Jade Bryana Matos-Jones

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN RE:
JADE BRYANA MATOS-JONES,
Debtor.
CASE NO. 25-56673-JWC
CHAPTER 7
JADE BRYANA MATOS-JONES,
Movant,
v.
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL
MANAGEMENT, LLC AS AGENT FOR
EQR PENMAN LLC D/B/A THE
PENMAN APARTMENTS ,
Respondent.
CONTESTED MATTER
ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Reopen Case to Enforce Discharge Injunction
and for Sanctions and Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No.
IT IS ORDERED as set forth below:
________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
Jeffery W. Cavender
U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge
Date: September 30, 2026
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36) (the “Motion”) filed by Debtor Jade Bryana Matos-Jones. Matos-Jones seeks a
contempt order against Equity Residential Management, LLC as Agent for EQR
Penman LLC d/b/a The Penman Apartments (“Equity”) for violating the discharge
injunction by seeking to collect discharged prepetition debt. Equity filed a response
in opposition to the Motion (Doc. No. 39). The Court held an evidentiary hearing June
10, 2026 (the “Hearing”), at which Matos-Jones and counsel for Equity appeared,
presented evidence, and made argument.
After considering the Motion, the testimony and other admitted evidence, the
record in this case,1 and arguments of the parties presented at the Hearing, the Court
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 52, made applicable to this proceeding through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Matos-Jones and Leiyana Gonzales, as co-leaseholders, entered into a
residential lease agreement with Equity in August 2023 (the “Lease”). Leiyana
Gonzales vacated the property in December 2024 but remains responsible for
outstanding amounts under the Lease.
2. 	On May 22, 2025, Equity filed a dispossessory action in Fulton County
State Court against Matos-Jones and Leiyana Gonzales (the “Dispossessory”).
3. 	Matos-Jones filed this chapter 7 bankruptcy case on June 16, 2025,
which stayed the Dispossessory.
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the dockets, orders, pleadings, and reports filed in Matos-
Jones’ case. Fed. R. Evid. 201; Bobadialla v. Aurora Loan Services, 478 Fed. App’x 625 (11th
Cir. 2012) (unpublished) stating “a court may take judicial notice of its own records and the
records of inferior courts.”
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4. 	As 	of 	the 	petition 	date, 	Matos-Jones 	and Leiyana 	Gonzales 	owed
$4,860.43 under the Lease (the “Prepetition Debt”).
5. 	Matos-Jones continued to reside at the leased property during the
bankruptcy case. Matos-Jones made efforts to work out a payment plan, but Equity
indicated that it required full payment to bring the account current. (Doc. 52, Ex. 2).
6. 	Matos-Jones made no payments to Equity during the bankruptcy case.
She testified that she was unable to make any payment because there was no way to
pay only the post-petition amounts owed because her online account reflected the
Prepetition Debt.
7. 	Equity moved for stay relief to continue the Dispossessory. (Doc. No. 25).
In its motion, Equity asserted that Matos-Jones owed, at that time, $6,474.50 in post-
petition charges under the Lease, for a total balance of $11,334.93.
8. 	Matos-Jones opposed stay relief, but the Court granted stay relief by
order entered October 24, 2025. (Doc. No. 32).
9. 	Five days later, Matos-Jones received a discharge, and the bankruptcy
case closed October 29, 2025. (Doc. No. 34).
10. 	Equity’s 	attorney 	of 	record 	received 	electronic 	notification 	of 	the
discharge immediately after entry of the discharge, and the Bankruptcy Notice
Center mailed notice of the discharge to Equity on October 31, 2025. (Doc. No. 35).
11. 	Following stay relief, Equity reopened the Dispossessory. Matos-Jones
opposed the Dispossessory, asserting, among other things, that Equity sought
recovery of the Prepetition Debt. (Doc. No. 52, Ex. 5). Matos-Jones testified, however,
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that monetary damages were not being sought, and Equity was only looking for
possession of the rental unit. On January 5, 2026, the state court entered judgment
in favor of Equity granting a writ of possession and entering judgment for $2,509,
which represented rent for November 2025. (Doc. No. 52, Ex. 17). Matos-Jones
vacated the property on January 21, 2026, and relocated to Florida the same day.
