USA v. Goodman

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, Case No. 25-cr-1039-CJW
vs.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
AUSTIN ANDREW GOODMAN,
Defendant.
____________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 2
II. THE DECEMBER 29, 2025 HEARING ............................................... 3
III. FINDINGS OF FACT ...................................................................... 4
IV. THE MOTION TO DISMISS ...........................................................12
A. The Parties’ Arguments ..........................................................12
B. Analysis ..............................................................................13
V. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS .........................................................17
A. Stipulation...........................................................................17
B. The Parties’ Arguments ..........................................................18
C. Relevant Law .......................................................................19
D. Analysis ..............................................................................23
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 1 of 34

2
1. Was there probable cause for the first warrant to seize
Defendant’s phone? .......................................................23
2. Was there probable cause for the second warrant to
search Defendant’s home for electronic devices? ...................29
3. Was there probable cause for the third warrant (i.e., to
search Defendant’s home for controlled
substances, paraphernalia, firearms, and ammunition)? .........30
4. Was there probable cause for the fourth warrant (i.e., to
search Defendant’s electronic devices)? ..............................31
5. Is the Leon good faith exception applicable? ........................31
VI. CONCLUSION .............................................................................33
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 9, 2025, the Grand Jury returned an Indictment charging Defendant
with one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person in violation of 18
U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(4) and 924(a)(8). (Doc. 3.)
The matters before me are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 35) and
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. (Doc. 39.) Attached to the suppression motion is
Defendant’s Inventory (Dubuque Police Department Property and Evidence Voucher) of
items to be suppressed which includes: any evidence derived from the seizure of
Defendant’s Apple iPhone and Lenovo ThinkPad, the extraction of those devices’ data
and content, and the review of that data; and any evidence derived from the search of
Defendant’s person and residence, but not limited to, an Apple iPhone, the Lenovo
ThinkPad, firearms, magazines, ammunition, documents related to firearms and
ammunition, controlled substances, paraphernalia, photographs taken by police, and
observations of officers. (Docs. 39-1 at 13, 39-2.) The Government filed a timely
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 2 of 34

3
Resistances to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41) and Motion to Suppress (Doc.
42). The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief United States District Court Judge, referred
the motions to me for a Report and Recommendation.
The Motion to Dismiss takes issue with the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. Section
922(4) which prohibits possession of a firearm by a person “who has been adjudicated as
a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” The Motion to
Suppress challenges certain warrants authorizing the search of his residence.1
II. THE DECEMBER 29, 2025 HEARING
I held a hearing on Defendant’s motions on December 29, 2025. (Doc. 43.) At
the hearing, the following Government’s suppression exhibits were admitted without
objection:
1. Application for Search Warrant (person of Austin Goodman);
1A. Search Warrant (person of Austin Goodman);
2. Application for Search Warrant (residence; electronic devices);
2A. Search Warrant (residence; electronic devices);
3. Application for Search Warrant (residence; drugs, firearms and ammunition);
3A. Search Warrant (residence; drugs, firearms and ammunition);
4. Application for Search Warrant (Lenovo ThinkPad and Silver Apple iPhone);
and
4A. Search Warrant (ThinkPad and Silver Apple iPhone).
At the hearing, the following Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss exhibits were
admitted without objection:
A. Austin Goodman Involuntary Commitment Order; and
1 At the hearing, the parties confirmed that parts of Defendant’s suppression motion have been
rendered moot by the Government’s agreement not to offer at trial evidence relating to seized
electronic devices, as discussed below.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 3 of 34

4
B. Austin Goodman Physician’s Report of Examination.
The following Defendant’s suppression exhibits were also admitted without
objection:
A. Dubuque County Sheriff’s Office Incident/Investigation Report;
B. Application for Search Warrant (person of Austin Goodman);
B1. Search Warrant (person of Austin Goodman);
C. Application for Search Warrant (residence; electronic devices);
C1. Search Warrant (residence; electronic devices);
D. Application for Search Warrant (residence; drugs, firearms and ammunition);
D1. Search Warrant (residence; drugs, firearms and ammunition);
E. Application for Search Warrant (Lenovo ThinkPad and Silver Apple iPhone);
E1. Search Warrant (Lenovo ThinkPad and Silver Apple iPhone).
The Government called Dubuque Police Officer Nick Schlosser2 as a witness. I
found the witness credible.
For the following reasons, I respectfully recommend that the District Court deny
both Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
The indictment, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss it, arise from events on March
3, 2025 when Defendant was arrested in the Dubuque, Iowa Federal Building3 while in
possession of a firearm. The facts pertaining to the March 3, 2025 incident, while
dramatic, are at least straight forward. The facts underlying the motion to suppress that
2 Officer Schlosser has been employed by the Dubuque Police Department for more than 21
years. He graduated from the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy in 2004. He is currently
assigned to the Criminal Investigations Division and is part of the ATF Task Force.
3 The Historic Building was once a United States Post Office and Courthouse but now houses
the City of Dubuque City Council Chambers. (Schlosser H’rg Test. at 16;
https://www.cityofdubuque.org/1555/Historic-Federal-Building.)
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 4 of 34

5
transpired the previous fall, on the other hand, are much more complicated. Because the
sufficiency of the probable cause in a warrant must be determined by the content of the
supporting affidavit, it may be best to start with the facts as presented by the warrants in
question.
But first, a précis: Officer Schlosser was investigating alleged harassment by
Defendant directed toward his former employer, C.M. Ultimately, Officer Schlosser
obtained four warrants from two judges in Dubuque County to (1) seize Defendant’s cell
phone from his person (Gov’t Ex. 1); (2) to search Defendant’s residence for “[a]ny
electronic devices that can communicate via cell service or internet and or Wi-Fi” (Gov’t
Ex 2); (3) to search Defendant’s residence for evidence relating to controlled substances,
firearms, and ammunition (Gov’t Ex. 3); and (4) to search the contents of Defendant’s
cell phone and Lenovo Thinkpad that had been seized pursuant to warrants 1 and 2.
(Gov’t Ex. 4.)
Officer Schlosser’s “Affiant’s Attachment” supporting the warrants to seize
Defendant’s phone, initially search his apartment for electronic devices, and to later
search the devices (i.e., Exhibits 1, 3, and 4) contains the following identical statements:
On 10/28/2024 at approximately 1034 hours Officer Barbour, responded to
the DLEC4 to meet with [C.M.] [DOB and address]
[C.M.] advised he has been dealing with ongoing harassment with Austin
Andrew Goodman [DPN] of [XXXX] Melrose Ter. over the last month.
[C.M.] advised Goodman use [sic] to work for his business up until about
09/10/2024 when he was fired.5
[C.M.] found out recently Goodman created a letter regarding a lawsuit
attacking [C.M.] and his business. [C.M.] advised on 10/26/2024 and
4 I believe DLEC stands for Dubuque Law Enforcement Center. It is reasonable to infer this
facility is known to judges in Dubuque.
5 Officer Schlosser testified that Defendant was “heavily involved in technology” related to his
work for C.M. (Schlosser Hr’g Test. at 40-41.) This statement does not appear in the affidavit.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 5 of 34

