Clarkin v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
TRACY MARIE CLARKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-00239 MWJS-KJM
ORDER REVERSING DECISION OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
AND REMANDING FOR FURTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
After a long career as a loan officer, Tracy Clarkin applied for Social Security
disability and disability insurance benefits based on what she described as severe
symptoms from mental and physical impairments. After a brief hearing, the ALJ found
that Clarkin’s symptom statements were not consistent with the evidence in the record
and denied the applications.
Clarkin now appeals to this court. Invoking well-established Ninth Circuit
precedent, she argues that the ALJ could not reject her symptom testimony without
“offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
806 F.3d 487, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). She maintains that the ALJ’s offerings
fell short of those demanding standards.
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 1 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

2
Clarkin’s appeal is well taken. The ALJ’s decision is REVERSED, and this matter
is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Under the relevant Social Security regulations, ALJs must follow “a five-step
sequential process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th
Cir. 2011). These “steps”—really, questions that must be answered in proper order—
are the following:
(1) Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? (2) Is the
claimant’s impairment severe? (3) Does the impairment meet or equal one of a
list of specific impairments described in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant able
to perform any work that he or she has done in the past? and (5) Are there
significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform?
Id. at 724-25 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
In a written decision issued after a brief hearing, the ALJ worked through the
first four of these steps in Clarkin’s case.
Step One. At step one, the ALJ found that Clarkin was not presently gainfully
employed. Dkt. No. 8-1, at PageID.48 (Administrative Record (AR) at 27). Although
Clarkin had worked as a loan officer since the early 2000s—both as an employee of
companies and as an independent contractor—she stopped working in February 2022
because of a “group layoff” at her latest employer. Id. And the administrative record
reflects that Clarkin did not resume work elsewhere, which she attributed to her severe
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 2 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

3
impairments and their symptoms. Id. at PageID.293 (AR at 272) (Clarkin representing
that she “stop[ped] working” in February 2022 “[b]ecause of [her] condition(s)”).
Step Two. At step two, the ALJ agreed with Clarkin that she faced several severe
physical impairments. Id. at PageID.48 (AR at 27). But the ALJ did not credit Clarkin’s
statements and hearing testimony that she also suffered from several mental
impairments. The ALJ acknowledged that Clarkin had alleged difficulty in four areas
of mental functioning: (1) “understanding, remembering, or applying information,”
(2) “interacting with others,” (3) “concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace,” and
(4) “adapting or managing oneself.” Id. at PageID.49-50 (AR at 28-29). The ALJ
nonetheless concluded that “considered singly and in combination,” these mental
impairments “do not cause more than minimal limitation” in Clarkin’s “ability to
perform basic mental work activities.” Id. at PageID.49 (AR at 28).
The ALJ offered three reasons for this conclusion. First, the ALJ relied on
“mental status examinations”—more precisely, the observations Clarkin’s psychiatrist,
Dr. John Guo, made of her during once-a-month teleconference appointments. Id.; see
generally id. at PageID.79 (AR at 58) (ALJ noting that Clarkin was “going to” therapy
with Dr. Guo “once a month via Zoom”). During these appointments, Clarkin was
observed as “alert and oriented,” and was perceived to be exhibiting “normal attention
and concentration, logical thought process, intact associations, normal memory, good
impulse control, and good judgment and insight,” as well as displaying “normal and
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 3 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

