Matsuda v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
LESLIE MATSUDA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-00444 MWJS-RT
ORDER REVERSING DECISION OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
AND REMANDING FOR FURTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from the denial of an application for Social Security disability
insurance benefits. In that application, Plaintiff Leslie Matsuda represented that severe
pain in her back and leg has made it difficult for her to stand and walk. And, she
attested, this difficulty (along with others) has prevented her from continuing to work
full time.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recognized that Matsuda’s physical
impairments—some of which have required surgery—could indeed cause this degree of
pain. The ALJ nonetheless denied Matsuda’s application. He reasoned, principally,
that Matsuda was not truly experiencing the amount of pain she claimed because she
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had acknowledged being able to do things like walk her dog, occasionally go shopping
(with assistance), complete light chores, and drive herself to appointments.
With further elaboration of the administrative record, these could conceivably be
sufficient grounds for rejecting the credibility of Matsuda’s representations about the
amount of pain she suffers. But they are not sufficient on the current record. For that
reason, and because no other adequate basis for affirming the denial is evident, the
decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further administrative proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Matsuda worked as a bartender for many years, but she stopped in 2020 after
suffering from severe back pain and depression. Dkt. No. 7-1, at PageID.55–57
(Administrative Record (AR) at 36–38). She developed significant leg and hand pain,
too, and eventually had surgery on her back in 2022 and 2023, and on her hands in 2023
and 2024. Id. at PageID.32 (AR at 13). In June 2022, Matsuda applied for Social Security
disability insurance benefits, which her lengthy history of gainful employment entitled
her to do. Id. at PageID.30 (AR at 11).
The Social Security regulations require ALJs to follow “a five-step sequential
process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir.
2011). The steps are:
(1) Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? (2) Is the
claimant’s impairment severe? (3) Does the impairment meet or equal one of a
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list of specific impairments described in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant able
to perform any work that he or she has done in the past? and (5) Are there
significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can
perform?
Id. at 724-25 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
After a hearing in July 2022 at which Matsuda (who was not then represented by
counsel) testified, Dkt. No. 7-1, at PageID.47–69 (AR at 28–50), the ALJ issued a written
decision denying her application, id. at PageID.27–42 (AR at 8–23). The ALJ concluded
that Matsuda passed the first two steps of the sequential analysis: she was not working
in a substantially gainful activity and she suffered from severe impairments. Id. at
PageID.32 (AR at 13). The ALJ identified these as “lumbar radiculopathy and spinal
stenosis status post L5-S1 laminectomy and discectomy on May 10, 2022 and revision
discectomy at L5-S1 on February 27, 2023; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome status post
carpal tunnel release surgeries on July 10, 2023 and May 29, 2024; and morbid obesity.”
Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Matsuda’s impairments did not meet or exceed
any listed impairment that would qualify her as disabled without regard to her age,
education, and work experience. Id. at PageID.34 (AR at 15). So ALJ next assessed
Matsuda’s residual functional capacity, or “RFC,” to aid in determining whether she
could perform available work at steps four and five.
And this is where Matsuda’s representations about the severity of her symptoms
became important. In her hearing testimony, Matsuda explained that she cannot “sit for
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extended periods of time, nor can [she] stand.” Id. at PageID.55 (AR at 36). She
elaborated:
I’m in constant pain. I’m never not in pain. It’s my back mostly that’s hurt, and
my leg is always, like, tingling, and it feels like—when I step sometimes, I get
spasms in my nerve in my leg. That’s what, like, makes me sometimes lose my
balance. I can’t sit for a very long time. Like, an hour is kind of the max that I
can sit for right now . . . . I can stand now for a little more than an hour which is
really nice. But even if I do that for longer than, like—the pain is, like, so bad
that I’ll struggle walking, like. And I do walk. I do exercise every day. I have a
dog, and I take him for, like, little walks three times a day because he needs to
get outside, and I also need the exercise. But I can’t walk as far as I used to.
Like, 30 minutes of walking, which I’m not—I’m very lucky I can do that.
Id. at PageID.61–62 (AR at 42–43).
In the face of that testimony, the ALJ asked a vocational expert to consider two
different hypothetical RFCs. In the first, the person would be able to, among other
things, “[s]tand and walk . . . two hours in an eight-hour period, and only one hour at a
time,” as well as to “sit six hours in an eight-hour period” for “only one hour at a time.”