6
10/27/2024 Goodman went on a spree giving people these letters. [C.M.]
advised he has had Goodman trespassed6 from several of his properties due
to the harassment that has been on going. Officer Barbour located 9
different properties [C.M.] had Goodman trespassed from. [C.M.] advised
he found many of these letters from Goodman at the properties he has
trespassed from. [C.M.] is unsure if he physically dropped these off or
how they were delivered. [C.M.] advised he found a copy of a letter on
the business floors of XXX Main St. and YYY Main St. The doors were
locked over the weekend so he would have slid it through the door.7 [C.M.]
advised his wife has a property at ZZZ W. 3rd St., (which Goodman is
trespassed from) found a letter on the floor as well. [C.M.] advised he
found approximately 50 copies of this letter on his printer at YYY Main St.
[C.M.] believes Goodman got into the Wi-Fi and accessed the printer.
[C.M.] is afraid because he knows Goodman owns firearms, uses drugs and
is not mentally stable.
[C.M.] advised on 10/28/2024 at approximately 0900 hours he got to his
business at XXX Main St. [C.M.] heard from his employees working
outside that Goodman drove by and yelled “Fuck Chris [C.M.].” [C.M.]
advised Goodman drives a black Jeep Cherokee.
[C.M.] also showed Barbour a text Goodman sent to [D.L.] who owns [a
local business]. The text says, “[C.M.] is going to have to deal with the
consequences of his actions.” Goodman talks about [C.M.] making
millions from a deal Goodman allegedly got him. [D.L.] asked Goodman
“Whats the goal? Settlement or burn it down?” Goodman responded with
fire emojis and money bag emojis. Then states “House on fire” and “I
expect a settlement, but that’s not what it’s about.”
6 Officer Schlosser testified at the hearing that having someone “trespassed” means the person
has been formally notified that their presence on the property could subject them to prosecution
for trespassing. (Schlosser H’rg Test. at 42.)
7 Officer Schlosser testified, “C.M. wasn’t sure if he—the buildings were locked, so he wasn’t
sure—he didn’t believe Goodman may have entered them but may have slid them under the
doors.” (Schlosser H’rg Test. at 20.)
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 6 of 34

7
[C.M.] also showed a Facebook post8 by Goodman that he advised is
directed at him. It states, “You forced the hand, now you can deal with the
consequences.” [C.M.] advised there is [sic] several posts directed at him.
[C.M.] also sent me a letter from a “[S.C.]” that she wrote. The letter
states she does not want to be involved in the case. The letter talks about
Goodman stating he wants to “destroy [C.M.]” and that he will “Own
everything when it’s over.”
Officer Barbour later spoke with [C.M.]’s IT person, [J.O. DOB)]. J.O.
advised he works for [technology business] at[address]. J.O. advised he
was informed about the printer incident by [C.M.], so he looked up who
logged onto the network. [J.O.] observed a new laptop was added to the
network on 10/27/2024 at 1817 hours and disconnected at 1824 hours.
[J.O.] advised an Iphone 15 also connected to the network at the same time.
[J.O.] advised the same Iphone connected on 10/12/2024 at approximately
1213 hours. [J.O.] advised Goodman’s access to the network was revoked.
However, he has knowledge on how to get onto the wifi since it has not
been changed which enables him to access the printer. [J.O.] sent me
photos of the devices connected.
Officer Barbour later reviewed traffic camera footage. Officer Barbour
observed on 10/28/2024 at approximately 0907 hours a black Jeep Grand
Cherokee bearing IA plates [AAAAAA] registered to Goodman driving
south on Main St. near [XXX] Main St. Officer Barbour observed workers
working outside and his vehicle stopped near them. He goes around the
town clock and drives away.
On 10/27/2024 at approximately 1816 hours Goodman’s vehicle arrives at
[YYY] Main St. and parks in front of it briefly. Goodman then drives east
on 8th St. and parks near Iowa St. He gets out of his car and walks towards
the parking ramp, but Officer Barbour cannot tell what he is doing. He
gets back in his car and pulls onto Iowa St. He walks over to the DLEC.
He later walks back to his car and drives away at approximately 1822 hours.
8 At the hearing, Officer Schlosser confirmed this was a public facing post and not a direct
message to C.M. (Schlosser H’rg Test. at 35-36.)
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 7 of 34

8
The warrant to search for evidence of controlled substances, firearms, and
ammunition was a piggyback warrant9 that followed the initial search of Defendant’s
residence. Thus, Officer Schlosser’s Affiant’s Attachment for Exhibit 3 includes all the
foregoing quoted text as well as the following additional statement:
On 10/31/2024 Dubuque Police were executing a search warrant at
Goodman’s residence. When police entered the residence, they could detect
an odor of marijuana. Upon initial search of the residence, located in plain
view was marijuana, firearms, and drug paraphernalia.
In addition to the facts shown in Officer Schlosser’s affidavits, he testified at the
hearing regarding, inter alia, (1) the investigation of the alleged harassment of C.M., (2)
drafting, obtaining, and executing the various warrants; (3) Defendant’s involuntary
commitment; and (4) the March 2025 incident at the Federal Building. I will address this
additional factual background, bearing in mind that whether the affidavits demonstrate
probable cause is to be determined from the four corners of the affidavit and not what
else Officer Schlosser might have known or later learned. Nevertheless, these facts bear
on the motion to dismiss, and to some extent, on the application of the Leon good faith
doctrine.
Officer Schlosser testified he had written “several” warrants which he later stated
meant “well over a hundred.” (Schlosser Hr’g Test. at 7, 40). Officer Schlosser
9 “Piggyback warrant” refers to a supplemental warrant that is obtained to seize unanticipated
contraband or evidence after a warranted search for other evidence discloses the contraband or
evidence. See e.g., United States v. Vailes, No. 2:22-cr-00104-JAD-BNW, 2023 WL 5347134,
at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2023) (“[G]uns and drugs were found during a search of [the
defendant’s] home and car that was initially authorized by a search warrant seeking evidence of
pandering based on the testimony of an undercover detective to whom [the defendant] offered
his pimp services. After discovering the guns and drugs, the officers obtained a ‘piggyback
warrant’ and seized them.”).
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 8 of 34

