Patterson v. Tyler

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN RE:
TONY R. TYLER,
Debtor.
CASE NO. 11-59151-JWC
CHAPTER 7
TYREE PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
TONY R. TYLER,
Defendant.
ADV. PRO. NO. 25-05074-JWC
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
IT IS ORDERED as set forth below:
________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
Jeffery W. Cavender
U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge
Date: July 1, 2026
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This case involves a long history between two former friends: Tyree Patterson,
now known as Tyree Daniels (“Mr. Daniels”), and Tony Reed Tyler (“Mr. Tyler”). Two
matters are before the Court: (1) the Complaint (the “Complaint”) (Doc. No. 1) filed
by Mr. Daniels, initiating this adversary proceeding against Mr. Tyler, and (2) Mr.
Tyler’s Motion to Avoid Placement of Lien (Doc. No. 24) (the “Motion”).
Mr. Daniels’s Complaint asserts two judgments he obtained against Mr. Tyler
in 2008 and 2009 were not discharged in Mr. Tyler’s 2011 chapter 7 bankruptcy, and
he raises two theories in support of his position. First, he contends the debts were not
discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3),1 which, in short, provides an exception to
discharge if a creditor is not duly listed or scheduled and does not obtain actual notice
of a bankruptcy case in time to file either a proof of claim or a nondischargeability
action under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6). Second, Mr. Daniels asserts what he calls a “§ 343
exception” to discharge claim contending he was robbed of the opportunity to question
Mr. Tyler at a § 341 creditors meeting and otherwise participate in the chapter 7 case.
Although the Court is not aware of a “343” exception to discharge, the Eleventh
Circuit has ruled that a debt may be excepted from discharge if the failure to schedule
the creditor was the result of “fraud or intentional design.” See Samuel v. Baitcher
(In re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1986). Both § 523(a)(3) and Baitcher require
the Court to determine whether Mr. Tyler failed to properly list or schedule Mr.
Daniels as a creditor in the bankruptcy case. Here, neither party disputes that Mr.
Tyler included Mr. Daniels as a creditor in the 2011 case, but Mr. Daniels asserts
1 All statutory references are to the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) unless otherwise
specified.
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that the address was intentionally incorrect, and he never received notice of the
bankruptcy case until many years after the discharge. Mr. Tyler, in contrast, asserts
he used the correct address for Mr. Daniels, the judgments were discharged, and Mr.
Daniels has since violated his discharge by filing a lien against his mother’s residence
and other actions.
The Court heard a full day of testimony on April 8, 2026, with respect to the
Complaint and the Motion. After considering the pleadings, the testimony offered,
the evidence admitted, the record in this adversary proceeding and the underlying
bankruptcy case,2 and the arguments of the parties presented at the trial, the Court
will deny the relief requested in the Complaint and grant in part and deny in part
the relief requested in the Motion for the reasons that follow.3
I. 	JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).
II. 	MATERIAL FACTS
A. Underlying Bankruptcy Case
Mr. Tyler filed the underlying bankruptcy case on March 28, 2011, as a chapter
13 proceeding. The list of creditors attached to the petition included “Tyree Patterson”
2 The Court takes judicial notice of the docket, orders, and pleadings filed in Mr. Tyler’s underlying
bankruptcy case and this adversary proceeding. Fed. R. Evid. 201; Bobadilla v. Aurora Loan Servs.,
478 F. App’x 625, 627 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“A court may take judicial notice of its own
records and the records of inferior courts.”) (quoting United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5
(11th Cir. 1987)).
3 This Memorandum Opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, made applicable to this proceeding through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052.
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with the following mailing address: 7868 Cofax Chicago, Illinois, 60649 (“7868 Cofax”)
(BK Doc. No. 1; Doc. No. 35, p. 76).4 Shortly after filing the petition, Mr. Tyler filed
Schedules D and E/F (BK Doc. No. 12), and Mr. Daniels was not scheduled as a
creditor in these documents. The Court dismissed Mr. Tyler’s chapter 13 case for
failure to make plan payments (BK Doc. No. 46), but the case was subsequently
reinstated. Soon after, Mr. Tyler filed a request to convert the case from chapter 13
to chapter 7 (BK Doc. No. 53). The case was converted to chapter 7, and the chapter
7 trustee later filed a report indicating that after diligent inquiry no property was
available for distribution from the estate above that exempted by law and requesting
to be discharged of his duties as trustee. Because it was a no-asset chapter 7 case, no
deadline for creditors to file proofs of claim was ever established. Thereafter, on
February 22, 2012, Mr. Tyler received a discharge, and the case was closed (BK Doc.
No. 71).
Throughout the entirety of the bankruptcy case, the clerk’s office served notices
and filings to Mr. Daniels at 7868 Cofax, and Mr. Tyler never amended his list of
creditors. The present issues arose thirteen years after Mr. Tyler’s discharge when
Mr. Daniels moved to reopen the bankruptcy case, asserting he was not properly
scheduled in the case, had no knowledge of the case until 2024, and holds two
prepetition judgments against Mr. Tyler that are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(3)
(BK Doc. No. 84). The Court reopened the bankruptcy case (BK Doc. No. 88), and Mr.
4 References to the docket in this adversary proceeding are cited to as “Doc. No.” or their respective
given title, and references to the docket in the underlying bankruptcy case are cited to as “BK Doc.
No.”
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Daniels filed the Complaint initiating this adversary proceeding (Doc. No. 1). Mr.
Tyler filed an answer to the Complaint denying liability (Doc. No. 5) and filed his
Motion (Doc. No. 24) asserting that Mr. Daniels sought to enforce his judgments in
violation of his 2012 discharge. Mr. Tyler asserts that Mr. Daniels filed a lien against
his mother’s residence at 16838 Wausau Avenue, South Holland, Illinois (“16838
Wausau”) and took other collection actions. He asks the Court to order Mr. Daniels
to remove the lien and hold Mr. Daniels in contempt and impose sanctions.