Id. at 64 (AR at 45). In response to this hypothetical, the vocational expert opined that
the person could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy—namely, as a food and beverage order clerk, a charge account clerk, and a
telephone solicitor. Id. at PageID.65 (AR at 46).
The ALJ’s second hypothetical posited a person who had the same limitations as
the first, except that the person would “be off task up to 15% of the workday due to
pain.” Id. at PageID.66 (AR at 47). In that scenario, the vocational expert testified that
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“[t]hat amount of time being off task at work would prevent maintaining employment,
so no work would be available.” Id.
In his written decision, the ALJ acknowledged that Matsuda’s impairments
“could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” Id. at PageID.35 (AR at
16). And the ALJ did not suggest that Matsuda was malingering—that is, exaggerating
or feigning her symptoms. But the ALJ nonetheless found that Matsuda’s “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the
reasons explained in this decision.” Id.
The decision offered three such reasons. First, the ALJ reasoned that Matsuda’s
expressed pain was inconsistent with the activities she reported in her written
application. Id. at PageID.36 (AR at 17). That “wide range of activities of daily living”
including being able to “drive for short distances of up to 30 minutes,” going “shopping
once every two months with assistance to push the cart,” and “tak[ing] her dog walking
three times a day.” Id. It also included that Matsuda “sometimes cooks although she
cannot stand for long,” that she does “the laundry every other week, car washing once
every 6 months,” and “trims the bushes, when she is in less pain.” Id. The ALJ also
noted a psychological consultative examiner’s observation that Matsuda “has been able
to do all of her daily activities depending on her pain level; she can cook simple meals,
walk her dog, do light chores, and drive herself to appointments.” Id.
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The ALJ’s second reason for rejecting Matsuda’s pain testimony was based on
the “longitudinal evidence of record.” Id. Here, the ALJ summarized medical records,
treatment notes, and examination findings, some of which found that Matsuda had
“good strength in both legs” and “normal gait.” Id. at PageID.37–38 (AR at 18–19).
Third and finally, the ALJ noted that state agency consultants had rejected
Matsuda’s representations about her pain and symptoms, and he determined that these
conclusions were “well supported by the consultants’ reviews of the records, and
generally consistent with the testing showing a chronic left lumbar radicular process . . .
and exam findings of residual numbness and tingling.” Id. at PageID.38 (AR at 19).
For these reasons, the ALJ rejected Matsuda’s testimony about the severity of her
pain symptoms—which were more consistent with the ALJ’s second hypothetical to the
vocational expert—and instead adopted an RFC consistent with the first hypothetical.
Id. at PageID.35 (AR at 16). It followed that Matsuda could perform the jobs the
vocational expert had identified and did not qualify as disabled. Id. at PageID.40–41
(AR at 21–22). The ALJ therefore denied Matsuda’s application.
Matsuda’s request for the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council to
review the ALJ’s decision was also denied, id. at PageID.20–22 (AR at 1–3), making the
ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. This timely appeal followed.
//
//
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner’s disability determination must be reversed when “it is either
not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Luther v. Berryhill,
891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). To be sure, this standard is deferential, requiring “only
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). “But it is
not toothless.” Loniza v. King, Civ. No. 23-00352, 2025 WL 435943, at *3 (D. Haw. Feb. 7,
2025).
DISCUSSION
This case, like many Social Security disability cases, “hinge[s] on the credibility
of a claimant’s testimony about the severity of their symptoms.” Auapaau v. O’Malley,
Civ. No. 24-00176, 2024 WL 4301378, at *3 (D. Haw. Sept. 26, 2024). And when, as here,
the Commissioner concludes that a claimant is not malingering but indeed has severe
impairments “which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms alleged,”
the Commissioner can “reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [their]
symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-
Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up); see also Orn v. Astrue,
495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007). These reasons “‘must be sufficiently specific to allow a
reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on
permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding
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pain.’” Loniza, 2025 WL 435943, at *3 (quoting Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493 (cleaned
up)).
Matsuda contends that the ALJ’s written decision—which stands as the
Commissioner’s own—fell short of these requirements. The court agrees. None of the
ALJ’s three offered reasons for rejecting the credibility of Matsuda’s symptom
testimony meets the Ninth Circuit’s stringent standards.
