Belz v. Wright, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
MONICA BELZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RUTH WRIGHT, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-00517-DKW-RT
ORDER (1) DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
REMAND, (2) GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
DISMISS; AND (3) GRANTING
CERTAIN DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR JOINDER
On December 30, 2025, Defendants Anna Elento-Sneed, John Khil, ES&A
Inc., and Carlsmith Ball LLP (the “Attorney Defendants”) moved to dismiss Plaintiff
Monica Belz’s First Amended Complaint. 	Dkt. No. 6. 	On January 9, 2026,
Defendants Kimberly Metcalfe, Roberta Charles, Byron Watanabe, Alexandria
Jones, Ruth Wright, Cynthia Ayonon, Mark Kunimoto, and Danielle Mehew (the
“KFCU Defendants”) filed a separate motion to dismiss, in which the Attorney
Defendants sought to join. 	Dkt. Nos. 9, 11.1 Finally, on January 27, 2026, Belz
moved to remand this action to state court. 	Dkt. No. 13. 	These motions have all
been fully briefed.
1 The Attorney Defendants’ unopposed joinder request is granted and is not further discussed
herein.
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Having reviewed the pleadings, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant legal
authorities, the Court agrees that remand is unwarranted and that the Amended
Complaint should be dismissed. Accordingly, the motion to remand is DENIED and
the motions to dismiss and relevant joinder are GRANTED, albeit with leave to
amend, as described below.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. 	The Amended Complaint
The following facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint, filed in state
court on December 2, 2025. Dkt. No. 6-3.
In January 2018, Belz was hired by Kauai Federal Credit Union (“KFCU”) as
its president and CEO. 	Id. ¶ 22. On May 1, 2020, Belz and KFCU entered into a
Split Dollar Agreement (“SDA”), a retirement compensation benefit wherein KFCU
would fund, among other things, premiums on a life insurance policy owned by Belz.
Id. ¶ 27. The SDA provided that Belz could borrow against the policy “beginning
on access dates in 2030 and 2040.” Id. ¶ 27. If Belz’s employment was terminated
for disability, however, she could begin to borrow against the policy immediately.
Id. ¶ 28. The SDA defines “disability” as, inter alia, “any medically determinable
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physical or mental impairment” that leaves Belz “unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity.” Id. ¶ 29; Dkt. No. 6-5 at 1.2
In November 2022, Belz and KFCU entered an Employment Agreement for
Belz to continue serving as president and CEO from January 2023 to December
2028. Dkt. No. 6-3 ¶ 32. The Employment Agreement further provided that KFCU
could terminate Belz’s employment if she became “functionally disabled” such that
she was “incapable of performing her essential job functions” or for “good cause.”
Id. ¶¶ 36–40. If Belz was terminated due to disability, she was entitled to receive a
severance award in addition to the retirement benefits found in the SDA. 	Id. ¶ 39.
Belz, in turn, could terminate the Employment Agreement for “good reason.” 	Id.
¶ 41.
In June 2024, Belz “experienced a sudden and severe onset of debilitating
fatigue, migraines, cognitive difficulties, and other symptoms that rendered her
largely bedridden” and left her “unable to function normally.” Id. ¶¶ 43–44. Unable
to work, Belz informed KFCU of her condition and requested that her employment
be terminated due to functional disability. 	Id. ¶ 51. 	KFCU ceased paying Belz’s
salary after she reported her disability. Id. ¶ 52.
2 Defendants attached a copy of the SDA to their motion papers, see Dkt. No. 6-5, which the Court
will rely upon in light of Belz having incorporated its language into her Amended Complaint. U.S.
v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that, in deciding a motion to dismiss, a
court may incorporate by reference materials outside the complaint when they are referred to by
the plaintiff and “form[ ] the basis of the plaintiff’s claim”).
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Defendants—various KFCU employees or legal counsel—initially stated that
they would draft a release agreement to terminate her, based on her reports, id. ¶ 53.