9
explained how after he completed a “complaint” and affidavit, he would have it notarized,
reviewed by a shift commander, present it to a county attorney, and, if approved, appear
before an available judge. (Id. at 8.) He described how he incorporates any changes
suggested by the shift commander or county attorney. (Id. at 24.) From the time the
warrant is drafted until it is presented to a judge varies depending upon the complexity
of the case, but it takes 45 minutes on average. (Id. at 25.) Officer Schlosser estimated
it took approximately 20 minutes from his arrival at the hospital until he left with the
phone. (Id. at 26-27.)
Officer Schlosser testified that although C.M.’s IT person identified an iPhone as
having connected to the network, as stated in the affidavit, the warrant applied to
Defendant’s “cell phone,” because law enforcement did not yet know what kind of cell
phone Defendant had. (Id. at 34.)10 After the first warrant was executed, Officer
Schlosser went through the same process to obtain a warrant to search Defendant’s
residence. (Id. at 28-29.)
Officer Schlosser testified that Judge Richter, who signed the first three requested
warrants (Ex. 1A, 2A, and 3A) and Judge Hostager, who signed the fourth warrant (Ex.
4A) were former Assistant County Attorneys. Each judge happened to be available when
the warrants were presented. (Id. at 30.) Officer Schlosser testified that the judges in
Dubuque County are “very thorough, especially when it comes to electronic devices.”
He further explained that the judges were “strict on dates” so the warrants would not be
open ended and about the warrants’ “content” showing probable cause. (Id. at 9, 10,
32.) Officer Schlosser has not had a warrant rejected, although he has been asked to add
or modify warrants before they were signed. (Id. at 9.) The “custom” in Dubuque
10 The record does not disclose whether Officer Schlosser or anyone else considered the
possibility of seizing only an iPhone, if Defendant possessed one. Even if the Defendant has a
point that the warrant is slightly broader than necessary on this issue, it is mooted by the fact
that the cell phone (iPhone or otherwise) was never searched.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 9 of 34

10
County, Officer Schlosser testified, is that a warrant to seize a phone would be followed
by a separate warrant to search it. (Id. at 10.) Officer Schlosser authored the warrants
shown in Exhibits 1-4.
Regarding the investigation of Defendant, Officer Schlosser testified that the
Dubuque Police Chief requested the Criminal Investigations Division assist patrol with a
harassment investigation where Defendant was the subject. Moreover, the Dubuque City
Attorney was drafting a cease-and-desist letter for police to serve. (Id. at 11.)
Officer Schlosser spoke to Officer Barbour whose investigation was used to draft
the warrant to seize Defendant’s cell phone. (Id. at 12.) Officer Schlosser learned that
Defendant “had just currently been committed to Mercy Hospital.” Officer Schlosser
testified that the warrant was executed at Mercy Hospital where officers obtained
Defendant’s phone. (Id.) The warrant return reflects that a “silver apple iPhone in a
tinted case” was seized at 250 Mercy Drive on October 31, 2024.11
After Officer Schlosser left the hospital, he obtained a warrant to search
Defendant’s residence using the same information. (Gov’t Ex. 2, 2A; Schlosser Hr’g
Test. at 13.) When officers were clearing the residence “to make sure nobody else” was
present, officers noticed a glass pipe, some marijuana and some firearms. (Schlosser
Hr’g Test. at 13.) Law enforcement stopped the search and applied for a new warrant.
(Id.; Gov’t Ex. 3.) After obtaining the warrant, Officer Schlosser called officers on the
scene and advised them he was on his way with the signed warrant in hand. (Schlosser
11 Defendant’s Exhibit A states that Defendant was taken into custody in the Dubuque County
Courthouse on October 31, 2024 and was transported to Mercy One ER per a “court ordered
commitment for mental health and substance abuse.” (Doc. 39-3 at 3.) The commitment order
and physician’s exam are dated November 4, 2004. (Doc. 36-1 and 36-2.) Regardless of when
Defendant was formally committed, I see no reason to doubt that Defendant was at Mercy
Hospital when the iPhone warrant was executed.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 10 of 34

11
H’rg Test. at 14.) When he arrived back at the residence, officers were collecting those
items. (Id.)
While the warrant for the search of the iPhone and ThinkPad may, in a sense, be
moot, some of the details surrounding it may bear on the Leon issue. Officer Schlosser
testified that that he had requested a fellow officer provide him a template for a warrant
used to search cell phones. Officer Schlosser copied and pasted part of the contents of
Exhibit 4 that included details of an unrelated death investigation from that template.
Judge Hostager noted those details in what he believed were two errors in lines 3 (a)-(b)
of Exhibit 4, and asked Officer Schlosser to cross them out, initial them, and date them.
(Id. at 19). The judges had no other questions about the warrants. (Id. at 31.) The
judges had never before rejected Officer Schlosser’s warrants. (Id.) Although Officer
Schlosser authored a separate warrant to search the seized iPhone and the ThinkPad, he
was never able to obtain evidence from either device because they were password
protected. (Id. at 15.)
Officer Schlosser described the incidents of March 2025 that resulted in the
indictment now before this Court. On Facebook, Defendant had announced his intention
to attend a city council meeting at the Dubuque Federal Building. Officer Schlosser
testified Defendant, “entered the Dubuque building, along with his two dogs. He was
dressed in a suit, draped in an American flag, with a marijuana cigarette in his ear.” (Id.
at 16.) Officers stopped Defendant before he entered the city council chambers where a
meeting was in session. (Id.) Officer Schlosser understood Defendant had been
“previously mentally committed.” (Id.)
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Exhibit A is the November 4, 2024 “Finding of
Fact, Order Re: Involuntary Commitment and Order Re: Patient Advocate Per Iowa Code
Sec. 229.3” entered by Magistrate Natalia Blaskovich of the First Judicial District of
Iowa. This involuntary commitment order found Defendant to be suffering from a mental
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 11 of 34

12
illness and ordered he be involuntarily hospitalized for treatment. I note that the
commitment order contained a notification that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(4),
Defendant was prohibited from possessing firearms and ammunition. (Def. Ex. A at 2.)
Defendant’s Exhibit B is the Physician’s Report of Examination Pursuant to Iowa Code
Section 229.10(2) that appears to have been filed in support of the application for
Defendant’s involuntary hospitalization.
IV. THE MOTION TO DISMISS
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues that Title 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional on its
face and as applied to him. Relying principally on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n,
Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) and its progeny, Defendant argues that Section
922(g)(4) is unconstitutional because it is not consistent with the America’s “historic
tradition of firearm regulation” and thus infringes on his Second Amendment rights.
After arguing that the Second Amendment protects the conduct prohibited by Section
922(g)(4), Defendant addresses the historical analogues that might be marshaled in
support of the prohibition and finds them wanting as to both “how” and “why” those
historical prohibitions operated. Finally, Defendant argues Section 922(g)(4) is
unconstitutional as applied to him. Largely, Defendant contends the Government must
establish not only the allegation of mental illness, but that Defendant is also dangerous.
Defendant then asserts reasons he believes he is not dangerous. Defendant also says that
the process for restoration of rights pursuant to the Iowa Code does not make the
deprivation of rights constitutional.
The Government replies that Bruen does not cast doubt on the constitutionality of
statutes disarming the mentally ill. The Government then counters Defendant’s historical
analysis by pointing to the nation’s longstanding tradition of disarming categories of
dangerous persons, including those who have been determined to be mentally ill and
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 12 of 34

