Kornegay v. Gilbert et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ANTHONY TREVON KORNEGAY,
#A1004943,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STG. SRGT. CHRISTOPHER
GILBERT, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 26-00058 DKW-RT
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO
AMEND
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Anthony Kornegay’s Prisoner Civil
Rights Complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 ECF No. 1. In the
Complaint, Kornegay alleges that three prison officials at Oahu Community
Correctional Center (OCCC) violated his rights by threatening his safety (Count I),
using excessive force (Count II), and denying him adequate medical care (Count
III).2 Id. at PageID.5–7. After conducting the required screening pursuant to
1 Kornegay is currently incarcerated at Oahu Community Correctional Center. See ECF No. 1 at
PageID.1; VINE, https://vinelink.vineapps.com/search/HI/Person (select “ID Number”; enter
“A1004943”; and select “Search”) (last visited Mar. 5, 2026).
2 Kornegay names as defendants: (1) Security Threat Group (STG) Sergeant (Sgt.) Christopher
Gilbert; (2) Sgt. J. Dardeen; and (3) Registered Nurse Matthew Hubbard. ECF No. 1 at
PageID.1–2. Kornegay names all three defendants in both their individual and official
capacities. Id.
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28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), the Court DISMISSES the Complaint with
partial leave to amend. If Kornegay wants to proceed, he must file an amended
pleading that cures the noted deficiencies in his claims on or before April 10,
2026. Alternatively, instead of filing an amended pleading, Kornegay may inform
the Court in writing on or before April 10, 2026 that he would like to voluntarily
dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a
dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).3
I. 	BACKGROUND4
At some unspecified time, Kornegay informed Sgt. Gilbert of “safety
concerns” based on Kornegay’s “gang affiliation.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.5. After
Sgt. Gilbert denied Kornegay’s request for protective custody, Kornegay was
housed in a general population housing unit at OCCC. Id. Apparently beginning
in 2022 until a date unknown, Kornegay was the victim of “numerous attacks,”
during which he sustained “life[-]altering injuries.” Id.
In September 2025, Sgt. Dardeen “knock[ed]” a wooden box into
Kornegay’s right side. Id. at PageID.6. Kornegay suffered a broken hand and foot,
and injuries to his left knee and lower back. Id. Apparently during the same
3 In general, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from filing a civil action in forma pauperis
if he or she has on three or more occasions brought an action in federal court that was dismissed
as frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
4 The Complaint alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of
screening. See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014).
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incident, Sgt. Dardeen also wrapped his arms around Kornegay’s chest, lifted him
up, and swung him from side to side. Id. As a result, Kornegay’s legs, right hand,
and lower back are “permanently disable[d].” Id.
Kornegay told Nurse Hubbard that he had been attacked and showed Nurse
Hubbard his broken hand and foot. Id. at PageID.7. Kornegay also told Nurse
Hubbard that his head hurt, his teeth had been knocked out, and his vision was
blurry. Id. Although Kornegay asked for emergency medical care outside OCCC,
Nurse Hubbard responded by saying “so what” and telling an adult corrections
officer to take Kornegay out of the medical unit. Id. Approximately thirty days
passed before Kornegay was sent to an outside medical facility, where his broken
bones and missing teeth were confirmed. Id.
Kornegay commenced this lawsuit after signing the Complaint on January
13, 2026. Id. at PageID.8. In the Complaint, Kornegay alleges that Sgt. Gilbert,
Sgt. Dardeen, and Nurse Hubbard violated his rights by threatening his safety
(Count I), using excessive force (Count II), and denying him adequate medical care
(Count III). Id. at PageID.5–7. Kornegay seeks $3 million in damages, fees, and
costs. Id. at PageID.8. The Court granted Kornegay in forma pauperis status on
March 4, 2026. ECF No. 6.
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II. 	STATUTORY SCREENING
The Court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner complaints
filed against government officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018).
Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or
seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same
standard as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v.
Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the
facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief
from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.
In conducting this screening, the Court liberally construes pro se litigants’
pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Court must grant leave to amend if it
appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d
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at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d
1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under
color of’ law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution.’” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983,
a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020).
B. 	Eleventh Amendment
Kornegay has named Sgt. Gilbert, Sgt. Dardeen, and Nurse Hubbard in both
their official and individual capacities. See ECF No. 1 at PageID.1–2.
“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court
against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.”
Aholelei v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted); see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-03
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(1984). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars any claims for money damages
against Defendants in their official capacities, and those claims are therefore
DISMISSED with prejudice. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th
Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against a state
official acting in his or her official capacity.”).
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Kornegay’s claims for money
damages against Defendants in their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003). Before
any such claims can proceed, however, Kornegay must resolve the following
issues.
