Moore, Attorney Kakol
filed bankruptcy twice for her as requested by CMNC. The first bankruptcy was filed on December 5,
2022 (case no. 22-59917). The second bankruptcy was filed on April 3, 2023 (case no. 23-53145). CMNC
paid for both bankruptcies, and both were dismissed.
31 These text messages are from UST exhibit 41 and Edwards deposition exhibit D-005, page 13.
32 These text messages are from UST exhibit 81.
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foreclosure [sic] on Tuesday. Call me back so we can get
this done!”
o 	March 31, 2023: Callie Moore texts Edwards “Why
didn’t you tell me I could have gotten a lot more for this
house then what you offered I trusted you you knew
what I was going through and how hard this was for me
and you took advantage of that I was told I didn’t have
a choice and I didn’t know what to do so I trusted you
now I don’t have a choice but I don’t know if I can sign
anything else . . . .”
o 	April 3, 2023: Edwards texts Callie Moore that the
bankruptcy attorney [Attorney Kakol] sent her an email
with documents to sign, to do this as soon as possible,
and let him know if she needed any help. Callie Moore
asks Edwards for more money.
o 	April 12, 2023: Callie Moore asks Edwards about a
bankruptcy solicitation she received, and Edwards tells
her it is spam.
• 	Kareem 	Kenyada 	(Bankruptcy 	filed 	March 	6, 	2023;
dismissed March 31, 2023)33
o 	March 3, 2023: Kareem Kenyada texts Edwards that
“an attorney text said they worked for you and
wanted 	sensitive 	information, 	thought 	I’d 	tell 	you
before I start sending people stuff.” 	(emphasis added).
Edwards asked him who the attorney is, and Kareem
Kenyada says “Kakols.” Edwards responds “that is the
bankruptcy attorney[;] [y]es you can give them
info.” (emphasis added).
• 	Amanda 	Gutierrez 	(Bankruptcy 	filed 	October 	3, 	2022;
dismissed November 1, 2022)34
o 	October 	3, 	2022: 	Edwards 	provides 	an 	update 	to
Amanda Gutierrez that Attorney Kakol let him know
the bankruptcy petition stopped the foreclosure.
o 	October 	8, 	2022: 	Amanda 	Gutierrez 	texts 	Edwards
about 	bankruptcy 	documents 	she 	received, 	and
33 These text messages are from UST exhibit 73.
34 These text messages are from UST exhibit 15.
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Edwards lets her know that they can call Attorney
Kakol “together” to discuss the documents.
o 	November 6, 2022: Amanda Gutierrez texts Edwards
about other bankruptcy documents she received, and
Edwards lets her know that he will “take a look
and 	ask 	the 	bankruptcy 	attorney 	[Attorney
Kakol] about them.” (emphasis added).
• 	Glynetta Anderson (Bankruptcy filed December 3, 2022;
dismissed December 28, 2022)35
o 	December 1, 2022: Glynetta Anderson texts Edwards
that 	she 	had 	not 	received 	an 	email 	from 	Attorney
Kakol’s law firm, and Edwards responds that he will
follow up with Attorney Kakol’s law firm about the
email.
• 	Joshua Back (Bankruptcy filed July 31, 2023; dismissed
August 25, 2023)36
o 	No date: Joshua Back texts Edwards whether he “can
ask 	whoever 	you 	need 	to 	if 	I 	need 	to 	refile
bankruptcy?” 	(emphasis added). 	Edwards responds:
“[Y]ou 	should 	not 	have 	to 	file 	bankruptcy.”
(emphasis added).
• 	Tavius 	Maddox 	(Bankruptcy 	filed 	December 	31, 	2022;
dismissed January 24, 2023)37
o 	January 4, 2023: Tavius Maddox asks Edwards, not
Attorney Kakol, if the bankruptcy went “through,” and
Edwards responds it did.
G. Communications between (1) Edwards and Attorney
Kakol and (2) Edwards and Eakin regarding CMNC
Debtor cases
CMNC produced to the UST text messages that were between (1)
Attorney Kakol and Edwards and (2) Eakin and Edwards. 	These text
35 These text messages from UST exhibit 30.
36 These text messages from UST exhibit 93.
37 These text messages are from UST exhibit 50.
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messages 	show 	how 	diligent 	Attorney 	Kakol 	and 	Eakin 	were 	with
informing Edwards of the status of CMNC Debtor cases.
Text messages between Attorney Kakol and Edwards were limited,
but 	they 	show 	Edwards 	asking 	Attorney 	Kakol 	about 	starting
bankruptcy 	cases 	and 	checking 	on 	foreclosures. 	The 	following 	are
examples of these text messages:
• 	December 	30, 	2022: 	Edwards 	texts 	Attorney 	Kakol 	in
pertinent part “I need to get 1 more bankruptcy started
today.” (Edwards Dep., Ex. 27, 1).
• 	January 3, 2023: Edwards texts Attorney Kakol “I just called
Albertelli 	Law 	about 	287 	Banberry38 	and 	they 	are 	still
showing it’s going to be auctioned.” Attorney Kakol responds
“I will call them now.” Edwards then asks Attorney Kakol to
keep him updated on the status of the auction and Attorney
Kakol says he will. (Edwards Dep., Ex. 27, 1).
Text messages between Edwards and Eakin show Edwards and
Eakin sharing information about the CMNC Debtor cases. The following
are examples of these text messages:
• 	October 3, 2022: Edwards texts Eakin “just checking on the 3
bankruptcies.” Eakin responds “Hi Kyle, all 3 are filed . . . . We
are verifying the sale has been stopped now.” 	(Edwards Dep.,
Ex. 28, 1).
• 	October 19, 2022: Eakin informs Edwards that Attorney Kakol’s
law firm’s goal is to file Lottie Harmon’s bankruptcy “on the 24th
or 25th.” (Edwards Dep., Ex. 28, 2-3).
38 This home is the property CMNC was attempting to purchase in Tavius Maddox, Jr.’s case.
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• 	December 30, 2022: Edwards texts Eakin in pertinent part “[D]o
we have confirmations that the foreclosures are stopped for
Tavius Mattox [sic] and Teresa Blythe”? 	Eakin responds in
pertinent part “I think we’re good. 	Ms. Blythe is on the phone
with one of the paralegals now completing the interview portion,
and Mr. Mattox [sic] is doing his credit counseling. We anticipate
having both filed today and all notifications done today. I’ll send
you an update before leaving work.” (Edwards Dep., Ex. 28, 5).
• 	December 30, 2022: Edwards also texts Eakin in pertinent part
“[D]o I need to reach out to mattox [sic] for that signature”?
Eakin responds in pertinent part “Janice is on the phone walking
Mattox 	[sic] 	through 	the 	signatures 	now 	and 	the 	credit
counseling done. 	So we have him ready.” 	(Edwards Dep., Ex.
28, 6).
• 	February 3, 2023: Eakin texts Edwards in pertinent part “[W]e
are waiting on Ms. Harmon to sign. 	Maybe you can give
her a push. 	Thanks.” 	(Edwards Dep., Ex. 28, 8) (emphasis
added).
CMNC also produced to the UST emails between Edwards and
Attorney Kakol’s office. 	In an email dated September 1, 2023, Eakin
copied Edwards on an email sent to the mortgage lender’s law firm about
stopping the foreclosure in Callie Moore’s bankruptcy cases. 	(Edwards
Dep., Ex. 29, 13). Callie Moore was not copied on the email. (Id.).
H. Rule 2016(b) statements Attorney Kakol filed in the
CMNC Debtor cases
In the majority of the CMNC Debtor cases, Attorney Kakol did not
file a Rule 2016(b) statement until after the cases were dismissed and the
UST filed the Day Sanctions Motion. In some of the CMNC Debtor cases,
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Attorney Kakol did not file a Rule 2016(b) statement until more than a
year after he originally filed the case.39 	But being filed late was not the
only problem with the Rule 2016(b) statements Attorney Kakol filed in
the CMNC Debtor cases.
First, every Rule 2016(b) statement filed in the nineteen CMNC
Debtor cases were materially false because they listed services that
Attorney Kakol never performed and knew that he never was going to
perform. 	In the Rule 2016(b) statements Attorney Kakol filed in the
eighteen CMNC Debtor Chapter 13 cases, section 6 of each Rule 2016(b)
statement stated in pertinent part:
6. In return for the above-disclosed fee, I have
agreed to render legal service for all aspects
of the bankruptcy case, including:
a. Analysis of the debtor’s financial situation,
and 	rendering 	advice 	to 	the 	debtor 	in
determining 	whether 	to 	file 	a 	petition 	in
bankruptcy;
b. 	Preparation 	and 	filing 	of 	any 	petition,
schedules, statement of affairs and plan which
may be required;
c. Representation of the debtor at the meeting
of creditors and confirmation hearing, and any
adjourned hearings thereof;
d. Representation of the debtor in adversary
proceedings 	and 	other 	contested 	bankruptcy
matters;
39 Although not CMNC Debtor cases, Attorney Kakol never filed a Rule 2016(b) statement in Yung
Lai’s case or in Gunther Czarnecki’s case.
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e. [Other provisions as needed]
Base/flat fee services:
Assisting 	client 	obtain 	prefiling 	credit
counseling
Assisting client obtain pay advices
Assisting 	client 	obtain 	tax 	transcripts,
returns, and other relative documentation
Assisting in the preparation and completion
of client’s bankruptcy petition
Preparing and filing changes of address
Pre-confirmation turnover proceedings
Stop creditor actions against client
Motion to Extend Stay or to Impose Stay
Motion for Finding of Exigent Circumstances
Obtaining 	Employment 	Deduction 	Order
and serving employer
Order to Vacate Employer Deduction Order
Attending and representing client at the 341
Hearing and any reset hearings
Attending 	and 	representing 	client 	at 	the
Confirmation 	Hearing 	and 	any 	reset
hearings
Preparing and filing Modifications necessary
to confirm client’s plan
Preparing 	and 	filing 	lien 	avoidances
necessary to confirm client’s plan
Objections to claims necessary to confirm
plan
Objections to late filed claims
Bar date review (and all resulting/related
pleadings)
Provide 	information 	in 	obtaining 	pre-
discharge financial counseling certificate
Post-Confirmation amendment to add creditors
Resolving 	Trustee 	or 	creditor 	motions 	to
modify the plan.
(emphasis added).
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In the sole CMNC Debtor Chapter 7 case (Wade Butler) at issue in
this miscellaneous proceeding, Attorney Kakol falsely stated in the Rule
2016(b) statement the services he was to provide the debtor:
5. In return for the above-disclosed fee, I have
agreed to render legal service for all aspects
of the bankruptcy case, including:
a. Analysis of the debtor’s financial situation,
and 	rendering 	advice 	to 	the 	debtor 	in
determining 	whether 	to 	file 	a 	petition 	in
bankruptcy;
b. 	Preparation 	and 	filing 	of 	any 	petition,
schedules, statement of affairs and plan which
may be required;
c. Representation of the debtor at the meeting
of creditors and confirmation hearing, and any
adjourned hearings thereof;
d. [Other provisions as needed]
Negotiations 	with 	secured 	creditors 	to
reduce market value; exemption planning;
preparation 	and 	filing 	of 	reaffirmation
agreements 	and 	applications 	as 	needed;
preparation and filing of motions pursuant to
11 USC 522(f)(2)(A) for avoidance of liens on
household goods.
(emphasis added).
The Rule 2016(b) statement Attorney Kakol filed in Wade Butler’s
case also contained a certification which stated: “I certify that the
foregoing is a complete statement of any agreement or arrangement for
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payment to me for representation of the debtor(s) in this bankruptcy
proceeding.” Attorney Kakol signed this Rule 2016(b) statement.
Second, in addition to the Rule 2016(b) statements Attorney Kakol
filed listing services he never intended to perform, Attorney Kakol also
falsely certified in the Rule 2016(b) statements he filed in seventeen of
the CMNC Debtor Chapter 13 cases that he provided the debtor with “a
copy of the ‘Rights and Responsibilities Statement Between Chapter 13
Debtors and Their Attorneys.’”40 This false certification stated as follows:
I certify that the foregoing is a complete statement
of any agreement or arrangement for payment to
me 	for 	representation 	of 	the 	debtor(s) 	in 	this
bankruptcy 	proceeding. 	Pursuant 	to 	General
Order 	No. 	9, 	I 	certify 	that 	I 	provided 	to 	the
debtor(s) a copy of the “Rights and Responsibilities
Statement Between Chapter 13 Debtors and Their
Attorneys.”
Attorney Kakol signed each Rule 2016(b) statement.41
Lastly, some of the Rule 2016(b) statements incorrectly listed the
amount of compensation Attorney Kakol was to be paid. 	In Richard
Antrican’s case, the Rule 2016(b) statement Attorney Kakol filed stated
40 Demetrias Benton is the only CMNC Debtor whose case file contained a Rights and Responsibilities
Statement. (UST Ex. 88, 15-17).
41 Attorney Kakol’s testified at trial that the Rights and Responsibilities Statement is typically
overlooked in front-page-only filings. Apr. 1, 2026, Hearing at 12:14-12:15 PM, In re Kakol,
Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-00502 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.).
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that Attorney Kakol had agreed to accept $2,000 for his legal services.
Attorney Kakol testified that this amount was incorrect. 	See Apr. 1,
2026, Hearing at 12:19 PM, In re Kakol, Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-
00502 	(Bankr. 	N.D. 	Ga.). 	In 	Wade 	Butler’s 	case, 	the 	Rule 	2016(b)
statement Attorney Kakol filed stated that he agreed to accept $975 for
his legal services. 	Edwards testified that he did not remember paying
less than $1,000 for any of the CMNC Debtors’ cases. 	(Edwards Dep.
101:2-4).
The Rule 2016(b) statements Attorney Kakol filed in the cases for
Demetrias Benton and Joshua Back incorrectly listed the amount of
compensation and the source of compensation to Attorney Kakol. 	In
these two cases, the original Rule 2016(b) statements Attorney Kakol
filed 	falsely 	listed 	the 	source 	of 	compensation 	as 	the 	Debtor—not
CMNC—and that $1,000 had been paid prior to filing with $4,030 due.
Both of these Rule 2016(b) statements were filed after the UST had put
Attorney Kakol on written notice that it was inquiring into his conduct
in the Day case, including the source of his fee. 	In both of these cases,
Attorney 	Kakol 	finally 	filed 	amended 	Rule 	2016(b) 	statements 	in
December of 2023—well after the Day Sanctions Motion had been filed—
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that listed the source of compensation as “Kyle Edwards on behalf of
CMNC Homes, LLC” with $1,000 paid prior to filing with no remaining
amount 	due. 	But 	even 	with 	the 	amendments, 	the 	Rule 	2016(b)
statements 	filed 	in 	these 	two 	cases 	(both 	original 	and 	amended)
materially 	misrepresented 	the 	scope 	of 	services 	that 	were 	to 	be
performed.
In the two cases filed after the Day Sanctions Motion was filed,
Roosevelt Williams and Gary Hartsell, Attorney Kakol filed Rule 2016(b)
statements that incorrectly listed the source of his compensation as only
“Kyle Edwards.” Attorney Kakol amended these Rule 2016(b) statements
to state the source of compensation was “Kyle Edwards on behalf of
CMNC Homes, LLC.” 	But once again, the original and amended Rule
2016(b) statements filed in these two cases materially misrepresented
the scope of services that were to be performed. 	And all of the Rule
2016(b) 	statements 	Attorney 	Kakol filed 	in these 	two 	cases 	falsely
certified that he had given these debtors a copy of the Rights and
Responsibilities Statement.
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I. 	Trial
The trial in this miscellaneous proceeding occurred over the course
of two days: April 1, 2026, and April 21, 2026.
1. Attorney Kakol’s testimony at trial
Attorney Kakol testified that he has been a member of the Georgia
Bar since 1985 and has been disciplined on several occasions by the
Georgia 	Bar.42 	Apr. 	1, 	2026, 	Hearing 	at 	11:19 	AM, 	In 	re 	Kakol,
Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-00502 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.). Attorney Kakol also
testified that he has been involved in consumer bankruptcy practice since
1988, that he has been involved in thousands of bankruptcy cases, and
that his current practice is volume filing Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
debtor cases. 	Id. at 10:16-10:17 AM & 11:24 AM. When asked at trial if
he considered himself an expert in bankruptcy law, Attorney Kakol
testified that he was “just a regular guy.”43 	Id. at 11:24 AM. 	Attorney
Kakol also testified that he is the head of his law firm and that he
supervises everyone. 	Id. at 11:25-11:26 AM.
42 Attorney Kakol also testified that he has three pending complaints against him before the State Bar
of Georgia. Apr. 1, 2026, Hearing at 11:21 AM, In re Kakol, Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-00502 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga.). At least two of these complaints are from cases he handled in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, and one of them is for James Day’s case.
43 Contrast this with Attorney Kakol’s testimony during his deposition in this miscellaneous
proceeding that “I think I am a bankruptcy expert.” (Attorney Kakol Dep. 46:19).
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Concerning the CMNC Debtor cases, Attorney Kakol testified that
the CMNC Debtor cases were front-page-only filing and were intended to
be dismissed. 	Id. at 10:38-10:39 AM. 	Attorney Kakol further testified
that the CMNC Debtor cases were not designed to work. Id. at 2:38-2:39
PM.
Attorney Kakol also testified that he was aware before he filed any
bankruptcy cases for the CMNC Debtors that CMNC had a signed
contract 	with 	each 	CMNC 	Debtor 	to 	purchase 	their 	home 	or 	the
decedent’s estate’s home where the CMNC Debtor was an heir and the
purported future representative of the decedent’s estate. See id. at 10:23
AM & 11:56-11:57 AM. Attorney Kakol acknowledged that some of the
CMNC Debtors were dealing with the loss of a loved one, were dealing
with the financial stress of foreclosure, and that there was a degree of
vulnerability with these debtors. 	Id. at 12:13-12:14 PM.
Attorney Kakol further testified that he would not have taken the
CMNC Debtor cases if the CMNC Debtors would have asked him to
review the contracts they had with CMNC. 	Id. at 10:23 AM. 	Attorney
Kakol further testified that he never referred any of the CMNC Debtors
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to another attorney to review the contracts they had with CMNC. 	Id. at
11:57 AM.
Attorney Kakol testified that the goal of each CMNC Debtor with
their bankruptcy case was to stop the foreclosure so they could sell their
home to CMNC. 	Id. at 10:27 AM. 	Attorney Kakol testified that it was
not necessary for him to know how much CMNC was paying the CMNC
Debtors for their home for him to achieve each CMNC Debtor’s goal of
selling their home to CMNC.44 	Id. at 10:31-10:32 AM. Attorney Kakol
acknowledged that this stated goal of the CMNC Debtors was without
the benefit of any advice from him to them regarding their options and
the benefit of the automatic stay. 	See id. at 3:04 PM, 3:14-3:15 PM.