13
arguing Section 922(g)(4) is consistent with this tradition. After acknowledging that the
Eighth Circuit has not yet addressed this subsection of Section 922(g), the Government
then cites numerous district court decisions, including cases in this district, that support
its conclusion.
Finally, the Government argues that the as-applied challenge is premature and
must not be ruled upon without a trial on the merits. The Government includes its
arguments regarding why, after such a trial, the Court should conclude Section 922(g)(4)
is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant.
B. Analysis
The facial challenge before me is identical to the one presented to the Court in
United States v. Clark, No. 24-cr-2056 (N.D. Iowa April 8, 2025.) As in the case at
bar, the defendant in Clark was alleged to have possessed a firearm12 knowing he had
previously been committed to a mental institution. In Clark, the defendant asserted the
same challenges as Defendant herein. Chief Judge Williams reasoned as follows:
Defendant first argues Section 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional on its face.
(Doc. 23- 1, 3–9). He asserts that prohibiting a mentally ill person from
possessing a firearm is inconsistent with the Nation’s history and tradition
of firearm regulation. See (Id., at 7).
The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II; see also District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (recognizing that the Second Amendment confers
“an individual right to keep and bear arms.”); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding that the right to bear and keep
arms is a fundamental right incorporated against the states by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). A law may be facially
unconstitutional if “no set of circumstances exists under which the [law]
would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see
also United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2024). When
analyzing a facial challenge to a firearm regulation specifically, “a court
12 Clark involved multiple firearms.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 13 of 34

14
must begin by asking whether the firearm regulation at issue governs
conduct that falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment.” United
States v. Sitladeen, 64 F.4th 978, 985 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing New York
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2022)). “If the
regulation does govern such conduct, [a] court [shall] uphold it so long as
the government can ‘identify an American tradition justifying’ the
regulation.” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38–39). Courts do not need
to identify a “historical twin” to a modern regulation; rather, a “historical
analogue” is sufficient. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, 30 (emphasis omitted).
As an initial matter, Section 922(g)(4) “governs conduct that falls within
the plain text of the Second Amendment” because it regulates the people’s
right to possess firearms. Sitladeen, 64 F.4th at 985; see United States v.
Grubb, 699 F. Supp. 747, 750–51 (N.D. Iowa 2023). The Second
Amendment, however, does not specify who is included in “the people.”
Grubb, 699 F. Supp. at 751. Thus, if the “Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation” provides a justification for regulating the possession of
firearms by mentally ill individuals, Section 922(g)(4) must be upheld.
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17.
Section 922(g)(4) specifically prohibits any person “who has been
committed to a mental institution” from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(4). The accompanying regulations promulgated by the Bureau of
Alcohol Tabacco and Firearms and the Department of Justice define the
term “committed to a mental institution” as
A formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court,
board, commission, or other lawful authority. The term includes a
commitment to a mental institution involuntarily. The term includes
commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness. . . . The term
does not include a person in a mental institution for observation or a
voluntary admission to a mental institution.
27 C.F.R. § 478.11. Although “[t]he issue of whether a person has been
committed to a mental institution is a question of federal law . . .[,] it will
almost always be the case that a prior commitment will have occurred
pursuant to state law[.]” United States v. Whiton, 48 F.3d 356, 358 (8th
Cir. 1995). Many states, including Iowa, require that a person pose a
danger to himself or others in order to be involuntarily committed to a
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 14 of 34

15
mental institution. Iowa Code §§ 229.1, 229.13; see, e.g., Kan Stat. Ann.
§§ 59-2946(f), 2966 (2025); Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.02, 253B.09 (2024); Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 71-908, 925 (2025); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 358 (1997) (“We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they
have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional
factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”). Put another
way, Section 922(g)(4) prohibits a person from possessing a firearm if a
court has determined that the person has a diagnosed mental illness and, as
a result, poses a danger to himself or others.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the
constitutionality of Section 922(g)(4) specifically, the Court has held that
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the
mentally ill” are “presumptively lawful.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627
n.26. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not directly addressed the
constitutionality of Section 922(g)(4) either. In Veasley, however, the
Eighth Circuit analyzed this Nation’s history of regulating a mentally ill
person’s ability to possess firearms. See 98 F.4th 906, 912–16 (2024)
(addressing a facial challenge to Title 18, United States Code, Section
922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful drug users from possessing firearms).
In the late eighteenth century, those who were deemed both mentally ill and
dangerous were confined in institutions and denied access to guns. See id.
at 913–15 (citations omitted). Judicial proceedings before a justice of the
peace were also required before a person could be confined involuntarily.
Id. at 916. If a mentally ill person did not pose a danger to the community,
he was allowed to stay at home with his family with “[his] civil liberties
. . . intact.” Id. at 913; see also United States v. Cooper, 127 F.4th 1092,
1095 (8th Cir. 2025). There were even mechanisms by which mentally ill
individuals could regain their firearm rights when they no longer posed a
danger to the community. Compare Veasley, 98 F.4th at 915 with Iowa
Code § 724.31(2) (“A person who is subject to the disabilities imposed by
18 U.S.C. § [922(g)(4)] because of an order or judgment that occurred
under the laws of this state may petition the court . . . for relief from the
disabilities imposed under 18 U.S.C. § [922(g)(4)].”). These core
regulatory principles have remained consistent throughout this Nation’s
history. Id. at 913. Because this Nation’s historical tradition of disarming
individuals who are both mentally ill and dangerous is sufficiently
analogous to modern regulations, Section 922(g)(4) must be upheld under
Bruen. Although non-dangerous persons with mental illnesses have
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 15 of 34

16
historically been allowed to maintain their firearm rights, this fact has no
bearing on whether Section 922(g)(4) is facially constitutional.
Furthermore, there are many circumstances where Section 922(g)(4) would
be constitutional because mental illnesses can manifest differently in each
person. See, e.g., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
99–105 (Am. Psychiatry Ass’n ed., 5th ed. 2013) (explaining the diagnostic
criteria for schizophrenia and the kinds of symptoms different patients may
exhibit). As it did in the eighteenth century, whether a mentally ill person
may lawfully possess firearms depends on the specific risk of danger he
poses to himself or others. See Veasley, 98 F.4th at 912–16. This type of
individualized assessment, however, is not required when addressing a
facial challenge to a statute. See id. at 909. Because it is not impossible to
imagine circumstances where it would be dangerous to allow a mentally ill
person to possess a firearm, Section 922(g)(4) is also facially constitutional
under the Salerno rule. See 481 U.S. at 745.
Thus, the Court denies defendant’s facial challenge to Section 922(g)(4).
Having independently considered the merits of Defendant’s challenge to Section
922(4)(g) and the case law he relies upon; I see no reason to reach a different conclusion
than the Court in Clark. Thus, I recommend the Court deny defendant’s facial challenge
to Section 922(g)(4).
Defendant’s as-applied challenge is also fated to the same conclusion as in Clark
which states,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d) requires district courts to “decide
every pretrial motion before trial unless it finds good cause to defer a
ruling.” Pretrial resolution may be appropriate “if the district court
determines that it can decide the legal issues presented without making any
factual findings.” United States v. Baxter, 127 F.4th 1087, 1091 (8th Cir.
2025). But if ruling on an as-applied challenge requires “resolving factual
issues related to [the] alleged offense,” pretrial resolution “is likely
improper before trial.” Id.; see also United States v. Turner, 842 F.3d
602, 605 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Grimmett, 150 F.3d 958,
962 (8th Cir. 1998)). Here, there are factual issues related to the elements
of the offense that must be resolved by the fact-finder. Because those issues
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 16 of 34

