Guerrero Cordero v. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION
MARIO GUERRERO CORDERO, No. 25-CV-176-CJW-KEM
Petitioner, MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT and
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondents.
____________________
Petitioner Mario Guerrero Cordero’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus is before the
Court. (Doc. 3). Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition. (Doc. 5). For the
following reasons, the Court grants the motion to dismiss and dismisses petitioner’s
petition for writ of mandamus.
“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). “The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the
plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. However, “the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to
be invoked only in extraordinary situations.” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449
U.S. 33, 34 (1980). The writ may issue only in those exceptional circumstances
amounting to a judicial usurpation of power.” Id. at 35; accord Will v. United States,
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389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (“[I]t is clear that only exceptional circumstances amounting to
a judicial usurpation of power will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.”
(internal quotation marks removed)). In addition, “[i]n order for mandamus to lie the
duty owed to the plaintiff must be ministerial and a positive command so plainly
prescribed as to be free from doubt.” Keeny v. Sec’y of the Army, 437 F.2d 1151, 1152
(8th Cir. 1971).
“A district court may grant a writ of mandamus only in extraordinary situations
and only if: (1) the petitioner can establish a clear and indisputable right to the relief
sought, (2) the defendant has a nondiscretionary duty to honor that right, and (3) the
petitioner has no other adequate remedy.” Castillo v. Ridge, 445 F.3d 1057, 1060–61
(8th Cir. 2006); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Colum., 542 U.S. 367,
380 (2004) (listing the three conditions that must be satisfied before a court can issue a
writ of mandamus). “Further, whether a writ of mandamus should issue is largely a
matter within the district court’s discretion.” Castillo, 445 F.3d at 1061; see also Kerr
v. U.S. Dist. Ct. N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976).
“Federal courts lack the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to state courts under
either the federal mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361—which provides for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus to federal officers and agencies—or, where mandamus is the only
relief sought, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.” Middlebrooks v. Thirteenth Judicial
Dist. Cir. Court, Union Cnty., 323 F.2d 485, 486 (8th Cir. 1963) (quoting Chambersel
v. Florida, 816 F. App’x 424, 425–26 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)). If an offender
wishes to attack the validity of a prior state conviction or sentence, “the proper vehicle
is a [state] habeas corpus action” in that state. Otey v. Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th
Cir. 1993). The same is true of a challenge to the state conviction or sentence based on
a Due Process Clause violation. See Iowa Code § 822.2 (authorizing a post-conviction
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relief (“PCR”) proceeding under a claim that “[t]he conviction or sentence was in
violation of the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state”).
On November 14, 2012, a state court judge sentenced petitioner to life in prison
with a twenty-five year consecutive sentence on his convictions for first degree murder
and attempted murder. State v. Guerrero Cordero, FECR221465 (Dist. Ct. Polk Cnty.
2012). Thirteen years into that sentence, petitioner filed the above referenced document,
captioned as a “Petition for Writ of Mandamus,” in which he requests that the Court
order Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officials “to come to the Anamosa
State Prison [(“ASP”)] and take custody of his person for removal from the United States
back to Mexico, his country of origin.” (Doc. 3, at 3).1 Petitioner is not a United States
citizen, and remains a citizen of Mexico. (Id., at 1). Petitioner argues that because he
signed voluntary deportation documents upon his arrival at ASP, the Court should allow
him to voluntarily depart the United States by ordering ICE agents deport him as,
according to petitioner, he has the right to be deported from the United States under
federal law and not be further detained without due process. (Id., at 1–2).
As support for his claim, petitioner references an executive order from President
Donald Trump that directs all “ICE agents to locate and remove all criminal illegal aliens
located in the United States.” (Id., at 1). Petitioner did not cite the executive order, but
it is likely he is referencing Executive Order 14159 issued on January 20, 2025.
1 The pro se document petitioner filed (Doc. 3) seems to be a form document that has recently
been filed by several other litigants who are in Iowa state custody. See, e.g., 25-CV-0145-LTS-
KEM, 25-CV-0129-CJW-MAR. The arguments contained therein do not appear to be exclusive
to Iowa. See Hurtadodominguez v. United States, No. 1:25-CV-00434-JLT-CDB (HC), 2025
WL 1400194, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2025) (denying a substantially similar petition for a writ
of mandamus). Elsewhere, state prisoners have tried to raise the same argument via Title 28,
United States Code, Section 2241. Antonio-Hernandez v. Calloway, No. 1:25-CV-00759-ACA-
SGC, 2025 WL 3492382, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2025), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 1:25-CV-00759-ACA-SGC, 2025 WL 3490555 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2025) (denying the same
argument but in the context of a habeas petition).