Concerning the potential conflict of interest between CMNC and
the CMNC Debtors, Attorney Kakol testified that there was no conflict of
interest between CMNC’s goal of purchasing the CMNC Debtors’ homes
and the CMNC Debtors’ goal of selling their homes to CMNC because
there was a “complete alignment of interest.” 	Id. at 10:31-10:32 AM.
However, Attorney Kakol also testified that he would have left the CMNC
44 Attorney Kakol also testified that he did not know the mortgage balances on the homes CMNC was
purchasing from the CMNC Debtors. Apr. 1, 2026, Hearing at 10:55 AM, In re Kakol, Miscellaneous
Proc. No. 24-00502 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.).
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Debtors’ bankruptcy cases “in a heartbeat” and withdrawn if the CMNC
Debtors would have asked him to review their contracts with CMNC as
there would have been a conflict of interest. 	Id. at 10:35 AM. 	Attorney
Kakol also testified that he disagreed with the Court that there was a
conflict of interest in the Day case, and he also disagreed that there was
a conflict of interest in the CMNC Debtor cases. 	See id. at 12:12-12:13
PM.
Attorney Kakol also testified that the homes CMNC purchased
from the CMNC Debtors “had no market value,” Id. at 10:26 AM, but that
was based on photos of the homes taken by CMNC that he only saw after
the commencement of this miscellaneous proceeding.45 	There were no
photos of the CMNC Debtors’ homes in Attorney Kakol’s case files for the
CMNC 	Debtors 	aside 	from 	the 	few 	case 	files 	that 	had 	real estate
valuations from websites, which did not show the condition of the homes.
And there is no evidence that Attorney Kakol saw photos of the CMNC
Debtors’ homes or knew the condition of the CMNC Debtors’ homes prior
45 The photos attached to Edwards’ deposition transcript include pictures of some, but not all of the
homes and some of the pictures only show clutter. No one can competently evaluate the equity in a
property without also knowing the mortgage balance as well as the condition of the property. There
are many investors in the local foreclosure market looking for these types of properties. The better
evidence showing that the properties did indeed have value in excess of the mortgage and in excess of
what CMNC paid for them is shown in Table B (CMNC Net Profit).
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to the commencement of this miscellaneous proceeding. 	Attorney Kakol
even admitted that he did not know at the time he filed the bankruptcies
whether the CMNC Debtors could have gotten more for their homes at a
foreclosure. 	See id. at 3:00-3:01 PM.
Concerning his scope of representation of the CMNC Debtors,
Attorney Kakol testified that his representation was limited to stopping
the foreclosure sale and that he was not going to get involved with giving
the 	CMNC 	Debtors 	advice 	about 	their 	options 	instead 	of 	filing
bankruptcy or what they could do with their homes instead of selling
them to CMNC.46 	See id. at 3:14-3:15 PM. 	Alarmingly, Attorney Kakol
testified “I’m not going to give any more advice” after he stopped the
foreclosure sales with the front-page-only bankruptcy petitions. 	Id. at
3:14-3:15 PM.
When asked about the Rule 2016(b) statements and the attorney-
client agreements in the CMNC Debtor cases not having limits on the
scope 	of 	the 	representation, 	Attorney 	Kakol 	testified 	that 	these
46 During a break in Attorney Kakol’s testimony, the parties stipulated that the CMNC Debtor case
files that have handwritten notes from Attorney Kakol do not reflect any analysis by Attorney Kakol
concerning the CMNC Debtors’ assets other than there was real property CMNC was purchasing; the
CMNC Debtors’ liabilities other than there were mortgages on the real properties CMNC was
purchasing; the CMNC Debtors’ income or expenses; or any discussion of Chapter 13 plans for the
CMNC Debtors. Apr. 1, 2026, Hearing at 2:10 PM, In re Kakol, Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-00502
(Bankr. N.D. Ga.).
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documents were not tailored for limited representation.47 	Id. at 10:38
AM. 	Attorney Kakol admitted that there was nothing in writing that
limited his representation of the CMNC Debtors to just a front-page-only
filing. 	Id. at 12:09 PM.
Attorney Kakol also acknowledged that he was the head of his law
firm and that he signed the Rule 2016(b) statements filed in the CMNC
Debtor cases, and he maintained that any mistakes in the Rule 2016(b)
statements were due to his poor proofreading.48 	See id. at 10:37 AM.
Attorney Kakol also acknowledged that just because the CMNC Debtor
cases were front page only, that did not excuse him from filing Rule
2016(b) statements in those cases. 	See id. at 2:39 PM.
Attorney Kakol also made a point during his testimony to complain
that he was being singled out for front-page-only filings and that the
majority of other law firms in the Northern District of Georgia do front-
page-only filings.49 Id. at 12:09-12:10 PM. However, Attorney Kakol also
47 This testimony conflicts with the fact that the Rule 2016(b) statement filed in the Wade Bulter case
shows a more limited list of services to be provided and did not include the certification language about
the Rights and Responsibilities Statement which demonstrates that Attorney Kakol and his staff knew
how to edit what was included in the Rule 2016(b) statement.
48 Attorney Kakol’s staff member Jones testified that Attorney Kakol reviews documents before they
are filed. Apr. 1, 2026, Hearing at 3:48–3:49 p.m., In re Kakol, Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-00502
(Bankr. N.D. Ga.).
49 The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia is usually among the two or three busiest
districts in the country with respect to Chapter 13 filings, with more than 800 being filed in this
District in May 2026, alone. Yet only a handful of petitions filed by lawyers every month are dismissed
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testified that he came to the conclusion after the Day order that a front-
page-only filing that is not intended to work is not in good faith. 	See id.
at 10:45 AM. Attorney Kakol also testified that he no longer does front-
page-only filings and that his law firm made changes after the Day order.
See id. at 10:43-10:45 AM.
Lastly, Attorney Kakol testified about how the Day suspension
impacted his law firm’s finances and his personal finances. 	Attorney
Kakol testified that the Day suspension greatly impacted his law firm’s
finances, for example, that the firm’s revenues decreased substantially.
However, the Court did not receive any evidence concerning Attorney
Kakol’s 	law 	firm’s 	profitability—or 	lack 	thereof—before 	the 	Day
suspension other than the evidence presented to the Court showed that
Attorney Kakol’s law firm had to borrow $75,000 from Eakin in the
months before the Day suspension. (Defs.’ Ex. 3).
for failure to file information, and some lawyers file Rule 2016(b) statements in those cases and some
do not. The Court was not aware of the practice by some to not file Rule 2016(b) statements in these
types of cases prior to this miscellaneous proceeding. Regardless of whether other lawyers violate their
statutory obligation by not filing such statements, Attorney Kakol should have known better because
he has been sanctioned numerous times in the past by the Court for violating his obligations under
Rule 2016, so he knew he was required to file those statements. Additionally, the CMNC Debtor cases
were not typical filings because the attorney fee was paid by a third-party purchaser of property, and
the debtors did not receive the required counseling from an attorney to which they were entitled.
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Concerning the impact of the Day suspension on Attorney Kakol’s
personal finances, Attorney Kakol testified that it negatively impacted
his personal finances.50 	However, Attorney Kakol also testified that he
had no money in savings or in a retirement account before the Day
suspension, Apr. 1, 2026, Hearing at 4:15 PM, In re Kakol, Miscellaneous
Proc. No. 24-00502 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.), just like after the Day suspension.
2. Closing arguments made by the parties
The UST went through the facts and explained how Attorney Kakol
and 	his 	law 	firm 	violated 	numerous 	Georgia 	Rules 	of 	Professional
Conduct and Bankruptcy Code sections and Rules, including 11 U.S.C. §
527. The UST reminded the Court that its rulings in these types of
proceedings sets the tone for the practice in the Court.
Attorney Kakol mainly focused on a few points during his closing
argument: Attorney Kakol paid a steep price on account of the conduct in
Day; none of the CMNC Debtors showed up to complain;51 and the CMNC
Debtors were not harmed because they benefited from Attorney Kakol
50 Attorney Kakol’s testimony regarding the exact impact of the Day suspension on his personal
finances was hampered by the fact that he testified that he could not recall the last time he filed a tax
return. Consequently, those types of documents to show income were not produced. Apr. 1, 2026,
Hearing at 4:18 PM, In re Kakol, Miscellaneous Proc. No. 24-00502 (Bankr. N.D. Ga).
51 As discussed in more detail below, the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provides that
this is neither an aggravating nor mitigating factor.
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stopping 	the 	foreclosures 	by 	filing 	the 	front-page-only 	bankruptcy
petitions.
II. 	Discussion
A. Jurisdiction and venue
This Court has jurisdiction over this miscellaneous proceeding
under 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	105 	and 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	157 	and 	1334(b).52 	This
miscellaneous proceeding also constitutes a core proceeding under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) because the counts asserted in the Complaint concern
bankruptcy statutes and rules and this Court’s inherent power; there are
no state law claims; and this miscellaneous proceeding arises from the
conduct of Attorney Kakol in cases before this Court and, as an attorney,
he is an officer of this Court.53 	See In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. 675, 679 & n.1
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2015) (citations omitted) (noting that the show cause
order 	proceeding 	concerning 	an 	attorney’s 	violation 	of 	bankruptcy
statutes and rules and ethical violations was a core proceeding in part
because it arose through the attorney’s position as an officer of the court).
52 Attorney Kakol and his law firm admitted this Court had jurisdiction over the CMNC Debtor cases
and this miscellaneous proceeding. (Answer ¶ 4).
53 Attorney Kakol and his law firm admitted that this miscellaneous proceeding is a core proceeding.
(Answer ¶ 5).
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This Court is also the proper venue for this miscellaneous proceeding
under 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a).54
B. Sources of legal authority to impose sanctions and civil
penalties
Bankruptcy courts can sanction attorneys based upon the court’s
inherent authority and 11 U.S.C. § 105, Ginsberg v. Evergreen Sec., Ltd.
(In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd.), 570 F.3d 1257, 1273 (11th Cir. 2009), and can
impose civil penalties for violating 11 U.S.C. § 526.
This authority to sanction and impose civil penalties applies to
violations of rules of professional misconduct. See Parker v. Parker (In re
Parker), 485 Fed. Appx. 989, 991-92 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
1. 11 U.S.C. § 105
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) states in pertinent part that a court “may issue
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of this title” including “taking any action or making
any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement
court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.” 	Under this
statute, “a court may impose sanctions if a party violates a court order or
54 Attorney Kakol and his law firm admitted that this Court is the proper venue for this miscellaneous
proceeding. (Answer ¶ 6).
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rule.” 	In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d at 1273 (citation omitted). 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) also empowers this Court “to sanction counsel and to
discipline unprofessional conduct.” 	Cheney v. Watson (In re Recovery L.
Grp., APC), 670 B.R. 193, 237 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2025) (citations omitted).
“No finding of bad faith is necessary for the Court to exercise its statutory
authority to ensure that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are given
proper effect.” 	In re Crawford, Ch. 11 Case No. 14-28923, 2021 Bankr.
LEXIS 1152, 2021 WL 1731861, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2021)
(citation omitted); see also In re Modi, Ch. 7 Case No. 22-58929, 2023
Bankr. LEXIS 1324, at *16 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 17, 2023) (“A finding
of bad faith is not required to issue sanctions under section 105(a).”
(citation omitted)); In re Siskind, Case No. 9:17-CV-81004, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15593, 2018 WL 634547, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2018)
(noting that the bankruptcy court was not required to make a finding of
bad faith to impose sanctions under section 105(a)).
“Bankruptcy 	courts 	also 	have 	authority 	under 	section
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to suspend or disbar attorneys.” 	In re Gleason, Case
No. 11-62406, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, 2012 WL 463924, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 13, 2012) (citing In re Brooks-Hamilton, 400 B.R. 238, 246
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(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009)), aff’d, 492 Fed. Appx. 86 (11th Cir. 2012); see also
In re Baker, Ch. 7 Case No. 23-50344, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 1613, 2023 WL
4139541, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 22, 2023) (citations omitted)
(noting that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) “includes the authority to suspend the bar
privileges of attorneys who practice before it”); L. Sols. of Chi. LLC v.
Corbett, Case No. 1:18-cv-00677, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39335, 2019 WL
1125568, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2019) (noting that the court’s authority
under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) “includes conducting disciplinary proceedings
and suspending attorneys from practicing before the court” (citation
omitted)), aff’d on other grounds, 971 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2020).
2. Inherent authority
“Federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, have the inherent
power to impose sanctions on parties and lawyers.” Gwynn v. Walker (In
re Walker), 532 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). 	“Courts have long
recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers.” 	In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (citations omitted); see also In re Parker,
485 Fed. Appx. at 992 (noting that the court’s inherent authority includes
the authority to disbar attorneys). This authority to suspend and disbar
applies to law firms. 	See In re Recovery L. Grp., APC, 670 B.R. at 250
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(noting that the court’s inherent authority to suspend and disbar extends
to 	“nonmembers 	of 	the 	bar 	who 	engage 	in 	unauthorized 	activities
affecting the court” (quoting Allen v. Fitzgerald, Case No. 5:18-CV-00057,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213990, 2019 WL 6742996, at *5 (W.D. Va. Dec.
11, 2019))); Allen v. Fitzgerald, 590 B.R. 352, 359 (W.D. Va. 2018) (“[T]he
bankruptcy court had the inherent authority to prohibit Petitioners—
including any nonlawyers and law firms—from practicing in front of it.”)
3. 11 U.S.C. § 526
11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(5)(B) allows this Court to impose a civil penalty
against a person who “intentionally violated this section, or engaged in a
clear and consistent pattern or practice of violating this section.”55
11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(5) provides a bankruptcy court with the authority to
disbar an attorney from the practice of law in the bankruptcy court.
Parker v. Jacobs, 466 B.R. 542, 549 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (citations omitted)
(“Disbarment 	generally 	is 	regarded 	as 	a 	civil 	penalty.” 	(citations
omitted)), aff’d, 485 Fed. Appx. 989 (11th Cir. 2012).
55 This section is discussed in detail on pages 95-98 of this Order.
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4. Standard of proof for disbarment
Although the Court has not found an Eleventh Circuit decision
stating what the standard of proof is for disbarment when applying the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“Georgia Rules”), the Georgia
Rules require clear and convincing evidence in disciplinary proceedings.
GA. RULES OF PRO . CONDUCT 4-221.2(b); see also In re Tuggle, 892 S.E.2d
761, 776 (Ga. 2023) (citing GA. RULES OF PRO . CONDUCT 	4-221.2(b))
(noting that the “State Bar has the burden of proving violations of the
GRPC by clear and convincing evidence”). 	The Fifth Circuit has also
noted that clear and convincing evidence is required when the sanction
is disbarment. 	In re Sealed Appellant, 194 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
In light of the above authorities, the Court will apply the standard
of 	clear 	and 	convincing 	evidence. 	In 	the 	context 	of 	a 	disbarment
proceeding, clear and convincing evidence
“produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief 	or 	conviction 	as 	to 	the 	truth 	of 	the
allegations sought to be established, evidence so
clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to
enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts”
of the case.
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In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 n.11 (1990)).
C. Attorney Kakol violated many Georgia Rules.
Attorneys who practice in this Court are governed by the Georgia
Rules, “contained in the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of
Georgia, and judicial decisions interpreting those rules and standards.”
In re Cabe & Cato, Inc., 524 B.R. 870, 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014) (citation
omitted).
As will be explained below, Attorney Kakol violated Georgia Rules
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 3.3, and 5.4.56
1. Attorney Kakol did not competently represent the
CMNC Debtors, impermissibly limited his scope of
representation, and failed to act diligently in the
CMNC Debtor cases.
a. Competence (Georgia Rule 1.1)
Georgia Rule 1.157 deals with competence and states in pertinent
part: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. . . .
56 As noted above, the cases at issue in this miscellaneous proceeding span a date range where the
earliest case was filed on April 4, 2022, and the latest case was filed December 4, 2023. Georgia Rules
1.0, 1.2, and 1.8 were amended during this time frame, and Rule 1.0 was amended further in 2025.
However, these amendments are not material to this miscellaneous proceeding. Additionally, these
amendments do not substantively impact the portions of the Georgia Rules and comments cited in this
Order, but the ordering of defined terms in Georgia Rule 1.0 has changed. For ease of reference, the
current version of the Georgia Rules is cited.
57 The maximum penalty for a violation of Georgia Rule 1.1 is disbarment. G A. R ULES OF PRO. C ONDUCT
1.1.
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Competence 	requires 	the 	legal 	knowledge, 	skill, 	thoroughness 	and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” GA. RULES OF
PRO . CONDUCT 1.1.
Competence in the context of representing a debtor in a bankruptcy
case requires an attorney to “analyze the client's financial situation,
advise the client about whether to file for bankruptcy and if so, under
what chapter, and assist the client in completing the petition, schedules,
statements, and other documents necessary for the filing.” 	Cheney v.
Watson (In re Recovery L. Grp., APC), 670 B.R. 193, 238 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2025) (quoting 	In re White, 659 B.R. 68, 79 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2024)).
Additionally, the “attorney is required to perform a reasonable inquiry to
include interviewing the client, requiring the client to produce relevant
information, 	reviewing 	the 	client's 	financial 	documents 	and 	other
information, and resolving any inconsistencies prior to filing the case.”
Id. at 238-39 (quoting In re Burnett, Ch. 7 Case No. 21-02018, 2022
Bankr. LEXIS 684, 2022 WL 802586, at *6 (Bankr. D.S.C. Mar. 16,
2022)).
Here, Attorney Kakol did not provide competent representation to
the CMNC Debtors because he did none of the above. 	It is clearly
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established in the miscellaneous proceeding that Attorney Kakol did not
analyze the CMNC Debtors’ financial situations. 	It is also clear that
Attorney Kakol did not advise the CMNC Debtors whether they needed
to file for bankruptcy and their options in bankruptcy, nor did he
complete any schedules or statements in the CMNC Debtor cases, let
alone gather any other financial information to properly advise the
CMNC Debtors. Also, Attorney Kakol’s “interview” of the CMNC Debtors
consisted of a short phone call with the purchaser of the CMNC Debtors’
property (Edwards, an employee of CMNC) on the phone call. 	Thus,
Attorney Kakol failed to competently represent the CMNC Debtors.
b. Limited representation (Georgia Rule 1.2)
Attorney Kakol argues that he could limit his representation of the
CMNC 	Debtors 	to 	just 	filing 	a 	front-page-only 	bankruptcy 	petition
because he said that was their goal, albeit a goal arrived at without the
benefit of competent legal advice. 	This constitutes an impermissible
limitation on his representation under Georgia Rule 1.2 and this Court’s
Local Rules.
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Georgia 	Rule 	1.2 	addresses 	limitations 	of 	representation 	by
attorneys.58 	Specifically, section (c) of Georgia Rule 1.2 states that “[a]
lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives
informed consent.” G A. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.2(c).
Georgia Rule 1.0 defines “reasonable” and “informed consent.”