17
may not be resolved before trial, the Court cannot yet rule on defendant’s
as-applied challenge.
Thus, I recommend that the Court hold in abeyance Defendant’s as-applied challenge.
V. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
A. Stipulation
While not formally titled a “stipulation,” the parties have come to an agreement
limiting the necessary scope of the Court’s ruling on the motion to suppress. The
Government asserted:
The government has conferred with counsel and confirmed this relates only
to evidence seized pursuant to warrants issued on October 31, 2024, and
November 1, 2024, and not to the firearm and other evidence seized on
March 3, 2025, resulting in the charged offense. As noted in defense
Exhibit E-1, no evidence was obtained from the Apple iPhone or Lenovo
Thinkpad. The government will not be seeking to admit either the Apple
iPhone or the Lenovo Thinkpad or the extraction of those devices’ data and
content and the review of that data, so the Court need not rule on their
admissibility. This leaves the admission of “[f]irearms, magazines,
ammunition, documents related to firearms and ammunition, controlled
substances, paraphernalia, photographs taken by police, and observations
of officers” taken by the officers from defendant’s residence on October
31, 2024.
(Doc. 42 at 2, Hr’g Tr. at 1-3.) In other words, the Government obtained no evidence
from Defendant’s cell phone or his Lenovo Thinkpad which are the subject of the first
and fourth warrants and that the Government will not be offering the contents of these
devices at trial. This moots Defendant’s argument that the warrant for the search of the
phone was insufficiently particular. (Doc. 39-1 at 10, Hr’g Tr. at 4.) This also appears
to largely moot any arguments about all the warrants except the warrant to search for
controlled substances, firearms, and ammunition, i.e., the third warrant. (Gov. Ex. 3.)
I say the arguments are “largely” mooted because the warrants are somewhat cumulative,
and the third warrant clearly piggybacks on the information gleaned from execution of
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 17 of 34

18
the warrant for the initial search of Defendant’s residence. Moreover, Defendant’s Leon
argument appears to relate to the procedures for drafting, obtaining, and executing the
whole series of warrants. For these reasons, consideration of certain circumstances
surrounding all the warrants may be necessary.
B. The Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues that the warrants are not supported by probable cause.
Defendant asserts that the applications to seize Defendant’s cell phone and search his
residence do not explain why law enforcement believed evidence might be found there.
More particularly, Defendant alleges that the affidavit does not (a) explain who was being
harassed or how, other than in a conclusory manner, (b) connect the alleged harassment
to activity at Defendant’s residence, and (c) provide a basis to conclude any electronic
devices that were capable of “communicat[ing] via cell service or Wi-Fi” would be
located at the residence. Defendant asserts that the “the first search warrant application
provided no explanation for why Goodman’s cell phone or any electronics might contain
evidence of a crime.” (Doc. 39-1 at 7.)13 Similarly, Defendant claims that the affidavit
for the second warrant fails to explain why law enforcement expected to find evidence of
harassment (which he believes was inadequately described) or evidence of trespass.
Regarding the third warrant, Defendant argues that it did not allege with
particularity any crime relating to the observed firearms. Defendant does not take issue
with the conclusion that the items seized were in plain view during the execution of the
second warrant. Defendant’s principal argument is that the third warrant is fruit of the
poisonous tree, that is, the product of the entry into the residence to execute the second
warrant.
13 While the contents of the phone are no longer at issue, Officer Schlosser’s efforts to locate
phones and other electronic devices led to the search of Defendant’s residence and the discovery
of evidence or firearms and controlled substances that were in plain view.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 18 of 34

19
As stated above, Defendant’s argument regarding the particularity of the warrant
for the search of the phone and laptop is moot. Defendant finally argues that the Leon
good faith exception does not apply.
The Government contends that the four corners of the warrants supply probable
cause for the search. The Government cites the existence of “a multitude of links between
defendant and criminal activity and harassment of C.M.” (Doc. 42-1 at 9.) The
Government notes evidence that Defendant appears to have delivered or arranged for the
delivery of a letter to multiple properties from which he had been “trespassed.” The
Government notes Defendant’s previous access to the printer at Defendant’s business, the
fact that Defendant’s letter was printed there more than 50 times, and his presence in the
area when C.M.’s network was accessed. Moreover, the Government notes Defendant’s
use of Facebook and text messages to communicate about C.M. Finally, the Government
argues that even if the warrants are not supported by probable cause, the Leon good faith
exception applies.
C. Relevant Law
“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment requires that warrants (1) be
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, (2) contain a ‘particular[ ] descri[ption of]
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,’ and (3) be based ‘upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.’” United States v. Skarda, 845 F.3d
370, 375 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir.
1994), in turn quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). “A magistrate judge may issue a search
warrant ‘upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search
is located in a particular place.’” Skarda, 845 F.3d at 376 (quoting Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 213, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981)). “Probable cause
exists when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 19 of 34

20
Reed, 921 F.3d 751, 757 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230,
238 (1983)); see also United States v. Evans, 4 F.4th 633, 636 (8th Cir. 2021) (“Probable
cause is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in the location to be
searched”) (quoting United States v. LaMorie, 100 F.3d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1996))). “In
assessing whether a warrant is sufficiently particular, [courts] consider the purpose for
which the warrant was issued, the nature of the items to which it is directed, and the total
circumstances surrounding the case.” United States v. Ivey, 91 F.4th 915, 918 (8th Cir.
2024) (citation omitted). The particularity requirement “is one of ‘practical accuracy
rather than a hypertechnical one.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Schave, 55 F.4th 671,
675 (8th Cir. 2022)). “Common sense” drives the inquiry into whether probable cause
exists, and the ultimate determination cannot be “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983). “‘[T]his practical
and common-sensical standard’ is based on ‘the totality of the circumstances.’” United
States v. Zamora-Garcia, 831 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original)
(quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)).
It is not this Court’s place to determine whether affidavits supporting search
warrants are supported by probable cause. “[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the
sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s
determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.”
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United
States v. Hallam, 407 F.3d 942, 948 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In reviewing the issuance of a
warrant, a district court need not make a de novo inquiry into the existence of probable
cause.”). “The Fourth Amendment requires that the issuing ‘magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.’” United
States v. Maccani, 49 F.4th 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236);
see also United States v. Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2017) (“The role of a
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 20 of 34