B. The Trial
At trial, both parties testified and answered questions by each other and the
Court.
Mr. Daniels’s evidence consisted mostly of testimony and exhibits regarding
the two judgments he received against Mr. Tyler in 2008 and 2009. Mr. Daniels
testified that the first judgment for $528 was for harassment regarding ten messages
Mr. Tyler sent him. On October 16, 2008, Mr. Daniels filed a lawsuit against Mr.
Tyler in the City of Richmond General District Court, Civil Division. Mr. Daniels
introduced into evidence a document titled “Warrant in Debt (Civil Claim for Money)”
which appears to be a court summons. [Doc. No. 41, Ex. 38-1.] The document contains
what appears to be a few factual allegations handwritten by Mr. Daniels, but they
are mostly illegible. [Id.] The document also appears to include the handwritten
judgment of the state court for $528 entered on December 16, 2008. [Id.] The
judgment includes no factual findings of any kind and was entered after Mr. Tyler
failed to appear. [Id.] The document contains several handwritten words circled on it,
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including “harassment” and “tortious injury damages.” [Id.] Mr. Daniels testified that
the messages he received from Mr. Tyler included death threats, but he provided no
written evidence to support this. Mr. Daniels alerted authorities about the messages
on October 27, 2008, and he alleges the police issued an arrest warrant. However, he
testified that he was unable to receive a copy of the arrest warrant, and he provided
no other evidence about an arrest warrant. He did, however, introduce an incident
report by the Richmond Virginia Police Department. [Doc. No. 41, Ex. 38-2.] After
reporting the messages, the Richmond Police Department prepared a report noting,
“[t]he victim is receiving annoying phone calls from a known person.” [Id.] The police
report makes no reference to death threats. Mr. Daniels later registered the judgment
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. [See case no. 2009-MI-501004.]
As to the second judgment for $1,500, Mr. Daniels testified that Mr. Tyler filed
a lawsuit against him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois in 2008. [See case
no. 2008-MI-191956.] Mr. Daniels testified he has been a practicing attorney for 23
years and previously represented Mr. Tyler. Mr. Daniels filed a counterclaim in the
action for past attorney’s fees owed by Mr. Tyler. When Mr. Tyler initially filed the
case, he served Mr. Daniels at a mailing address of 7944 S. Escanaba Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois (“7944 Escanaba”). Although Mr. Daniels testified 7944 Escanaba
was a family property and he did not live there, he did not contest service. At that
time, Mr. Daniels lived at 609 Westover Hills Boulevard, Richmond, Virginia (“609
Westover”). On May 13, 2009, the state court entered a judgment on Mr. Daniels’s
counterclaim, awarding him $1,500. [Doc. No. 41, Ex. 38-3; Doc. No. 35, p. 22.]
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After entry of these judgments, the parties’ friendship was on and off at various
times. At the time Mr. Tyler filed bankruptcy in 2011, Mr. Daniels testified the pair
had not been friends, while Mr. Tyler testified they were friends. Because they were
often not in communication with each other, Mr. Daniels testified that he forgot about
the judgments until 2024.5 Before he was aware of the bankruptcy, Mr. Daniels
revived both judgments. On January 31, 2024, the Circuit Court of Cook County
entered orders for revival of the judgments regarding his $1,500 judgment with
accrued interest of $3,715.49 and his $528 judgment with accrued interest of
$1,372.17. [Doc. No. 35, p. 22, 27, 143; see case nos. 2009-MI-501004 and 2008-MI-
191956.] Subsequently, on March 26, 2024, and June 5, 2024, Mr. Daniels filed
notices and affidavits in Georgia to register the revived judgments in the Superior
Courts of Fulton County and Douglas County. [Doc. No. 35, p. 5, 19, 20, 23; see case
nos. 24CV003762 & 24CV00953.] The Superior Court of Fulton County registered the
judgment from the Circuit Court of Cook County in the amount of $1,500 on August
12, 2024. [See case no. 24CV003762.] In response to the Douglas County action, on
November 7, 2024, Mr. Tyler filed a Motion to Deny and Dismiss Plaintiff’s Proposed
Order to Domesticate Foreign Judgment and attached the discharge order from his
2011 bankruptcy. [Doc. No. 35, p. 100–102; Doc. No. 32, Ex. 10, case no. 24CV00953.]
Mr. Daniels testified that this was the first time he learned about Mr. Tyler’s
5 Mr. Daniels also filed three bankruptcy petitions in this Court and failed to schedule the two
judgments as assets of his estate (See case nos. 14-65877-PWB, 18-64668-PWB, 18-70205-PWB). When
the Court was made aware of the omission by his former chapter 7 trustee, the Court sua sponte issued
a show cause order as to why this adversary proceeding should not be dismissed on grounds of judicial
estoppel (Doc. No. 11). At a hearing held on August 26, 2025, the Court concluded that judicial estoppel
did not apply to bar prosecution of the current adversary proceeding (Doc. No. 21).
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bankruptcy. On March 5, 2025, the Superior Court of Douglas County denied Mr.
Tyler’s motion and registered both judgments. [Doc. No. 32, Ex. 12.] Mr. Tyler filed a
motion to reconsider the court’s order, which the Superior Court of Douglas County
denied. [Doc. No. 32, Exs. 13, 14.]
On June 18, 2025, Mr. Daniels filed affidavits for Writs of Fieri Facias in the
Superior Court of Douglas County. [See case no. 24CV00953.] On November 28, 2025,
Mr. Daniels filed a lien in Illinois against the 16838 Wausau property. [Doc. No. 35,
p. 24–5.] The judgment lien states it is in satisfaction of both judgments, which now
total $8,399.89 with accrued interest. [Id.] 16838 Wausau was first owned by Mr.