“‘Reasonable’ or ‘reasonably’ when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer
denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.” GA.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.0(y). 	“Informed consent” is defined as “the
agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer
has communicated adequate information and explanation about the
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct.” 	G A. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.0(n).
The comments to Georgia Rule 1.2 provide helpful insight into the
Rule. The comments state in part:
[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer
may be limited by agreement with the client or by
the terms under which the lawyer’s services are
made available to the client. When a lawyer has
been 	retained 	by 	an 	insurer 	to 	represent 	an
insured, for example, the representation may be
58 The maximum penalty for a violation of Georgia Rule 1.2 is disbarment. G A. R ULES OF PRO. C ONDUCT
1.2.
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limited 	to 	matters 	related 	to 	the 	insurance
coverage. 	A 	limited 	representation 	may 	be
appropriate 	because 	the 	client 	has 	limited
objectives for the representation. In addition, the
terms upon which representation is undertaken
may exclude specific means that might otherwise
be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. Such
limitations may exclude actions that the client
thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as
repugnant or imprudent.
[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and the
client 	substantial 	latitude 	to 	limit 	the
representation, the limitation must be reasonable
under the circumstances. If, for example, a client’s
objective is limited to securing general information
about the law the client needs in order to handle a
common 	and 	typically 	uncomplicated 	legal
problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the
lawyer’s 	services 	will 	be 	limited 	to 	a 	brief
telephone 	consultation. 	Such 	a 	limitation,
however, 	would 	not 	be 	reasonable 	if 	the 	time
allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon
which 	the 	client 	could 	rely. 	Although 	an
agreement for a limited representation does not
exempt 	a 	lawyer 	from 	the 	duty 	to 	provide
competent 	representation, 	the 	limitation 	is 	a
factor to be considered when determining the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation. See
Rule 1.1.
G A. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.2 cmts. 6 & 7.
The Georgia Rules are not the only rules that attorneys practicing
before this Court must follow if they wish to limit the representation of
their clients. Pursuant to General Order 42-2020 (the “General Order”),
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this Court has also adopted its own rules with regard to how and whether
attorneys may limit their representation of clients. 	See Amended and
Restated Order with Regard to Fees, Expenses and Costs of Attorneys for
Debtors in Chapter 13 Cases, General Order No. 42-2020 (Bankr. N.D.
GA, January 6, 2021).59
The 	General 	Order 	states 	clearly 	and 	concisely 	that 	the
“[a]ttorney must represent Debtor in all matters.” Id. § 1.0, at 2
(emphasis 	added). 	It 	continues: 	“Attorneys 	representing 	Debtors 	in
Chapter 13 cases must represent the Debtor in all matters related to the
case that affect the Debtor’s interests unless the attorney is permitted to
withdraw by order of the Court.” Id. As the Court put it in In re Egwim,
“Regardless of whether a valid limitation on services as between lawyer
and client is established, . . . the lawyer must represent the client until
withdrawal is permitted.” 291 B.R. 559, 574-75 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2003).
Egwim has been the standard of practice in this Court for more than
twenty years.
The General Order directs any attorney wishing to limit his or her
representation of a client to the Local Rules of the Bankruptcy Court for
59 Future citations to the General Order will be shortened to simply “General Order.”
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the 	Northern 	District 	of 	Georgia 	(the 	“Local 	Rules”) 	pertaining 	to
withdrawal from representation. 	General Order § 1.0 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
Jan. 6, 2021). 	Local Rule 9010-5 delineates, among other things, the
rules for withdrawal from representation of a client in a case before this
Court. Section (a) states the withdrawal policy as follows:
An 	attorney 	who 	has 	appeared 	in 	a 	case 	or
adversary proceeding, other than for the limited
purpose 	of 	receiving 	notices, 	must 	obtain
permission 	from 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Court 	to
withdraw as counsel, unless substitute counsel
has made an appearance for that party. Counsel
may make a fee arrangement limiting the services
to be performed without the payment of additional
fees, 	but 	the 	failure 	of the 	client, 	including 	a
debtor, to comply with the fee arrangement is
merely a ground to seek withdrawal and not a
basis on which the attorney may refuse to render
services. Counsel will not ordinarily be allowed to
withdraw if withdrawal would delay the progress
of an adversary proceeding or contested matter.
Bankr. N.D. Ga. R. 9010-5(a).
“Whether an attorney will be permitted to withdraw involves both
procedural and substantive issues.” 	In re Egwim, 291 B.R. at 575.
Section (b) of Local Rule 9010-5 maps out the procedures that must be
followed before an attorney is allowed to withdraw. 	That section states
that an attorney desiring to withdraw as counsel “must give fourteen
days’ notice to the client of the attorney’s intention to request permission
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to withdraw” and “file a motion with the Bankruptcy Clerk requesting
permission to withdraw,” which the Bankruptcy Clerk will submit to the
bankruptcy judge with any responses. Bankr. N.D. Ga. R. 9010-5(b).
Section 	(c) 	of 	Local 	Rule 	9010-5 	provides 	attorneys 	with 	an
alternative set of procedures for withdrawal when a client consents. That
section states in pertinent part that
[a]n attorney wishing to withdraw may be relieved
from the requirement to send a notice of intent to
withdraw and to file a motion to withdraw by
instead filing a Certificate of Consent with the
Bankruptcy Clerk that has been signed by the
client, 	the 	withdrawing 	attorney, 	and 	the
substituting attorney, if one has been selected by
the client.
Bankr. N.D. Ga. R. 9010-5(c).
“An attorney desiring to limit the scope of an engagement has the
burden of demonstrating compliance with all of the conditions required
for the validity of the limitation.” 	In re Egwim, 291 B.R. at 572. 	Aside
from ensuring that attorneys follow the appropriate procedures, courts
also “have an interest in the proper administration of justice and in
having parties before them properly represented.” 	Id. at 576. 	“For this
reason, courts have always limited the right of attorneys to withdraw
from a case once they have appeared.” 	Id. 	Court approval “involves
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considerations 	of 	fairness, 	reasonableness 	and 	proper 	protection 	of
debtor’s rights based on the circumstances in each case.” Id. (quoting In
re Pair, 77 B.R. 976, 979 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987)). 	Moreover, “counsel
cannot be permitted to initiate cases and then simply abandon debtors.”
Id. (quoting In re Pair, 77 B.R. at 979).
Beginning with Georgia Rule 1.2, the CMNC Debtors did not give
informed consent to the limited representation of nothing more than a
front-page-only 	bankruptcy 	petition. 	Informed 	consent 	requires
communication of “adequate information and explanation about the
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct.” See GA. RULES OF PRO . CONDUCT 1.0(n). The evidence
is clear that Attorney Kakol never advised the CMNC Debtors of their
options. There is also no evidence that Attorney Kakol communicated to
the CMNC Debtors the consequences of filing bankruptcy.
Additionally, 	Attorney 	Kakol 	did 	not 	discuss 	with 	the 	CMNC
Debtors their alternatives to filing bankruptcy as he testified that he was
not going to get involved in giving the CMNC Debtors advice about
alternatives to filing bankruptcy. Instead, Attorney Kakol has taken the
position that each CMNC Debtor’s alleged goal was to file bankruptcy to
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stop a foreclosure and sell their home to CMNC. This, he said, “excused”
him from looking at the real estate purchase contracts the CMNC
Debtors had with CMNC and analyzing other financial information.
Thus, it was impossible for the CMNC Debtors to have given informed
consent to the limited representation.
In addition to the CMNC Debtors not giving informed consent to
the limited representation, Attorney Kakol’s limitation of representation
of the CMNC Debtors to the mere filing of a front-page-only bankruptcy
petition was unreasonable. Attorney Kakol’s only “advice” to the CMNC
Debtors was that they could file bankruptcy and stop a foreclosure.
However, many of the CMNC Debtors had already signed a real estate
purchase contract with CMNC that required them to file bankruptcy.
Moreover, Attorney Kakol’s “advice” was unreasonable because the
CMNC Debtors did not know what their options were and Attorney Kakol
refused 	to 	inform 	them 	of 	their 	options. 	Evidence 	of 	this 	limited
representation being unreasonable is Teresa Blythe’s case where she told
Edwards 	that 	she 	wanted 	to 	keep 	her 	home 	instead 	of 	selling 	it.
Additional evidence is Callie Moore’s case where Callie Moore asked
Edwards “why didn’t you tell me I could have gotten a lot more for this
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house than what you offered . . . you knew what I was going through and
how hard this was for me and you took advantage of that.” (UST Ex. 81) .
Unfortunately, Attorney Kakol never advised Teresa Blythe or Callie
Moore of their options instead of selling their homes to CMNC.
Lastly, evidence that Attorney Kakol’s limitation on representation
was impermissible are the CMNC Debtor cases which have attorney-
client agreements and Rule 2016(b) statements. These documents show
no such limitation on Attorney Kakol’s representation.
Turning to the General Order and the Local Rules, Attorney Kakol
also completely ignored the General Order and this Court’s procedure for
a limited representation that requires withdrawal from the case, which
failure also makes this alleged limitation per se unreasonable. The
General Order required Attorney Kakol to represent the CMNC Debtors
“in all matters,” not only the one or ones Attorney Kakol picks and
chooses. Had Attorney Kakol followed the procedures in the Local Rules
and General Order, this Court would have received either a motion to
withdraw or a certificate of consent immediately after the petitions were
filed. This would have been extremely unusual and possibly never seen
before in this Court, which would have immediately sounded alarms and
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likely sparked some investigation by the Chapter 13 Trustee, the UST
and the Court through an emergency status conference to inquire into
what was going on.
Instead, the effect of failing to follow these procedures was to
obscure the supposed “limited representation” to allow the CMNC Debtor
cases to fly under the radar. 	This would avoid any scrutiny into the
underlying facts by Court, the Chapter 13 Trustee, or the UST because
proper disclosure would have revealed a situation where the CMNC
Debtors 	were 	not 	being 	adequately 	represented 	in 	bankruptcy
proceedings.
c. Diligence (Georgia Rule 1.3)
Georgia Rule 1.360 	states “A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence
as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to
the 	detriment 	of 	the 	client 	in 	effect 	willfully 	abandon 	or 	willfully
disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.” 	GA. RULES OF PRO .
CONDUCT 1.3.
60 The maximum penalty for a violation of Georgia Rule 1.3 is disbarment. G A. R ULES OF PRO. C ONDUCT
1.3.
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Attorney 	Kakol 	did 	not 	exercise 	diligence 	in 	representing 	the
CMNC Debtors because he did not obtain the necessary information to
adequately represent them and abandoned the CMNC Debtor cases.
Attorney Kakol also never filed statements and schedules in the CMNC
Debtor cases and failed to respond to deficiency notices by the Court and
allowed the CMNC Debtors bankruptcy cases to be dismissed when a
different strategy would have potentially been more beneficial. 	Thus,
Attorney Kakol violated Georgia Rule 1.3.
2. There was a conflict of interest between CMNC and
the 	CMNC 	Debtors, 	and 	CMNC 	interfered 	with
Attorney Kakol’s professional independence.
Like in Day, Attorney Kakol was paid his fee for filing the CMNC
Debtor cases from the third party CMNC. While accepting an attorney’s
fee from a third party is not always impermissible, the third party may
have competing interests with the debtor, which can lead to a conflict of
interest in the attorney’s representation of that debtor.
a. Conflict of interest (Georgia Rule 1.7)
Georgia Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts of interest generally.61 	It
states in part:
61 The maximum penalty for a violation of Georgia Rule 1.7 is disbarment. G A. R ULES OF PRO. C ONDUCT
1.7.
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(a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to
represent a client if there is a significant risk that
the lawyer’s own interests or the lawyer’s duties to
another client, a former client, or a third person
will 	materially 	and 	adversely 	affect 	the
representation of the client, except as permitted in
(b).
GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.7(a).
Sections (b) and (c) of Georgia Rule 1.7 address when the informed
consent of a client may permit a lawyer to represent that client in the
face of a conflict. Those sections provide:
(b) 	If 	client 	informed 	consent 	is 	permissible 	a
lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a
significant risk of material and adverse effect if
each affected client or former client gives informed
consent 	confirmed 	in 	writing62 	to 	the
representation 	after: 	(1) 	consultation 	with 	the
lawyer, 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	1.0(c);63 	(2) 	having
received 	in 	writing 	reasonable 	and 	adequate
information 	about 	the 	material 	risks 	of 	and
reasonable 	available 	alternatives 	to 	the
representation; 	and 	(3) 	having 	been 	given 	the
opportunity to consult with independent counsel.
(c) Client informed consent is not permissible if the
62 Confirmed in writing
when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes
informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing
that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral
informed consent. . . . 	If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the
writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer
must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.
G A. R ULES OF PRO. C ONDUCT 1.0(d).
63 “‘Consult’ or ‘consultation’ denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the
client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.” G A. R ULES OF PRO. C ONDUCT 1.0(e).
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representation: (1) is prohibited by law or these
Rules; (2) includes the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the
lawyer 	in 	the 	same 	or 	substantially 	related
proceeding; 	or 	(3) 	involves 	circumstances
rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer
will be able to provide adequate representation to
one or more of the affected clients.
GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.7(b), (c).
The 	comments to the 	definition of informed consent 	from the
Georgia Rules provide in part:
[6] . . . The communication necessary to obtain
such 	consent 	will 	vary 	according 	to 	the 	Rule
involved and the circumstances giving rise to the
need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client
or other person possesses information reasonably
adequate 	to 	make 	an 	informed 	decision.
Ordinarily, this will require communication that
includes 	a 	disclosure 	of 	the 	facts 	and
circumstances giving rise to the situation, any
explanation reasonably necessary to inform the
client or other person of the material advantages
and 	disadvantages 	of 	the 	proposed 	course 	of
conduct and a discussion of the client’s or other
person’s 	options 	and 	alternatives. 	In 	some
circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer
to advise a client or other person to seek the advice
of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client
or other person of facts or implications already
known to the client or other person; nevertheless,
a lawyer who does not personally inform the client
or other person assumes the risk that the client or
other person is inadequately informed and the
consent is invalid. In determining whether the
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information 	and 	explanation 	provided 	are
reasonably 	adequate, 	relevant 	factors 	include
whether the client or other person is experienced
in legal matters generally and in making decisions
of the type involved, and whether the client or
other 	person 	is 	independently 	represented 	by
other counsel in giving the consent. Normally,
such 	persons 	need 	less 	information 	and
explanation than others, and generally a client or
other person who is independently represented by
other 	counsel 	in 	giving 	the 	consent 	should 	be
assumed to have given informed consent.
[7] 	Obtaining 	informed 	consent 	will 	usually
require an affirmative response by the client or
other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume
consent from a client’s or other person’s silence.
Consent 	may 	be 	inferred, 	however, 	from 	the
conduct 	of 	a 	client 	or 	other 	person 	who 	has
reasonably 	adequate 	information 	about 	the
matter.
GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.0 cmts. 6 & 7.
The comments to Georgia Rule 1.7 elucidate the finer points of the
Rule and what constitutes a conflict of interest. Pertinent excerpts from
the comments on loyalty to a client include:
[1] 	Loyalty 	and 	independent 	judgment 	are
essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to
a client. If an impermissible conflict of interest
exists 	before 	representation 	is 	undertaken 	the
representation 	should 	be 	declined. 	The 	lawyer
should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate
for the 	size 	and type 	of firm 	and 	practice, 	to
determine 	in 	both 	litigation 	and 	non-litigation
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matters the parties and issues involved and to
determine whether there are actual or potential
conflicts of interest.
[2] Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer
cannot 	consider, 	recommend 	or 	carry 	out 	an
appropriate course of action for the client because
of the lawyer’s other competing responsibilities or
interests. 	The 	conflict 	in 	effect 	forecloses
alternatives that would otherwise be available to
the 	client. 	Paragraph 	(a) 	addresses 	such
situations. 	A 	possible 	conflict 	does 	not 	itself
preclude the representation. The critical questions
are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate
and, 	if 	it 	does, 	whether 	it 	will 	materially
interfere 	with 	the 	lawyer’s 	independent
professional 	judgment 	in 	considering
alternatives or foreclose courses of action
that reasonably should be pursued on behalf
of the client. Consideration should be given to
whether the client wishes to accommodate the
other interest involved.
GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.7 cmts. 1 & 2 (emphasis added).
The comments on conflicts related to a lawyer’s own interests and
the interests of third parties paying for a lawyer’s services also provide
helpful insight pertinent to the facts of this case. Those comments state:
[6] The lawyer’s personal or economic interests
should not be permitted to have an adverse effect
on representation of a client. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5.
If the propriety of a lawyer’s own conduct in a
transaction 	is 	in 	serious 	question, 	it 	may 	be
difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a
client objective advice. A lawyer may not allow
related business interests to affect representation,
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for example, by referring clients to an enterprise
in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.
. . . .
[10] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than
the client, if the client is informed of that fact and
gives informed consent and the arrangement does
not compromise the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the
client. 	See 	Rule 	1.8(f). 	For 	example, 	when 	an
insurer and its insured have conflicting interests
in 	a 	matter 	arising 	from 	a 	liability 	insurance
agreement, and the insurer is required to provide
special counsel for the insured, the arrangement
should assure the special counsel’s professional
independence. So also, when a corporation and its
directors 	or 	employees 	are 	involved 	in 	a
controversy 	in 	which 	they 	have 	conflicting
interests, the corporation may provide funds for
separate legal representation of the directors or
employees, if the clients give informed consent and
the arrangement ensures the lawyer’s professional
independence.
GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.7 cmts. 6 & 10.
b. 	Conflict 	of 	interest: 	prohibited 	transactions
(Georgia Rule 1.8)
Georgia Rule 1.8 addresses conflicts of interest and prohibited
transactions, such as transactions where a third-party pays a lawyer’s
fee. Section (f) of Georgia Rule 1.8 provides:
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for
representing a 	client 	from one 	other than 	the
client unless: (1) the client gives informed consent;
(2) 	there 	is 	no 	interference 	with 	the 	lawyer’s
independence of professional judgment or with the
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client-lawyer 	relationship; 	and 	(3) 	information
relating to representation of a client is protected
as required by Rule 1.6.64
G A. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.8(f).65
The comment to section (f) of Georgia Rule 1.8 states:
[5] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a
client under circumstances in which a third person
will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part.
The third person might be a relative or friend, an
indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company)
or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along
with 	one 	or 	more 	of 	its 	employees). 	Because
third-party payers frequently have interests
that differ from those of the client, including
interests in minimizing the amount spent on the
representation 	and 	in 	learning 	how 	the
representation 	is 	progressing, 	lawyers 	are
prohibited 	from 	accepting 	or 	continuing
such 	representations 	unless 	the 	lawyer
determines that there will be no interference
with the lawyer’s independent professional
judgment 	and 	there 	is 	informed 	consent
from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting
interference with a lawyer’s professional judgment
by one who recommends, employs or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another).