1. The ALJ’s preeminent reason for rejecting Matsuda’s symptom testimony was
that, in his view, her testimony was inconsistent with her activities of daily living. This
is an appropriate mode of analysis; it merely “follows the maxim that actions speak
louder than words.” Auapaau, 2024 WL 4301378, at *3. Nonetheless, “there is a danger
in conducting an analysis of that sort, for ‘disability claimants should not be penalized
for attempting to lead’ their ‘lives in the face of their limitations.’” Id. (quoting Reddick
v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)). As a “safeguard against that danger, the
Ninth Circuit has provided guidelines for using evidence of a claimant’s activities of
daily living to assess a claimant’s symptom testimony.” Id. An ALJ must, in particular,
consider whether the activities (1) “actually contradict the claimant’s symptom
testimony,” or (2) “show that the claimant spends a substantial part of their day
engaged in pursuits that are transferrable to a work setting,” Id. at *4 (citing Orn, 495
F.3d at 639). “Absent one of these grounds, a claimant’s daily activities cannot fairly be
said to detract from a claimant’s testimony about the effect of their disability.” Id.
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The ALJ did not offer specific, clear, and convincing reasons for concluding that
either of these grounds exists. As an initial matter, the ALJ nowhere suggested that
Matsuda’s activities of daily living involved “pursuits that are transferrable to a work
setting.” Id. Nor does the record, at least in its current form, support the conclusion
that they are.
So the only question is whether Matsuda’s activities “actually contradict” her
symptom testimony. Id. But here again, the ALJ did not offer detailed enough
reasoning to support his conclusion that they do. He noted that Matsuda could “drive
for short distances of up to 30 minutes,” go “shopping once every two months with
assistance to push the cart,” and “take[] her dog walking three times a day.” Dkt. No. 7-
1, at PageID.36 (AR at 17). He further noted that Matsuda “sometimes cooks although
she cannot stand for long,” and that she does “the laundry every other week, car
washing once every 6 months,” and “trim[ming] the bushes, when she is in less pain.”
Id.
But none of these activities actually contradicts Matsuda’s testimony that she
can, at most, do “30 minutes of walking,” and that she is “very lucky” she can do even
that. Id. at PageID.61–62 (AR at 42–43). And that is critical, because the ALJ concluded
that Matsuda’s RFC included the ability to walk for an hour at a time. See id. at
PageID.35 (AR at 16). The vocational expert’s opinion that a hypothetical person could
perform available jobs was based on that assumption. See id. at PageID.64-65 (AR at 45-
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46). Just as nothing in Matsuda’s activities actually contradicts her testimony that she
can only walk for 30 minutes at a time, nothing in the vocational expert’s opinion
supports the conclusion that there is any available job she can perform with that 30-
minute limitation.
It is, of course, possible that with further elaboration of the record, the ALJ could
find a basis for concluding that Matsuda’s activities of daily living do actually
contradict her symptom testimony. For example, although Matsuda generally testified
that she could walk no more than 30 minutes at a time, she separately testified that she
walks her dog up to three times a day. One might perhaps speculate that those walks
could sometimes be longer than 30 minutes. But despite the ALJ’s “special duty to fully
and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered,”
Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d
441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983), the ALJ did not ask any follow up questions about the length of
Matsuda’s walks at the hearing. And neither his written decision nor the existing
administrative record offers any basis for concluding that they were longer than 30
minutes. Nor did the ALJ identify any other activity—whether shopping, cooking, or
performing light chores—that would have involved more than 30 minutes of walking,
let alone develop a factual basis for reaching that conclusion.
And, in fact, an item in the administrative record suggests that even if Matsuda
did occasionally walk for more than 30 minutes, even that would not actually contradict
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her symptom testimony: as the psychological consultative examiner observed, Matsuda
“has been able to do all of her daily activities depending on her pain level; she can cook
simple meals, walk her dog, do light chores, and drive herself to appointments.” Id. at
PageID.36 (AR at 17) (emphasis added). This observation is significant, because
Matsuda testified that she is virtually always in at least some pain. See id. at PageID.61-
62 (AR at 42-43). And so even if the ALJ had identified some instances in which
Matsuda had walked for more than 30 minutes—which he did not—he still would have
needed to account for the fact that Matsuda might not be able to consistently walk that
way. The ALJ did not do so.