Tyler’s mother, Mary Ann Reed. On January 27, 2023, Ms. Reed transferred half her
interest to Mr. Tyler as joint tenant. [Doc. No. 32, Ex. 16.] A second deed dated
September 15, 2025, reflects Mr. Tyler transferring his interest in the property back
to Ms. Reed. [Doc. No. 35, p. 56.] During the trial, Mr. Tyler testified that he has
never owned the property at 16838 Wausau, he is only listed as the beneficiary for
his mother. He further testified that the actions which he alleges violate his discharge
order have caused him emotional distress.
With respect to the address for Mr. Daniels that Mr. Tyler used in his
bankruptcy schedules, Mr. Daniels testified that he lived on Cofax around 2003 to
2004 for only a few months, but he lived at 7838 Cofax, not 7868 Cofax. He further
testified that he did not know Mr. Tyler when he lived on Cofax. Both parties agreed
that Mr. Daniels lived on Cofax, at some point in time, with another individual,
Joseph McClure. Mr. Tyler testified that he knew Mr. Daniels lived at 7868 Cofax at
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the time he filed bankruptcy in 2011 because he visited the address on at least three
occasions, and he received the address from Mr. McClure. From these facts the Court
addresses the parties’ respective claims for relief.
III. 	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Discharged Debts
i. 	Incorrect Address
The Complaint asserts that Mr. Daniels holds two state-court judgments
against Mr. Tyler that are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(3). Section 523(a)(3)
provides that a discharge does not discharge a debt
neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(a)(1) of this title, with the
name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed,
in time to permit—
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or
(6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for
such timely filing; or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6)
of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely
request for a determination of dischargeability of such debt under
one of such paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual
knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3). Whether a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(3) is a
multistep analysis. First, the Court must determine whether a debt was duly listed
or scheduled under § 521(a)(1). If the debt in question was duly listed or scheduled,
then the debt is not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(3). If, on the other hand,
the debt was not duly listed or scheduled, the Court must determine whether the
creditor otherwise received notice of the bankruptcy in time to file a proof of claim or
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a complaint to determine the dischargeability of the debt and whether the exceptions
to discharge under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) apply.
The debtor bears the initial duty to properly schedule his creditors. See Oxford
Video, Inc. v. Walker (In re Walker), 125 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990).
Section 521(a)(1)(A) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(a)(1) require debtors to file a list of
creditors with their names and addresses. A creditor is not “duly scheduled” if a
debtor lists the incorrect name or address of a creditor, and the creditor does not
receive notice. See Manzanares v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (In re Manzanares),
345 B.R. 773, 785 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). To determine if a creditor has been duly
listed or scheduled, courts consider whether the address and name of the creditor
provided by the debtor is “sufficiently accurate to permit delivery by the United
States Postal Service to the appropriate party.” In re Walker, 125 B.R. at 180. If the
name and address of the creditor are correct, or otherwise undisputed, mailings are
presumed to have been delivered to the party addressed. See North Am. Specialty Ins.
Co. v. Foxson (In re Foxson), 660 B.R. 633, 646 (Bankr. D. Md. 2023). When, however,
a creditor challenges the address, the burden rests on the creditor to “establish that
the address provided by the debtor was so incorrect as to fall short of this threshold.”
In re Walker, 125 B.R. at 180; see also In re TEMSCO NC Inc., 537 B.R. 108, 120
(Bankr. D.P.R. 2015). Creditors who meet their burden of showing they were
incorrectly listed or scheduled often are treated the same as creditors who were not
listed at all. See In re Manzanares, 345 B.R. at 785.
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Mr. Daniels alleges that Mr. Tyler, although listing Mr. Daniels as a creditor,
intentionally provided an incorrect address for Mr. Daniels so that he would not
receive notice of the bankruptcy or the Court’s notices in time to file a dischargeability
complaint. Mr. Tyler asserts he provided notice by listing Mr. Daniels as a creditor
with an address of 7868 Cofax. During the trial, Mr. Daniels testified he never lived
at 7868 Cofax and is not aware of what is at that address. He also testified about two
other addresses which Mr. Tyler was aware of and could have used. First, Mr. Daniels
testified that in previous years he lived at 609 Westover in Virginia. His testimony,
however, makes clear that he lived in Virginia from September 2008 until April 2009,
around two years before Mr. Tyler filed the underlying bankruptcy case in 2011. The
state court documents listing 609 Westover as Mr. Daniels’s address are all from 2008
and 2009. [Doc. No. 32, Ex. 38-1, 38-2, 38-3.] Second, Mr. Daniels testified that Mr.
Tyler was aware of Mr. Daniels’s address at 7944 Escanaba in Illinois. When Mr.
Tyler sued Mr. Daniels in 2008 in the Circuit Court of Cook County, he served Mr.
Daniels at 7944 Escanaba, and Mr. Daniels did not contest service. Several state
court documents list this address for Mr. Daniels, both before and after Mr. Tyler’s
petition date. [Doc. No. 32, Ex. 38-4, 38-5.] Although he testified that this address
was family property and he never lived there, this address was known to Mr. Tyler
through the various state court documents, and he was aware Mr. Daniels previously
accepted service at this address.
Lastly, Mr. Daniels testified that he once lived on Cofax at a different address
number. During cross-examination, Mr. Daniels stated he lived at 7838 Cofax around
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2003 to 2004 for a temporary period of two to three months, before he met Mr. Tyler.
Despite this, Mr. Tyler testified he knew Mr. Daniels when he lived on Cofax, and he
knew the address because he visited Mr. Daniels there at least three times. Even if
Mr. Daniels lived on Cofax in 2011, he testified he lived at 7838 Cofax and not 7868
Cofax as listed by Mr. Tyler. Mr. Tyler presented no written evidence demonstrating
that Mr. Daniels lived at 7868 Cofax at any point in time.
Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Mr. Daniels met his burden of
establishing that the address listed for him in the creditor matrix was inaccurate and
did not give him notice of the bankruptcy case. No evidence before the Court
establishes that 7868 Cofax was a proper address for Mr. Daniels at the time of Mr.