But Defendants then made repeated requests for additional medical information, and
despite multiple responses from Belz’s physicians affirming her condition, id. ¶¶ 56–
60, Defendants have continuously refused to classify Belz as disabled and refused
to pay Belz her salary or disperse her disability benefits. Id. ¶¶ 74, 114.
II. 	Procedural History
On November 13, 2025, Belz filed this action in state court. Dkt. No. 1-3. On
December 2, 2025, Belz filed her First Amended Complaint. 	Dkt. No. 6-3. 	On
December 5, 2025, Defendants removed the action to this Court. Dkt. No. 1. The
First Amended Complaint asserts the following claims against Defendants: (1)
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) invasion of privacy; (3)
breach of fiduciary duty; (4) discrimination and harassment on the basis of Belz’s
disability in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 378-2; (5) tortious
interference with contract; (6) negligence; and (7) civil conspiracy (“Counts I–VII”).
Dkt. No. 6-3 ¶¶ 117–160.
a. Motions to Dismiss
On December 30, 2025, the Attorney Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing
that (1) Belz’s state law claims were preempted by ERISA; and (2) her claims were
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inadequately pled.3 Dkt. No. 6. On January 9, 2026, the KFCU Defendants moved
to dismiss on the same grounds, Dkt. No. 9, in which the Attorney Defendants sought
to join, Dkt. No. 11. 	Belz filed substantially similar responses to both dismissal
motions, arguing that her claims were not subject to ERISA,4 her claims would not
be preempted even if the SDA were an ERISA plan, and she had sufficiently alleged
her claims. Dkt. Nos. 18 & 19. Regarding preemption, Belz specifically stated that
“[a]ll of Belz’s claims (except fiduciary duty) can stand without the SDA,”
apparently conceding that Count III was preempted by ERISA. 	Dkt. No. 19 at 9.
The Attorney Defendants and KFCU Defendants each replied, repeating their
arguments for dismissal. Dkt. Nos. 20 & 22.
b. Motion to Remand
On January 27, 2026, Belz moved to remand, asserting that her Amended
Complaint contains only state law claims. Dkt. No. 13. Belz argued that although
the action could be removed if her claims were governed by ERISA, that is not the
3 Because, as stated below, the Court grants dismissal on preemption grounds, this Order will not
discuss the merits of Belz’s claims or whether they were adequately pled.
4 Belz’s opposition states only that her claims are not subject to ERISA preemption “[f]or the
reasons articulated in Belz’s motion to remand.” 	See, e.g., Dkt. No. 18 at 9. 	The Attorney
Defendants argue that the Court should disregard this “incorporation by reference” approach
because it allows Belz to “improperly circumvent page limitations.” Dkt. No. 20 at 2–3. For the
sake of completeness, and because the Court will necessarily address the arguments in Belz’s
motion to remand regardless, the Court will consider Belz’s incorporated arguments. The Court
further notes that Belz did not utilize all of the space to which she was entitled by rule in responding
to the motions to dismiss and, thus, could have repeated some of the remand arguments in her
opposition, had she chosen to do so. See Dkt. Nos. 18-19.
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case because the SDA is non-discretionary and lacks any “ongoing administrative
scheme.” Dkt. No. 13-1 at 6–11. The Attorney Defendants and KFCU Defendants
responded, each arguing that the SDA involves an “ongoing administrative scheme”
and thus ERISA applies. Dkt. Nos. 16 & 17. Belz replied, substantially repeating
her arguments that the SDA was not an ERISA-governed plan. Dkt. No. 21.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. 	Removal and Remand
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1446(b), any civil action brought in a
State court may be removed to federal court by a defendant provided that the federal
court would have had original jurisdiction over the action, and the removal is timely.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a)(1), this Court has original jurisdiction of
all civil actions involving, respectively, (i) federal law and (ii) an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000 and citizens of different States.
