Smith v. Amazon.com Services LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
ATO SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant.
Civil No. 26-00089 MWJS-WRP
ORDER (1) GRANTING APPLICATION
TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT
WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS
AND (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 2026, Plaintiff Ato Smith filed a complaint and an application to
proceed without paying fees or costs, otherwise called an in forma pauperis or “IFP”
application. Because the court finds Smith has demonstrated an inability to pay, his IFP
application, Dkt. No. 2, is GRANTED. But because Smith has not pled facts establishing
each element of his claims, his complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND.
DISCUSSION
A. 	The IFP Application
It is expensive to litigate a case in federal court, but when a person submits an
affidavit demonstrating an inability to prepay fees and costs, a federal court may
authorize the person not to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The applicant need not
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demonstrate absolute destitution, Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331,
339-40 (1948), but must at least “allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness,
and certainty,” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
An affidavit is sufficient where it alleges that the applicant “cannot pay the court costs
and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1).
In this case, Smith has submitted an affidavit in which he represents that his
gross wages are $640, but that he has not yet received his first paycheck of $559. Dkt.
No. 2, at PageID.9. In addition to this income, Smith receives food stamps. Id. He
claims that he has $16.01 in his bank account, and that his monthly expenses include a
$60 phone payment and $80 for transportation. Id. at PageID.10. His affidavit also
states that he is homeless and owes $88,000 in student loans. Id. Based on this
information, the court concludes that Smith has demonstrated an inability to pay court
fees and costs while still affording the necessities of life. The court therefore GRANTS
his IFP application.
B. 	Screening of the Complaint
When a litigant asks to proceed without prepayment of fees, the court is
statutorily required to screen the complaint for other deficiencies. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Under that statute, the court must dismiss claims or complaints that are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim for relief. See id. at § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v.
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Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Screening under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A involves the same standard as is used under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam). And when screening a complaint, the court liberally construes pro se litigants’
pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 &
n.7 (9th Cir. 2010).
In evaluating whether a complaint states a valid claim for screening purposes,
courts generally apply the pleading standards in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
“Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a)”). Under Rule 8, a complaint must
include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Instead, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). A claim is
“plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief from a particular defendant for specific misconduct. See id.
In the present case, even when liberally construing Smith’s pro se complaint, the
court finds dismissal appropriate because the complaint does not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
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Smith alleges that he was employed by Amazon.com Services, LLC, (“Amazon”)
at its Honolulu facility, beginning on June 19, 2025. Dkt. No. 1 at PageID.3. He asserts
that he has ADHD and dyslexia, which he characterizes as disabilities under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Id. According to Smith, he disclosed these
disabilities during training and requested assistance, but his employer failed to provide
reasonable accommodations and instead separated him from training and placed him
into his assignment without adequate support. Id. Smith also alleges that he was
labeled “threatening” due to his race, which he claims created a hostile work
environment, and that after reporting discrimination and filing an inquiry with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) around July 22, 2025, he
experienced retaliation, including suspension and other adverse treatment. Id. Smith
alleges that he suffered loss of wages, benefits, tuition assistance, and emotional distress
as a result. Id. And he alleges that all of this violated his rights under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Smith’s complaint also alleges that he filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC on December 1, 2025. Id. at PageID.5-7. The
EEOC then issued a notice stating that it would not proceed further with its
investigation and informing Smith of his right to file a civil action within ninety days of
receiving the notice. Id. at PageID.8.
Even accepting these allegations as true, however, the complaint does not plead
sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief under the statutes invoked.
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1. 	ADA Claim
The ADA makes it unlawful for any covered entity to “discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie ADA employment discrimination case
by showing “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is a
qualified individual with a disability; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action
because of his disability.” Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir.
2001).
Smith’s disability discrimination claim appears to be based on the theory that
Amazon failed to accommodate his ADHD and dyslexia, and subjected him to adverse
treatment because of those disabilities. Dkt. No. 1 at PageID.3. According to the
complaint, Smith disclosed these conditions during training and requested assistance,
but Amazon allegedly separated him from training and placed him into his assignment
without proper support. Id.
Even accepting these allegations as true, they are not sufficient to state a claim
for employment discrimination under the ADA. As to the first prong, to show a
“disability” as that term is defined in the ADA, a plaintiff must show a “physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.
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§ 12102(1). Although Smith alleges that he has ADHD and dyslexia, the complaint does
not allege facts explaining how either condition substantially limits a major life activity.
Simply identifying a medical condition, without factual allegations describing how that
condition limits major life activities, is insufficient to establish a disability within the
meaning of the ADA. See id.; Hutton, 273 F.3d at 891.
As to the second prong, Smith does not allege facts demonstrating that he was a
“qualified individual”—that is, that he was able to perform the essential functions of his
job with or without reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The
complaint alleges difficulties during training and the need for assistance, but does not
include factual allegations explaining what the essential functions of the position were,
or how Smith could perform them with a reasonable accommodation.
Finally, to establish an ADA employment discrimination claim, Smith must
allege facts demonstrating that he suffered an adverse employment action because of
his disability. See Hutton, 273 F.3d at 891. The complaint asserts that Amazon failed to
accommodate him and that he experienced suspension and other adverse treatment
after reporting discrimination. But Smith pleads no facts connecting those actions to his
alleged disabilities. Instead, the complaint provides only conclusory assertions that the
conduct was discriminatory. Such allegations are insufficient to plausibly establish that
any adverse action occurred because of Smith’s disability.