64 Georgia Rule 1.6 deals with confidentiality of client information. It states in part:
(a) A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the
professional relationship with a client, including information which the
client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client,
unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are
required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court.
G A. R ULES OF PRO. C ONDUCT 1.6(a).
65 The maximum penalty for a violation of Georgia Rule 1.8(f) is a public reprimand. G A. R ULES OF
PRO. C ONDUCT 1.8.
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GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.8 cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
c. Professional independence of a lawyer (Georgia
Rule 5.4)
Lastly, Georgia Rule 5.4 addresses the professional independence
of a lawyer. That rule states in part that “[a] lawyer shall not permit a
person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal
services 	for 	another 	to 	direct 	or 	regulate 	the 	lawyer’s 	professional
judgment in rendering such legal services.” G A. RULES OF PRO . CONDUCT
5.4(c).66
d. Attorney Kakol violated Georgia Rules 1.7, 1.8, and
5.4.
Attorney Kakol argues that there was no conflict of interest by
CMNC paying his fee for the nineteen CMNC Debtor cases because the
interest of CMNC and the CMNC Debtors were completely aligned.
However, “Multiple representation by a lawyer in a transaction between
a buyer and seller has been characterized as the clearest instance of
improper representation of conflicting interests.” 	4 RONALD E. MALLEN ,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 34:12 (2026 ed.), Westlaw (footnote omitted).
Attorney Kakol receiving his fee from CMNC for the CMNC Debtor
66 The maximum penalty for a violation of Georgia Rule 5.4 is disbarment. G A. R ULES OF PRO. C ONDUCT
5.4.
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cases impaired his loyalty to his client, interfered with his professional
judgment, and materially and adversely affected his representation of
the CMNC Debtors. 	This is a direct violation of Georgia Rules 1.7 and
1.8. 	Attorney Kakol also allowed the third party (CMNC) to direct or
regulate his representation of the CMNC Debtors in violation of Georgia
Rule 5.4.
Attorney Kakol violated Georgia Rule 1.7(a) because he allowed his
own interest in receiving his fee from CMNC and “preventing” a conflict
of interest from arising between CMNC and the CMNC Debtors to limit
his ability to “consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of
action” for the CMNC Debtors, which “materially and adversely affect[ed]
the representation.” See G A. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.7(a) & cmt. 2.
This is evident by Attorney Kakol’s testimony that (a) he would not have
taken the CMNC Debtor cases if he was asked to review the real estate
purchase contracts because it would have been a conflict of interest and
(b) that he would have withdrawn from the CMNC Debtor cases if the
CMNC Debtors asked him about their real estate purchase contracts
with CMNC because a conflict of interest would have been present.
Ultimately, Attorney Kakol’s perceived “duties” to the “third person”
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(CMNC) that paid his fee “foreclose[d] courses of action that reasonably
should [have been] pursued.” 	See GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.7(a) &
cmt. 2.
Attorney Kakol also violated Georgia Rule 1.7(b). In the face of the
glaring conflict of interest, there is no evidence of informed consent from
the CMNC Debtors. 	First, there is no evidence that the CMNC Debtors
consulted Attorney Kakol concerning the significant risk of the conflict of
interest between CMNC and the CMNC Debtors. 	Instead, Attorney
Kakol testified that he was not going to get involved with giving the
CMNC Debtors advice about their options. 	Second, there is no evidence
that 	Attorney 	Kakol 	provided 	in 	writing 	to 	the 	CMNC 	Debtors
“reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and
reasonable available alternatives to the representation.” GA. RULES OF
PRO . CONDUCT 1.7(b)(2). Lastly, nothing at all indicates that the CMNC
Debtors were given an “opportunity to consult with independent counsel.”
GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.7(b)(3).
Attorney Kakol accepting his attorney fee from Edwards on behalf
of CMNC in the CMNC Debtor cases without obtaining informed consent,
without preventing interference with his independence and professional
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judgment 	or 	the 	client-lawyer 	relationship, 	and 	without 	shielding
information 	relating 	to 	the 	representation 	of 	the 	CMNC 	Debtors
constitutes a violation of Georgia Rule 1.8(f).
Attorney Kakol does not meet a single requirement of the three
under Georgia Rule 1.8(f). 	First, none of the CMNC Debtors gave
informed consent to this arrangement. 	Second, there was interference
with Attorney Kakol’s independence of professional judgment and with
the 	client-lawyer 	relationship. 	This 	is 	evident 	by 	Attorney 	Kakol’s
testimony that he would have withdrawn from CMNC Debtor cases if the
CMNC Debtors asked him about their real estate purchase contracts
with CMNC. 	Additionally, Edwards’ text messages with some of the
CMNC 	Debtors 	show 	how 	CMNC 	interfered 	with 	the 	client-lawyer
relationship by Edwards telling the CMNC Debtors that he and the
CMNC Debtor would call Attorney Kakol to discuss an issue.
Lastly, information relating to the representation of the CMNC
Debtors was hardly protected as required by Georgia Rule 1.6.67 	From
the beginning of the “representation” Edwards was present. 	Edwards
67 “Rule 1.6 applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all
information gained in the professional relationship, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose
such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.”
G A. R ULES OF PRO. C ONDUCT 1.6 cmt. 5.
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was present during every first phone call between Attorney Kakol and
the CMNC Debtors. 	Attorney Kakol also texted Edwards information
about some of the CMNC Debtor cases. 	Attorney Kakol’s staff member
Eakin did this as well.
Attorney Kakol also allowed the third-party payer (CMNC) to
regulate his professional judgment in rendering legal services in violation
of Georgia Rule 5.4(c). 	Anytime Attorney Kakol filed a bankruptcy case
for a CMNC Debtor, he did so at the request of Edwards at CMNC. In
each instance, Edwards reached out to Attorney Kakol and asked if he
could file a bankruptcy to stop a foreclosure. Each time, Edwards set up
a three-way call with Attorney Kakol and the CMNC Debtor and he
remained on the line for the entire call. 	Edwards “drove the train” in
these cases. This is also evident by Attorney Kakol’s staffs’ Best Case
notes where there are notes that Attorney Kakol’s staff called Edwards
to see if he wanted Attorney Kakol to refile Sandra Byrd’s bankruptcy
case and that Edwards wanted Lottie Harmon’s bankruptcy case filed by
a specific date.
Attorney Kakol was also aware that CMNC had an interest in
purchasing the CMNC Debtors’ homes, and if Attorney Kakol actually
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provided competent representation to the CMNC Debtors and advised
them of their options, Edwards would not have been happy and would
probably 	not 	have 	sent 	any 	further 	cases 	to 	him. 	With 	those
considerations at the front of his mind, Attorney Kakol allowed Edwards
to “direct or regulate” his “professional judgment in rendering legal
services” to the CMNC Debtors in violation of Georgia Rule 5.4. See GA.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 5.4(c).
Attorney Kakol argues that the CMNC Debtors signed the contracts
with CMNC before he got involved and that he was not hired to evaluate
whether going through with the contracts was a good idea for the CMNC
Debtors. 	This is precisely the problem. CMNC hired Attorney Kakol to
file the bankruptcy cases for the CMNC Debtors, and CMNC “direct[ed]”
the representation. 	Edwards was also present for the initial phone call
that Attorney Kakol had with each CMNC Debtor, which had the effect
of “regulat[ing]” his “professional judgment.” See GA. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT 5.4(c).
3. Attorney Kakol violated Georgia Rule 3.3 by filing
false Rule 2016(b) statements.
Georgia Rule 3.3 deals with a lawyer’s duty of candor to the
tribunal. Georgia Rule 3.3(a) states in pertinent part that “A lawyer shall
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not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal.” GA. RULES OF PRO . CONDUCT 3.3(a)(1). “Knowingly . . . denotes
actual knowledge of the fact in question. 	A person’s knowledge may be
inferred from the circumstances.” GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 1.0(o).
The comments to Georgia Rule 3.3 instruct that the Rule “sets forth
the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that
undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process” and that “[t]here
are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of
an affirmative misrepresentation.” GA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT 3.3 cmts.
2 & 3. 	Further, submission of a sworn statement to a court containing
false information violates the duty of candor. See In re Branan, 798
S.E.2d 218, 218-19 (Ga. 2017).
Attorney Kakol violated Georgia Rule 3.3(a)(1). 	First, Attorney
Kakol’s 	failure 	to 	file 	the 	required 	Rule 	2016(b) 	statements 	until
compelled to do so—especially after he had been sanctioned numerous
times 	in 	the 	past 	for 	violating 	the 	Rule—is 	the 	equivalent 	of 	an
affirmative misrepresentation in this situation. 	Second, every Rule
2016(b) statement he filed in the CMNC Debtor cases was a false
statement about the scope of services he was to provide to the CMNC
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Debtors. Third, in seventeen of the eighteen CMNC Debtors Chapter 13
cases, Attorney Kakol’s Rule 2016(b) statement also falsely certified that
he had given the CMNC Debtor a copy of the Rights and Responsibilities
Statement. Lastly, some of the Rule 2016(b) statements – even some filed
after the UST put Attorney Kakol on written notice of its investigation
into his conduct in Day – contained knowingly false statements about the
source of his compensation being the Debtor or Edwards instead of
CMNC.
Attorney 	Kakol 	also 	knew 	when 	he 	filed 	the 	Rule 	2016(b)
statements in the CMNC Debtor cases that they were false. 	Attorney
Kakol cannot escape his violations of Georgia Rule 3.3(a)(1) by arguing
the CMNC Debtor cases were front-page-only filings where the Rule
2016(b) 	statements 	were 	not 	tailored 	to 	this 	purported 	“limited
representation.” 	The software on which these statements are produced
is a fillable form which can easily be edited.
Nor can Attorney Kakol escape violating Georgia Rule 3.3(a)(1) by
blaming the Rule 2016(b) statements on his poor proofreading. The false
statements contained within the 	Rule 	2016(b) statements were 	not
isolated grammatical or punctuation mistakes but consisted of more than
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100 words and stretched over the course of two pages. It was obvious on
their face that they were materially inaccurate.
Further, 	because 	of 	Attorney 	Kakol’s 	prior 	history 	of 	being
sanctioned numerous times for Rule 2016(b) statement violations, he was
all too aware of the importance of not just filing these statements but
making them materially accurate. Yet he knowingly filed materially false
Rule 	2016(b) 	statements 	even 	after 	the 	UST 	notified 	him 	it 	was
conducting an investigation of his conduct in Day and then after the UST
filed the Day Sanctions Motion. Thus, Attorney Kakol knowingly violated
Georgia Rule 3.3(a)(1).
D. Attorney Kakol failed to follow the Bankruptcy Code,
Rule 2016, and this Court’s General Order.
Attorneys filing Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases must also abide by
certain rules and regulations and make various disclosures.
1. Attorney Kakol failed to comply with the Rights and
Responsibilities 	Statement 	requirement 	of 	the
General Order.
The Rights and Responsibilities Statement refers to a document
that outlines various topics debtors and their attorneys must discuss and
actions debtors and their attorneys must undertake before filing and
during the pendency of a Chapter 13 case. 	General Order § 8.0 & Ex. A
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(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2021). 	Additionally, before filing a Chapter 13
petition, the attorney for the debtor must provide the debtor with a copy
of 	the 	Rights 	and 	Responsibilities 	Statement. 	General 	Order 	§ 	8.0
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2021). 	The attorney for the debtor must also
certify in the Rule 2016(b) statement that the attorney provided the
debtor with a copy of the Rights and Responsibilities Statement. 	Id.
Pursuant to the Rights and Responsibilities Statement, attorneys
representing 	Chapter 	13 	debtors 	must 	undertake 	the 	following
obligations prior to filing the petition:
1. Personally 	counsel 	Debtor 	regarding 	the
advisability of filing either a Chapter 13 or a
Chapter 	7 	case, 	discuss 	with 	Debtor 	the
procedures 	in 	both 	Chapters, 	as 	well 	as
nonbankruptcy 	options, 	and 	answer 	Debtor’s
questions.
2. Personally explain to Debtor the requirement of
obtaining a certificate from an approved nonprofit
budget and credit counseling agency.
3. Personally explain to Debtor that the attorney is
being engaged to represent Debtor on all matters
arising in the case and explain how and when the
attorney’s 	fees 	and 	the 	trustee’s 	fees 	are
determined and paid.
4. Personally 	review 	with 	Debtor 	and 	obtain
Debtor’s signature on the completed petition, plan,
as well as the Statement of Financial Affairs,
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Income and Expenses, and other statements as
well as the various schedules (the “Schedules”),
and all amendments thereto, whether filed with
the 	petition 	or 	later. 	The 	Schedules 	may 	be
prepared 	initially 	with 	the 	help 	of 	clerical 	or
paralegal staff of the attorney’s office, but personal
attention of the attorney is required for the review
and signing by Debtor.
5. Timely prepare and file Debtor’s petition, plan,
Schedules, statement of monthly net income, and
any other required pleading.
6. Explain to Debtor how, when and where to make
all necessary payments, including both payments
that 	must 	be 	made 	directly 	to 	creditors 	and
payments that must be made to the Chapter 13
Trustee, 	with 	particular 	attention 	to 	housing,
vehicle, 	and 	domestic 	support 	obligation
payments.
7. Advise 	Debtor 	of 	the 	need 	to 	maintain
appropriate insurance especially for house and
vehicle.
8. Inform Debtor of the need to potentially provide
attorney with copies of each Federal income tax
return (or transcript of the return) for each tax
year ending while the Debtor is in the case.
General Order, Ex. A, 2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2021) (footnotes
omitted).
Attorney Kakol’s testimony and the case files he produced for the
CMNC Debtor cases show that he did not comply with the Rights and
Responsibilities Statement requirement of the General Order. 	First, as
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explained above, Attorney Kakol did not advise the CMNC Debtors on
their non-bankruptcy options, or the advisability of filing a Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13 case, or the procedures in those types of cases. 	Second,
Attorney Kakol never prepared and filed the CMNC Debtors’ schedules
and plan, let alone gather the requisite information to adequately advise
the CMNC Debtors about filing for bankruptcy relief. 	Lastly, Attorney
Kakol 	also 	did 	not 	provide 	a 	written 	copy 	of 	the 	Rights 	and
Responsibilities Statement to seventeen of the eighteen CMNC Debtors
in Chapter 13 cases even though he falsely certified that he did so in the
Rule 2016(b) statements he filed in those CMNC Debtor cases. 	Thus,
Attorney Kakol violated the General Order.
2. Attorney Kakol failed to comply with 11 U.S.C. §§ 527
and 528.
Attorney Kakol has admitted in his Answer to the Complaint that
one or more of the CMNC Debtors qualified as “assisted person[s]”68
under 11 U.S.C. § 101(3), and Attorney Kakol and his law firm acted as
68 An “assisted person” is defined as a person “whose debts consist primarily of consumer debts and
the value of whose nonexempt property is less than” $226,850 (for cases filed between March 27, 2022,
and June 20, 2022) and $256,800 (for cases filed on June 21, 2022, and afterwards). See 11 U.S.C. §
101(3) (March 27, 2022, through June 20, 2022, version of statute for $226,850 amount); 11 U.S.C. §
101(3) (June 21, 2022, through current version of statute for $256,800 amount).
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a “debt relief agency”69 under 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A).70 Upon the Courts
review of the record, including the petitions filed in the twenty two cases
in this miscellaneous proceeding, it appears that at least sixteen of the
CMNC Debtors qualified as assisted persons71 and Attorney Kakol and
his law firm acted as a debt relief agency. Had Attorney Kakol performed
the required due diligence to provide the CMNC Debtors the financial
analysis which they were entitled to receive, the record would have been
clearer on this issue with respect to all of the CMNC Debtors. 	Thus, 11
U.S.C. §§ 526-528 apply to Attorney Kakol and his law firm with respect
to at least sixteen of the CMNC Debtors.
a. 11 U.S.C. § 527
Under 11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(1), debt relief agencies must provide to
their clients a written notice containing “a brief description of [] (A)
69 “The term ‘debt relief agency’ means any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an
assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration . . . .” 11 U.S.C. §
101(12A); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 U.S. 1324, 1333-34 (2010)
(attorneys are debt relief agencies when they provide qualifying services to assisted persons).
70 See (Compl. ¶¶ 26-27); (Answer ¶¶ 26-27) (admitting the allegations in paragraphs 26-27 of the
Complaint that one or more of the CMNC Debtors was an “assisted person” and that Attorney Kakol
acted as a “debt relief agency” in one or more of the CMNC Debtor cases). “[A] party is bound by the
admissions in his pleadings.” Best Canvas Prods. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d
618, 621 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
71 The five debtors where it is unclear whether they qualify as assisted persons are Christy Fowler,
Wade Butler, Tavius Maddox, Jr., Yung Lai, and Gunther Czarnecki. It is not clear whether these
debtors qualify as assisted persons because their assets are listed on their bankruptcy petitions as
being worth between $100k-$500k. None of these debtors’ bankruptcy filings contain any schedules
or statements to calculate whether they were assisted persons. For purposes of this Order, the Court
will exclude Leonard Henderson as an “assisted person.”
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chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13, and the general purpose, benefits, and costs of
proceeding under each of those chapters; and (B) the types of services
available from credit counseling agencies[.]” 	11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(1); 11
U.S.C. § 342(b)(1). 	11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(2) requires debt relief agencies to
provide a “clear and conspicuous written notice” to assisted persons
regarding, among other things, the importance of accurate and complete
disclosures of information provided in the petition and other filings in a
bankruptcy case. 	See 11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(2). 	Debt relief agencies must
maintain a copy of the notices required under subsection (a) for two years.
11 U.S.C. § 527(d).
11 U.S.C. § 527(b) further provides that debt relief agencies shall
provide to assisted persons, at the same time as the notices required
under 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	527(a)(1), 	a 	written 	statement 	that 	contains
information such as the debtor’s bankruptcy options. See 11 U.S.C. §
527(b); In re Dobbs, 535 B.R. 675, 684 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2015) (Ҥ 527
requires that attorneys provide a statement with information about
bankruptcy assistance services, so as to ensure that debtors are able to
make an informed decision as to whether or not to file.” (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 527(b)). 	The written statement “shall be clear and conspicuous and
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shall be in a single document separate from other documents or notices
provided to the assisted person.” 11 U.S.C. § 527(b)
Attorney Kakol violated 11 U.SC. § 527(a) and (b). 	In the sixteen
case files produced for the CMNC Debtors who clearly qualified as
assisted persons, there is no written notice which complies with 11 U.S.C.