4
cooperative behavior.” Id. at PageID.49 (AR at 28). The ALJ also noted Clarkin’s self-
report that she “gets along ‘fine’ with authority figures.” Id.
Second, the ALJ reasoned that Clarkin’s “mental symptoms were conservatively
managed with psychotherapy and antidepressant medications,” and that at least one
aspect of her mental health “improved with treatment and support.” Id. at PageID.50
(AR at 29). The ALJ also observed that although Clarkin was “recommended for
cognitive behavioral therapy and to find a therapist,” the record “indicates she did not
follow through with this recommendation.” Id.
Third and finally, the ALJ found that Clarkin “reported intact activities of daily
living”—which the ALJ noted would be explored in more detail later in her written
decision—and found that these activities contradicted Clarkin’s statements about the
severity of her limitations. Id. at PageID.49 (AR at 28).
The Last Three Steps. At the third step, the ALJ found that Clarkin’s impairments
did not meet or exceed any listed impairment that would qualify her as disabled without
regard to her age, education, and work experience. Id. at PageID.55 (AR at 34). For that
reason, the ALJ assessed Clarkin’s residual functional capacity, or “RFC,” to aid in
determining whether she could perform available work at steps four and five.
In making this assessment, the ALJ stated that she “has considered all symptoms
and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with
the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” Id. at PageID.51 (AR at 30). The
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 4 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

5
ALJ further stated that she would begin by assessing “whether there is an[y] underlying
medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s)” that “could reasonably be
expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms.” Id.
As to mental impairments, the ALJ recognized that Clarkin had reported being
“consistently unable to make mental connections or remember things,” to “having
fatigue that prevents her from getting out of bed,” to “having intermittent chronic
dizziness,” and that “her brain fog creates enormous anxiety.” Id. The ALJ also
recognized that Clarkin had “testified that she struggles with memory, loss of train of
thought, occasional dizziness, debilitating fatigue, and mental decline,” and that
Clarkin had “anxiety and panic attacks outside of her home.” Id.
The ALJ did not doubt Clarkin’s inability to work if this symptom testimony
were credited. But the ALJ found that while Clarkin’s “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” Clarkin’s
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms
are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record
for the reasons explained in this decision.” Id. at PageID.51-52 (AR at 30-31).
In the ALJ’s view, Clarkin’s “statements concerning the alleged intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms” were “inconsistent” with Clarkin’s
“activities of daily living.” Id. at PageID.53 (AR at 32). As promised earlier in her
decision, the ALJ provided the following description of these activities:
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 5 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

6
The claimant reported that she is able to maintain personal care, prepare
simple meals, perform basic household chores, laundry, dishes, and
vacuuming, go outside two to three times per week, walk, drive a car,
shop in stores, and eat out with friends . . . . Additionally, she testified to
traveling during the relevant period: she flew to Ohio twice in 2023 for
the holidays with family, and to San Diego and Denver in 2024 by herself
to meet a friend as well as to help a friend recover from knee surgery.
Id. Although the ALJ noted that it was “not determinative of the ultimate issue,” and
acknowledged that “one need not be utterly incapacitated to be found disabled,” the
ALJ nonetheless reasoned that “some of the physical abilities required to perform these
activities are the same as those necessary for obtaining and maintaining employment.”
Id. As such, Clarkin’s “ability to participate in such activities is inconsistent with the
claimant’s statements regarding the degree of her limitations.” Id.
The ALJ offered one final reason for rejecting Clarkin’s symptom testimony: “the
evidence shows that the claimant stopped working for reasons not related to the
allegedly disabling impairments.” Id. According to the ALJ, Clarkin “stopped working
due to a business-related group layoff rather than owing to impairment related reasons
and reasons which are unrelated to her medical conditions, symptoms, and limitations.”
Id. The ALJ did not cite any evidence in the administrative record to support that
finding.
But having rejected Clarkin’s symptom testimony, the ALJ adopted an RFC that
led to the conclusion, at step four, that Clarkin could still perform past work as a loan
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 6 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

7
officer. Id. at PageID.55 (AR at 34). The ALJ therefore denied Clarkin’s applications
without having to consider whether Clarkin could perform other work at step five.
Clarkin asked the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council to review the
ALJ’s decision, but that request was denied, id. at PageID.22–27 (AR at 1–6), making the
ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. This timely appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner’s disability determination must be reversed when “it is either
not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Luther v. Berryhill,
891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). The standard is deferential, requiring “only such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). But a court
may “review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and
may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which [they] did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495
F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). “Long-standing principles of administrative law require us
to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the
ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have
been thinking.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
When a claimant is not found to be malingering—that is, they are not
exaggerating feigning their condition—and when their impairments could reasonably
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 7 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