12. 	On February 9, 2026, a representative of Equity, Joe Montelongo, sent
an email to email addresses of both Leiyana Gonzales and Matos-Jones, but the body
of the email was addressed only to Leiyana Gonzales (Doc. 52, Ex. 7). It states,
Hi Leiyana,
I’m Joe with the corporate office of Equity Residential. This
is a friendly reminder that a final statement is ready for
review on your resident portal.
Before March 6 th , 2026, you can either close out your final
statement by paying the balance in full or reply to this
email to set up a payment plan with me.
If neither of those options occur before this date, on March
6 th , 2026, your account becomes eligible to be sent to a third
party for collection. Once an account has been transferred,
all communication 	will be 	handled by the 	third-party
collection agency instead of Equity Residential.
I look forward to hearing from you, and I hope you are
having a great day.
Thank you,
Joe Montelongo
Collection Representative.
(Doc. 52 Ex.7). Matos-Jones presented a second, identical email, but it does not
contain a date. (Doc. No. 52, Ex. 8). Matos-Jones did not respond to either email.
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13. 	Between February 10, 2026, and March 6, 2026, Matos-Jones received
five phone calls from Equity. Matos-Jones did not answer the calls, but she presented
screenshots of her phone showing four substantially identical voicemail transcripts
from four of the calls, which stated:
Hello, this call is on behalf of equity residential. Please be
aware that there are items that need attention in order to
keep your account in good standing with us. You may
review your account by visiting myequityapartments.com.
If you have yet received your statement, or if you have
questions, please contact us at PRR at EQR.com. If you no
longer wish to receive reminder calls concerning your
account, please dial 1-800-377-8060 and request that your
number be removed from our call list. Thank you.
(Doc. 52 Ex. 9). Matos-Jones’ screen shot of the fifth call indicates her phone was
unable to transcribe the voicemail, but the phone number matches the other four calls
and the number provided in the voicemails. (Doc. 52 Ex. 9). Matos-Jones did not
return the calls or speak to anyone at Equity from the collections department
regarding her account.
14. 	Instead, Matos-Jones visited the online portal as directed, using her
personal login. The portal showed a balance of $22,961, an amount that included the
Prepetition Debt. (Doc. 52, Ex. 10).
15. 	Matos-Jones also presented a “statement of deposit” (the “SODA”) dated
Feb. 3, 2026, that she retrieved from the online portal. The SODA shows her name
only and a balance of $22,961, which included the Prepetition Debt. The SODA
further states that payment is due upon receipt and if not paid within 30 days of the
move out date, the balance may be sent to a third-party collection agency. (Doc. 52,
Ex. 6).
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16. 	Matos-Jones presented a “Social Media Growth & Training Contract”
dated August 20, 2025, between Matos-Jones’ business, the Colour Agency LLC, and
an individual named Sherman Ballard. (Doc. 52, Ex. 14). Matos-Jones owns the
Colour Agency LLC and provides social media work to clients in Atlanta. The contract
with Sherman Ballard was for an initial term of four months, with a renewal option
of month-to-month thereafter. Matos-Jones testified that the contract was “in flux”
and ultimately Mr. Ballard terminated it due to her instability. She provided no other
evidence of why Mr. Ballard terminated the contract, when he terminated the
contract, or any specific dollar amount lost as a result of the termination. She testified
that her instability was attributable to Equity’s conduct, which also caused emotional
distress.
17. 	At the Hearing, Jonathan Gonzalez, leader of the internal collections
team for Equity, testified on behalf of Equity. He testified that tenants’ SODAs are
processed when a resident moves out and reflects the account balance along with any
damage and security deposit. Once a SODA is processed, he and his team contact the
former resident for collection, including phone calls and emails. They do not include
any specific amount on any communication, including voicemails, until they have
direct contact with the former resident. An auto dialer calls anyone with an
outstanding balance. If someone picks up, a live person is connected; if no one picks
up, a standard voicemail is sent out.
18. 	Jonathan 	Gonzalez 	testified 	that 	when 	a 	resident 	is 	a 	debtor 	in
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy status is added to the resident’s account. If such
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resident’s bankruptcy covers the entire balance, the account is marked to have no
communications at all, but if some of the balance remains collectable, collection
emails and calls are sent out to the individual. He stated that accounts are reviewed
to determine whether there is a collectable amount on the account, but he did not
articulate any specific process or procedure to review the accounts for discharged
amounts or how discharged amounts might be delineated from collectable amounts
within the account. His testimony indicated that the review is done to determine if
there are any collectable amounts on the account, and if there are, calls and emails
are sent.