C. 	Joinder
Kornegay’s claims appear to arise out of two distinct events: (1) the series of
attacks that began in 2022 after he was placed in a general population housing unit
and that appear to have some relationship to his gang affiliation (Count I), and (2)
Sgt. Dardeen’s excessive use of force during an incident in September 2025 (Count
II), and the medical care rendered by Nurse Hubbard to Kornegay immediately
thereafter (Count III). ECF No. 1 at PageID.5–7.
When a single defendant is named in a lawsuit, a party may bring as many
claims as it has against that defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). “To name different
defendants in the same lawsuit, however, a plaintiff must satisfy Rule 20,
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governing joinder of parties.” Weeks v. Espinda, 2010 WL 2218631, at *3 (D.
Haw. June 2, 2010). Rule 20(a)(2) allows multiple defendants to be joined in one
action only if (1) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and (2) any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A), (B). “Unrelated
claims involving different defendants belong in different suits.” What v. Honolulu
Police Dep’t, 2014 WL 176610, at *4 (D. Haw. Jan. 13, 2014).
If Kornegay decides to file an amended complaint, he should make clear the
connection, if any, between his claim in Count I and his claims in Counts II and III.
Kornegay may state several claims against a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18.
He may also add any additional claims against other defendants, if those claims
arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions as his original
claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Kornegay may not, however, pursue a
combination of unrelated claims in a single suit. See Char v. Kaiser Hosp., 2019
WL 80890, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 2, 2019) (“Unrelated claims involving different
defendants must be brought in separate actions.”). The fact that Kornegay’s claims
are all based on events that occurred at OCCC, without more, is not enough to join
them in a single lawsuit. See Woolen v. Ramos, 2024 WL 3361116, at *4 (D. Haw.
July 10, 2024). An attempt to join claims that are not permitted by the Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure will result in those claims being dismissed as improperly
joined. In deciding which claim or claims, if any, he wants to pursue in this
lawsuit, Kornegay must consider the following legal standards.
D. 	Statute of Limitations
At one point in Count I, Kornegay states that he experienced attacks in the
general population housing unit at OCCC “since 2022.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.5.
He does not say if these attacks have now stopped, nor does he identify when the
last one occurred.
The applicable statute of limitations—that is, the deadline for commencing a
lawsuit—for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s
limitations period for personal injury actions. Bird v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 935
F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
In general, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Hawaii is
two years. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7 (2016); Bird, 935 F.3d at 743. Although
Hawaii law provides an exception in certain circumstances for causes of action that
accrue while a person is imprisoned either on a criminal charge or pursuant to a
court sentence, this exception does not apply to actions against, among others,
prison officials at OCCC. See Haw. Rev. Stat. 657-13(3) (2016); Conklin v.
Espinda, 2025 WL 294987, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 24, 2025).
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Federal law determines when a claim accrues. See Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). “Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” 	Klein
v. City of Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
E. 	Threat to Safety
Kornegay alleges in Count I that Sgt. Gilbert threatened his safety by
denying his request for protective custody. ECF No. 1 at PageID.5. Kornegay
does not say, however, if he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate when
these events occurred.
If Kornegay was a pretrial detainee, then his threat-to-safety claim “arise[s]
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than under the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Gordon v. County
of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). To establish a threat-to-safety claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) [t]he defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) [t]hose
conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious
harm; (3) [t]he defendant did not take reasonable available measures
to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the
circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct
obvious; and (4) [b]y not taking such measures, the defendant caused
the plaintiff’s injuries.
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Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(formatting and footnoted omitted).
“With respect to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be
objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
citations omitted). A pretrial detainee who asserts a threat-to-safety claim must
“prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to
reckless disregard.” Id.
If Kornegay was already convicted at the time the relevant events occurred,
then the Eighth, not Fourteenth, Amendment applies. See Norbert v. City &
County of San Francisco, 10 F.4th 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2021) (“For [a plaintiff] who
is convicted and awaiting sentencing, the Eighth Amendment supplies the relevant
standard.”). The Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials a duty to “take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A prison official
violates the Eighth Amendment, however, only when two requirements are met.
“First, the deprivation must be objectively, sufficiently serious[.]” Id. at 834. “For
a claim . . . based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.
Second, the plaintiff must show deliberate indifference—that is, that “the [prison]
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official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety.” Id. at
837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id.
F. 	Excessive Force
Kornegay alleges in Count II that Sgt. Dardeen used excessive force during
an incident in September 2025. ECF No. 1 at PageID.6. Kornegay does not say if
he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate at the time of the incident. If
Kornegay decides to pursue this claim, in addition to specifying the date of the
alleged incident in any amended pleading that he might file, he must also consider
the corresponding legal standard that applies to his claim.