8
produce the symptoms they allege, an ALJ may “reject the claimant’s testimony about
the severity of [her] symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons
for doing so.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492-93 (cleaned up); see also Orn, 495 F.3d at
635. To meet that standard, the ALJ’s reasons “‘must be sufficiently specific to allow a
reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on
permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding
pain.’” Loniza v. King, Civ. No. 23-00352, 2025 WL 435943, at *3 (D. Haw. Feb. 7, 2025)
(quoting Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493 (cleaned up)).
In this case, the ALJ did not suggest Clarkin was malingering. And the ALJ
acknowledged that Clarkin’s impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the
symptoms she reported. The only question, then, is whether the ALJ offered the
specific, clear, and convincing reasons needed to reject Clarkin’s symptom statements.
1. The ALJ’s first offered reason for rejecting Clarkin’s symptom statements is
that her psychiatrist, Dr. Guo, had observed during once-a-month Zoom appointments
that Clarkin was “alert and oriented,” exhibited “normal attention, and concentration,
logical thought process, intact associations, normal memory, good impulse control, and
good judgment and insight,” and showed “normal and cooperative behavior.” Dkt. No.
8-1, at PageID.49 (AR at 28).
This reasoning is not persuasive, and, indeed, the Commissioner himself does
not appear to defend it in his briefing. Dkt. No. 23, at PageID.977 & n.3 (discussing
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 8 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

9
Dr. Guo only in defending the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Guo’s opinion that Clarkin was
severely disabled, but not relying on Dr. Guo’s telehealth observations as a basis for
discounting Clarkin’s symptom statements). The fact that Clarkin “still regularly had
cogent moments—including in periodic appointments with medical professionals—
does not obviously contradict her testimony” that she also regularly had bad days in
which she could do nothing but lie in bed. Jaco v. Dudek, Case No. 24-00472, 2025 WL
1144764, at *6 (D. Haw. Apr. 18, 2025). “As the Ninth Circuit has cautioned, ‘while
discussing mental health issues, it is error to reject a claimant’s testimony merely
because symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment.’” Id. (quoting Garrison v.
Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014)).
In short, the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Guo’s observations during monthly telehealth
appointments does not amount to a specific, clear, and convincing reason to reject
Clarkin’s symptom statements.
2. The ALJ’s second offered reason concerned Clarkin’s treatment records. The
ALJ relied on these treatment records in three distinct ways, and the Commissioner
argues that each of them suffices to warrant affirmance here. But the court concludes
that none does.
a. The ALJ first relied on the fact that Clarkin’s “mental symptoms” had been
“conservatively managed with psychotherapy and antidepressant medications.” Dkt.
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 9 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

10
No. 8-1, at PageID.50 (AR at 29). Conservative management or treatment can be an
appropriate consideration in evaluating the credibility of symptom testimony.
But “to reject a claimant’s symptom testimony based on conservative treatment,
the record must contain evidence that a more aggressive, appropriate treatment was
available.” Jaco, 2025 WL 1144764, at *7 (citing Loniza, 2025 WL 435943, at *5); see also
Lapeirre-Gutt v. Astrue, 382 F. App’x 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2010). The administrative record
contains no evidence that more aggressive, appropriate treatment was available here.
To be sure, as Clarkin acknowledges, Dkt. No. 22, at PageID.957, one medical
professional suggested the possibility of an inpatient psychiatric evaluation. But there
is no evidence that any medical professional ever concluded that inpatient treatment
was appropriate under the circumstances.
b. Next, the ALJ noted that at least one aspect of Clarkin’s mental
impairments had improved with treatment. And it is true, as the Commissioner argues,
that “evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a
claim of disability.” Dkt. No. 23, at PageID.971 (quoting Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d
867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017)).
But the ALJ did not say—let alone offer reasons to conclude—that treatment
improved Clarkin’s mental symptoms to such an extent that they were no longer as
severe as Clarkin had represented. Just as a person with a disability should not be
“penalized for attempting to leave their lives in the face of their limitations,” Auapaau v.
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 10 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