21
reviewing court is to ensure the magistrate issuing the warrant ‘had a “substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed”‘“) (quoting United States v. Colbert, 828
F.3d 718, 726 (8th Cir. 2016), in turn quoting United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 682
F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2012))). “When the issuing magistrate relies solely on a
supporting affidavit in determining probable cause, . . . ‘only that information which is
found within the four corners of the affidavit may be considered in determining the
existence of probable cause.’” United States v. Saddler, 19 F.4th 1035, 1039 (8th Cir.
2021) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 975 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 2020)).
“The issuing court’s probable cause determination ‘should be paid great deference by
reviewing courts.’” Johnson, 848 F.3d at 876 (quoting United States v. Brewer, 588
F.3d 1165, 1170 (8th Cir. 2009)).
The substantial basis standard requires that the issuing judge “make a practical and
common-sense” determination, based only on the circumstances set forth in the affidavit,
that the totality of the circumstances point to “a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Kail, 804 F.2d
441, 444 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). “Not only may an issuing
judge ‘draw reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant, . . . law enforcement officers may make
reasonable inferences in preparing affidavits in support of a warrant.’” United States v.
Brackett, 846 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Thompson, 210
F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[T]here is no requirement that an affiant have first-
hand knowledge of every allegation he includes in his affidavit.” United States v. Fiorito,
640 F.3d 338, 346 (8th Cir. 2011). Conclusory statements, however, “made by affiants
fail to give the issuing magistrate a substantial basis for determining probable cause
exists.” United States v. Summage, 481 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (8th Cir. 2007). “In
addition to probable cause that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, ‘there
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 21 of 34

22
must [also] be evidence of a nexus between the contraband and the place to be searched.’”
United States v. Randle, 39 F.4th 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v.
Tellez, 217 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2000)). This requires “‘a “nexus” between the
evidence to be seized and the place to be searched, considering “the nature of the crime
and the reasonable, logical likelihood of finding useful evidence.”‘“ Schave, 55 F.4th at
676 (quoting United States v. Smith, 21 F.4th 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2021), in turn quoting
United States v. Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 878 (8th Cir. 2017)).
Defendant bears the burden of proving the warrant was issued without probable
cause. See Carter v. United States, 729 F.2d 935, 940 (8th Cir. 1984) (“As a general
rule, the burden of proof is on the defendant who seeks to suppress evidence”) (citing
United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1976)); United States v. McGuire, No.
CR 13-40058, 2013 WL 5516192, at *3 (D.S.D. Oct. 1, 2013) (“A movant seeking to
suppress evidence under a regularly issued warrant has the burden to show that the
warrant was issued without probable cause”) (quoting United States v. Sierra–
Garcia, 760 F. Supp. 252, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)), R. & R. adopted, 2013 WL 6449893
(D.S.D. Dec. 10, 2013). “In doubtful or marginal cases, the resolution of the Fourth
Amendment question should be determined to a large extent by the preference accorded
to searches based upon warrants.” United States v. Leichtling, 684 F.2d 553, 555 (8th
Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Christenson, 549 F.2d 53, 55 (8th Cir. 1977)); see
also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (“Although in a particular
case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of
probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.”).
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 22 of 34

23
D. Analysis
1. Was there probable cause for the first warrant to seize Defendant’s
phone?
While this aspect of the motion may be moot because law enforcement was not
able to search the phone or obtain any evidence from it, I will nevertheless address it.
The crux of Defendant’s argument is that the affidavit fails to explain why there might
be evidence on the phone. (Doc. 39-1 at 2, 3.)
The application expressly requested permission to search Defendant’s person for
his “cell phone.” Officer Schlosser checked that the cell phone “is property used or
possessed with the intent to be used as a means of committing a public offense or
concealed to prevent an offense from being discovered” and “property relevant and
material as evidence in a criminal prosecution.” In summary, the affidavit sets forth the
following:
a. Law enforcement’s initial meeting with the alleged victim C.M. on
October 28, 2024;
b. C.M.’s complaint of ongoing harassment by Defendant;
c. C.M was able to positively identify Defendant as a person who had
worked at C.M.’s business until Defendant was fired the previous
month;
d. C.M. had learned of a letter created by Defendant “regarding a
lawsuit attacking [C.M.] and his business”;
e. From October 26 to October 27, 2024 (i.e., a few days before the
warrant was issued), Defendant had given these letters to people;
f. The letters had been found at nine of C.M.’s properties (and one
property belonging to C.M.’s wife’s) from which Defendant had
been trespassed;
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 23 of 34

24
g. C.M. found approximately 50 copies of the same letter on his printer
and C.M. believes accessed the printer using Wi-Fi;
h. C.M. learned from his employees that Defendant had driven by his
business and yelled “Fuck [C.M.]” on October 28, 2024. Law
enforcement confirmed Defendant’s vehicle at this time and location
with traffic camera footage;
i. C.M. showed law enforcement a text Defendant sent to a third party
stating, “‘[C.M.] is going to have to deal with the consequences of
his actions.’ Goodman talks about [C.M.] making millions from a
deal Goodman allegedly got him. [D.L.] asked Goodman ‘Whats the
goal? Settlement or burn it down?’ Goodman responded with fire
emojis and money bag emojis. Then states, ‘House on fire’ and ‘I
expect a settlement, but that’s not what it’s about.’” It is reasonable
to infer that a “text” comes from a phone or other electronic device.
j. C.M. also showed law enforcement a Facebook post, among others,
by Defendant that he believed was directed at him, “You forced the
hand, now you can deal with the consequences.” It is reasonable to
infer that a Facebook post comes from a phone or other electronic
device.
k. C.M. showed law enforcement from a third party wherein Defendant
states, “he wants to ‘destroy [C.M.]’ and that he will ‘Own
everything when it’s over.’”
l. C.M.’s IT person told law enforcement that he had investigated
network logins and found a “new laptop” added to the network on
October 27, 2024 at 6:17 p.m. and disconnect at 6:24 p.m. Law
enforcement confirmed Defendant’s presence near C.M.’s office at
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 24 of 34