§ 527(a)(1). In addition to violating 11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(1), Attorney Kakol
also violated 11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(2) in David Jennings’ case and Teresa
Blythe’s case because (1) they qualified as assisted persons and (2) there
was no written notice which complied with 11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(2) in the
case files produced for each case. 	Attorney Kakol violated 11 U.S.C. §
527(b) for the sixteen CMNC Debtors who qualified as assisted persons
because he failed to provide the written notice required under that
section. Therefore, Attorney Kakol violated 11 U.S.C. § 527(a) and (b).
b. 11 U.S.C. § 528
11 U.S.C. § 528(a) states in pertinent part that a debt relief agency
shall
(1) not later than 5 business days after the first
date 	on 	which 	such 	agency 	provides 	any
bankruptcy 	assistance 	services 	to 	an 	assisted
person, but prior to such assisted person’s petition
under 	this 	title 	being 	filed, 	execute 	a 	written
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contract with such assisted person that explains
clearly and conspicuously—
(A) the services such agency will provide to such
assisted person; and
(B) the fees or charges for such services, and the
terms of payment;
(2) provide the assisted person with a copy of the
fully executed and completed contract.
Of the seventeen case files produced for the CMNC Debtor cases,72
four of them did not contain an attorney-client agreement. These CMNC
Debtors are Christy Fowler, David Jennings, Teresa Blythe, and Tavius
Maddox. 	Thus, Attorney Kakol violated 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(1)-(2) with
respect to David Jennings and Teresa Blythe (who qualify as assisted
persons) because there is no written contract specifying the services
Attorney Kakol and his firm were to provide and the fee for such services.
3. Attorney 	Kakol 	failed 	to 	timely, 	properly, 	and
accurately file Rule 2016(b) statements.
Both 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) and Rule 2016(b) mandate that an attorney
file a statement disclosing the facts and circumstances of the attorney’s
compensation in the case. 	Within fourteen days of filing the petition,
72 Attorney Kakol did not produce case files for CMNC Debtors Wade Butler or Joshua Back. The
Court also did not receive any evidence on whether there were attorney-client agreements in these two
cases.
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attorneys must file a statement disclosing “the compensation paid or
agreed to be paid” within the previous year “for services rendered or to
be rendered in contemplation of or in connection with the case by such
attorney and the source of compensation.” 	See 11 U.S.C. § 329(a); F ED .
R. BANKR. P. 2016(b). A debtor’s attorney must “lay bare all its dealings
. . . regarding compensation . . . . Counsel’s fee revelations must be direct
and comprehensive. Coy, or incomplete disclosures . . . are not sufficient.”
Jensen v. U.S. Tr. (In re Smitty’s Truck Stop, Inc.), 210 B.R. 844, 848
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Neben & Starrett, Inc. v. Chartwell Fin.
Corp. (In re Park-Helena Corp.), 63 F.3d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Regardless of the source of payment and regardless of whether the
attorney 	seeks 	payment 	from 	the 	estate 	or 	another 	source, 	the
disclosures of fee arrangements must be full and complete. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 329(a); F ED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(b); Mapother & Mapother, P.S.C. v.
Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 1996). The precise
nature of the fee arrangement must be disclosed, not merely the identity
of the ultimate owner of the funds. 	In re Park-Helena Corp., 63 F.3d at
881 (citations omitted). Pursuant to the General Order, the Rule 2016(b)
statement must “[d]escribe all fees, expenses and costs received before
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the 	filing 	of the 	case 	and 	the 	amounts 	and 	method 	of 	any 	future
payments[.]” General Order § 5.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2021).
It 	is 	clear 	that 	Attorney 	Kakol 	failed 	to 	comply 	with 	these
provisions. First, in the majority of the CMNC Debtor cases, Attorney
Kakol did not file a Rule 2016(b) statement until months after the case
was dismissed and only after the UST had filed the Day Sanctions
Motion.73 	This failure occurred even though Attorney Kakol has been
sanctioned by this Court numerous times in the past for failing to file
Rule 2016(b) statements.
Second, the Rule 2016(b) statements Attorney Kakol filed in every
CMNC Debtors case were materially false about the scope of legal
services he was going to render to the CMNC Debtor. 	Attorney Kakol
never intended to “render legal service for all aspects of the bankruptcy
case[s.]” 	Additionally, the Rule 2016(b) statements filed in all of the
CMNC Debtor cases except those of Demetrias Benton and maybe Joshua
Back,74 were materially false because Attorney Kakol certified that he
73 Attorney Kakol never filed a Rule 2016(b) statement in Yung Lai’s case and Gunther Czarnecki’s
case. The Court would inquire into that in a separate show cause hearing on those cases if the Court
ordered a lesser sanction in this miscellaneous proceeding.
74 The Court includes Joshua Back in this list solely because Attorney Kakol did not produce a case
file for Joshua Back, and there is no evidence that Attorney Kakol provided Joshua Back with a copy
of the Rights and Responsibilities Statement.
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had given the Debtor a copy of the Rights and Responsibilities Statement.
Third, the Rule 2016(b) statements filed in Richard Antrican’s case
and 	Wade 	Butler’s 	case 	falsely 	listed 	the 	amount 	of 	compensation
Attorney Kakol was to receive.
Fourth, the original Rule 2016(b) statements filed in the cases of
Roosevelt Williams and Gary Hartsell were materially false because they
both listed the 	source of compensation as “Kyle Edwards” with no
mention of CMNC. 	Attorney Kakol subsequently amended these Rule
2016(b) statements to disclose that the source of compensation was “Kyle
Edwards on behalf of CMNC Homes, LLC” but these amended Rule
2016(b) 	statements 	were 	still 	materially 	false 	concerning 	the 	legal
services Attorney Kakol was to provide the Debtors and that Attorney
Kakol 	had 	provided 	each 	Debtor 	with 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	Rights 	and
Responsibilities Statement.
Lastly, the original Rule 2016(b) statements Attorney Kakol filed
in the cases of Demetrias Benton and Joshua Back were materially false
because they listed the source of compensation as the Debtor and that
$1,000 had been paid prior to filing with $4,030 due. And these were filed
with knowingly false and material information even after the UST had
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put Attorney Kakol on written notice it was looking into similar conduct
in Day. 	In both of these cases, Attorney Kakol filed amended Rule
2016(b) 	statements 	in 	December 	of 	2023 	that 	listed 	the 	source 	of
compensation as “Kyle Edwards on behalf of CMNC Homes, LLC” with
$1,000 paid prior to filing with no remaining amount due. 	Once again,
though, these amended Rule 2016(b) statements were materially false in
regard to legal services Attorney Kakol was to provide these Debtors.
4. Attorney Kakol intentionally violated 11 U.S.C. § 526
or 	engaged 	in 	a 	clear 	and 	consistent 	pattern 	of
violating 11 U.S.C. § 526.
11 U.S.C. § 526(a) states in pertinent part:
A debt relief agency shall not—
(1) 	fail 	to 	perform 	any 	service 	that 	such
agency 	informed 	an 	assisted 	person 	or
prospective assisted person it would provide
in 	connection 	with 	a 	case 	or 	proceeding
under this title;
(2) make any statement . . . in a document
filed in a case or proceeding under this title,
that is untrue or misleading, or that upon the
exercise of reasonable care, should have been
known 	by 	such 	agency 	to 	be 	untrue 	or
misleading;
(3) misrepresent to any assisted person or
prospective 	assisted 	person, 	directly 	or
indirectly, 	affirmatively 	or 	by 	material
omission, with respect to—
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(A) 	the 	services 	that 	such 	agency 	will
provide to such person; or
(B) the benefits and risks that may result
if such person becomes a debtor in a case
under this title.
If a debt relief agency intentionally violated 11 U.S.C. § 526 “or
engaged in a clear and consistent pattern or practice of violating” 11
U.S.C. § 526, the court can impose a civil penalty against the debt relief
agency. 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(5). Attorney Kakol did both.
Concerning intent, “‘[b]ecause direct evidence of intent is rarely
available, a court may infer intent from the totality of the circumstances,’
and reckless indifference may be sufficient to establish intent in some
cases.” L. Sols. of Chi. LLC v. Corbett, Case No. 1:18-cv-00677, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 39335, 2019 WL 1125568, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2019)
(citation modified) (quoting In re DeJulio, 322 B.R. 456, 461 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2005)), aff’d, 971 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2020).
The Court finds that Attorney Kakol intentionally violated 11
U.S.C. 	§ 	526(a)(2) 	by 	filing Rule 2016(b) statements 	that 	he 	knew
contained materially untrue statements. 	Attorney Kakol’s intent is
evidenced by the fact that he admitted to reviewing the Rule 2016(b)
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statements before they were filed; almost all of the portions of the Rule
2016(b) statement form the attorney fills in contained untrue statements;
and Attorney Kakol filed them even after the UST notified him in writing
that it was investigating his conduct in Day, including the terms of his
fee agreement with CMNC and James Day.
There are numerous examples of Attorney Kakol’s intent. First, it
is undisputed that all of the Rule 2016(b) statements Attorney Kakol filed
in the CMNC Debtor cases listed services he knew he never intended to
provide the CMNC Debtors. Second, the vast majority of the Rule 2016(b)
statements Attorney Kakol filed in the CMNC Debtor cases contained the
knowingly untrue statement that he had provided the CMNC Debtor
with a copy of the Rights and Responsibilities Statement. 	Lastly, after
being put on written notice of UST investigation of his conduct in Day,
Attorney Kakol still made the knowingly false representation in the Rule
2016(b) statements in the cases of Demetrias Benton and Joshua Back
that his fee was paid by the debtors as opposed to CMNC.
In addition to, or in the alternative to, the finding that Attorney
Kakol intentionally violated 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(2), at the bare minimum,
Attorney Kakol “engaged in a clear and consistent pattern or practice” of
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filing knowingly false Rule 2016(b) statements because every single Rule
2016(b) statement he filed in the CMNC Debtor cases contained at least
one materially untrue statement.
E. Attorney Kakol’s acts constitute bad faith and subject
him to this Court’s inherent power.
Attorney 	Kakol 	acted 	in 	bad 	faith 	by: 	(1) 	failing 	to 	make 	a
reasonable investigation into the facts of the CMNC Debtors’ financial
situations and underlying facts and never intending to properly advise
the CMNC Debtors as required by law; (2) filing the bankruptcy petitions
in the CMNC Debtor cases with no intent of ever properly prosecuting
the cases, not timely filing Rule 2016(b) statements, and not voluntarily
dismissing 	the 	cases; 	and 	(3) 	filing 	knowingly 	false 	Rule 	2016(b)
statements.
“To impose sanctions under the court's inherent power, the court
must find bad faith.” 	Ginsberg v. Evergreen Sec., Ltd. (In re Evergreen
Sec., Ltd.), 570 F.3d 1257, 1273 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A
finding 	of 	bad 	faith 	is 	warranted 	where 	an 	attorney 	knowingly 	or
recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for
the purpose of harassing an opponent. A party also demonstrates bad
faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or hampering enforcement
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of a court order.” Id. at 1273-74 (quoting Gwynn v. Walker (In re Walker),
532 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008)). 	Additionally, in egregious cases,
“the pursuit of a claim without reasonable inquiry into the underlying
facts can be the basis for a finding of bad faith.” 	Id. at 1274 (quoting
Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998)). 	Lastly, “A
consistent failure to disclose and pattern of misrepresentations may
demonstrate bad faith if it rises to the level of a systemic abuse of
process.” 	In re Nilhan Devs., LLC, Ch. 11 Case No. 15-58443, 2021
Bankr. LEXIS 1632, 2021 WL 2546032, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 21,
2021) (citation omitted).
1. Attorney Kakol failed to make a reasonable inquiry
into 	the 	CMNC 	Debtors’ 	financial 	situation 	and
underlying facts.
Attorney Kakol did not make a reasonable inquiry into the CMNC
Debtors’ 	financial 	situation 	and 	underlying 	facts 	before 	filing 	the
bankruptcy petitions. 	It is clear that Attorney Kakol did not gather
sufficient information from the CMNC Debtors concerning their financial
situations. The parties stipulated during trial that Attorney Kakol’s
handwritten notes in the case files produced for the CMNC Debtors show
no analysis concerning the CMNC Debtors’ assets (other than there was
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a home CMNC was buying), liabilities (other than there was a mortgage
on the home CMNC was buying), or income and expenses.
If Attorney Kakol had made a reasonable investigation into the
CMNC Debtors’ financial situation and underlying facts, Attorney Kakol
may have realized that filing bankruptcy was not in the best interest of
some of the CMNC Debtors or maybe it was in the best interest of some
of the CMNC Debtors to use the automatic stay to sell their homes to
someone other than CMNC. 	But Attorney Kakol refused to do this
because he was only paid by CMNC to stop a foreclosure and was not
going to get involved in looking at the CMNC Debtors’ financial situation
and the real estate contracts the CMNC Debtors had with CMNC. 	And
thus, Attorney Kakol filed front-page-only petitions with the Court with
no 	information 	to 	determine 	the 	CMNC 	Debtors’ 	actual 	financial
situation and whether the CMNC Debtors actually qualified for or would
benefit from bankruptcy relief.
There are further issues with Attorney Kakol’s failure to make a
reasonable investigation into the CMNC Debtors’ financial situation and
underlying facts. 	Bankruptcy cases were filed for debtors who may not
have even had any creditors. Bankruptcy cases were also filed for debtors
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who were only getting $2,500 or less from CMNC, yet their credit records
are now burdened with a bankruptcy filing.
2. Attorney Kakol abused the bankruptcy process.
Attorney Kakol abused the bankruptcy process by filing front-page-
only petitions with no intent of ever properly prosecuting the cases, not
timely filing Rule 2016(b) statements, and then filing knowingly and
materially false Rule 2016(b) statements. 	Bankruptcy courts can use
their inherent authority to sanction for conduct that abuses the judicial
process. 	In re United States Corp. Co., Ch. 11 Case No. 20-40375, 2021
Bankr. LEXIS 745, 2021 WL 1100078, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Jan. 22,
2021) (citations omitted). “This power is derived from the court's need to
manage [its] own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.” 	Id. (quoting In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d at
1263).
Filing multiple front-page-only petitions with no intent of properly
prosecuting them is an abuse of the bankruptcy process. 	See In re
Armwood, 175 B.R. 779, 782-83, 787, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994). 	In
Armwood the debtor filed bankruptcy five times, with the third, fourth,
and fifth bankruptcy filings being front-page-only with no schedules or
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plan filed with the petitions. Id. at 782-83.75 All of the bankruptcies were
dismissed. Id. at 783, 791. The petition filed in the fifth bankruptcy case
only listed one creditor on the mailing matrix, which was the lienholder
on the debtor’s car and was done to stop the repossession of the car. 	Id.
at 783, 787. 	The Court held that this constituted an abuse of the
bankruptcy system and bad faith. 	Id. at 787. 	In imposing sanctions on
the debtor and the debtor’s attorney, the court noted that its inherent
powers allowed it “to regulate its own docket to ensure the process is not
being abused.” 	Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
Although the facts in Armwood are distinguishable, the principles
still apply here. Attorney Kakol abused the bankruptcy process by filing
front-page-only filings merely to stop a foreclosure on the CMNC Debtors’
properties so CMNC could buy time to purchase the properties—as
opposed to assisting the CMNC Debtors to maximize the value of the
homes.
Additionally, Attorney Kakol did not file the required statements,
schedules, and Rule 2016(b) statements in the CMNC Debtor cases and
never intended to. 	This resulted in the Court having to issue deficiency
75 The same attorney represented the debtor in the third and fifth bankruptcy filings. In re Armwood,
175 B.R. at 783.
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notices and expend resources to dismiss these cases for failure to cure
filing deficiencies since Attorney Kakol did not voluntarily dismiss them.
Lastly, the reason Attorney Kakol’s abuse of the bankruptcy system
on behalf of CMNC stopped was the UST filing the Day Sanctions Motion.
There is no evidence before the Court that Attorney Kakol would have
stopped this abuse of the bankruptcy system without the Day Sanctions
Motion and resulting Day suspension. Attorney Kakol even testified that
after the Day order was issued he realized that front-page-only filings,
with no intent to ever prosecute them, were not in good faith.76
3. Attorney Kakol filed knowingly false Rule 2016(b)
statements.
Filing misleading Rule 2016(b) statements can constitute bad faith
and subject an attorney to sanctions under a court’s inherent powers. 	L.
Sols. Of Chi. LLC v. Corbett, Case No. 1:18-cv-00677, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39335, 2019 WL 1125568, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2019) aff’d,
971 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2020). 	Here, it is clear that the Rule 2016(b)
76 This Court is not setting forth a per se rule that a front-page-only filing can never be something
other than an abusive filing. That issue is not before the Court at this time. What is an abuse of the
system is what Attorney Kakol did: file a front-page-only case without obtaining the necessary
information to properly advise the debtor of his or her options, after receiving a fee from a third-party
purchaser which was not disclosed to the Court as required by law, for the purpose of stopping a
foreclosure to allow the purchaser who paid the fee time to buy the debtor’s house rather than
prosecute the case for the benefit of the debtor.
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statements Attorney Kakol filed were false because they listed services
that Attorney Kakol never intended to perform and had not performed.
Additionally, the Rule 2016(b) statements falsely certified in almost all
of the CMNC Debtor cases that Attorney Kakol had provided a copy of
the Rights and Responsibilities Statement to the Debtor.
Further compounding Attorney Kakol’s bad faith is that he filed the
majority of the Rule 2016(b) statements in the CMNC Debtor cases only
after the UST filed the Day Sanctions Motion. In the two CMNC Debtor
cases (Demetrias Benton and Joshua Back) that Attorney Kakol filed a
Rule 2016(b) statement before the Day Sanctions Motion—but after the
UST put Attorney Kakol on written notice of its investigation of his
conduct in Day—Attorney Kakol knowingly misrepresented that it was
the CMNC Debtor who paid his attorney fee for the bankruptcy when it
was in fact CMNC. It was not until after the Day Sanctions Motion was
filed that Attorney Kakol decided to amend the Rule 2016(b) statements
in these cases to list the true source of compensation: “Kyle Edwards on
behalf of CMNC Homes, LLC.”
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F. Sanctions to be imposed on Attorney Kakol and his law
firm
Having determined that the UST proved by clear and convincing
evidence that Attorney Kakol violated certain Georgia Rules, Bankruptcy
Code sections and Rule 2016, and Local Rules and General Orders of this
Court in the CMNC Debtor cases, the Court turns to what sanctions
should 	be 	imposed 	on 	Attorney 	Kakol 	and 	his 	law 	firm 	for 	these
violations.
1. ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
In deciding the sanctions to be imposed on a lawyer, the Georgia
Supreme Court and the Southern District of Georgia use the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”). 	In re
Hawk, Misc. No. 115-006, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168527, 2016 WL
7157977, at *11 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2016) (noting that because the Georgia
Supreme Court uses the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
the court would also utilize the ABA Standards); Knox v. Hayes, 933 F.
Supp. 1573, 1584 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (applying the ABA Standards), aff’d,
108 F.3d 343 (11th Cir. 1997); In re Aplin, 922 S.E.2d 777, 780 (Ga. 2025)
(noting 	that 	the 	Georgia 	Supreme 	Court 	“generally 	relies 	on 	the
American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
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for guidance in determining the appropriate level of discipline, including
aggravating and mitigating factors”).