Pursuant to Section 1447(c) of Title 28, “[i]f at any time before final judgment
it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 	The burden of establishing this Court's subject
matter jurisdiction “rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction[,]” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), which, here, means the
Defendants, Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir.
2017). 	“[A]ny doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of
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remand.” 	Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir.
2009).
II. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the Court to dismiss a
complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Rule
12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). Pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” 	556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addition, “the tenet that a court must accept
as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” 	Id. 	Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	Factual allegations that only
permit the court to infer “the mere possibility of misconduct” do not show that the
pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id. at 679.
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When a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, leave to amend should be
given when “justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
has made clear that “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request
to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). However, justice does
not require leave to amend when (1) it would prejudice an opposing party, (2) it is
sought in bad faith, (3) it would produce an undue delay in litigation, (4) it would be
futile, or (5) there has been repeated failure to cure a deficiency. 	Abagninin v.
AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008); AmerisourceBergen Corp.
v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Remand
Defendants here removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, relying
on ERISA. 	Typically, federal question jurisdiction “turns on the well-pleaded
complaint rule,” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted), meaning that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint,” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “In particular,
the existence of a federal defense normally does not create statutory ‘arising under’
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jurisdiction, and a defendant may not generally remove a case to federal court unless
the plaintiff’s complaint establishes that the case arises under federal law.” Davila,
542 U.S. at 207 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original).
ERISA, however, provides an exception to this rule. “The purpose of ERISA
is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.” 	Id. at 208.
“To this end, ERISA includes expansive pre-emption provisions, . . . which are
intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be exclusively a
federal concern.” 	Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437, 1439 (9th Cir. 1990) (“ERISA contains
one of the broadest preemption clauses ever enacted by Congress.”). 	“When a
federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-
emption, the state claim can be removed.” 	Davila, 542 U.S. at 207 (cleaned up).
“This is so because [w]hen the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law
cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even
if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.” Id. at 207–08.
Within the Ninth Circuit, “a relatively simple test has emerged to determine
whether a plan is covered by ERISA: does the benefit package implicate an ongoing
administrative scheme?” Delaye v. Agripac, Inc., 39 F.3d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1994).
To determine if an ongoing administrative scheme is present, courts examine
whether the employer is required to use discretion and judgment in administering
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the plan—if so, an ongoing administrative scheme is implicated. 	See Bogue v.
Ampex 	Corp., 	976 	F.2d 	1319, 	1323 	(9th 	Cir. 	1992) 	(finding 	an 	ongoing
administrative scheme where “the program’s administration required a case-by-case,
discretionary application of its terms”); Velarde v. PACE Membership Warehouse,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1997) (no ongoing administrative scheme where
“[t]he level of discretion, if any, which [the employer] was required to exercise in
implementing the agreement was slight”); Edwards v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 954
F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (E.D. Wash. 2013), aff’d, 617 F. App’x 648 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“In the Ninth Circuit, an ‘ongoing administrative scheme’ is implicated where the
employer is required to exercise a significant degree of discretion in determining
eligibility for the plan and/or in awarding benefits to participants.”).
The parties here agree that the Court must determine if preemption applies—
and thus whether remand is appropriate—based on whether the SDA involves an
ongoing administrative scheme. 	See Dkt. Nos. 13-1, 16, 17. 	Belz argues that the
SDA does not do so because there “is nothing discretionary about the determination
of disability, or the timing, amount or form of the payment” to which Belz is entitled.
Dkt. No. 13-1 at 9. According to Belz, the duties the SDA imposes on KFCU are
“predetermined, purely mechanical in execution, based on objective third-party
determinations” rather than any discretionary decision, and “triggered at a single,
clearly defined event—separation from employment.” Id. at 9–10.