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Petitioner also references a memo sent by Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds directing that
all Iowa Department of Public Safety and Department of Corrections officials assist ICE
and turn over any “illegal criminal alien.” (Id., at 2). Petitioner did not cite to this state
memo either, but it is likely that he is referring to the memo issued on January 17, 2025,
to Stephan Bayens, Iowa Department of Public Safety commissioner, and Beth Skinner,
director of the Iowa Department of Corrections.
Petitioner’s claim here fails for two reasons. First, petitioner is unable to leave
the United States to voluntarily return to Mexico because of his life sentence on his state
court conviction. For that reason, what petitioner is really attacking is that state court
sentence. His immigration detainer will only attach once he has served his entire state
court sentence. Orellana v. Nobles Cnty., 230 F. Supp. 934, 943 (D. Minn. 2017)
(finding that an inmate is only released to ICE once they have satisfied the release
conditions on their state court sentence). The Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to
allow petitioner to challenge the validity of his state sentence as the proper venue for that
challenge is an application for PCR.2 The same is true of his claim that he is being held
without due process. Thus, petitioner fails to meet the third required element for a writ
of mandamus, that he has no other adequate remedy.
Second, as respondents argue, petitioner has failed to establish a clear and
indisputable right to the relief sought, and thus he also fails to meet the first required
element. (Doc. 5-1, at 3–4). As stated by another court:
[p]etitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief under the Executive Order;
however, that order neither grants [p]etitioner a right to relief (deportation
or removal) nor imposes upon any of the [r]espondents an obligation to
investigate [p]etitioner’s immigration status and compel commencement of
removal proceedings in the event [p]etitioner is deportable. Instead, the
2 It appears that petitioner has already filed an unsuccessful PCR application in state court. See
Guerrero Cordero v. State, No. 17-1425, 2018 WL 4360929, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 12,
2018) (affirming the denial of his PCR application).
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order merely directs [r]espondents to provide for “the efficient and
expedited removal of aliens from the United States.” This language
implicates the quintessential discretionary functions of those executive
agencies charged with investigating and enforcing the laws of the United
States -- a court may not properly issue a writ of mandamus to compel the
exercise of such discretionary duties. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 831 (1985) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “has
recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision
not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a
decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”)
(collecting cases).
Hurtadodominguez v. United States, No. 1:25-CV-00434-CDB (HC), 2025 WL 1150955,
at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-CV-
00434-JLT-CDB (HC), 2025 WL 1400194 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2025). Petitioner relies
on the same executive order as in Hurtadodominguez, so the analysis is the same. See
Exec. Order 14159, § 23(c) (“This order is not intended to, and does not, create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party
against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees,
or agents, or any other person.”). And, even if the order said what petitioner alleges it
says, he does not have a right to leave the country to avoid serving his life sentence in
state prison. See Gonzalez v. U. S. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs., 867 F.2d 1108,
1110 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding no private right to an expeditious deportation proceeding
by a state court inmate still serving his sentence and thus that a writ of mandamus was
not available); Herbage v. Carlson, No. 92-1920, 1992 WL 323466, at *1 (8th Cir. Nov.
6, 1992) (per curiam) (summarily affirming the denial a “petition for a writ of habeas
corpus seeking an immediate deportation hearing” and citing to Herbage). Further, as
noted above, the two documents cited by petitioner—the executive order and the memo—
do not create such a right. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to
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issue a writ of mandamus as it finds petitioner has failed to demonstrate the required
elements and this is not an extraordinary circumstance that merits one.
For the reasons stated, the Court grants respondents’ motion to dismiss. (Doc.
5). Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus, (Doc. 1), is dismissed.3
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of January, 2026.
___________________________
C.J. Williams, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
3 As noted above, petitioner’s claim could be construed as a challenge to his conviction that
would need to be brought in a PCR action. To the extent, then, that petitioner’s claim could be
construed as one for habeas relief, the Court declines to grant him a certificate of appealability.
See United States v. Lambros, 404 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating, “[a] certificate of
appealability is required to appeal the denial of any motion that effectively or ultimately seeks
habeas corpus or § 2255 relief.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Tiedeman v. Benson, 122
F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997).
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