The 	ABA 	Standards 	set 	up 	a 	framework 	to 	analyze 	attorney
misconduct. 	This 	Court 	will 	utilize 	the 	1992 	version 	of 	the 	ABA
Standards because the Georgia Supreme Court has indicated that it
approves of the 1992 version.77 In re Arrington, 878 S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ga.
2022).
After 	a 	finding 	of 	attorney 	misconduct, 	a 	court 	considers 	the
following factors in imposing sanctions: “(a) the duty violated; (b) the
lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the
lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating
factors.” ABA S TANDARDS art. III, § 3.0 (A.B.A. 1992); see also In re Hood,
909 	S.E.2d 	445, 	449 	(Ga. 	2024) 	(“The 	ABA 	Standards 	recommend
consideration 	of 	the 	duty 	violated, 	the 	lawyer's 	mental 	state, 	the
potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.”).
77 The Court has reviewed the 2012 version of the ABA Standards, and the differences between them
are minor and not material to this miscellaneous proceeding.
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a. Duties Attorney Kakol violated
A lawyer owes duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and
the profession. 	ABA S TANDARDS art. II (A.B.A. 1992). 	As explained
above, Attorney Kakol violated Georgia Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 3.3,
and 5.4. 	Attorney Kakol also violated Bankruptcy Code sections, Rule
2016, and this Court’s Local Rules and General Orders.
Attorney 	Kakol 	violated 	his 	duties 	to 	his 	clients, 	the 	CMNC
Debtors. 	Specifically, he violated his duties to the CMNC Debtors of
competence, 	diligence, 	failure 	to 	preserve 	the 	CMNC 	Debtors’
confidences, and failure to avoid conflicts of interest. 	ABA S TANDARDS
art. III, §§ 4.2-4.5 (A.B.A. 1992).
Attorney Kakol also violated his duties to the legal system by filing
false Rule 2016(b) statements and abusing the bankruptcy process. 	See
id. §§ 6.1-6.2. 	Attorney Kakol abused the bankruptcy process by filing
front-page-only petitions with no intent to properly prosecute them.
Attorney Kakol also made no effort to obtain the requisite information
about the CMNC Debtors’ financial affairs to assist the CMNC Debtors
to make informed decisions after being explained their options about how
their case should proceed.
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The recommended disciplinary sanctions in the ABA Standards for
these violations are set forth in Appendix B.
b. Attorney Kakol’s mental state
The ABA Standards ask whether a lawyer acted intentionally,
knowingly, or negligently. ABA S TANDARDS art. II (A.B.A. 1992). “Intent”
is 	defined 	as 	“the 	conscious 	objective 	or 	purpose 	to 	accomplish 	a
particular result.” 	ABA S TANDARDS art. III, Definitions (A.B.A. 1992).
“Knowledge” is defined as “the conscious awareness of the nature or
attendant 	circumstances 	of 	the 	conduct 	but 	without 	the 	conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” 	Id. 	“Negligence”
is defined as “the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that
circumstances exist 	or that 	a result 	will follow, which failure 	is a
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would
exercise in the situation.” 	Id.
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	Attorney 	Kakol’s 	mental 	state 	was 	not
negligent 	for 	any 	of 	his 	violations 	because 	he 	has 	been 	practicing
consumer bankruptcy law for more than twenty years and has been
sanctioned for some of these same violations in the past.
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Instead, the Court finds that Attorney Kakol intentionally violated
his duties to his clients. First, Attorney Kakol intentionally violated the
duty of confidentiality because he responded to Edwards’ request for
information on some of the CMNC Debtor cases and allowed Edwards to
participate in the entire 	calls with them. 	Second, Attorney Kakol
intentionally violated the duty of diligence because he intentionally did
not gather the requisite financial information to analyze his clients’
situations and never intended to properly prosecute the bankruptcy cases
for the benefit of his clients and allowed the cases to be dismissed to the
potential 	disadvantage 	of 	and 	serious 	injury 	to 	his 	clients. 	Third,
Attorney Kakol intentionally violated the duty of competence because he
attempted to limit his representation of the CMNC Debtors to what
amounted to basically no representation in an attempt to “avoid” a
conflict of interest.
Lastly, Attorney Kakol intentionally violated his duty to avoid
conflicts of interest because he was aware there was a great potential for
a conflict of interest between CMNC and the CMNC Debtors. This is
evidenced by the fact that Attorney Kakol stated he would not have
represented the CMNC Debtors if they asked questions about their
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contracts with CMNC. Instead of heeding this great potential for a
conflict 	of 	interest, 	Attorney 	Kakol 	attempted 	to 	limit 	his
“representation” of the CMNC Debtors to filing front-page-only petitions
and 	providing 	no 	advice. 	As 	will 	be 	explained 	below, 	this 	caused
potentially serious injury to the CMNC Debtors.
The Court also finds that Attorney Kakol intentionally abused the
bankruptcy system. 	Attorney Kakol filed front-page-only petitions with
no intent whatsoever of properly prosecuting them for the benefit of his
clients 	and 	failed 	to 	provide 	the 	CMNC 	Debtors 	with 	adequate
representation. 	Attorney Kakol also intentionally signed and filed false
Rule 2016(b) statements for the reasons stated above.
c. The potential or actual injury caused by Attorney
Kakol’s misconduct
The ABA Standards define “Injury” in pertinent part as “harm to a
client, the public, the legal system, or the profession which results from
a lawyer’s misconduct. The level of injury can range from ‘serious’ injury
to ‘little or no’ injury[.]” ABA S TANDARDS art. III, Definitions (A.B.A.
1992). 	The ABA Standards define “Potential injury” as “the harm to a
client, the public, the legal system or the profession that is reasonably
foreseeable at the time of the lawyer’s misconduct, and which, but for
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some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the
lawyer’s misconduct.” 	Id.
Attorney 	Kakol’s 	misconduct 	harmed 	the 	legal 	system. 	As
explained above, Attorney Kakol abused the bankruptcy process. 	The
court in In re Armwood aptly described the effect of the abuse of the
bankruptcy system by front-page-only filings:
When one or more attorneys allow one or more
clients 	to 	abuse 	the 	system, 	the 	harm 	which
devolves is not limited to the affected creditors. By
example 	and 	word 	of 	mouth, 	the 	"technique"
spreads until it is no longer perceived by the Bar
and by debtors as an abuse but as a permissible
manipulation of the 	system. 	In the 	meantime,
respect 	for 	the 	bankruptcy 	system, 	including
attorneys 	who 	wish 	to 	assist 	honest 	debtors,
deteriorates. When public respect for any part of
the 	legal 	system 	falters, 	it 	harms 	everyone
involved in the system, which must rely on honest
participation.
175 B.R. 779, 791 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
Attorney Kakol’s testimony complaining about being singled out for
front-page-only filings and that other law firms do front-page-only filings
in the Northern District of Georgia78 illustrates the court’s concern in
78 There was no evidence that the cases in which other attorneys filed front-page-only filings are really
similar to this case, such as filing them after taking fees from third parties who are looking to purchase
the debtor’s home and where the lawyer provided no meaningful analysis of the debtor’s financial
condition or counsel regarding alternatives. Nor have those attorneys been sanctioned repeatedly by
this Court for violating Rule 2016(b) and other Bankruptcy Code sections.
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Armwood. Attorney Kakol’s argument was essentially that even though
he has been sanctioned in the past for similar conduct, other people do it
so it should be okay. That is simply wrong.
Attorney Kakol’s misconduct also harmed the CMNC Debtors. One
of the arguments Attorney Kakol makes is that the CMNC Debtors were
not harmed by his conduct but rather their homes or the homes subject
to probate were saved by him because the CMNC Debtors would have
gotten nothing if their properties were sold at foreclosure instead of to
CMNC.79 The argument is basically that the CMNC Debtors were better
off even though Attorney Kakol violated his ethical duties. But as Judge
Mullins pointed out to Attorney Kakol at a disciplinary hearing in 2009
in 	Hill, the attorney’s responsibilities under the Georgia Rules and
Bankruptcy 	Code 	and 	Rules 	don’t 	cease 	just 	because 	there 	is 	an
emergency, such as a foreclosure. 	See Transcript of Motion to Show
Cause Hearing on February 19, 2009, 10:5-11, In re Hill, Ch. 13 Case No.
07-67074-CRM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2009), Dkt. No. 65.
79 The argument was also made that by stopping the foreclosure Attorney Kakol also gave the CMNC
Debtors the opportunity to sell the properties to whoever they wanted to, but Attorney Kakol never
discussed that option with them or advised them how continued bankruptcy protection could help them
maximize the value of the property through a reasonable marketing process.
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The Court’s own experience shows that this argument that the
CMNC Debtors were not harmed is just wrong. 	Although a foreclosure
auction does not bring a fair market value sale price, there are many
potential buyers of these types of properties who monitor the foreclosure
market and bid at these auctions. By contractually requiring the CMNC
Debtors to file for bankruptcy to stop the foreclosure, CMNC gave itself
more 	time 	to 	purchase 	the 	property 	and 	protected 	itself 	from 	the
competitive bidding process that could have resulted at a foreclosure
auction.
If it was true that the CMNC Debtors would not have gotten
anything at foreclosure, one certainly has to wonder why CMNC would
have agreed to pay the CMNC Debtors more than it could have purchased
the property for at foreclosure. 	Obviously, CMNC did not want to take
that chance and wanted to tie the property up before competitive bidding
at a foreclosure auction occurred. 	This Court knows that excess bids do
occur and the excess proceeds are paid into bankruptcy cases. This Court
has recently had one such case where a third party bid in excess of 70%
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of fair market value and the excess proceeds of more than $160,000 were
paid into the bankruptcy case.80
Attorney Kakol’s argument that he helped the CMNC Debtor’s get
something instead of nothing is based on the pictures of some of the
properties in Edwards’ deposition. 	But Edwards only provided pictures
of 	twelve 	of 	nineteen 	CMNC 	Debtors’ 	properties.81 	Despite 	being
cluttered, it is clear that some of the properties did not require much
work, as evidenced by CMNC costs set forth in Table B of this Order.
For example, CMNC only had costs of $4,410 on Jerome Davis’
property—including the bankruptcy and probate costs—so the property
was in decent shape and readily saleable. 	And CMNC had a net return
on investment of 79% and a net profit of more than $71,000 on that
property. Clearly, those facts show that Attorney Kakol’s failure to advise
Jerome Davis of his options and the alternatives to the sale of the
property to CMNC involved at least the potential for serious harm to
Jerome Davis.
80 See In re Parham, Ch. 13 Case No. 26-51165-JRS (Bankr. N.D. Ga.).
81 These CMNC Debtors are Lottie Harmon, Joshua Back, David Jennings, Teresa Blythe, Gary
Hartsell, Amanda Gutierrez, Shanterri Slaton, Richard Antrican, Jerome Davis, Christy Fowler,
Kareem Kenyada, and Glynetta Anderson. See (Edwards Dep. Exs. D002-D013).
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Another 	example 	is 	Amanda 	Gutierrez. 	The 	mortgage 	on 	the
property that was the subject of her case was only about $12,000 and only
about 	$15,000 	was 	spent 	by 	CMNC 	on 	that 	property—including
bankruptcy and probate costs. 	Because CMNC had a net return on
investment of 36% after sale of that property, it is apparent that the
failure of Attorney Kakol to advise her of her options—which could also
have potentially included assumption or modification of the mortgage or
the sale of the property after a reasonable marketing period—involved at
least the potential for serious harm to her.
The potential serious harm to every CMNC Debtor is illustrated in
Table B of this Order. 	The fact is that CMNC had a return on its
investment—after rehab costs—of 129%, 79%, 70%, 48% and 47% on the
properties 	it 	purchased 	from 	Joshua 	Back, 	Jerome 	Davis, 	Richard
Antrican, David Jennings and Lottie Harmon, respectively, yet it only
paid 	these 	debtors 	$15,000, 	$10,000, 	$6,000, 	$5,000 	and 	$2,500
respectively. 	This is clear and convincing evidence of the potential for
serious harm to them. 	Most of the CMNC Debtors had the potential to
get more for the property at issue either through a foreclosure auction or
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a reasonable marketing period that bankruptcy should have provided to
them.
In addition, there was the potential for serious harm to Kareem
Kenyada and Lottie Harmon, who filed bankruptcy and injured their
credit records to receive a mere $2,000 and $2,500, respectively, without
having the benefit of competent advice from an attorney whether that
was a good idea. This is not a new issue from a Court to Attorney Kakol:
Judge Mullins also lectured him on the harm to a debtor’s credit record
by filing bankruptcy without understanding the consequences of such a
filing in Hill. 	Transcript of Motion to Show Cause Hearing on February
19, 2009, 13:8-17, In re Hill, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-67074-CRM (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Apr. 10, 2009), Dkt. No. 65.
Furthermore, we can see from text messages between Edwards and
Callie 	Moore 	and 	Edwards 	and 	Teresa 	Blythe 	that 	there 	was 	the
potential for serious harm to them because they indicated they wanted to
sell the properties for more than CMNC was offering, yet they received
no counseling from Attorney Kakol that would have let them know they
did have options that potentially could have improved the sale price they
received from the properties.
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Ultimately, after considering the duties Attorney Kakol violated,
Attorney Kakol’s mental state, and the potential or actual serious injury
caused 	by 	Attorney 	Kakol’s 	misconduct, 	and 	applying 	the 	Court’s
findings to the ABA Standards, the Court concludes the appropriate
sanction for the misconduct of Attorney Kakol is permanent disbarment
from the practice of law in this Court and to permanently prohibit his law
firm from filing cases and representing parties in cases in this Court,
subject to adjustment for aggravating or mitigating factors which will be
discussed below.82
d. The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors
a. Aggravating factors
The 	ABA 	Standards 	define 	“[a]ggravation 	or 	aggravating
circumstances” as “any considerations or factors that may justify and
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” ABA S TANDARDS art.
III, § 9.21 (A.B.A. 1992). Aggravating factors include:
(a) 	prior 	disciplinary offenses; 	(b) dishonest 	or
selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d)
multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the
82 Although the Court finds that the suggested sanction of disbarment is the appropriate sanction
based on the ABA standards for each of Attorney Kakol’s violations because of its finding that his
conduct had the requisite mental state and resulted in a potential for serious injury to warrant that
sanction, if it had been determined that the conduct only had the requisite mental state and resulted
in merely the potential for injury, so as to merit the sanction of suspension, the sheer number of
violations warranting a suspension would be an aggravating factor to merit disbarment.
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disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary
agency; 	(f) 	submission 	of 	false 	evidence, 	false
statements, or other deceptive practices during the
disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge
wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of
victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of
law; 	(j) 	indifference 	to 	making 	restitution; 	(k)
illegal conduct, including that involving the use of
controlled substances.
Id. § 9.22.
Aggravating factors which are not present here are dishonest or
selfish motive,83 bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
failing to comply with orders of the Court, submission of false evidence
or false statements during the disciplinary proceeding, indifference to
making restitution, and illegal conduct.
The aggravating factors that are present here are particularly
aggravating. First, Attorney Kakol has an extensive disciplinary history,
which is set forth in Appendix A, including for some of the same violations
at issue here.
83 Although Attorney Kakol earned a fee for the very little work he and his office performed, the Court
views selfish motive as requiring something more than the standard fee, such as if Attorney Kakol
was getting an additional payment from CMNC based on a percentage of the deal. There is no evidence
of any such arrangement.
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Second, Attorney Kakol’s misconduct at issue in this miscellaneous
proceeding is a pattern of misconduct and there are multiple offenses in
many of the CMNC Debtor cases in this miscellaneous proceeding.
Attorney Kakol’s misconduct that is the subject of this miscellaneous
proceeding is also very similar to his misconduct in the 	Day 	case.
Additionally, there are many CMNC Debtor cases in this miscellaneous
proceeding where Attorney Kakol engaged in the same misconduct.
Thus, Attorney Kakol’s pattern of misconduct and there being multiple
offenses are aggravating factors.
Third, Attorney Kakol refuses to acknowledge that there was a
conflict of interest in the Day case and the CMNC Debtor cases. Instead,
Attorney Kakol essentially told the Court that it was wrong in its Day
opinion about there being a conflict of interest and complained about
being singled out for filing front-page-only filings. Thus, Attorney Kakol’s
refusal 	to 	acknowledge 	the 	wrongful 	nature 	of 	his 	conduct 	is 	an
aggravating factor, even if he said he would not do it anymore.
Fourth, the CMNC Debtors were vulnerable as many of them were
dealing with the recent loss of a loved one and the stress of a foreclosure.
Thus, the vulnerability of the CMNC Debtors is an aggravating factor.
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Lastly, Attorney Kakol has been practicing consumer bankruptcy
law for decades and has handled thousands of consumer bankruptcy
cases. 	Thus, 	Attorney 	Kakol’s 	substantial 	experience 	in 	practicing
consumer bankruptcy law is an aggravating factor.
Ultimately, 	the 	aggravating 	factors 	that 	are 	applicable 	here
reinforce the conclusion that the appropriate sanction for Attorney Kakol
is permanent disbarment from the practice of law in this Court and to
permanently prohibit his law firm from filing cases and representing
parties in cases in this Court.
b. Mitigating factors
The 	ABA 	Standards 	define 	“[m]itigation 	or 	mitigating
circumstances” as “any considerations or factors that may justify a
reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” ABA S TANDARDS art.
III, § 9.31 (A.B.A. 1992). Mitigating factors include:
(a) 	absence 	of 	a 	prior 	disciplinary 	record; 	(b)
absence 	of 	a 	dishonest 	or 	selfish 	motive; 	(c)
personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good
faith 	effort 	to 	make 	restitution 	or 	to 	rectify
consequences 	of 	conduct; 	(e) 	full 	and 	free
disclosure 	to 	disciplinary 	board 	or 	cooperative
attitude toward proceedings; (f) inexperience in
the practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h)
physical 	disability; 	(i) 	mental 	disability 	or
chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug
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abuse when: (1) there is medical evidence that the
respondent is affected by a chemical dependency
or mental disability; (2) the chemical dependency
or mental disability caused the misconduct; (3) the
respondent’s 	recovery 	from 	the 	chemical
dependency or mental disability is demonstrated
by a meaningful and sustained period of successful
rehabilitation; and (4) the recovery arrested the
misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is
unlikely; (j) delay in disciplinary proceedings; (k)
imposition 	of 	other 	penalties 	or 	sanctions; 	(l)
remorse; (m) remoteness of prior offenses.
Id. § 9.32.
Mitigating factors which Attorney Kakol asserts are present here
are absence of a dishonest or selfish motive,84 good faith effort to rectify
consequences of misconduct (Attorney Kakol made changes after the Day
suspension), 	and 	imposition 	of 	other 	penalties 	or 	sanctions 	(Day
suspension).
Mitigating factors for which no evidence was presented are personal
or emotional problems, character or reputation, physical disability, and
delay in disciplinary proceedings.