Tyler’s bankruptcy case. Having determined that Mr. Daniels met his burden of
establishing that the address listed for him in the creditor matrix was inaccurate, the
Court now considers the dischargeability of the underlying debts under § 523(a)(3)
and Baitcher.
ii. 	Dischargeability Under § 523(a)(3)
Mr. Daniels’s first claim for nondischargeability rests on § 523(a)(3). The Court
must determine that the failure to list or schedule Mr. Daniels’s debts prevented him
from taking the actions specified in either § 523(a)(3)(A) or (B). Specifically, the Court
must decide whether Mr. Daniels had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in
time to file either a proof of claim or a nondischargeability action, or if the debts are
of the kind specified in § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6).
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The Court first addresses whether Mr. Daniels had actual knowledge in time
to file an action. Courts within the Eleventh Circuit have long held that a creditor’s
actual knowledge 	of 	a case 	is 	“sufficient 	to satisfy 	constitutional due 	process
requirements.” Ford Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Sure Card, Inc., 180 B.R. 294, 295 (S.D. Fla.
1994). This prevents a creditor who knew about the bankruptcy case but did not
receive proper notice, “from standing back, allowing the bankruptcy action to proceed
without adjudication of his claim, and then asserting that the debt owed [to] him is
[non]dischargeable.” Washington v. Abreu (In re Abreu), No. 19-5301, 2021 WL
346112, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2021) (quoting Byrd v. Alton (In re Alton), 837
F.2d 457, 460 (11th Cir. 1988)). The creditor must have knowledge in time to timely
file a complaint regarding dischargeability. See id. Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P.
4007(c), a creditor has 60 days from the first date set for the meeting of creditors to
file a complaint to determine dischargeability under § 523(c). Courts generally find
30 days’ notice before the deadline to file a dischargeability complaint sufficient. See
id. The debtor bears the burden of proving a creditor had actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy case. See id. at *3.
The Court concludes that Mr. Tyler failed to carry his burden of establishing
Mr. Daniels had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to either file a proof
of claim (if such a deadline existed) or to file a nondischargeability action. The only
evidence 	presented 	to 	the 	Court 	regarding 	actual 	knowledge 	is 	Mr. 	Daniels’s
testimony that he was not aware of the bankruptcy case until November 2024, when
Mr. Tyler responded to Mr. Daniels’s notices to register the judgments in Georgia.
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After receiving notice, Mr. Daniels moved to reopen the bankruptcy case to file this
adversary proceeding. The Court concludes that Mr. Tyler failed to establish that Mr.
Daniels had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to file a proof of claim
or a nondischargeability action.
Whether § 523(a)(3)(A) or (B) applies depends upon whether the debts at issue
are “of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6)” of § 523(a) (“246 claims”). If Mr.
Daniels’s debts are not 246 claims, then § 523(a)(3)(A) applies, and the question is
whether the failure to schedule Mr. Daniels’s debts prevented “timely filing a proof
of claim.” Because Mr. Tyler’s bankruptcy case was a no-asset case, however, no
deadline to file a proof of claim ever existed, and any failure to list or schedule Mr.
Daniels’s claims could not have prevented him from “timely filing a proof of claim.”
See In re McIntosh, 657 B.R. 279, 294 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2024) (“In a no-asset chapter
7 case, no deadline is set for the filing of claims. Therefore, the lack of notice to the
creditor does not deprive the creditor of the opportunity to file a timely proof of
claim.”) (quoting 4 COLLIER ON B ANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.09 (16th ed. 2023)). Thus, the
judgments cannot be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(3)(A) or (B) based on
Mr. Daniels’s inability to timely file a proof of claim, as no such deadline ever existed.
That leaves only § 523(a)(3)(B)’s inquiry of whether the judgment debts are of the
kind specified in § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6).
In short, 246 claims are debts arising from fraud (§ 523(a)(2)), defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity, larceny, or embezzlement (§ 523(a)(4)), or willful and
malicious injury (§ 523(a)(6)). Mr. Daniels does not allege that either of the judgments
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arise 	from 	fraud, 	defalcation 	while 	acting 	in 	a fiduciary 	capacity, 	larceny, 	or
embezzlement, 	so 	the 	exceptions 	to 	discharge 	under 	§ 	523(a)(2) 	and 	(4) 	are
unavailable. That leaves § 523(a)(6), which provides that a debt is nondischargeable
if it arises from “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). “A debtor is responsible for a
‘willful’ injury when [he] commits an intentional act the purpose of which is to cause
injury or which is substantially certain to cause injury.” Kane v. Stewart Tilghman
Fox & Bianchi P.A. (In re Kane), 755 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Maxfield v. Jennings (In re Jennings), 670 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2012)). The
debtor must intend the injury and the act leading to the injury. See Watson v.
Bradsher (In re Watson), 147 F.4th 1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2025). A finding of liability
for 	an 	intentional 	tort 	alone 	is 	not 	enough 	for 	a 	creditor 	to 	establish
nondischargeability. A finding of an intent to cause injury must be shown. See id. As
for malice, the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted this as an injury which is “wrongful
and without just cause or excessive even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or
ill-will.” Id. at 1339 (quoting In re Jennings, 670 F.3d at 1334). “Constructive or
implied malice can be found if the nature of the act itself implies a sufficient degree
of malice.” Id. (quoting Lee v. Ikner (In re Ikner), 883 F.2d 986, 991 (11th Cir. 1989),
abrogated on other grounds by, Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991)). To support
the Bankruptcy Code’s purpose of a “fresh start,” the exceptions to discharge are
narrowly construed in favor of the debtor. See In re Abreu, 2021 WL 346112, at *3.
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The creditor must prove nondischargeability by a preponderance of the evidence. See
id.; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4005.