11
O’Malley, Civ. No. 24-00176, 2024 WL 4301378, at *3 (D. Haw. Sept. 26, 2024) (cleaned
up), so should they not be penalized for attempting to improve their conditions. Unless
an improvement is significant enough to remove the disability, it does not change the
fact that the person is disabled and thus entitled to benefits.
That is, indeed, precisely what the Ninth Circuit explained in the very case on
which the Commissioner relies. In Wellington, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
“[s]ymptoms may wax and wane during the progression of a mental disorder,” but that
those symptoms “may also subside during treatment.” 878 F.3d at 876. And if
treatment results “not only” in the “symptoms and signs” being “ameliorated,” but also
the individual “return[ing] to a level of function close to the level of function they had
before they developed symptoms or signs of their mental disorders,” then that
improvement “can undermine a claim of disability.” Id.
In this case, the ALJ found, at most, that “symptoms and signs” were to some
extent “ameliorated.” Id. Apart from noting Clarkin’s improvement, the ALJ said
nothing about the extent or significance of the improvement—let alone offered
reasoning to conclude the improvement was significant enough to meet Wellington’s
standards. And the administrative record contains no obvious reason why one should
reach that conclusion here.
//
//
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 11 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

12
c. Lastly, the ALJ relied on the fact that while Clarkin was “recommended for
cognitive behavioral therapy and to find a therapist,” the record “indicates she did not
follow through with this recommendation.” Dkt. No. 8-1, at PageID.50 (AR at 29).
It is true that a “claimant’s ‘unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to
seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment’ can undermine her
allegations about the severity of an impairment.” Dkt. No. 23, at PageID.974 (quoting
Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1989)). But Clarkin did offer an explanation
here. As she testified: “I did try, on numerous occasions, to find another counselor,
often at Dr. Gu[o]’s request, but I wasn’t able to. I would call. I would call providers
that were in my network, and they had indicated on the roster that they were taking
new clients, and I had one of two things happen. Either they just never called back, or
they weren’t, in fact, taking new clients.” Dkt. No. 8-1, at PageID.79 (AR at 58).
Of course, the ALJ was not required to credit this explanation or to accept it as
adequate. But to reject it, the ALJ had to offer reasons. The ALJ did not do that. As
such, it is only the ALJ’s rejection of Clarkin’s testimony that is, on the present record,
“unexplained, or inadequately explained.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603-04.
3. This brings us to the third of the ALJ’s reasons, which centered on Clarkin’s
activities of daily living. That is to say, the ALJ reasoned that because Clarkin could do
certain things in her everyday life, she was not reliably describing the severity of her
symptoms.
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 12 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

13
Whenever an ALJ relies on reasoning of this sort, it creates a risk that a
“‘disability claimant[]’” will be “‘penalized for attempting to lead’ their ‘lives in the face
of their limitations.’” Auapaau, 2024 WL 4301378, at *3 (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157
F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)). Id. As a safeguard against that risk, the Ninth Circuit has
barred ALJs from relying on activities of daily living unless one of the following is true:
(1) the activities “actually contradict the claimant’s symptom testimony,” or (2) the
activities “show that the claimant spends a substantial part of their day engaged in
pursuits that are transferrable to a work setting.” Id. (citing Orn, 495 F.3d at 639).
“Absent one of these grounds, a claimant’s daily activities cannot fairly be said to
detract from a claimant’s testimony about the effect of their disability.” Id.
The ALJ did not offer sufficient reasoning to make either showing. To begin
with, the ALJ offered no reasoning to support the conclusion that any of Clarkin’s
activities of daily living “show that the claimant spends a substantial part of their day
engaged in pursuits that are transferrable to a work setting.” Id. To be sure, the ALJ
generally observed that “some of the physical abilities required to perform” Clarkin’s
activities of daily living “are the same as those necessary for obtaining and maintaining
employment.” Dkt. No. 8-1, at PageID.53 (AR at 32). But this otherwise-unexplained
observation falls short for three reasons. First, the ALJ does not explain what “physical
abilities” are the ones that would be “necessary for obtaining and maintaining
employment.” Id. Second, the ALJ does not explain how any of these “physical
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 13 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