The mitigating factors which are not present here are absence of a
prior disciplinary record, full and free and disclosure to disciplinary
84 See the comment on selfish motive in footnote 83.
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board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings, inexperience in the
practice of law, remorse, and remoteness of prior offenses. 	Concerning
the factor of full and free disclosure and cooperative attitude toward
proceedings, the Court notes that Attorney Kakol failed to turn over some
case files for the CMNC Debtors to the UST and had to be ordered by this
Court to do so.
The Court does not view the sanctions against Attorney Kakol and
his law firm in Day to be a mitigating factor here because those were
sanctions for the misconduct in that case and this is a distinct proceeding
involving different cases, although the conduct is similar. In the Day
Order, the Court specifically stated it would reserve 	ruling on the
misconduct in these cases pending the outcome of this miscellaneous
proceeding. 	Townson v. Kakol (In re Day), Ch. 13 Case No. 23-52197,
2024 Bankr. LEXIS 851, 2024 WL 1506751, at *36 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr.
5, 2024).
In addition, Attorney Kakol testified about changes he had made to
his law practice to prevent this type of misconduct from happening again,
but the Court has heard that before from Attorney Kakol. 	In his long
history of disciplinary proceedings before this Court, the Court has been
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told by Attorney Kakol that procedures have been instituted to clean up
“sloppy” practice. 	But the Court sees this as more than sloppy practice,
and misconduct just continues to happen again and again.
Ultimately, the mitigating factors here do not support reducing the
sanction of permanent disbarment for Attorney Kakol from the practice
of law in this Court and permanently prohibiting his law firm from filing
cases and representing parties in cases in this Court.
c. Factors that are not mitigating or aggravating
The ABA Standards also identify factors which “should not be
considered as either aggravating or mitigating”: “(a) forced or compelled
restitution; (b) agreeing to the client’s demand for certain improper
behavior or result; (c) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; (d)
resignation 	prior 	to 	completion 	of 	disciplinary 	proceedings; 	(e)
complainant’s recommendation as to sanction; (f) failure of injured client
to complain.” ABA S TANDARDS art. III, § 9.4 (A.B.A. 1992).
The first four of those factors are not present here, but the last two
are, and are discussed below.
The Court notes that the UST did recommend a lesser sanction to
the Court. But the Court finds that recommendation does not adequately
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align with Attorney Kakol’s intentional misconduct and the potential for
serious injury here arising from the numerous serious violations of the
Georgia Rules, Bankruptcy Code sections and Rules and the General
Order, 	including 	the 	filing 	of 	numerous 	knowingly 	material 	false
statements in the Court, and the very long history of discipline arising
from repeated violations involving much of the misconduct here.85 	The
ABA Standards make clear that the UST’s recommendation should not
factor into the sanction the Court imposes on Attorney Kakol.
The ABA Standards also make clear the failure of the CMNC
Debtors to complain should not factor into the sanction the Court imposes
on Attorney Kakol.86 	This is particularly appropriate in this proceeding
since some of the serious violations of misconduct on the part of Attorney
Kakol involve his violations of duties to the legal system, and not just his
clients, including but not limited to filing knowingly false Rule 2016(b)
statements, and abuse of the legal process.
85 The Court also notes that during a status conference the parties advised the Court they may have a
proposed agreed upon sanction. The Court informed the parties that regardless of whether the parties
had a proposed agreement, the Court would have to perform its own analysis as to Attorney Kakol’s
violations and determine the appropriate sanction. Not only did neither party object, but they
expressly understood that to be the case.
86 The UST advised the Court that it had a difficult time contacting and communicating with the
CMNC Debtors and the Court notes that the docket in this miscellaneous proceeding reflects many
notices of undeliverable mail addressed to the CMNC Debtors, which makes sense because the houses
in which they may have lived were sold.
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III. 	Conclusion
This miscellaneous proceeding is important because
lawyers serve a critical function in our society.
Lawyers are entrusted with the duty of serving
their clients' best interests, within the confines of
the law and in accordance with the rule of law. To
serve such noble ends, lawyers are deemed officers
of the Court and are charged with the "special
responsibility for upholding the quality of justice
within 	the 	judicial 	process." 	Both 	courts 	and
clients must be able to rely upon the competence,
diligence, 	and 	dedication of the 	attorneys who
comprise the bar of the state in which they are
admitted to practice. When an attorney falls short
of meeting these standards, the Court must act to
protect the integrity of the judicial system.
Cheney v. Watson (In re Recovery L. Grp., APC), 670 B.R. 193, 237 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2025) (internal citations omitted).87 	Additionally, this “Court
takes very seriously its ‘duty to protect an unsuspecting public from
attorneys who fail to perform competently and professionally . . . .” 	In re
Dobbs, 535 B.R. 675, 692 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2015) (quoting In re T.H.,
529 B.R. 112, 133 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015)).
87 In Hill, Judge Mullins stated on the record that judges “have to trust the system and trust the
lawyers involved, but when something is brought to our attention that highlights that, we simply can’t
turn our back and act as if nothing happened, no harm, no foul. That would just be a total breakdown
of the bankruptcy process.” Transcript of Motion to Show Cause Hearing on February 19, 2009, 12:21-
13:1, In re Hill, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-67074-CRM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2009), Dkt. No. 65.
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Simply put, after having been disciplined by this Court in at least
twenty-five cases over his years practicing in this Court, not including
the many cases in this miscellaneous proceeding, this Court has no
confidence 	that 	Attorney 	Kakol 	will 	truthfully 	make 	the 	required
disclosures to the Court and adequately represent debtors who appear in
this Court.
Accordingly, based upon the Court’s inherent authority, 11 U.S.C.
§ 105, and 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(5)(B) it is hereby
ORDERED that effective upon the entry of this Order, Attorney
Kakol 	is 	permanently 	disbarred 	from 	the 	practice 	of 	law 	in 	the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and his law firm,
the Law Offices of Stanley J. Kakol, Jr., LLC, is permanently prohibited
from filing cases and representing parties in the Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Georgia; 88
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court is
directed to immediately terminate the CM/ECF privileges of Attorney
Kakol and his law firm and terminate him and his law firm as counsel of
record in any open cases and adversary proceedings in this Court;
88 Attorney Kakol may appear in this Court on behalf of his law firm for the limited purpose of any
proceedings to determine his firm’s entitlement to fees in his open cases.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 	that Attorney Kakol shall give
written 	notice to each of his clients with cases pending in this Court of
his inability to act as an attorney in this Court in sufficient time for the
client to obtain new counsel or for the client to seek an extension of any
deadlines or hearings, but in no event later than within thirty days from
the date of entry of this Order. The notice shall advise his clients to either
promptly substitute another attorney in his place or proceed pro se.
Attorney Kakol is reminded of his duties under the Georgia Bar Rule 4-
219(b)(1), as applicable to this Court, of “taking all actions necessary to
protect the interests of his clients”; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall file on the
docket in each open case and adversary proceeding in which Attorney
Kakol and his law firm are counsel of record in this Court a notice of their
inability to practice law and represent parties in this Court and serve a
copy of that notice on the debtor by mail.
The Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Order on the UST,
counsel for Attorney Kakol, and Attorney Kakol.
END OF ORDER
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This Order has been adopted as an Order of
the entire Court for this District at a regular
meeting of all the active bankruptcy judges
in this District by unanimous vote of all
bankruptcy judges who voted.
For the Court:
__________________________
Barbara Ellis-Monro
Chief Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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APPENDIX A
A. The State Bar of Georgia’s discipline of Attorney Kakol
The State Bar of Georgia has disciplined Attorney Kakol in the past
multiple times, including by suspending him from practice for three
years. In May of 1997, Attorney Kakol was suspended from practice until
further order of the Georgia Supreme Court for failure to adequately
respond to the State Bar of Georgia’s Notice of Investigation, in which
the maximum sanction for the violations therein was disbarment. See
Order, In re Kakol, Case No. S97Y1236 (Ga. May 13, 1997). Attorney
Kakol thereafter adequately responded and was reinstated in July 1997.
See Order, In re Kakol, Case No. S97Y1236 (Ga. July 2, 1997).
Shortly thereafter, in January 1998, the Georgia Supreme Court
accepted 	Attorney 	Kakol’s 	petition 	for 	voluntary 	discipline 	and
suspended him for three years in resolution of nine disciplinary matters
pending against him in two separate notices of discipline. 	See In re
Kakol, 494 S.E.2d 340, 341 (Ga. 1998). 	Attorney Kakol admitted to
violating
Standards 22 (failure to properly withdraw from
employment on discharge by client); 44 (willful
abandonment 	or 	disregard 	of 	a 	client’s 	legal
matter); 61 (failure to promptly notify a client of
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the 	receipt 	of 	client 	funds 	or 	property 	and 	to
promptly 	deliver 	the 	funds 	or 	property 	to 	the
client); 63 (failure to maintain complete records of
client); and 65 (commingling of client funds with
those of the lawyer) of Bar Rule 4-102 (d) . . . .
Id.
The Georgia Supreme Court also noted that
In some or all of the nine pending disciplinary
matters, Kakol agreed to represent clients and
then did not take appropriate action in their cases,
including failing to file lawsuits or settle cases,
failing to appear in court or notify the client of
court 	dates 	thus 	permitting 	the 	statute 	of
limitation to expire and cases to be dismissed;
failing to return client files upon request; failing to
promptly deliver settlement proceeds to a client;
presenting checks from his escrow account against
insufficient funds; and using his escrow account as
his personal checking account.
Id.
Next, in 2010, Attorney Kakol was disciplined by the Georgia
Supreme Court for failing to have an escrow account, which discipline
consisted of a Review Panel reprimand in accordance with Bar Rules
4-102 (b) (4) and 4-220, and with various conditions strictly limiting
Attorney Kakol’s practice for two years.89 	See In re Kakol, 689 S.E.2d
89 Attorney Kakol had closed his practice at this time and became an associate at another law firm
where he had no managerial responsibility. He was required to remain an associate at this law firm
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308, 309-10 (Ga. 2010). The Georgia Supreme Court noted that Attorney
Kakol’s prior discipline included a “1984 public reprimand, a three-year
suspension in 1998, and a letter of admonition in 2007.” 	Id. at 309.
Attorney Kakol’s discipline by the Georgia Supreme Court in 2010 was
the result of this Court’s decision in Townson v. Kakol (In re Willis), Ch.
13 Case No. 06-61285-JB, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3413, 2007 WL 7140150
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2007), in which Judge Bihary’s sanctions
included limiting Attorney Kakol to filing no more than two cases per
month for eighteen months.
B. The 	Bankruptcy 	Court 	for 	the 	Northern 	District 	of
Georgia’s discipline of Attorney Kakol
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia has
frequently sanctioned Attorney Kakol. 	A sample of such cases follows
with particularly applicable portions bolded90:
Sanctions between 2005 and 2015
In re Derrick Lamar Williams, Ch. 13 Case No. 04-98641-MHM; In re
Jake Shields, Ch. 13 Case No. 04-98620-MHM; and In re Belinda Maria
Hearn, Ch. 13 Case No. 04-98293-MHM
for twenty-four months, but was precluded from signing and filing pleadings, and appearing at
hearings, among many other restrictions.
90 Other orders exist which disallow or reduce Attorney Kakol’s fees for various violations of duties
and failures to properly represent his clients.
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- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol Failed to properly represent each of
the three clients in these cases.
- 	Disposition: The Court dismissed all three cases, and Attorney
Kakol was required to disgorge all fees and to prepare and file new
cases for each of the debtors and to pay the filing fees for each.91
In re Sandra Jewel Hunter, Ch. 13 Case No. 05-84124-JEM
- 	Facts: 	Attorney Kakol 	and 	another 	attorney 	filled 	out a
petition and took no further action for a fee of $1,500.
- 	Disposition: 	Attorney 	Kakol 	was 	required 	to 	return 	all 	fees
received, and the Court imposed a $250 sanction on Attorney Kakol
payable to the Court.92
In re Kimberley Anntionette Smith, Ch. 13 Case No. 06-62445-JEM
- 	Facts: 	Attorney 	Kakol 	failed 	to 	file 	complete 	schedules,
statements 	of 	financial 	affairs, 	and 	required 	disclosure
statements. The Court identified twenty other cases filed by
Attorney Kakol since September 	2005, in which he also
failed to file complete schedules, statements of financial
affairs, and required disclosure statements. The Court also
identified another thirty-five cases where Attorney Kakol filed
schedules and statements of financial affairs for his clients some
fifty-three days on average beyond the deadline of fifteen days after
the petition date. Attorney Kakol acknowledged that he should be
sanctioned, but he stated he believed he could safely handle one
new case per month.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol was prohibited from filing cases for six
months from June to December 2006.93
91 See Order for Attorney to Show Cause, In re Williams, Ch. 13 Case No. 04-98641-MHM (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Apr. 25, 2005), Dkt. No. 21; Order Dismissing Case, In re Williams, Ch. 13 Case No. 04-98641-
MHM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 19, 2005), Dkt. No. 25; Order Dismissing Case, In re Shields, Ch. 13 Case
No. 04-98620-MHM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 19, 2005), Dkt. No. 18; Order Dismissing Case, In re Hearn,
Ch. 13 Case No. 04-98293-MHM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 18, 2005).
92 See Order Directing Stanley J. Kakol, Jr. and Sandra Sheppard to Refund Fees, In re Hunter, Ch.
13 Case No. 05-84124-JEM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 10, 2006), Dkt. No. 24.
93 See Order Barring Stanley J. Kakol, Jr. From Filing Any Case in This Court Prior to December 1,
2006, In re Smith, Ch. 13 Case No. 06-62445-JEM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 2, 2006), Dkt. No. 15.
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In re Patricia H. Willis, Ch. 13 Case No. 06-61285-JB94
- 	Facts: 	Attorney 	Kakol 	failed 	to 	file 	the 	Rule 	2016(b)
statement. 	The 	Court 	issued 	an 	Order 	of 	Sanctions 	in
response to the Chapter 13 Trustee’s Motion for Sanctions
for Attorney Kakol’s repeated failure to file the Rule 2016(b)
statements. 	The Court also expressed concern about Attorney
Kakol’s lack of an escrow account, his “all cash” law practice, and
his repeated failure to disclose fees.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol was required to complete (1) six hours
of continuing legal education on consumer bankruptcy law, (2) six
hours of continuing legal education on ethics, (3) a consultation
with the State Bar of Georgia on Law Firm Management, and (4) to
refrain from filing more than two cases per month for eighteen
months.
In re Deborah Williams, Ch. 7 Case No. 07-68540-MHM95
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol failed to file a Rule 2016(b) statement,
failed to file the required documents before the 341 meeting,
and failed to seek additional time to do so. Attorney Kakol also
failed to ensure that his client appeared at the 341 meeting.96
Lastly, Attorney Kakol also filed motions to extend the stay without
performing his duties.
- 	Disposition: Sanctions deferred but never imposed. The Chapter 13
Trustee was directed to monitor cases Attorney Kakol was involved
in. 	The Order in this case, entered in September 2007, mentions
that in August 2007, as a result of the Willis case discussed above,
Attorney Kakol advised the Court he had voluntarily agreed to limit
94 The opinion in this case was published: In re Willis, Ch. 13 Case No. 06-61285-JB, 2007 Bankr.
LEXIS 3413, 2007 WL 7140150 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2007).
95 The opinion in this case was published: In re Williams, Ch. 7 Case No. 07-68540-MHM, 2007 Bankr.
LEXIS 3723, 2007 WL 7141823 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2007).
96 The Motion for Show Cause Order identified three other cases with similar issues involving five
total debtors. None of the five debtors appeared at their 341 meetings. See Motion for Order to Show
Cause, In re Williams, Ch. 7 Case No. 07-68540-MHM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. July 16, 2007), Dkt. No. 25.
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his practice to filing no more than two cases per month so he can
try to improve the deficiencies in his practice.
In re Larry Vonzell Black & Ruby Mae Black, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-74822-
CRM
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol filed a Motion to Reconsider on behalf of the
debtor despite not having been the attorney of record in the case
previously. 	Attorney 	Kakol 	did 	not 	file 	the 	required
disclosure statement pursuant to Rule 2016(b) even though
he admitted to accepting $1,000 from the debtor prior to his
appearance.
- 	Disposition: Unknown or none; no written order entered, although
the matter was pending after the sanctions in Willis had limited
Attorney Kakol’s practice. Motion to Reconsider was denied and
case was closed.97
In re Bobby Lee Robinson, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-68960-MHM98
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol Failed to appear at a hearing on an objection
to claim that he had filed.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol was ordered to remit $200 to the
trustee. Attorney Kakol was operating under the limitation on
filing new cases set forth in the Willis case discussed below at this
time.
In re Patricia A. Coard-Seabrooks, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-70014-JEM
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol received $4,500 for a bankruptcy case with
only one creditor paid through the Chapter 13 plan, which the
Court found to be a high fee. The Chapter 13 Trustee also reported
not receiving payments from the debtor timely on the required
97 See Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Dismissal and Notice to Stanley Kakol to Show Cause at a
Hearing to be Held on January 30, 2008 Why He Should not be Barred From Filing Any Case in this
Court for a Period of Six Months, In re Black, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-74822-CRM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan.
4. 2008), Dkt. No. 38.
98 The opinion in this case was published: In re Robinson, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-68960-MHM, 2008 Bankr.
LEXIS 4404, 2008 WL 7842094 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2008).
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schedule, but instead in lump sums. Judge Massey wanted to know
what Attorney Kakol was doing to earn his fee in a one creditor case
under the circumstances.
- 	Disposition: Unknown or none; hearing held to evaluate Attorney
Kakol’s fee, but no written order entered.99 	The law firm of Clark
and Washington was substituted in as counsel.
In re Leroy Hill, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-67074-CRM
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol prepared and filed a Chapter 13 petition for
the debtor, Leroy Hill, signed by his son, Tyrone Hill, without proof
of the son’s legal right to sign on behalf of his father. 	Attorney
Kakol also failed to timely file an accurate Rule 2016(b)
Disclosure 	Statement; 	failed 	to 	timely 	file 	the 	debtor’s
Schedules 	I 	and 	J; 	and 	knowingly 	made 	false 	oaths 	in
relation to the case. 	Attorney Kakol also prepared a bankruptcy
case under Chapter 13 that was filed in Maryland for the same
debtor at the same time as this case.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol was required to pay back the filing fee
for the Maryland case. 	Attorney Kakol advised the Court in
February 2009 that he had closed his law practice and that
he 	had 	transferred 	all 	cases 	to 	another 	firm 	and 	was
working as an intake attorney for Sandberg & Associates
but would not represent debtors in this Court. His lawyer
proffered 	that 	Attorney 	Kakol 	has 	“determined 	that
running a business of his own is beyond his capabilities and
is very aware of the problems he has encountered over the
years and decided it is best to go work for someone else.” No
additional 	sanctions 	were 	imposed, 	but 	the 	Court 	put 	its
findings on the record for future use if Attorney Kakol
represented debtors in this Court again.100
99 See Order to Show Cause and Notice of Continued Hearing on Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss, In re
Coard-Seabrooks, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-70014-JEM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2008), Dkt. No. 58.