25
this time and location. During this same time, an iPhone was also
connected to the network. The same iPhone had previously
connected on October 12, 2024. Although the IT person stated that
Defendant’s access had been revoked, he believed Defendant could
nevertheless access the printer via Wi-Fi.
Defendant is correct that Officer Schlosser’s affidavit never declares, “I believe
Defendant may have used his phone as part of his campaign of harassment of C.M.,
including remotely accessing C.M.’s network, sending messages as part of the
harassment and/or posting messages related to the harassment.” Nevertheless, it would
take an inordinately obtuse reading of the application to avoid drawing the inference that
Defendant was suspected of using his iPhone in this manner.
Obviously, the affidavit need not establish Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, only probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be present on
Defendant’s cell phone. I recommend that the Court conclude that the affidavit contains
a substantial basis for the issuing judge to conclude that a search would uncover evidence
of wrongdoing. First, C.M.’s statements to law enforcement showed reason to believe
that Defendant was a disgruntled former employee with both a motive and opportunity to
harass C.M. Moreover, the affidavit showed Defendant was, in fact, hostile to C.M.
For example, the affidavit shows Defendant yelling “Fuck [C.M.]” to C.M.’s employees,
potentially accessing properties he was banned from, and making threatening
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 25 of 34

26
statements.14 Defendant’s phone (whether an iPhone or not15) could reasonably be
expected to contain evidence of Facebook posts or texts to third parties that are included
in the affidavit. It could also reasonably be inferred that investigation of any iPhone
seized from Defendant may match the one C.M.’s IT person had identified as accessing
the network.
14 It might be tempting to speculate about whether statements attributed to Defendant such as
“burn it down,” “house on fire” or “destroy [C.M.]” are subject to criminal sanction. Iowa
Code Section 708.7 defines various types of harassment. I don’t intend to delve into the issue.
Nevertheless, these statements bear enough hallmarks of hostility to make them relevant to the
investigation into Defendant’s possible motive and involvement in the alleged harassment. Even
if the alleged harassment is not itself criminally actionable, evidence Defendant entered onto
property as part of the harassment campaign may be relevant to the crime of trespass which
includes:
Entering or remaining upon or in property without justification after being notified
or requested to abstain from entering or to remove or vacate therefrom by the
owner, lessee, or person in lawful possession, or the agent or employee of the
owner, lessee, or person in lawful possession, or by any peace officer, magistrate,
or public employee whose duty it is to supervise the use or maintenance of the
property. A person has been notified or requested to abstain from entering or
remaining upon or in property within the meaning of this subparagraph (2) if any
of the following is applicable:
(a) The person has been notified to abstain from entering or remaining upon or in
property personally, either orally or in writing, including by a valid court order
under chapter 236.
Iowa Code § 716.7(2)(a)(2).
15 The defense’s cross-examination of Officer Schlosser was critical that the affidavit did not
specify the seizure of an “iPhone” or even an “iPhone 15,” which C.M.’s IT person believed
had accessed the network. As Officer Schlosser stated, at the time of the seizure, law
enforcement did not know what kind of cell phone Defendant owned or whether he owned more
than one. Certainly, an iPhone 15 would be most consistent with the conclusion that Defendant
had accessed C.M.’s network. However, any phone might have contained other sorts of evidence
about the harassment.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 26 of 34

27
The supporting affidavit is not perfect. Perhaps it leaves the reader to make
connections by inference that could have been detailed more specifically. A practical
reading of the affidavit, considering the totality of the circumstances, however, makes
clear the nature of what is being sought and why. First, it is not surprising or alarming
in 2025 that a judge reviewing a search warrant would infer that the purpose of seizing
Defendant’s phone is to ultimately search it for evidence of criminal trespass or
harassment. Judges “may draw reasonable inferences from the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant.” United
States v. Thompson, 210 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir.2000). Nor is it troubling that the
affidavit does not separately delineate what evidence law enforcement anticipates
discovering when it is reasonably clear from the context of the application.
Second, the warrant application does not expressly state that either the cell phone
itself (perhaps its make and model number) or its contents would reveal evidence of
Defendant’s presence at C.M.’s place of business. A decade (or more) ago, the failure
to spell out the evidentiary value of placing the cell phone at a particular location might
have been a more glaring omission. In October 2024, the absence of such an explanation
is less troubling. Here, the affidavit contains the explanation of C.M.’s IT person that
at an iPhone 15 and a laptop connected to C.M.’s network within the few minutes that
Defendant was in the area. The affidavit stated that “the same iPhone” connected earlier
the same month. From this, it is not difficult to deduce that C.M.’s IT person is able to
identify the specific device that was used to access the network. If it turned out that
Defendant (who had been driving by and hollering at employees and was involved in a
letter-writing campaign against his former employer) had entered onto C.M.’s property
to access his Wi-Fi and print letters that were found on other properties from which he
had been trespassed, the phones presence at this time and location would be a significant
evidentiary discovery for a trespass prosecution.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 27 of 34

28
Again, the affidavit could have been improved with explicit explanations of the
“how” and “why.” But I do not fault an experienced judge for making the inferences
necessary to find probable cause for this warrant. At some point in our receding
technological past, it might have been necessary for a law enforcement officer to explain
to a judge that a “telephone” is an electrical instrument for simultaneously transmitting
and receiving audible signals, principally to facilitate voice communication over long
distances. That detail is obviously no longer required in a routine warrant that talks about
telephonic communication. Now, I suggest, some detailed explanations of other
technological items referred to in Officer Schlosser’s affidavit such as “texts,” “printer,”
“Wi-Fi,” and “laptop” are not invariably necessary. Certainly, there may be aspects of
how, for example, “Wi-Fi” networks generate evidence that require more detailed
explanation. While a judge might have refused the instant warrant for not better spelling
out how seizing the phone would be “relevant and material as evidence in a criminal
prosecution,” I recommend the Court decline the invitation to substitute its judgment for
the issuing judge under the totality of the circumstances presented.
Based on the totality of the circumstances outlined above, and paying great
deference to the issuing court’s probable cause determination in the search warrant, I find
that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed
and that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be
found on the cell phone or that the cell itself would be evidentiary. See Reed, 921 F.3d
at 757; Johnson, 848 F.3d at 876; Kail, 804 F.2d at 444. I also find that the requisite
“nexus” between the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched was established
in the search warrant. See Schave, 55 F.4th at 676. Thus, I find that there was probable
cause for the initial October 31, 2024 search warrant, Government’s Exhibit 1.
Accordingly, I recommend that the motion to suppress the first warrant be denied.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 28 of 34

29
2. Was there probable cause for the second warrant to search Defendant’s
home for electronic devices?
The application for a warrant to search Defendant’s residence (Gov’t Ex. 2) is
almost identical to the application in support of the first warrant. The only difference is
that instead of seeking a warrant to search Defendant’s person to seize his phone, law
enforcement sought permission to search his residence for “Any electronic devices that
can communicate via cell service or internet and or Wi-Fi.. (a search warrant to
forensically examine the items will be sought later.)” (Gov’t Ex. 2). Both warrants were
signed by Judge Richter on October 31, 2024. The second warrant was issued shortly
after the first and after Defendant’s cell phone was seized at the hospital. However, the
warrant application does not mention this circumstance. The application does not say,
for example, “I executed the first warrant by seizing Defendant’s cell phone, an iPhone,
at the hospital, but I did not note the presence of a laptop or other electronic devices in
Defendant’s possession. In my training and experience, people store laptops, cell phones
and other internet capable electronic devices in their residence.”
For the reasons outlined in the immediately preceding section, I believe there was
substantial evidence to conclude a laptop would contain evidence of a crime. The laptop
was in mentioned in the affidavit as having connected to C.M.’s network at the time
Defendant was near C.M.s place of business. Moreover, other electronic devices could
have been used to make posts or texts relevant to the harassment investigation. The
absence of an expressed nexus between the laptop and Defendant’s residence is more
troubling. Here, again, I would defer to the issuing judge’s ability to draw a reasonable
inference about where the laptop or other electronic devices were likely to be found. This
is not a case where a judge is being asked to infer, for example, that a drug dealer stores
quantities of drugs for later distribution at his residence. Rather, the inference is simply
that a reasonable place to look for familiar, useful, valuable, objects such as a laptop or
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 29 of 34