19. 	For 	Matos-Jones’ 	account, 	Jonathan 	Gonzalez 	confirmed 	that 	her
bankruptcy status was flagged on her account. He also confirmed that the initial
SODA provided to Matos-Jones reflected $22,961, but the balance has since been
adjusted down to $18,100, which excludes the Prepetition Debt. He could not say who
requested the adjustment or when the adjustment occurred.
20. 	As to the February 9 th email, Jonathan Gonzalez testified that the email
was addressed only to Leiyana Gonzales because her name was listed first on the
account, and Matos-Jones was copied on the email because they routinely copy all
parties on the account.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the Motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1334. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).
Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part,
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(a) A discharge in a case under this title
. . .
(2) 	operates 	as 	an 	injunction 	against 	the 	commencement 	or
continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to
collect, recover or offset any such [discharged] debt as a personal
liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived
. . . .
11 U.S.C. § 524(a). Section 524 is meant to “‘eliminate any doubt concerning the effect
of the discharge as a total prohibition on debt collection efforts.’ And Congress meant
no doubt whatsoever: ‘[Section 524] is intended to insure that once a debt is
discharged, the debtor will not be pressured in any way to repay it.’” Green Point
Credit, LLC v. McLean (In re McLean), 794 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting
H.R. REP . NO. 95-595, at 365–66 (1977)). The Court must ask whether the objective
effect of the creditor’s action is to pressure the debtor to repay a discharged debt. Id.
at 1322. The debtor has the burden of establishing a violation of the discharge
injunction by clear and convincing evidence. Daniels v. Howe Law Firm, P.C. (In re
Daniels), 591 B.R. 814, 822 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2018).
The Court first finds that the evidence does not establish that continuation of
the Dispossessory or the ultimate dispossession violated the discharge injunction.
Although lessors may not seek a monetary judgment on a discharged debt, they may
pursue recovery of their property based on discharged debt. See Powder Mill Ridge v.
Miller (In re Miller), 674 B.R. 316, 331 (Bankr. D. 2025) (when lessor seeks to retake
possession of leased premises, “It is of no import whether [debtor] defaulted pre-
petition, pre-discharge, or post-discharge”); In re Dabrowski, 257 B.R. 394, 415
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“proceeding in rem against the Debtor’s leasehold [is] no
more inconsistent with a discharge than would be a mortgagee’s proceeding against
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the Debtor’s fee interest.”). Matos-Jones asserts that the Dispossessory constituted
an effort to collect the Prepetition Debt, but the evidence does not support the
assertion. Matos-Jones testified that Equity was not seeking monetary damages and
sought only possession of the unit, which it was entitled to do given the amounts owed
on the Lease and this Court’s prior grant of relief from the automatic stay for purposes
of its pursuing the dispossessory. Further, the only document from the Dispossessory
submitted into evidence (other than a response filed by Matos-Jones) was the
judgment entered in January of 2026, which granted a monetary judgment for rent
accrued in November, 2025—after the bankruptcy case was closed.2 Matos-Jones has
not argued that any post-petition amounts were discharged.3 The Court finds Equity
did not violate the discharge injunction by pursuing possession of the property and
ultimately evicting Matos-Jones, nor does the evidence show that Equity sought or
obtained a money judgment on the Prepetition Debt.
2 The dispossessory judgment’s inclusion of a monetary award for November 2025 rent is
hard to square with Matos-Jones’ testimony that Equity only sought possession of the unit,
but the limited records presented from the state court make it impossible for the Court to
understand what led to the entry of the judgment in that form. Regardless, the judgment did
not include an award for the Prepetition Debt.