Accordingly, at least on the current record, the ALJ has not offered a sufficient
basis for concluding that Matsuda’s symptom testimony was actually contradicted by
her activities of daily living.
2. The ALJ’s second reason for rejecting Matsuda’s symptom testimony was
based on the “longitudinal evidence of record,” including medical records, treatment
notes, and examination findings. Id. at PageID.36–38 (AR at 17–19). But the Ninth
Circuit has held that “[o]nce the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying
impairment,” as Matsuda has done here, “the Commissioner may not discredit the
claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are
unsupported by objective medical evidence.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th
Cir. 1998) (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Put
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differently, it is not appropriate for an ALJ to “effectively render a claimant’s subjective
symptom testimony superfluous by demanding positive objective medical evidence
fully corroborating every allegation within the subjective testimony.” Ferguson v.
O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498
(9th Cir. 2022)).
Perhaps for that reason, the ALJ nowhere suggested that these objective medical
records were sufficient, standing alone, to reject Matsuda’s symptom testimony. And
while “[c]ontradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the
claimant’s subjective testimony,” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155,
1161 (9th Cir. 2008), the ALJ nowhere suggested that Matsuda’s symptom testimony
might actually be contradicted by the medical evidence. The ALJ’s decision merely
highlighted how the medical records do not offer any obvious support for Matsuda’s
testimony; it offers no explanation for why they would contradict that testimony. 1
Because the ALJ did not offer any reasoning to support the conclusion that
medical records contradicted Matsuda’s symptom testimony, and because the court
cannot say on this record that they do, the court cannot affirm on this ground.
1 	In like manner, although the ALJ noted that some of Matsuda’s symptoms had
improved with treatment, see Dkt. No. 11, at PageID.1180-81—and while “evidence of
medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of
disability,” Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017)—the ALJ did not find
that any improvement was significant enough to “reliev[e]” Matsuda of the debilitating
symptoms she had identified, let alone identify an evidentiary basis for reaching such a
finding.
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3. That leaves the opinions of the state agency consultants. In considering these,
the ALJ merely offered that their conclusions were “well supported by the consultants’
reviews of the records, and generally consistent with the testing showing a chronic left
lumbar radicular process . . . and exam findings of residual numbness and tingling.”
Dkt. No. 7-1, at PageID.38 (AR at 19).
When, as here, an application for disability benefits is filed after March 27, 2017,
current Social Security Administration regulations require an ALJ to consider, among
other things, the “supportability” and the “consistency” of medical opinions in the
administrative record before deciding whether they are persuasive. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c; see generally Wade v. O’Malley, Civil No. 23-00350, 2024 WL 3248021, at *3
(D. Haw. Feb. 16, 2024) (cleaned up). “Supportability” is “the extent to which a medical
source supports the medical opinion by explaining the relevant objective medical
evidence.” Id. at *4 (cleaned up). “Consistency,” by contrast, focuses on “whether the
medical opinion is consistent with the evidence from other medical sources and
nonmedical sources in the claim.” Id. (cleaned up).
The ALJ did not adequately explain how he considered the “supportability” and
“consistency” factors here. To be sure, the ALJ did use the words “supported” and
“consistent.” But it is not enough to merely assert a conclusion about those factors;
ALJs must explain how they considered them, and their explanations must be supported
by substantial evidence. Id.; see also Cross v. O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2024)
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(“ALJs must explain how persuasive they find the medical opinion by expressly
considering the two most important factors for evaluating such opinions:
‘supportability’ and ‘consistency.’”). Because the ALJ did not do so here, the court
cannot affirm the denial on the ground that the ALJ had accepted the persuasiveness of
the state agency consultants’ opinions.
CONCLUSION
Because the court has found no adequate basis in the record for affirming the
Commissioner’s decision denying Matsuda’s application for Social Security disability
insurance benefits, that decision is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further
administrative proceedings consistent with this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 25, 2026, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Civil No. 25-00444 MWJS-RT, Leslie Matsuda v. Frank Bisignano; ORDER REVERSING
DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND REMANDING
FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
/s/ Micah W.J. Smith
Micah W.J. Smith
United States District Judge
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