Analyzing the underlying judgments does not support a conclusion that they
were based on willful and malicious injuries. Mr. Daniels alleges that the judgment
for $528 was granted for “the intentional tort of harassment (which was willful and
malicious under the circumstances).” [Compl. ¶ 22.] While Mr. Daniels testified that
he received ten messages from Mr. Tyler which he categorizes as harassment and
willful conduct, his evidence is insufficient for the Court to find that judgment
resulted from a willful and malicious injury. First, Mr. Daniels put forward no
evidence of Mr. Tyler intentionally causing injury. Even if Mr. Tyler’s ten messages
to Mr. Daniels were intentional, Mr. Daniels failed to show they were delivered with
the purpose of causing harm or knowingly done with substantial certainty of harm.
Mr. Daniels’s evidence to establish willful and malicious conduct consists of the
document titled “Warrant in Debt (Civil Claim for Money)” (Doc. No. 41, Ex. 38-1)
and the Richmond Police Department incident report (Id., Ex. 38-2). The Warrant in
Debt document includes the handwritten judgment of the City of Richmond General
District Court, Civil Division, for $528, but the judgment includes no factual findings
of any kind. The only information this document provides the Court is mostly illegible
handwritten notes by Mr. Daniels including the circled words “harassment” and
“tortious injury damages.” [Id., Ex. 38-1.] As for the incident report, it merely states
that “[t]he victim is receiving annoying phone calls from a known person.” [Id., Ex.
38-2.] The state court’s finding of tortious injury damages, the incident report with
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“annoying phone calls,” and Mr. Daniels categorizing the actions as harassment are
not enough to establish that the phone calls were made with the intent of causing
injury.
Second, Mr. Daniels failed to put forward evidence of malice, either showing
Mr. Tyler’s actions were excessive or without just cause. The only evidence the Court
has before it is his testimony that he received ten messages, one of which allegedly
contained a death threat. Allegations of death threats were not supported by any
physical evidence and were contradicted by the police report which references only
“annoying phone calls.” [Id., Ex. 38-2.] Finding the messages “annoying” is not
enough, and Mr. Daniels failed to provide any other additional evidence to support
his contention that the judgment for harassment resulted from a willful and
malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). Considering the lack of evidence and narrow
construction of discharge exceptions in favor of debtors, the Court finds that the
judgment for $528 is not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).
As for the $1,500 judgment, Mr. Daniels does not contend that it is a 246 claim
at all. The only evidence relative to the basis of the $1,500 judgment is testimony of
Mr. Daniels that it was for unpaid legal work Mr. Daniels performed on behalf of Mr.
Tyler. Mr. Daniels’s only argument is that Mr. Tyler’s intentional failure to provide
his correct address in the bankruptcy case “robbed” him of the opportunity to
participate in the bankruptcy case, including objecting to Mr. Tyler’s discharge for
failing to disclose certain assets. The Court, however, addresses this argument below
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as it relates to Baitcher. The Court concludes that the $1,500 judgment is not a 246
claim, and it cannot be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(3)(B).
The Court finds that Mr. Daniels established Mr. Tyler used an incorrect
address and failed to provide him with timely notice of the bankruptcy filing. Despite
the incorrect address, Mr. Daniels failed to establish the underlying debts are
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(3).
iii. 	Dischargeability Under Baitcher
In Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1986), the
Eleventh Circuit implemented a judicially created supplement to § 523(a)(3), “to fill
a gap left under the Code which enabled unscrupulous debtors to obtain discharge of
debts 	of 	the 	kind 	which 	would 	have 	been 	[non]dischargeable 	in 	the 	case 	by
fraudulently omitting such debts from their schedules . . . .” Keenom v. All Am. Mktg.
(In re Keenom), 231 B.R. 116, 123 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1999). In simple terms, if a debtor
failed to schedule, or as in this case incorrectly listed, a creditor in a no-asset case by
an honest, good faith mistake and not by fraud or intentional design, the debt may be
discharged. See In re McDaniel, 217 B.R. 348, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1998). The burden
shifts to the debtor to show an absence of fraud or intentional design. See Rion v.
Spivey (In re Springer), 127 B.R. 702, 708 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). If Mr. Tyler cannot
establish evidence presenting an honest mistake, then the Court must presume he
used the wrong address intentionally. See id.
At trial, Mr. Tyler testified that he believed 7868 Cofax was where Mr. Daniels
was living at the time he filed bankruptcy in 2011. Further, he stated that Mr.
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Daniels lived there with another individual, Joseph McClure. Mr. Tyler testified he
knew of this address because he was friends with Mr. Daniels and Mr. McClure at
the time and visited them at the address several times. While Mr. Daniels avers that
he did not live on Cofax in 2011, the Court has no evidence of where he lived at that
time and in fact heard testimony from Mr. Daniels that he previously lived on Cofax
with Mr. McClure, but at a different street number. The Court concludes that Mr.
Tyler’s use of an incorrect address was due to an honest mistake, and not as a result
of any intentional design or fraud. The fact that Mr. Tyler was aware of another
address where Mr. Daniels previously accepted service of process in another matter
in Illinois is not determinative on this issue for at least two reasons: (1) Mr. Daniels
testified that he did not live at that address at the time and chose not to contest
service in the prior proceeding; and (2) the prior action was filed in 2008, and no
evidence was presented that such was a proper address for him at the time Mr. Tyler
filed his bankruptcy petition. The Court finds Mr. Tyler’s explanations for the address
he used credible and concludes no fraud or intentional design instigated use of an
incorrect address.
Baitcher provides no basis to conclude the two judgments are nondischargeable
despite the incorrect address, and Mr. Daniels failed to establish the underlying debts
were 	excepted 	from 	discharge 	under 	§ 	523(a)(3). 	Accordingly, 	the 	debts 	were
discharged. The Court next considers Mr. Tyler’s assertions of discharge violations
and any appropriate sanctions.