3 Matos-Jones did not assert that Equity violated the discharge injunction by pursuing
collection of any of the post-petition charges, and neither party presented any evidence or
argument related to that issue. The Court therefore makes no ruling on that issue but notes
that courts appear to be split on the question of whether post-petition rent is discharged
when, as in this case, a lease is rejected by operation of § 365(d)(1). Compare Miller v. Chateau
Communities, Inc. (In re Miller ), 282 F.3d 874 (6th Cir.2002) (where debtor vacated prior to
petition date, all amounts arising under lease are discharged); In re Humbert, 567 B.R. 512
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2017) (finding post-petition rent discharged and lessor’s action to obtain
judgment for post-petition rent violated discharge) with In re Werbinski, 271 B.R. 514 (Bank.
E.D. Mich) (finding lease reverts back to debtors after rejection and lessor may pursue all
rights under lease); Johnson v. Manatee Bay Apts. Corp. (In re Johnson), 460 B.R. 328 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2011) (finding under Florida law that post-discharge rent not discharged where
debtors remained in property and paid rent during case); see also In re Licea, 2018 WL 898221
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb.12, 2018).
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The Court next considers the February 9 th email and concludes it violated the
discharge injunction. The email directs the recipient to review a final statement on
an online portal, directs the recipient either to pay the full account balance or contact
Equity for a payment plan with a warning that the matter would be referred to a
third party for collection if neither occurred within less than a month. At that time,
the online portal and SODA showed the full balance that included the discharged
Prepetition Debt. Although the email was addressed to Leiyana Gonzales only in the
body, Matos-Jones was copied, and the online portal and SODA (which shows only
Matos-Jones’ name) showed the full balance with the Prepetition Debt. The Court
finds the objective effect of the Feb. 9 th email was to pressure Matos-Jones to pay the
discharged Prepetition Debt, and it violated the discharge injunction.4
The Court next finds that the four phone calls for which Matos-Jones included
voicemail transcripts violated the discharge injunction.5 Those calls were directed
specifically to Matos-Jones and directed her to the online portal to review her account.
As with the email, the online portal and SODA showed the full balance with demands
to pay the balance, including the Prepetition Debt. The objective effect of these calls
was to pressure Matos-Jones to pay the full balance showing on the online account,
which included the discharged Prepetition Debt. The fact that the calls did not state
4 Matos-Jones submitted a second, undated email substantially similar to the February 9th
email. Because it was undated, and Matos-Jones could not say when she received it, the Court
does not find clear and convincing evidence that the second email violated the discharge
injunction.
5 Matos-Jones received a fifth call and voicemail from the same number, but there is no
evidence establishing the contents of the voicemail, and the Court does not find clear and
convincing evidence that the fifth phone call violated the discharge injunction.
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a specific amount or demand payment specifically does not change the result. Nothing
in the voicemail suggests that answering or returning the call would have put Matos-
Jones in touch with a live person who might have information contrary to the online
account. Nothing in the evidence shows that Equity presented anything to Matos-
Jones clarifying that the Prepetition Debt portions of the SODA and online balances
did not apply to her, or that she had any option to pay less than the amounts shown.
Neither the SODA, email communication, nor phone calls contained protective
language typical of collection efforts after entry of a discharge that make clear they
are not seeking to collect discharged indebtedness. See Mele v. Bank of America Home
Loans (In re Mele), 486 B.R. 546, 557–58 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013); Ohai v. Delta
Community Credit Union (In re Ohai), 660 B.R. 737, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2024).
Equity failed to take proper precautions to exclude the discharged debt from the
SODA or make clear it was not seeking to collect on the discharged Prepetition Debt
as part of its ongoing collection efforts. The Court finds the objective effect of the
phone calls directing Matos-Jones to an online portal showing discharged debt was to
pressure her to pay the discharged Prepetition Debt. See In re Strong, No. 25-03068,
2026 WL 1557450, at *11 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2026) (finding that landlord violated
discharge injunction by pursuing payment of discharged debt through presenting
resident ledger including pre- and post-petition debt and failing to provide payment
method on post-petition debt only).
Having determined that Equity violated the discharge injunction, the Court
must determine whether Equity may be found in contempt and subject to sanctions.
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As a threshold matter, the Court easily concludes that Equity had notice of the
discharge and that it intended the actions that violated the discharge injunction. See
In re McLean, 794 F.3d at 1323. There is no dispute, and the record in the bankruptcy
case makes clear, that Equity was aware of the bankruptcy case and had actual
knowledge of the discharge. Further, Equity does not suggest that the Feb. 9th email
and four phone calls were unintentional. Instead, Equity intentionally sent them in
the ordinary course of Equity’s regular collection efforts, and there is no indication or
any argument that Matos-Jones received them by mistake.