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In sum, Smith fails to state a prima facie case of ADA employment
discrimination because he has not pled sufficient facts to establish each element of the
claim. Accordingly, that claim is DISMISSED.
2. 	Title VII Claim
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) [he] belongs to a protected class; (2) [he] was
qualified for [his] position; (3) [he] was subject to an adverse employment action; and
(4) similarly situated individuals outside [his] protected class were treated more
favorably.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). “[A]n adverse
employment action is one that ‘materially affect[s] the compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of ... employment.’” Id. (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d
1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Here, Smith indicates that he was subjected to discriminatory treatment based on
race. Dkt. No. 1 at PageID.3. But the complaint contains only a conclusory assertion
that he was treated differently because of his race. It does not allege facts supporting a
reasonable inference that Amazon took any adverse employment action because of
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Smith’s race. For example, Smith does not allege that similarly situated employees of a
different race were treated more favorably, nor does he identify any racially
discriminatory statements or actions tied to a specific employment decision. Instead,
the complaint alleges that Smith was labeled “threatening” and that he experienced
workplace difficulties related to training and job assignments. Id. These allegations,
without additional factual context linking them to racial animus, are insufficient to state
a plausible Title VII discrimination claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To the extent Smith also intends to assert a hostile work environment claim
under Title VII, the complaint does not plausibly allege such a claim. A hostile work
environment exists when discriminatory conduct in the workplace is “sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.” Christian v. Umpqua Bank,
984 F.3d 801, 809 (9th Cir. 2020). The conduct need not be directed specifically at the
plaintiff to support such a claim, Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 687 (9th
Cir. 2017), but it must be of a nature that permeates the workplace with “discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, or insult” such that it creates an abusive working environment.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d
1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, Smith does not allege facts describing conduct that
meets this standard. Apart from a single allegation that he was labeled as
“threatening,” the complaint does not describe “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
or insult” connected to Smith’s race. And even accepting that allegation as true,
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“[s]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)
will not amount to discriminat[ion].” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998) (cleaned up). On the facts alleged here, therefore, Smith has not plausibly alleged
conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his
employment.
Nor does the complaint plausibly allege retaliation under Title VII. “To make
out a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show that (1) he engaged in a
protected activity; (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action;
and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Ray
v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). Smith’s complaint alleges that shortly
after he filed his EEOC inquiry in July 2025, he began to experience retaliation, which
included a suspension. These allegations might possibly be enough to plausibly allege
that Smith engaged in a protected activity and that an adverse employment action was
taken against him. But the complaint, in this current form, does not offer enough
factual detail to plausibly allege causation. To be sure, the temporal proximity of a
protected activity and an adverse employment action—which Smith alleges—can
support an inference of causation. See Jarvis v. Corteva Agriscience, Inc., Civ. No. 23-
00396, 2025 WL 1312119, at *7-10 (D. Haw. May 6, 2025). But it cannot support such an
inference here. For one thing, Smith does not allege that his employer knew he had
filed an EEOC inquiry at the time of the alleged retaliation in around July 2025. For
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another, although his December 2025 charge of discrimination with the EEOC would
have been disclosed to his employer, Smith does not allege any further retaliation after
that date. These shortcomings are fatal to Smith’s complaint in its current form because
“[e]ssential to a causal link is evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff
had engaged in the protected activity.” Id. at *7 (quoting Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686
F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982)).
And so, as with his ADA claim, Smith has failed to allege any prima facie case
under Title VII because he has not pled sufficient facts to establish each element of any
of his claims. Accordingly, the Title VII claims are DISMISSED.
3. 	Leave to Amend
But Smith could potentially cure the deficiencies in his complaint by alleging
facts demonstrating that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, that he was a
qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of his position with or
without reasonable accommodation, and that Amazon failed to provide a reasonable
accommodation or otherwise took adverse action because of his disability. He could
also allege additional facts supporting a reasonable inference that Amazon took adverse
action against him because of his race or because of his protected activity, for purposes
of his Title VII claim. In other words, Smith must allege facts that link his disabilities or
other protected status to the actions he claims Amazon took for purposes of making the
respective claims.
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The court therefore GRANTS Smith leave to amend the complaint. Any
amended complaint—which should be titled “First Amended Complaint”—must be
filed by April 13, 2026, and must cure the deficiencies identified above; that is, Smith
must provide sufficient facts to establish claims under the ADA or Title VII in the ways
described above. Smith is cautioned that failure to timely file an amended complaint
that addresses the deficiencies identified above will result in the automatic dismissal of
this action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Smith’s IFP application,
DISMISSES the complaint, and GRANTS Smith leave to amend.
If Smith elects to file an amended complaint, he must comply with the following
requirements:
(1) Smith’s deadline to file an amended complaint is April 13, 2026;
(2) Smith’s amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint”;
and
(3) Smith must cure the deficiencies identified above.
Smith is cautioned that failure to timely file an amended complaint that complies with
this order will result in automatic dismissal of this action.
//
//
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 13, 2026, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Civil No. 26-00089 MWJS-WRP; Smith v. Amazon.com Services, LLC; ORDER (1)
GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT
PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS AND (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND
/s/ Micah W.J. Smith
Micah W.J. Smith
United States District Judge
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