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B. Discharge Violations
Because the Court finds that the two judgment debts were discharged, the
Court must consider whether Mr. Daniels's actions violated § 524, and whether
sanctions are appropriate. Mr. Tyler requests that the Court find Mr. Daniels in
contempt for violating his discharge injunction by filing a lien against his mother’s
property and his activities renewing the judgments. He requests that the Court: 1)
order Mr. Daniels to rescind the lien, 2) hold Mr. Daniels in contempt of court, and 3)
sanction Mr. Daniels for violation of the discharge injunction.
i. 	Violation of Discharge Injunction
To determine whether Mr. Daniels violated the discharge injunction, the Court
must first consider two threshold matters: 1) whether Mr. Daniels had notice of the
discharge; and 2) whether Mr. Daniels intended the actions which violated the
discharge injunction. See Green Point Credit, LLC v. McLean (In re McLean), 794 F.3d
1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]o find contempt, the bankruptcy court needed only to
find that [creditor] was aware of the discharge injunction and intended the action
that violated it . . . .”). There can be no dispute that Mr. Daniels became aware of the
discharge by no later than November 7, 2024, when Mr. Tyler filed a Motion to Deny
and Dismiss Plaintiff’s Proposed Order to Domesticate Foreign Judgment in the
Superior Court of Douglas County (Doc. No. 35, p. 100–102; Doc. No. 32, Ex. 10).
Thus, any action taken after November 7, 2024, was done with actual knowledge of
Mr. Tyler’s discharge. The record contains no evidence that Mr. Daniels had
knowledge of the discharge prior to November 7, 2024.
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Section 524 provides in pertinent part,
(a) A discharge in a case under this title
. . .
(2) 	operates 	as 	an 	injunction 	against 	the 	commencement 	or
continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to
collect, recover or offset any such [discharged] debt as a personal
liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived
. . . .
In determining what constitutes a violation of the discharge injunction, the Eleventh
Circuit has found that § 524 is meant to “’eliminate any doubt concerning the effect
of the discharge as a total prohibition on debt collection efforts.’ And Congress meant
no doubt whatsoever: ‘[Section 524] is intended to insure that once a debt is
discharged, the debtor will not be pressured in any way to repay it.’” In re McLean,
794 F.3d at 1321 (quoting H.R. REP . N O. 95-595, at 365–66 (1977)). The applicable
test is whether the “objective effect of the creditor’s action is to pressure a debtor to
repay a discharged debt, regardless of the legal entity against which the creditor files
its claim.” Id. at 1322.
The Court first considers Mr. Daniels’s continuation of the Superior Courts of
Fulton County and Douglas County actions to register the judgments once he learned
of Mr. Tyler’s discharge on November 7, 2024. Section 524 does not define an “act, to
collect . . . any such debt,” but courts generally apply a broad injunction against an
extensive range of collection activities. See McKenzie-Gilyard v. HSBC Bank Nev.,
N.A. (In re McKenzie-Gilyard), 388 B.R. 474, 481 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007). Mr.
Daniels’s efforts to domesticate the judgments were procedural steps to enforce the
judgments in a new jurisdiction. Registering the judgments after a discharge is a
continuation of collection efforts because Mr. Daniels would not domesticate the
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judgments if he had no intent to pursue them in the future. See In re Passa, 578 B.R.
898, 903 (Bankr. D. Utah 2017) (finding that recording a judgment is a violation of
the automatic stay and discharge injunction even if the party’s intent was only to
preserve the judgments because “[t]hat argument still demonstrates an intent to
collect a debt, just at a later date.”). Mr. Daniels sought to domesticate the judgments
in March and June of 2024, months before he had knowledge of the bankruptcy, so
initiation of the domestication actions did not intentionally violate the discharge.
However, once he learned of the discharge on November 7, 2024, he had ample time
to dismiss the case before the Superior Court of Douglas County entered an order
domesticating the judgments on March 5, 2025.6 Some courts have found a creditor’s
inaction once learning of a discharge injunction is a willful violation. See Robb v. Nat’l
Tree Co. (In re Robb), 399 B.R. 171, 175–76 (Bankr. N.D.W.V. 2008); In re Daly, 666
B.R. 810, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2025) (“[T]he continuation in any way of an action
against the Debtor to collect on a discharged debt – including the refusal to dismiss
pending 	litigation 	even 	if 	that 	litigation 	is 	stayed 	– 	violates 	the 	discharge
injunction.”). The Court finds that Mr. Daniels’s continuation of his action to
domesticate the judgments after he was made aware of the discharge order violated
the discharge injunction issued to Mr. Tyler.
6 Mr. Daniels commenced the action to register the $1,500 judgment in the Superior Court of Fulton
County on March 26, 2024. The Superior Court of Fulton County registered the judgment on August
12, 2024. However, Mr. Daniels did not have actual knowledge of the discharge until November 7,
2024, when Mr. Tyler filed documents in the Superior Court of Douglas County domestication action
referencing his 2012 discharge. Because Mr. Daniels did not have actual knowledge of Mr. Tyler’s
discharge when the judgment for $1,500 was domesticated by the Superior Court of Fulton County,
any discussion pertaining to a discharge violation through continuation of actions to register the
judgments relates only to the domestication action in the Superior Court of Douglas County.
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The Court next considers whether filing the lien against property, which Mr.
Tyler asserts only his mother owns, was a violation of the discharge injunction. The
judgment lien states twice, “[f]or satisfaction of a judgment that was entered against
Tony R. Tyler in the Municipal Department of the First District of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois . . . .” [Doc. No. 35, p. 4–5.] The document refers to both
judgment debts at issue, for a total balance of $8,399.89. [Id.] A facial reading of the
judgment lien makes clear that it was filed to collect against Mr. Tyler for the two
discharged debts. The filing of a lien on Mr. Tyler’s mother’s property, when his
mother bears no liability on the judgments, and the judgments include no in rem
interest, equates to Mr. Daniels seeking to coerce Mr. Tyler to repay a discharged
debt. Such efforts against a non-liable third party constitute an indirect attempt to
collect a discharged debt. See In re Feldmeier, 335 B.R. 807, 812 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005)
(finding creditor violated discharge injunction by leaving collection message on
debtor’s mother’s answering machine). Accordingly, the Court finds that the lien was
a continuation of an action to collect a discharged debt in violation of § 524.