The Supreme Court has instructed that before the Court can hold Equity in
contempt, the Court must determine there is “no fair ground of doubt” that Equity
violated the discharge injunction. “In other words, civil contempt may be appropriate
if there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct
might be lawful.” Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554, 557, 139 S.Ct. 1795, 1799 (2019).
“[A] good-faith belief that an action taken does not violate the discharge injunction
will not shield a party if the belief is not objectively reasonable.” In re Cowan, No. 18-
54666, 2020 WL 7330049, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2020). The burden to
establish a fair ground of doubt as to whether the actions violated the discharge
injunction rested upon Equity.
The Court finds no fair ground of doubt that the Feb. 9 th email and the
transcribed phone calls violated the discharge injunction. Equity sent multiple
collection emails and phone calls directing Matos-Jones to an online portal that
demanded payment in full on a balance that included discharged debt. Nothing in the
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communications 	or 	information 	provided 	to 	Matos-Jones 	suggested 	that 	the
information on the online portal or SODA was incorrect or limited to non-discharged
amounts. Nor did the communications contain any protective language making clear
they were not seeking collection of any debts discharged through bankruptcy. The
Court finds no fair ground of doubt that the emails and phone calls violated the
discharge injunction, and the Court finds Equity in contempt of the discharge
injunction.
Upon a finding of contempt, sanctions may be imposed “to coerce the defendant
into compliance with the court’s order, [or] to compensate the complainant for losses
sustained.” In re McLean, 794 F.3d at 1323. Matos-Jones requests that the Court
order Equity to correct its ledger to remove the discharged Prepetition Debt and
prohibit it from transferring the account to a third-party for collection. At the hearing,
Jonathan Gonzalez asserted that Equity already reduced Matos-Jones’ account to
remove the Prepetition Debt, and there was no evidence to contradict this assertion.
If Equity has not marked the Prepetition Debt as discharged or otherwise deducted
it from Matos-Jones’ account, it must do so on a permanent basis. Further, Equity
must not take any further collection actions on the Prepetition Debt, including
transferring it to a third-party for collection.
“Under § 105, bankruptcy courts may impose compensatory sanctions for
actual damages that a debtor incurs as a result of a creditor's violation of the
discharge injunction,” which can include emotional distress damages. In re McLean,
794 F.3d at 1325. Matos-Jones requests compensatory damages including actual
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damages from the wrongful eviction and emotional distress damages, return of a $400
security deposit, punitive damages, and costs incurred. The burden rested on Matos-
Jones 	to 	prove 	actual 	damages, 	punitive 	damages, 	or 	the necessity 	for 	other
sanctions.
Matos-Jones 	presented 	no 	evidence 	of 	out-of-pocket 	monetary 	expenses
resulting from the discharge violation, and she has no attorney’s fees as a pro se party.
Matos-Jones argued that her relocation to Florida caused various damages, but the
Court has determined that the Dispossessory and eviction were not discharge
violations, and the collection efforts occurred after she moved to Florida. Further,
Matos-Jones provided no evidence of the cost of relocation, and it is unclear why
relocation to Florida was necessary after the dispossession. There is no basis to award
damages based on the relocation to Florida or other out-of-pocket expenses.
Matos-Jones argued her business has suffered as a result of the discharge
violations, but the only evidence presented related to her business is a contract titled
“Social Media Growth & Training Contract” between Matos-Jones’ business, The
Colour Agency LLC, and Mr. Ballard (Doc. No. 52, Ex. 14). Matos-Jones testified
generally that Mr. Ballard terminated the contract because of her instability and
Equity’s conduct, but she offered no further testimony or evidence explaining how
Equity’s discharge violations caused Ballard to terminate the contract. She did not
testify or provide any evidence related to when he terminated the contract or how
much revenue she lost as a result of the termination. The contract was dated August
20, 2025, with a four-month term and optional monthly renewal terms. There was no
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evidence that the contract extended beyond the initial four-month term or that it was
still in place by February, 2026, when the discharge violations occurred. Further, the
contract is not with Matos-Jones individually but with her LLC, and her LLC is not
entitled to recover damages for any violations of her individual discharge. See
Bahnsen v. Discover Fin. Servs. Inc. (In re Bahnsen), 547 B.R. 779, 787 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2016) (husband lacked standing to file suit for violation of his wife’s discharge);
and Kiebala v. Boris, No. 1:16-cv-7478, 2017 WL 4339947, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,
2017) (business owner cannot recover for injuries derivative of injuries to business).