14
abilities” would address the symptoms from mental impairments that Clarkin
described. Third, and most importantly, the ALJ offered no reason to believe that
Clarkin spends a “substantial part” of her day engaged in transferrable pursuits.
Indeed, the ALJ did not even offer a view on how much time Clarkin spends on these
activities of daily living on a typical day.
Nor does the record offer any support for the conclusion that Clarkin spends any
substantial part of her day engaged in transferrable pursuits. For example, Clarkin
reported being able to “maintain personal care, prepare simple meals, perform basic
household chores like cleaning, laundry, dishes, and vacuuming.” Id. But on the same
form in which she reported those activities—Exhibit 8E—Clarkin wrote that dishes
typically take her “5-10 min.” and vacuuming “15 mins.” Id. at PageID.337 (AR at 316).
As for meals, Clarkin explained that because she prepares “[j]ust simple meals usually
frozen,” it only takes her “from 5 – 30 minutes.” Id. And Clarkin did not represent that
she did each of these activities every single day. Id. This record does not support the
ALJ’s conclusion that Clarkin performed these activities for a substantial part of her
day.
As to the other activities of daily living, the record in fact shows that Clarkin does
not perform them each day, but instead only performs them on rare occasion. Clarkin
reported that she goes outside of her house only “two to three times per week,” for
example. Id. at PageID.53 (AR at 32); see also id. at PageID.338 (AR at 317) (Clarkin
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 14 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

15
reporting that she “tr[ies] to daily,” but can only manage it “2-3 x a week”). Putting
aside the separate problem that there is no evidence regarding how long each outing
lasts on average, it simply cannot be said that a person spends a “substantial part” of
their day on something they do not at all do four to five days out of the week.
The same is true of the rest of Clarkin’s activities. Clarkin reported that she
sometimes will “drive a car, [and] shop in stores.” Id. at PageID.53 (AR at 32). But
those are activities that require her to go outside of her home—and, as noted, she does
not do that on four to five days of her week. Clarkin also reported occasionally
“eat[ing] out with friends,” id., but clarified that she only does this about once a week,
id. at PageID.339 (AR at 318). She reported occasionally walking, but clarified that she
generally can only walk for about seven minutes at a time. Id. at PageID.340 (AR at
319). And while she has gone on three airline flights—once in 2023 and twice in 2024—
it cannot be said that a person spends a substantial part of their day on transferrable
pursuits by traveling three times in two years.
The ALJ did not distinctly say that Clarkin’s activities of daily living “actually
contradict the claimant’s symptom testimony,” Auapaau, 2024 WL 4301378, at *3, but in
any event the record in its present form would not support the conclusion that they do.
In describing her symptoms, Clarkin did not suggest that she was always incapacitated
and unable to perform any activities. She made clear that she performs activities of
daily living whenever she is having “a good day,” but that whenever she is having “a
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 15 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

16
bad day,” she “sleep[s] all day from fatigue and inability to walk from it and/or
dizziness.” Dkt. No. 8-1, at PageID.336 (AR at 315). In a similar vein, she explained that
although she “tr[ies]” to go outside “daily,” she in fact succeeds “2-3 x a week.” Id. at
PageID.338 (AR at 317). It is not obvious how Clarkin’s ability to maintain personal
care, prepare simple meals, perform basic household chores, walk, drive, shop, and eat
out with friends on her good days is at all inconsistent with her representation that she
cannot do any of those things—that she must instead simply stay in bed—on her bad
days. Accord Jaco, 2025 WL 1144764, at *6 (“[T]he fact that Jaco was not invariably
incapacitated by her PTSD, anxiety, and depression does not discredit her testimony
that she occasionally was.”). At the least, the ALJ offered no reason to find any actual
inconsistency, and the court may not “attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have
been thinking” in this appeal. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1225.
In his briefing, the Commissioner argues that the three lengthy airline trips
Clarkin took over a two-year period present an actual inconsistency with her symptom
testimony. But Clarkin explained that she is better able to withstand airline travel
because travel helps to reduce her anxiety. The ALJ offered no reason to reject that
explanation—indeed, the ALJ did not acknowledge it at all. Nor did the ALJ explain
why traveling on three occasions in a two-year period would actually contradict
Clarkin’s allegation that she regularly has “bad day[s]” in which she cannot do
anything at all.
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 16 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