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Belz, in other words, attempts to frame the SDA as a straightforward,
mechanically-applied contract that simply dispenses money upon the end of her
employment. 	The reality is far different. 	Analyzing the actual provisions of the
SDA shows that a significant part of the agreement demands discretionary decision-
making on the part of KFCU, including provisions which are central to Belz’s
claims. 	Most obvious of these are the sections dealing with the definition and
determination of disability. 	The SDA states that “disability” is “any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment” that results in Belz being “unable to
engage in any substantial gainful activity.” 	Dkt. No. 6-5 at 1. 	These terms—
“determinable” and “substantial”—necessarily demand at least some degree of
judgment from KFCU. This is far from the only example. The SDA provides that
a “good reason” to terminate employment arises where Belz experiences a “material
diminution” in her compensation or duties, or a “material change” in the location
where she works. 	Id. 	It further states that the SDA’s annual borrowing cap is
calculated based on, in relevant part, any “necessary assumptions [KFCU] deems
reasonable.” 	Id. at 4. 	Determinations of reasonableness and materiality are
inherently discretionary calls. 	See Sutton v. Brandywine Realty Tr., 2007 WL
2288118, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007) (“[I]t is also impossible to determine
whether there has been a ‘material adverse alteration’ or an assignment of new duties
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that 	are 	‘materially 	inconsistent’ 	with 	former 	duties 	without 	an 	ongoing
administrative scheme.”).
These few examples are not exhaustive—the SDA is replete with others. But
they alone are enough to show that the SDA’s implementation depends upon
KFCU’s judgment. In light of this, the SDA constitutes an ongoing administrative
scheme and is therefore subject to ERISA.
Accordingly, this Court has original jurisdiction over this case because it
arises “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and Defendant has met its burden of demonstrating removal was proper, see
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Belz’s motion to remand is denied.
II. 	Motions to Dismiss
Having determined that the SDA implicates ERISA, the question remains as
to which, if any, of Belz’s state-law claims are preempted by that statute. Defendants
assert that all such claims are preempted and move to dismiss them. Dkt. Nos. 6-1
at 8–12, 8-1 at 6–9.
As noted, the Court must determine if ERISA “wholly displaces the state-law
cause of action through complete pre-emption.” Davila, 542 U.S. at 208. According
to the Ninth Circuit, ERISA preempts state laws that “relate to” an ERISA plan,
Cleghorn v. Blue Shield of California, 408 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005), meaning
that a “state law claim is preempted by ERISA if it has a connection with or a
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reference to an ERISA-governed benefit plan.” 	Wise v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
600 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Stated
another way, where the existence of an ERISA plan is a critical factor in establishing
liability under a state cause of action, the state law claim is preempted.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). “[A] complaint containing only state-law
claims that are preempted by ERISA must be dismissed.” 	Cruzeta v. Sony Elecs.,
Inc., 2013 WL 1788552, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013).
Belz argues that, with the exception of her Count III fiduciary duty claim, her
state-law claims are not preempted by ERISA. 	Dkt. No. 19 at 9–12. 	The Court
disagrees. To begin, each of Belz’s claims—without exception—refers explicitly to
the SDA and alleges that the denial of benefits under the SDA gave rise to the
corresponding cause of action. 	Count V, for example, states that Defendants
“tortiously interfered with Belz’s rights” under the SDA by denying Belz “access
[to] benefits.” Dkt. No. 6-3 ¶¶ 144–150. Belz’s negligence claim (Count VI) alleges
that Defendants’ duty to Belz arose from her status as “a beneficiary of agreements”
with KFCU, 	id. ¶ 152, and her discrimination claim (Count IV) states that
Defendants improperly “refus[ed] to afford Belz the benefit of any of her disability-
related benefits” on discriminatory grounds, id. ¶ 141. 	The same is true of Belz’s
remaining claims: all either expressly refer to SDA (directly quoting from it in some
cases) or describe how Belz has been unable to access benefits under the SDA to
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which she claims entitlement because of Defendants’ conduct. 	Given these
allegations, it is plain that the existence of an ERISA plan is a “critical factor” in
each of Belz’s claims. 	Wise, 600 F.3d at 1190; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (finding ERISA preempts all common law causes
of action arising from improper handling of claim for benefits under an ERISA plan);
Bommarito v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3537118, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 23,
2018) (“The Ninth Circuit has continually held that state law claims arising out of a
denial of ERISA plan benefits are preempted by ERISA.”).