30
other devices, is in someone’s residence. Here, the affidavit creates the impression that
the campaign against C.M. was personal in nature. There is no hint that some other
business entity was involved and, thus, no reason to suspect the items sought might be at
some commercial property. Similarly, there was no reason to suspect Defendant had a
place of business or storage locker where he might keep these devices. Thus, I would
again conclude that there was a substantial basis to find probable cause existed to search
the residence for the requested devices.
3. Was there probable cause for the third warrant (i.e., to search
Defendant’s home for controlled substances, paraphernalia, firearms,
and ammunition)?
Defendant argues that the third warrant did not allege with particularity any crime
related to the observed firearms. Here, again, Officer Schlosser’s affidavit is not a model
of precision or completeness. It does include the statements:
[C.M.] is afraid because he knows Goodman owns firearms, uses drugs and
is not mentally stable.
On 10/31/2024 Dubuque Police were executing a search warrant at
Goodman’s residence. When police entered the residence, they could detect
an odor of marijuana. Upon initial search of the residence, located in plain
view was marijuana, firearms, and drug paraphernalia.
(Gov’t Ex. 3.) I recommend the Court defer to the issuing judge’s determination that
the crime or crimes being investigated are reasonably inferred from the affidavit.
Obviously, possession of a marijuana is a crime under federal law. Additionally, the
circumstances cited in the supporting affidavit made it reasonable for law enforcement to
investigate the crimes of possession of a firearm by a drug user under 18 U.S.C. Section
922(g)(3).
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 30 of 34

31
Defendant’s other argument regarding the third warrant is that it was fruit of the
poisonous tree. In other words, because the warrant to search his residence for electronic
devices lacked probable cause, law enforcement had no legitimate reason to be present
to detect the odor of marijuana, as well as see marijuana, firearms, and drug
paraphernalia. Because I have recommended that the Court find a substantial basis to
support probable cause for the second warrant, I also recommend the Court conclude
there is no poisonous tree and, therefore, the product of the third warrant is untainted.
However, should the Court disagree with my conclusion regarding the second warrant, I
recommend it suppress the products of the search shown in pages 3-4 of Defendant’s
inventory. (Doc. 39-2).
4. Was there probable cause for the fourth warrant (i.e., to search
Defendant’s electronic devices)?
This aspect of Defendant’s motion should be ruled moot because law enforcement
was unable to access the devices and the Government does not intend to offer evidence
of their contents at trial.
5. Is the Leon good faith exception applicable?
Alternatively, if the Court determines that the initial October 31, 2024 search
warrant lacked probable cause, the Leon good faith exception should be applied in this
matter.
Under the good faith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, even if a
reviewing court determines substantial evidence to issue a warrant is absent, the court
should not suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant if the officers
executing the search warrant acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the issuance of
the warrant by a neutral magistrate or judge. 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); United States
v. Houston, 665 F.3d 991, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2012). “In making this determination, we
ask ‘whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 31 of 34

32
illegal despite a judge’s issuance of the warrant.’” United States v. Lopez-Zuniga, 909
F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 784 F.3d 1227, 1231
(8th Cir. 2015)).
Under the “good-faith exception,” if a law enforcement officer’s reliance on a
warrant was objectively reasonable, the evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant
will not be suppressed. United States v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007).
Proell noted that Leon identified four scenarios where it is not objectively reasonable for
the executing officer to rely on a warrant issued by a magistrate:
(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant contained a false
statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for
its truth, thus misleading the issuing judge; (2) when the issuing judge
“wholly abandoned his judicial role” in issuing the warrant; (3) when the
affidavit in support of the warrant is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4)
when the warrant is “so facially deficient” that no police officer could
reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.
Id. at 431 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; United States v. Puckett, 466 F.3d 626, 630
(8th Cir. 2006)).
Leon explained that “[s]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep
inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a judge normally suffices to establish
that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.” 468
U.S. at 922 (quotations omitted). Nevertheless, “in some circumstances the officer will
have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.” Id. at
922-23 (footnote omitted). “For the Leon exception to apply when the warrant is based
on evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation, [law enforcement’s]
prewarrant conduct must have been ‘close enough to the line of validity to make the
officers’ belief in the validity of the warrant objectively reasonable.’” United States v.
Cannon, 703 F.3d 407, 413 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 32 of 34

33
663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997)). If the prewarrant conduct is clearly illegal, however, the
exception does not apply. Cannon, 127 F.3d at 413.
None of the four scenarios contemplated by Leon apply here. There is no evidence
that the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained any false statements or that
the issuing magistrate judge was misled in any way. There is no evidence that the issuing
magistrate judge “wholly abandoned” his or her judicial role in issuing the search
warrant. As discussed above, based on the affidavit in support of the warrant application,
the issuing judge had a substantial basis and made “a practical and common-sense”
determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, that “a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing”; and therefore, the affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” See
Kail, 804 F.2d at 444; Maccani, 49 F.4th at 1130; Proell, 485 F.3d at 431. Finally,
there is no allegation or evidence that the warrant is “so facially deficient” that a police
officer could not reasonably presume that the warrant was valid. Thus, I find that law
enforcement’s conduct was close enough to the line of validity to justify law
enforcement’s belief that the search warrant was objectively reasonable. See id.
Accordingly, as an alternative, I recommend that Defendant’s motion to suppress be
denied under the Leon good faith exception.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend the District Court deny
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 35) and deny Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
(Doc. 39).
Objections to this Report and Recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(b)(l) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b) must be filed within fourteen (14) days of
the service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Objections must specify the
parts of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made, as well as the
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 33 of 34

34
parts of the record forming the basis for the objections. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59. Failure
to object to the Report and Recommendation waives the right to de novo review by the
district court of any portion of the Report and Recommendation as well as the right to
appeal from the findings of fact contained therein. United States v. Wise, 588 F.3d 531,
537 n.5 (8th Cir. 2009).
DONE AND ENTERED at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, this 9th day of January, 2026.
Case 2:25-cr-01039-CJW-MAR Document 44 Filed 01/09/26 Page 34 of 34