100 See Order, In re Hill, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-67074-CRM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2009), Dkt. No. 63;
Transcript of Motion to Show Cause Hearing on February 19, 2009, In re Hill, Ch. 13 Case No. 07-
67074-CRM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2009), Dkt. No. 65.
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In re Kadesha Grey, Ch. 13 Case No. 15-52337-MHM
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol was now working as an associate at Golden
& Associates. After a failure to pay the full filing fee, Attorney
Kakol filed a motion to vacate dismissal (even though vacating the
dismissal would not impose the stay) and then failed to prosecute
the motion.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol was required to obtain, within six
months, two hours of continuing legal education on ethics and
professionalism in connection with Chapter 13.101
Attorney Kakol ceased the practice of law between 2015 and 2019.
By 2018, Judges Massey, Bihary, Murphy, and Mullins had all retired.
Sanctions between 2020 to present
In re Neil Arthur Duelen & Tracy Lynn Duelen, Ch. 13 Case No. 19-69887-
PMB
- 	Facts: 	Attorney 	Kakol 	failed 	to 	go 	over 	the 	Rights 	and
Responsibilities Statement with debtors, failed to meet with
and obtain original signatures on the verifications, and did not
timely execute a contract with the debtors.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol’s fees were disallowed in their entirety,
and in all active cases pending in the Northern District of Georgia
as of March 5, 2020, where he was listed as counsel of record,
Attorney Kakol was required by April 30, 2020, to review with his
clients all Verified Papers filed in each case, obtain the client’s
signature 	on 	the 	papers, 	and 	certify 	to 	the 	Court 	that 	the
documents had been signed and were accurate or, if errors and
omissions 	were 	discovered, 	prepare 	and 	file 	corrected 	Verified
Papers, signed by the debtors. 	For a period of twelve months
Attorney Kakol was also required to attach a photocopy of the
101 See Order, In re Grey, Ch. 13 Case No. 15-52337-MHM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 2015), Dkt. No.
37.
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debtor’s wet ink signature on a Verified Paper when the debtor
elected to affix their original signature to the Verified Paper using
a wet ink signature. During this same twelve-month period, if the
debtor elected to affix their original signature to a Verified Paper
using an e-signing and digital management software application,
Attorney Kakol was required to attach to each filing that included
a Verified Paper an audit trail from the software application.
Lastly, for a period of three months, Attorney Kakol was limited to
filing no more than fifteen Chapter 13 cases per month.102
In re Sedric Delaney Ross, Ch. 7 Case No. 20-60176-LRC
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol secured a limited imposition of the stay to a
date certain when a hearing would be held. However, Attorney
Kakol submitted a proposed order granting the imposition of the
stay, without restriction or notice of a hearing and signed opposing
counsel’s signature to the proposed order without permission.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol’s fee was reduced to $4,000 and for a
period of twelve months Attorney Kakol was required to attach to
any proposed order written permission from opposing counsel along
with the signature.103
In re Tommy LeWayne Leach, Ch. 13 Case No. 22-51217-SMS
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol filed a motion to impose the stay, which was
granted, but then waited three weeks to upload the order, so the
debtor’s 	car 	was 	repossessed. 	Attorney 	Kakol 	also 	failed 	to
familiarize himself with the facts of the repossession prior to a
hearing 	for 	turnover 	and 	it 	was 	unclear 	when 	the 	car 	was
repossessed. 	The 	Court 	granted 	turnover 	of 	the 	vehicle, 	but
Attorney Kakol again failed to timely upload an order.
102 See Order on United States Trustee’s Motion for Review of Conduct and Fees and Motion for
Sanctions, In re Duelen, Ch. 13 Case No. 19-69887-PMB (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2020), Dkt. No. 34;
Consent Order Amending Court’s Order on United States Trustee’s Motion for Review of Conduct and
Fees and Motion for Sanctions, In re Duelen, Ch. 13 Case No. 19-69887-PMB (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 5,
2020), Dkt. No. 39.
103 See Order Regarding Show Cause Hearing, In re Ross, Ch. 7 Case No. 20-60176-LRC (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. May 4, 2020), Dkt. No. 34.
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- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol’s fees were disallowed.104
In re Keyanna Kesha Nelson, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-50126-LRC
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol failed to appear for a hearing on the debtor’s
Motion to Impose Stay, which Attorney Kakol’s law firm scheduled.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol’s fee was reduced by $500.105
In re Temeka Narisse White, Ch. 7 Case No. 22-58566-PMB
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol failed to disclose a personal injury action
when he filed the case, failed to seek employment of special counsel,
and also allowed settlement proceeds to be paid to special counsel
without approval of the Court.
- 	Disposition: Attorney fees were reduced by $1,000, and Attorney
Kakol was ordered to implement procedures by which his law firm
would thoroughly counsel debtors regarding their continuing duty
to: disclose all claims and causes of action; timely identify and
schedule all claims and causes of action; promptly seek approval for
employment of professionals, with a properly detailed application
and 	verified 	statement 	of 	the 	professional; 	serve 	retention
applications 	and 	orders 	on 	employed 	professionals; 	properly
counsel debtors, and instruct professionals regarding restrictions
and requirements for settlements and disbursement of proceeds;
periodically communicate with debtors and professionals to monitor
their 	conduct; 	obtain 	necessary 	documents 	and 	information;
prepare, file, and serve pleadings that adequately set forth material
terms for approval of settlements, compensation of professionals,
and disbursement of proceeds; serve professionals with pertinent
orders; and timely and fully communicate and cooperate with the
trustee serving in the case.106
104 See Order Disallowing Attorney’s Fees, In re Leach, Ch. 13 Case No. 22-51217-SMS (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. June 8, 2022), Dkt. No. 32.
105 See Order Regarding Show Cause Hearing, In re Nelson, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-50126-LRC (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2023), Dkt. No. 20
106 See Supplemental Order Regarding Attorney Fees for and Practices by the Law Office of Stanley J.
Kakol, Jr., and Order for Attorney Rebecca Kay Sapp to Show Cause, In re White, Ch. 7 Case No. 22-
58566-PMB (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2023), Dkt. No. 42.
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In re Emeka Nwosu, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-55213-JWC
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol and his law firm failed to properly
confirm the debtor’s identification and failed to conduct a
proper inquiry into the debtor’s financial affairs prior to
filing the bankruptcy case.
- 	Disposition: 	The 	attorney 	fees 	were 	reduced 	to 	$357.50, 	and
Attorney Kakol and his law firm were required to develop and
implement procedures to ensure his law firm properly verifies the
identity of his law firm’s clients prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
case, including: processes by which his law firm will collect photo
identification and proof of social security number from each client
prior to filing a bankruptcy case; ensure that an attorney with his
law firm reviews the identification documentation received from
the 	client 	prior 	to 	filing 	a 	bankruptcy 	case 	for 	accuracy 	and
authenticity; 	and compares the 	identification document 	to 	the
information included on the voluntary petition. 	Attorney Kakol
and his law firm were also ordered to implement procedures
to 	ensure 	that 	his 	law 	firm 	abides 	by 	the 	Rights 	and
Responsibilities Statement.107
In re Chrisea Denise Moring, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-56182-BEM
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol did not provide the debtor with a copy
of the Rights and Responsibilities Statement as required by
the General Order. At the 341 meeting of creditors, the debtor
testified that she had not met with an attorney since the case was
filed and only met with support staff to answer questions she had
regarding her case, potentially including legal questions, despite
the fact that the Chapter 13 Trustee had specifically asked Attorney
Kakol to meet with debtor to discuss her rights and responsibilities.
The 	meeting 	of 	creditors 	also 	revealed 	undisclosed 	debts 	and
undisclosed assets of the debtor.
107 See Supplemental Consent Order Regarding Attorney Fees for and Practices by the Law Office of
Stanley J. Kakol, Jr., In re Nwosu, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-55213-JWC (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 20, 2023),
Dkt. No. 27.
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- 	Disposition: Case dismissed, and any unpaid attorney fees were
disallowed.108
In re Frederick Phillips, Ch. 7 Case No. 22-50660-BEM
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol converted a case from Chapter 13 to Chapter
7 despite the debtor being ineligible for a Chapter 7 discharge.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol filed a motion for voluntarily dismissal
of the debtor’s case, and the debtor’s case was dismissed.109
In re David George DaCosta, Ch. 13 Case No. 22-59912-SMS110
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol failed to timely move to extend the automatic
stay as required by the Bankruptcy Code since it was the debtor’s
second Chapter 13 case in one year, filed a Chapter 13 plan with
the incorrect case number, and failed to object to creditor claims.
Further, the debtor sought sanctions against Attorney Kakol
related to Attorney Kakol’s failure to communicate with the
debtor, his failure to properly represent the debtor, and his
$5,200 fee in the case. 	At the show cause hearing on the debtor’s
request 	for 	sanctions, 	the 	Court 	discovered 	that 	Attorney
Kakol also required the debtor to submit a $1,000 payment
to show “good faith” to the Court that the debtor had the
funds to complete a Chapter 13 case, but Attorney Kakol kept
this money for himself. According to the Court, Attorney Kakol also
“disparaged the debtor’s mental health” despite warnings from the
Court. 	The Court also found that Attorney Kakol violated
Georgia 	Rule 	1.2(c) 	by 	limiting 	the 	scope 	of 	his
representation with respect to a creditor claim without the
debtor’s informed consent.
108 See Order Dismissing Case, In re Moring, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-56182-BEM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Nov. 1,
2023), Dkt. No. 30.
109 See Order of Dismissal and Closing Estate, In re Phillips, Ch. 7 Case No. 22-50660-BEM (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2024), Dkt. No. 145.
110 The opinion in this case was published: In re DaCosta, Ch. 13 Case No. 22-59912-SMS, 2024 Bankr.
LEXIS 266, 2024 WL 422779 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2024).
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- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol was ordered to pay a $2,500 sanction
and his $5,200 attorney’s fee to the debtor.
In re James Day, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-52197-JRS111
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol impermissibly accepted his attorney fee from
CMNC Homes, LLC (“CMNC”) to file bankruptcy for the debtor
when CMNC had the debtor’s home under contract to purchase;
impermissibly 	limited 	his 	representation 	of 	the 	debtor;
impermissibly allowed CMNC to interfere with his professional
independence; and impermissibly represented the debtor in the face
of 	a 	conflict 	of 	interest 	between 	the 	debtor 	and 	CMNC.
Additionally, Attorney Kakol failed to follow Bankruptcy Statutes
and Rules such as failing to timely, properly, and accurately file a
Rule 2016(b) statement and failing to obtain a written agreement
with the debtor for the representation. 	Lastly, Attorney Kakol
violated this Court’s General Orders and Local Rules by failing to
comply 	with 	the 	Rights 	and 	Responsibilities 	Statement
requirement 	and 	by 	failing 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	signature
requirements for filing a bankruptcy petition.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol and his law firm were prohibited from
filing any new bankruptcy cases in the Northern District of Georgia
for one year beginning on April 11, 2024. 	Additionally, Attorney
Kakol and his law firm, effective immediately, were permanently
prohibited from filing any new bankruptcy cases in the Northern
District of Georgia where Attorney Kakol and his law firm’s fees
and costs would be paid by a third party.
In re Lynn Jon Robertson, Sr., Ch. 13 Case No. 23-61014-JWC112
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the debtor’s previous cases and the court records of
those cases and failed to obtain any evidence from the
111 The opinion in this case was published: Townson v. Kakol (In re Day), Ch. 13 Case No. 23-52197,
2024 Bankr. LEXIS 851, 2024 WL 1506751 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2024). For ease of reading, the
facts are not bolded as nearly all of the facts would be bolded.
112 The opinion in this case was published: In re Robertson, Ch. 13 Case No. 23-61014-JWC, 2024
Bankr. LEXIS 1853, 2024 WL 3738155 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2024).
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debtor necessary to support the positions Attorney Kakol
took in the case. Attorney Kakol filed the sixth and seventh
bankruptcy cases for the debtor, each the day before a scheduled
foreclosure on the debtor’s home, and listed in the plan in each case
an estimated prepetition arrearage of $21,000 for U.S. Bank’s lien
on the debtor’s home when in reality it exceeded $250,000 as
evidenced by proof of claims filed by U.S. Bank in the debtor’s cases.
For the confirmation hearing in the debtor’s seventh bankruptcy
case, Attorney Kakol sent appearance counsel who could not answer
basic question from the Court. 	During the hearing on the motion
for sanctions against Attorney Kakol, Attorney Kakol took the
position that no abuse occurred in the debtor’s seventh bankruptcy
case, “just very aggressive lawyering on behalf of the Debtor.”
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol and his firm were required to disgorge
all fees he received in connection with the case to U.S. Bank.
Attorney Kakol and his firm were also required to reimburse U.S.
Bank for all its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the case in the
total amount of $5,090. 	Attorney Kakol was required to attend
fifteen hours of continuing legal education focused on consumer
bankruptcy topics, with at least three of the hours focused on
professionalism 	and/or 	ethics 	in 	bankruptcy. 	Lastly, 	Attorney
Kakol 	and 	his 	firm 	were 	prohibited 	from 	using 	attorneys,
associates, or appearance counsel that have failed to review the
pleadings filed in a case, or who are otherwise not adequately
prepared to represent clients’ interests before the Court. If Attorney
Kakol 	and 	his 	firm 	used 	attorneys, 	associates, 	or 	appearance
counsel that were unprepared or unable to properly handle a
debtor’s business before the Court, Attorney Kakol and his firm
would be subject to a $500 sanction for each occurrence.
In re Robert Leon Benson & Tara Lynn Benson, Ch. 13 Case No. 26-
50381-JWC
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol failed to adequately investigate whether two
debtors were eligible to file bankruptcy and filed bankruptcy for
them during a two-year bar period.
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- 	Disposition: Case dismissed with a two-year bar period on refiling
bankruptcy, and Attorney Kakol was ordered to return any fees,
excluding filing fees, he received from the debtors.113
In re Chicilia L. Moore, Ch. 13 Case No. 26-54449-BEM
- 	Facts: Attorney Kakol filed an emergency motion to impose stay
which was set for a hearing. About three hours before the hearing
on the motion to impose stay, Attorney Kakol’s office emailed
chambers to announce a consent order with the creditor. However,
Attorney Kakol failed to inform his client, and she appeared at the
courthouse for the hearing on the motion to impose stay. Attorney
Kakol’s client told the Court that she had paid for two hours of
parking for the hearing on the motion to impose stay. 	Attorney
Kakol also failed to appear for the confirmation hearing for this
case.
- 	Disposition: Attorney Kakol was ordered, within forty-eight hours
after the entry of the order, to disgorge $100 to his client from the
attorney fees she paid him prepetition. Attorney Kakol also agreed
to reduce his attorney fee by $1,000.114
END OF APPENDIX A
113 See Order on Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss Case for Violation of the Court’s Order Barring the
Debtors From Filing Any Chapter of Bankruptcy for a Period of 2 Years and to Declare the Automatic
Stay Void AB Initio, In re Benson, Ch. 13 Case No. 26-50381-JWC (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 2, 2026), Dkt.
No. 27.
114 See Order Directing Debtor’s Counsel to Partially Refund Fees, In re Moore, Ch. 13 Case No. 26-
54449-BEM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. June 24, 2026), Dkt. No. 27.
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APPENDIX B
SELECTED PORTIONS OF APPLICABLE ABA STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (A.B.A. 1992)
4.0 	Violations of Duties Owed to Clients
4.2 	Failure to Preserve the Client’s Confidences
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of
the 	factors 	set 	out 	in 	3.0, 	the 	following 	sanctions 	are 	generally
appropriate 	in 	cases 	involving 	improper 	revelation 	of 	information
relating to representation of a client:
4.21 	Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the
intent to benefit the lawyer or another, knowingly reveals
information 	relating 	to 	representation 	of 	a 	client 	not
otherwise 	lawfully 	permitted 	to 	be 	disclosed, 	and 	this
disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.22 	Suspension 	is 	generally 	appropriate 	when 	a 	lawyer
knowingly reveals information relating to the representation
of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed,
and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a
client.
4.3 	Failure to Avoid Conflicts of Interest
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of
the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally
appropriate in cases involving conflicts of interest:
4.31 	Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer,
without the informed consent of client(s):
(a) 	engages in representation of a client knowing that the
lawyer’s interests are adverse to the client's with the
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intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes
serious or potentially serious injury to the client; or
(b) 	simultaneously 	represents 	clients 	that 	the 	lawyer
knows have adverse interests with the intent to benefit
the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client; or
(c) 	represents a client in a matter substantially related to
a matter in which the interests of a present or former
client 	are 	materially 	adverse, 	and 	knowingly 	uses
information relating to the representation of a client
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.
4.32 	Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of
a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the
possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential
injury to a client.
4.4 	Lack of Diligence
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of
the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally
appropriate in cases involving a failure to act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client:
4.41 	Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
(a) 	a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or
potentially serious injury to a client; or
(b) 	a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a
client and causes serious or potentially serious injury
to a client; or
(c) 	a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to
client matters and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to a client.
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4.42 	Suspension is generally appropriate when:
(a) 	a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client
and causes injury or potential injury to a client, or
(b) 	a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect causes injury
or potential injury to a client.
4.6 	Lack of Candor
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, on application of
the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally
appropriate in cases where the lawyer engages in fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation directed toward a client:
4.61 	Disbarment 	is 	generally 	appropriate 	when 	a 	lawyer
knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the
lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potential
serious injury to a client.
4.62 	Suspension 	is 	generally 	appropriate 	when 	a 	lawyer
knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential
injury to the client.
6.0 	Violations of Duties Owed to the Legal System
6.1 	False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of
the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally
appropriate 	in 	cases 	involving 	conduct 	that 	is 	prejudicial 	to 	the
administration of justice or that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation to a court:
6.11 	Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the
intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits
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a 	false 	document, 	or 	improperly 	withholds 	material
information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury
to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant
adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
6.12 	Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows
that false statements or documents are being submitted to
the court or that material information is improperly being
withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or
potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes
an 	adverse 	or 	potentially 	adverse 	effect 	on 	the 	legal
proceeding.
6.2 	Abuse of the Legal Process
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of
the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally
appropriate in cases involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a
meritorious claim, or failure to obey any obligation under the rules of a
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists:
6.21 	Disbarment 	is 	generally 	appropriate 	when 	a 	lawyer
knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to
obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious
injury or potentially serious injury to a party or causes
serious 	or 	potentially 	serious 	interference 	with 	a 	legal
proceeding.
6.22 	Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows
that he or she is violating a court order or rule, and causes
injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or causes
interference 	or 	potential 	interference 	with 	a 	legal
proceeding.
END OF APPENDIX B
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