Belz arguments against preemption are not persuasive. 	First, relying on
Groves v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. Cal.
2014), Belz argues that her claims are not preempted because they “do not seek plan
benefits” as damages. 	Dkt. No. 18 at 11–12. 	Although the First Amended
Complaint does not clearly specify the damages it seeks, see Dkt. No. 6-3 at 37,
Belz’s reliance on Groves is misplaced. In that case, the court granted dismissal of
state-law claims because they were preempted by ERISA, despite the plaintiff not
seeking plan benefits as damages—the court merely refrained from doing so with
prejudice. Groves, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1088.
Second, Belz argues that at least her disability discrimination claims are not
preempted because they rely on independent bases separate from the ERISA
relationship. 	Dkt. No. 18 at 11. 	It is true that “[a]n otherwise ERISA-preempted
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claim may survive to the extent that it relies on a theory independent of the benefit
plan.” 	Kibble v. Quigley, 1993 WL 81362, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1993) (citing
Sorsosky v. Burroughs, 826 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 1987)). Still, “[a] garden variety
state law cause of action, not particularly troublesome in circumstances not
involving employee benefits, may be preempted where it is used to remedy exactly
the type of illegal activity proscribed by ERISA.” 	Tingey v. Pixley-Richards, 953
F.2d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1992).
Belz also cites to two independent bases for her claims. First, she argues that
all of her claims rely not only on the SDA, but also on her Employment Agreement,
“which no one claims is an ERISA plan.” Dkt. No. 18 at 11. Thus, “all of her claims
would still stand if [the Employment Agreement] were the only agreement providing
her disability related benefits.” Id. Even if the Court assumed that the Employment
Agreement was not an ERISA plan, however, that alone would not save Belz’s
claims from preemption. In cases involving both ERISA and non-ERISA contracts,
the Ninth Circuit has found that where “at least some of the contracts at issue . . . are
ERISA plans,” a plaintiff’s claims may still be completely preempted by ERISA.
Fossen v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Montana, Inc., 660 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir.
2011). 	The relevant question is not whether multiple contracts exist, but whether
the plaintiff’s claims are based on enforcing rights provided by ERISA—that is so
with Belz’s claims here. 	See id. (“The individual [plaintiffs] are the participants in
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the ERISA plan, and they are suing [defendant] . . . to enforce rights that are provided
by 	ERISA. 	That 	is 	enough 	to 	bring 	a 	suit 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	ERISA
[preemption].”); see also Cruzeta, 2013 WL 1788552, at *4 (holding that plaintiff’s
“claims do not rely on an independent theory because [p]laintiff’s sole assertion is
that he was . . . deprived of early retirement benefits”).
Second, Belz asserts that her disability discrimination claims cannot be
preempted because they “would also allege federal law violations.” Dkt. No. 18 at
13. That is certainly not the case now – no such federal discrimination claim appears
in the operative complaint, and Belz’s opposition brief is not the means by which to
amend her claims.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Belz’s claims, as currently asserted, are
preempted by ERISA and, therefore, the First Amended Complaint must be
dismissed. Cruzeta, 2013 WL 1788552, at *4. Because it is possible that Belz could
assert non-preempted claims if permitted an opportunity, the Court grants leave to
amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 6
& 9, are GRANTED, and the First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND. The Motion to Remand, Dkt. No. 13, is DENIED. Should
Belz wish to amend her pleadings, she must file a standalone Second Amended
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Complaint no later than April 28, 2026. If no amended pleading is filed by that date,
this action will be dismissed and closed without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 7, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Monica Belz v. Ruth Wright, et al; Civil No. 25-00517 DKW-RT; ORDER (1)
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND, (2) GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS; AND (3) GRANTING CERTAIN
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JOINDER
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