Matos-Jones made some additional statements about her clients being in
Atlanta and that her work has suffered from the relocation, but, again, there was no
evidence indicating how much work she lost, when she lost it, or any other evidence
of actual monetary losses beyond the bare assertion that being in Florida hurt her
business. The Court simply does not have sufficient evidence to establish any actual
damages related to the business or income.
Matos-Jones also presented insufficient evidence to recover damages for
emotional distress. For emotional distress damages “a plaintiff must (1) suffer
significant emotional distress, (2) clearly establish the significant emotional distress,
and (3) demonstrate a causal connection between that significant emotional distress
and the violation of the [discharge injunction].” Lodge v. Kondaur Cap. Corp., 750
F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2014). Generally, a party must also produce corroborating
evidence to establish significant emotional distress. Steed v. GSRAN-Z LLC (In re
Steed), 2021 WL 1186482, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2021). Matos-Jones
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testified generally that Equity’s communications and the balance reflected on the
resident portal and SODA caused her emotional distress, but she provided no other
testimony or corroborating evidence. Accordingly, the Court will not award emotional
distress damages.
Nor is this case appropriate for punitive damages. Courts have “traditionally
been reluctant to grant punitive damages absent some showing of reckless or callous
disregard for the law or rights of others.” In re McLean, 794 F.3d at 1325 (quoting
Goichman v. Bloom (In re Bloom), 875 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Court does
not find, and Matos-Jones makes no argument, that Equity acted recklessly or with
a callous disregard for the law. Although Equity should take better care in handling
resident accounts in bankruptcy, the Court heard no evidence that Equity is a
persistent violator of discharge injunctions, and their conduct here does not warrant
punitive damages.
The Motion requests a return of a $400 security deposit, arguing Equity failed
to comply with O.C.G.A. § 44-7-33 warranting a return of the security deposit. Matos-
Jones provided no evidence at the Hearing related to the security deposit. Further,
there is no dispute that Matos-Jones owes substantially more than the security
deposit, and the Court finds she holds no legitimate claim for a return of the security
deposit. See O.C.G.A. § 44-7-34 (“Nothing in this Code section shall preclude the
landlord from retaining the security deposit for nonpayment of rent or of fees for late
payment . . .”); 11 U.S.C. § 553 (preserving rights of setoff for mutual debts); In re
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Bowers, 666 B.R. 374, 390 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2025) (lessor may offset security deposit
against prepetition amounts owed on lease).
Although the Court finds Matos-Jones failed to provide evidence warranting
compensatory or punitive damages, the evidence clearly and convincingly established
that Equity violated the discharge injunction. The Court “need not and will not simply
overlook Debtor’s statutory right to be free of collection attempts in violation of the
discharge injunction.” In re Musto, No. 8:19-bk-03452, 2021 WL 99343, at *4 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2021). Based on the circumstances here, the Court finds it
appropriate to award nominal damages to Matos-Jones. The Court awards $500 for
each of the 5 discharge violations, for a total of $2,500.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. Equity is found to be in contempt for violating the discharge injunction; to the
extent not already done, Equity must permanently mark the Prepetition Debt as
discharged in its records and deduct the Prepetition Debt from Matos-Jones’ account;
Equity is prohibited from taking any further collection activity in connection with the
Prepetition Debt, including transferring the discharged debt to a third-party for
collection; Jade Bryana Matos-Jones is awarded damages in the amount of $500 per
discharge violation for a total award of $2,500. The Motion is DENIED as to any
further request for damages and sanctions.
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The Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jade Bryana Matos-Jones,
Equity Residential Management, LLC as Agent for EQR Penman LLC d/b/a The
Penman Apartments’ counsel of record, and the chapter 7 trustee.
END OF DOCUMENT
Case 25-56673-jwc Doc 61 Filed 09/30/26 Entered 09/30/26 16:54:03 Desc Main
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