17
For these reasons, the court concludes that the ALJ did not offer specific, clear
and convincing reasons for rejecting Clarkin’s symptom statements based on Clarkin’s
activities of daily living.
4. The ALJ offered one last reason for rejecting Clarkin’s symptom testimony:
that Clarkin “stopped working due to a business-related group layoff rather than owing
to impairment related reasons and reasons which are unrelated to her medical
conditions, symptoms, and limitations.” Dkt. No. 8-1, at PageID.53 (AR at 32).
The court agrees, in principle, that the “fact that a claimant stopped work for
reasons other than her impairments is a sufficient basis to discount her testimony.”
Dkt. No. 23, at PageID.974 (citing Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001).
But while the ALJ offered the conclusion that Clarkin stopped working for reasons other
than her impairments, the ALJ offered no reasons to reach that conclusion. And the
administrative record does not make it obvious why one should reach that conclusion
here.
To be sure, there is no question that Clarkin stopped being an employee for the
last of her employers because of a group layoff in February 2022. If the question were
simply why Clarkin stopped working for that specific employer at the moment she did,
the group layoff would be the correct answer. But the proper question is not why
Clarkin stopped being an employee for her last employer; it is why Clarkin stopped
working altogether—that is, why she did not seek new work for a different employer.
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 17 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

18
Clarkin was, after all, a loan officer with extensive experience. And she represented
that she did not seek new work because her severe impairments precluded it. Merely
pointing to the group layoff does not offer a persuasive reason to reject Clarkin’s
representation.
Perhaps the Commissioner’s suggestion (though it is no more fleshed out in the
Commissioner’s briefing than in the ALJ’s decision) is that Clarkin should have stopped
working for her last employer before she was laid off if her severe impairments truly
were disabling. But Clarkin addressed that issue, too. In her hearing testimony, she
explained that she had already begun to have significant cognitive challenges at work.
As she testified, she had “started to notice,” months before her termination, that she
was “forgetting things” and “was making mistakes at work” that were not “typical” of
her. Dkt. No. 8-1, at PageID.88 (AR at 67). And in January 2022, Clarkin made a
substantial error that negatively affected a client, and which reflected her cognitive
decline. Id. at PageID.88-89 (AR at 67-68). If credited, this testimony would show that
while it took her employer some time to terminate her, it had already become the case
that Clarkin could not perform the duties of the job. Granted, that testimony need not
have been credited. But the ALJ must offer reasons to reject it, and yet offered none.
* 	* 	*
The bottom line is that the ALJ did not offer any “specific, clear and convincing
reasons” for rejecting Clarkin’s symptom statements. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492-93
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 18 of 19
PageID.<pageID>

19
(cleaned up). And because that alone is sufficient reason to reverse the ALJ’s decision
and remand for further proceedings, the court declines to consider the other arguments
Clarkin has made in support of her request for reversal. See McLean v. O’Malley, Civ.
No. 23-00362, 2024 WL 1482616 at *5 (D. Haw. Apr. 5, 2024) (noting the propriety of
remanding for one reason and declining to reach alternative grounds).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ’s decision (made on behalf of the
Commissioner) is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further administrative
proceedings consistent with this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 16, 2026, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Civil No. 25-00239 MWJS-KJM, Tracy Marie Clarkin v. Frank Bisignano; ORDER
REVERSING DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND
REMANDING FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
/s/ Micah W.J. Smith
Micah W.J. Smith
United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-00239-MWJS-KJM Document 25 Filed 04/16/26 Page 19 of 19
PageID.<pageID>