If Kornegay was a pretrial detainee, his excessive force claim is analyzed
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. As the Supreme Court
has stated, “the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim
is solely an objective one.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015).
Under this standard, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or
knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396-97.
Relevant considerations include the relationship between the need for the use of
force and the amount of force used, the extent of plaintiff’s injury, any effort made
by the officer to temper or limit the amount of force, the severity of the security
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problem at issue, the threat reasonably perceived by the officer, and whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting. Id. at 397.
If Kornegay was a convicted inmate at the time of the incident, his excessive
force claim is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. “In excessive force cases
brought under the Eighth Amendment, the relevant inquiry is ‘whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.’” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1221 (9th Cir.
2022) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). The Ninth Circuit has
identified the following five factors to consider when determining whether a use of
force was malicious and sadistic: “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate;
(2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the
amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response.”
Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
G. 	Medical Care
Kornegay alleges in Count III that Nurse Hubbard denied him adequate
medical care immediately after his encounter with Sgt. Dardeen. ECF No. 1 at
PageID.6. Again, Kornegay does not say whether he was a pretrial detainee or a
convicted inmate when his rights were allegedly violated.
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Medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees also arise under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Gordon v. County of Orange,
888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018). “[C]laims for violations of the right to
adequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants
under the Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under an objective deliberate
indifference standard.” Id. at 1124–25.
A pretrial detainee asserting a failure-to-provide-adequate-medical-care
claim must show that: (1) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect
to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) those conditions put
the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not
take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable
official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4)
by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at
1125.
Regarding the third element, “the defendant’s conduct must be objectively
unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn[ ] on the facts and circumstances of
each particular case.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in
original). The “mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an
individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment”; the
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plaintiff must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—
something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
To establish a claim of inadequate medical care, a convicted prisoner must
show both a “serious medical need” and that an official’s response to the need was
“deliberately indifferent.” Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 785-86 (9th Cir.
2019) (per curiam).
A serious medical need is present when, for example, the “‘failure to treat a
prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 785 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Serious medical needs can relate to physical, dental and mental health.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the course of
treatment the [official] chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances
and that the [official] chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk
to the plaintiff’s health.” Id. at 786 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (alterations in original). This is a “high legal standard.” Toguchi v.
Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “An inadvertent or negligent failure
to provide adequate medical care is insufficient to establish a claim under the
Eighth Amendment.” Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786 (citation omitted). “In other words,
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[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because
the victim is a prisoner.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(alteration in original).
IV. 	LEAVE TO AMEND
The Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED with partial leave to amend.
Kornegay must file any amended pleading on or before April 10, 2026. Kornegay
may not expand his claims beyond those already alleged herein or add new claims
without explaining how those new claims relate to the claims alleged in the
Complaint. Claims that do not properly relate to those in the Complaint are subject
to dismissal.
Kornegay must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules for the District of Hawaii. Local Rule 10.4 requires that an amended
complaint be complete in itself, without reference to any prior pleading. An
amended complaint must be short and plain, comply with Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and be submitted on the Court’s prisoner civil rights
form. See LR99.2(a). An amended complaint will supersede the preceding
complaint. See Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th
Cir. 2015). Defendants not renamed and claims not realleged in an amended
complaint may be deemed voluntarily dismissed. See Lacey v. Maricopa County,
693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).
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V. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
If Kornegay fails to file an amended complaint or is unable to amend his
claims to cure their deficiencies, this dismissal may count as a “strike” under
28 U.S.C. §1915(g). Under this “3-strikes” provision, a prisoner may not bring a
civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis,
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
VI. 	CONCLUSION
(1) The Court DISMISSES with prejudice all claims for money damages
against Defendants in their official capacities. These may not be reasserted.
(2) If Kornegay wants any of his claims for money damages against
Defendants in their personal capacities to proceed, he must file an amended
pleading that cures the noted deficiencies in those claims on or before April 10,
2026.
(3) ALTERNATIVELY, instead of filing an amended pleading, Kornegay
may inform the Court in writing on or before April 10, 2026 that he would like to
voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
(4) Failure to comply with these deadlines may result in AUTOMATIC
DISMISSAL of this suit without further notice, and Kornegay may incur a strike
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
(5) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Kornegay a blank prisoner civil rights
complaint form so that he can comply with this order if he elects to file an
amended pleading.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 10, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawaiʻi.
Anthony Trevon Kornegay v. Stg. Srgt. Christopher Gilbert, et al.; Civil No. 26-
00058 DKW-RT; ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL
LEAVE TO AMEND
_______________________________
Derrick K. Watson
Chief United States District Judge
/s/ Derrick K. Watson
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