Further, because the Court finds that the underlying judgment debts were
discharged, any act to collect against them is void. “[A]n act in violation of the
discharge injunction is void.” Wagabaza v. Beveridge (In re Wagabaza), 582 B.R. 486,
498 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2018); see also Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Gurrola (In re
Gurrola), 328 B.R. 158, 171 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“Once the discharge was entered
. . . any judgment that [creditor] at any time obtained on the discharged debt would
automatically be rendered ‘void’ by § 524(a)(1) . . . .”); In re Eichor, 689 F. Supp. 3d
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438, 446 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (finding any judgment rendered on a discharged debt in any
forum other than bankruptcy court is null and void). Thus, the registered judgments
in Georgia and the lien attached to 16838 Wausau are void, and any further act to
collect on the judgments will be in direct violation of this Court’s discharge order.
ii. 	Fair Ground of Doubt
Not every violation of a debtor’s discharge injunction entitles a debtor to
contempt sanctions. The Supreme Court in Taggart v. Lorenzon, 587 U.S. 554 (2019)
held that a court may impose sanctions for a discharge order violation only if there is
“no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the creditor's conduct. In
other words, there must be no reasonably objective basis for concluding that the
creditor's conduct might be lawful. “[A] good-faith belief that an action taken does not
violate the discharge injunction will not shield a party if the belief is not objectively
reasonable.” In re Cowan, No. 18-54666, 2020 WL 7330049, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
Dec. 11, 2020). The burden to establish a fair ground of doubt as to whether the
actions violated the discharge injunction rests upon Mr. Daniels. See In re McIntosh,
657 B.R. at 292.
The first discharge violation is the continuation of the action to register the
judgments in the Superior Court of Douglas County. Mr. Daniels’s evidence consists
of an order entered in the Superior Court of Douglas County that addressed Mr.
Tyler’s bankruptcy discharge (Doc. No. 32, Ex. 12). In response to Mr. Tyler’s motion
to deny Mr. Daniels’s proposed order to domesticate the judgments which referenced
his discharge, the Superior Court of Douglas County denied Mr. Tyler’s motion,
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finding that “the judgments against [Mr. Tyler] appear to have been revived by the
Illinois court in 2024 after he was given notice and opportunity to respond to same,
at which time this argument should have been raised.” [Id.] Subsequently, the
Superior Court of Douglas County entered an order domesticating the judgments on
March 5, 2025, after Mr. Daniels had knowledge of the bankruptcy discharge. Mr.
Daniels testified that the state court’s order, which he relied on, led him to believe
that pursuing the case was not a violation of Mr. Tyler’s discharge.
Considering, first, Mr. Tyler used the wrong address for Mr. Daniels, second,
Mr. Daniels had no knowledge of the discharge at the time he sought to register the
judgments on June 5, 2024, and third, the Superior Court of Douglas County
continued the action despite the discharge, the Court concludes Mr. Daniels had an
objectively reasonable basis to believe his actions were permitted. Mr. Daniels
believed the two judgments were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(3), and at the time
the judgments were registered, this adversary proceeding was not yet filed. No
bankruptcy 	court 	had 	rendered 	a 	dischargeability 	decision. 	Considering 	his
arguments as to nondischargeability discussed above, and notwithstanding the
Court’s conclusion today that such arguments are not winners, Mr. Daniels had an
objectively reasonable basis to believe his claims were nondischargeable. See In re
Grant-Carmack, No. 6:20-bk-02408, 2022 WL 1115001, at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar.
31, 2022) (finding a fair ground of doubt because no determination of dischargeability
had 	been 	made 	and 	it 	was 	arguable 	that 	domestic 	support 	obligation 	was
nondischargeable). Although the Court now finds the debts were discharged, at the
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time Mr. Daniels became aware of the discharge, a reasonable person could have
believed otherwise. Accordingly, the Court finds that a “fair ground of doubt" existed
as to whether the discharge order barred Mr. Daniels’s conduct in failing to dismiss
the action in the Superior Court of Douglas County.7
Whether Mr. Daniels had a fair ground of doubt when filing the judgment lien
against the 16838 Wausau property presents a more difficult question. Mr. Daniels
filed the lien November 28, 2025, seven months after he initiated this adversary
proceeding and nearly a year after learning about Mr. Tyler’s discharge. He initiated
this adversary proceeding requesting that the Court find the two judgment debts
nondischargeable and proceeded to take action to collect on the judgments at the
same time. On one hand, filing this adversary proceeding arguably did not, in and of
itself, remove the fair ground of doubt, and Mr. Daniels could still have an objectively
reasonable belief that the judgment debts were nondischargeable for the same
reasons explained above. However, creditors should not be enforcing their debts that
are the subject of pending dischargeability actions, and they do so at their own peril.
“Requiring the party subject to the injunction to bring a legal challenge before
7 While the Court finds a fair ground of doubt exists, in part because of the state court order, the Court
does not interpret the state court’s order as a dischargeability determination, nor does Mr. Daniels
argue it is. The order states that the Circuit Court of Cook County revived the judgments in 2024 and
Mr. Tyler should have raised his discharge then. No language indicates that the state court believed
the judgment debts were discharged pursuant to Mr. Tyler’s discharge order. However, a discharge is
a nonwaivable defense, and Mr. Tyler’s failure to raise his discharge in the prior state court action to
revive the judgments does not prevent him from asserting it in a later proceeding. See Meadows v.
Hagler (In re Meadows), 428 B.R. 894, 907 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (“Both §§ 524(a)(1) and (a)(2)
expressly state, however, that their protections with regard to a discharged debt apply ‘whether or not
discharge of such debt is waived.’”); In re Daly, 666 B.R. at 824–25; In re Eichor, 689 F. Supp. 3d at
446 (“[I]t is ‘unequivocally unnecessary’ for the bankruptcy debtor to raise the discharge injunction as
an affirmative defense or even to respond in the state-court action.”).
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intentionally violating the final order ensures notice to other interested parties,
adversarial testing and a fair opportunity for unbiased judicial resolution.” Thomas
v. City of Philadelphia (In re Thomas), No. 24-1861, 2026 WL 1658785, at *6 (3rd Cir.
June 9, 2026). Instead of waiting for this Court’s ruling, Mr. Daniels employed a self-
help approach by filing a lien while the adversary proceeding was pending. See id. at
*1 (“[T]he [creditor] violated well-established law by resorting to a self-help violation
of the discharge order years after it became final.”). To allow Mr. Daniels to pursue
collection activity at the same time he sought a dischargeability determination from
this Court would “throw those types of debts into ‘debt limbo,’ with neither the
automatic stay nor the discharge injunction functioning to protect debtors . . . [and]
creditors could perceive it as granting them the ‘green light’ to commence or continue
litigation against debtors” before a bankruptcy court makes a dischargeability
determination. Buke, LLC v. Eastburg (In re Eastburg), 447 B.R. 624, 632 n.38 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 2011); see also In re Daly, 666 B.R. at 823.
Ultimately, the Court need not make this difficult determination because, even
assuming there was no fair ground of doubt when Mr. Daniels filed the lien against
16838 Wausau, Mr. Tyler failed to prove any recoverable damages and sanctions
against Mr. Daniels are not appropriate for the reasons set forth below.
iii. 	Sanctions and Damages
Although § 524 does not expressly authorize monetary damages upon a
discharge injunction violation, courts rely on their statutory powers pursuant to § 105
of the Bankruptcy Code to impose appropriate sanctions. See In re Deemer, 602 B.R.
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770, 776 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2019). Under § 105, bankruptcy courts may impose
compensatory sanctions for actual damages that a debtor incurs as a result of a
creditor's violation of the discharge injunction, which can include emotional distress,
but “not every willful violation of the [discharge injunction] merits compensation for
emotional distress and that a standard governing such claims is necessary.” Lodge v.
Kondaur Cap. Corp., 750 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2014). The Court may impose
sanctions for such violations “to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court’s
order, [or] to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.” In re McLean, 794
F.3d at 1323 (quoting F.T.C. v. Leshin, 719 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2013)). The
burden rested on Mr. Tyler to prove actual damages or provide a justification
warranting punitive damages. See In re Cowan, 2020 WL 7330049, at *7. Mr. Tyler’s
Motion requests the Court hold Mr. Daniels in contempt of court and impose
sanctions. He further argued for emotional distress damages.
At trial, Mr. Tyler presented no evidence of out-of-pocket monetary expenses
resulting from the discharge violations, and he has no attorney’s fees as a pro se
party. He also presented insufficient evidence to recover damages for emotional
distress. For emotional distress damages “a plaintiff must (1) suffer significant
emotional distress, (2) clearly establish the significant emotional distress, and (3)
demonstrate a causal connection between that significant emotional distress and the
violation of the [discharge injunction].” Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271. Generally, a party
must also produce corroborating evidence to establish significant emotional distress.
Steed v. GSRAN-Z LLC (In re Steed), 2021 WL 1186482, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar.
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26, 2021). Mr. Tyler presented no testimony or corroborating evidence to warrant
emotional distress damages. He testified that Mr. Daniels’s action of filing the
judgment lien caused him emotional distress but provided no other testimony or
evidence. Accordingly, the Court will not impose compensatory sanctions for actual
damages, including emotional distress damages.
The Court has no evidence of losses sustained by Mr. Tyler and does not believe
monetary sanctions against Mr. Daniels are appropriate under the unique facts and
circumstances of this case. Mr. Daniels was not given proper notice of the bankruptcy,
he did not learn of the existence of the discharge until twelve years after its entry,
and 	he 	promptly 	filed 	an 	action 	in 	this 	Court 	seeking 	a 	determination 	of
dischargeability. However, the Court must make clear that Mr. Daniels violated the
discharge injunction. Mr. Tyler’s Motion will be granted in part, and the lien attached
to 16838 Wausau and any other liens associated with the renewed judgments are
declared void, and Mr. Daniels will be ordered to take all necessary steps to have any
judgment liens cancelled of record and any pending litigation relating to the
judgments dismissed with prejudice. Since the Court finds the debts discharged and
Mr. Daniels is now on notice of this finding, any further collection efforts would be a
violation of this Court’s discharge order and will result in a different outcome under
Taggart if the parties find themselves here again. The judgments in question were
discharged, and further collection efforts on them are prohibited.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
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IT IS ORDERED that both judgment debts were discharged by the discharge
granted to Mr. Tyler in 2012, and Mr. Daniels’s claims for relief under the Complaint
are denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Tyler’s Motion is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. It is GRANTED as to Mr. Tyler’s request to have the lien attached
to 16838 Wausau and any other liens associated with the renewed judgments
declared void. Any renewals of the original judgments entered by the City of
Richmond General District Court, Civil Division for $528, and the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois for $1,500, as well as the recording of any judgment liens related
thereto, are void by virtue of the discharge injunction issued by this Court. Mr.
Daniels is ordered and directed to take all necessary steps to have any liens
associated with the judgments cancelled of record and any pending litigation relating
to the judgments dismissed with prejudice. This Order may be recorded in the real
estate records of any state, county, or municipality to effectuate the intent and
purpose of this Order. The Motion is DENIED as to all other forms of relief not
specified above.
The Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Mr. Tyler, Mr. Daniels,
and the Chapter 7 Trustee.
END OF DOCUMENT
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