Arguello v. Sioux City et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
SEMEHAR GHEBREKIDAN
ARGUELLO,
Plaintiff, 	No. C25-4078-LTS
vs.
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER	CITY OF SIOUX CITY, et al.,
Defendants.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
This matter is before me on a motion (Doc. 13) to dismiss filed by defendants the
City of Sioux City (the City) and Robert Padmore. 	Plaintiff Semehar Arguello has
resisted (Doc. 18) and the defendants have replied (Doc. 20). 	Oral argument is not
necessary. 	See LR 7(c).
II. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from Arguello’s employment with, and ultimate discharge by, the
City. 	Arguello filed her initial complaint (Doc. 1) on December 22, 2025. 	The
defendants responded by filing a motion (Doc. 6) to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 6. Arguello sought leave to file an amended complaint, adding
additional counts. 	Doc. 7; Doc. 7-2 at 26-31. 	The court granted this request and
Arguello filed her amended complaint (Doc. 9) on April 16, 2026. The defendants have
now filed a motion (Doc. 13) to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
Arguello asserts the following claims:
• 	Count I – Pregnancy Discrimination under the Pregnant Workers Fairness
Act (PWFA) against the City
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• 	Count II – Disability Discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and Americans with Disabilities Act, As Amended (ADAAA)
against the City
• 	Count III – Race Discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 against the City
• 	Count IV – Sex Discrimination under Title VII against the City
• 	Count V – Retaliation under Title VII against the City
• 	Count VI – Hostile Work Environment Based on Race, Sex and Pregnancy
under Title VII against the City
• 	Count VII – Wrongful Termination in Violation of Iowa Code § 70A.29
against the City
• 	Count VIII – Race Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 via 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the City
• 	Count IX – Race Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against
Padmore in his individual capacity1
• 	Count X – Procedural Due Process Claim via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
City and Padmore in his individual capacity
• 	Count XI – Defamation against the City and Padmore in his individual
capacity
• 	Count XII – Interference with Business Relations against Padmore in his
individual capacity
Doc. 8 at 21–29. 	The defendants seek dismissal of all claims but Counts V and VII.
Doc. 13 at 3–4. Arguello agrees to dismiss the race-based portion of her hostile work
environment claim (Count VI), along with Count X in its entirety. Doc. 18 at 1–2.
1 Arguello failed to bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requests to amend this
pleading error. Doc. 18-1 at 10.
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At this stage of the case, I must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in
the amended complaint. With that standard in mind, the relevant facts are as follows:
Arguello is a first-generation Ethiopian-Eritrean American woman, who also
identifies as Black. 	Doc. 9 ¶¶ 1, 160. 	From April 12, 2021, until May 28, 2024,
Arguello worked as the Community Inclusion Liaison for the City and led the Unit of
Community Inclusion, beginning this position when she was 26. 	Id. ¶¶ 1, 5. 	The Unit
was included within the City Manager’s office. 	Id. ¶ 6. 	Although she was the Unit’s
only member, she was not a standalone department or department director. 	Id.
While Arguello worked for the City, Padmore was the City Manager. 	Id. ¶ 7.
During 	this 	time, 	Karen 	Mackey 	was 	the 	Director 	of 	the 	City’s 	Human 	Rights
Commission (HRC) and reported to the HRC, Nicole DuBois was the City Attorney,
Mike Collett was the Assistant City Manager and Janelle Bertrand was the Director of
the Human Resources Department (HR). Id. ¶¶ 8–11. Padmore and DuBois reported to
the City Council, while Arguello, Collett and Bertrand reported to Padmore. 	Id. ¶¶ 7–
11, 15.
Arguello’s employment with the City began successfully and she received both
positive performance evaluations from Padmore and external awards recognizing her
work. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 20, 28. She also developed her own private consulting business,
with Padmore’s approval. 	Id. ¶ 217. 	However, in 2022 Arguello reported that a male
coworker told her that she was “hot” while touching his penis. 	Id. ¶ 25. 	The City
investigated her complaint but did not place the male employee on administrative leave
and he remained in his job duties. 	Id.
Arguello also began to have conflicts with Mackey and others in the City
government. In 2022, Mackey made several negative public comments about Arguello’s
age, experience and religious beliefs. Id. ¶ 26. On February 4, 2023, during a publicly
live-streamed budget session, a city councilmember “publicly questioned Arguello’s
competency, qualifications, level of programming, and relationship with the HRC.” 	Id.
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¶ 29. 	Arguello believed that these remarks undermined her authority, making her job
more difficult. 	Id. ¶ 31.
Mackey continued speaking negatively about Arguello’s age and experience. 	Id.
¶ 35. 	On April 26, 2023, Mackey paid her niece to spy on Arguello while Arguello
worked at an outreach event. 	Id. ¶ 43. 	The City had an outside attorney investigate
Mackey’s behavior. Id. ¶ 48. While the investigation proceeded, “Mackey remained in
her role without being placed on leave, having her job duties restricted, or being assigned
to home confinement.” 	Id. 	Similarly, in 2022, the City had an outside attorney
investigate Padmore and another male employee regarding allegations about how they
treated women in the workplace. Id. ¶ 19. The men “were not placed on administrative
leave, were not required to work from home, and were not removed from their job duties
during the pendency of the investigation.” 	Id.
While Mackey’s investigation proceeded, a councilmember told a committee
member that they “needed to support Mackey . . . because they were both Native
American.” Id. ¶ 49. The committee member reported this statement to the City’s legal
department, which did not address it. 	Id. 	Arguello asked the councilmember to recuse
from any vote regarding Mackey’s investigation, but the councilmember refused. 	Id. ¶
50. 	Mackey continued making public statements disparaging Arguello during the
investigation and instructed her staff to submit complaints about Arguello. Id. ¶ 51. The
outside attorney’s investigation concluded that “Mackey had displayed hostility toward
Arguello, spoke negatively about Arguello in public settings, paid her niece to spy on
Arguello, and failed to engage in meaningful efforts to collaborate with Arguello.” 	Id.
¶ 53. Mackey was not fired or disciplined because of the investigation. 	Id. ¶ 54.
In 2023, Arguello received complaints about her work attire. 	In May, Arguello
removed her jacket while moving offices. 	Id. ¶ 44. 	DuBois told HR that Arguello had
worn only a tank top to work. 	Id. 	The City investigated the complaint, concluding
Arguello had done nothing wrong. 	Id. ¶ 47. 	In August 2023, Padmore questioned the
length of Arguello’s dress and brought her to HR. 	Id. ¶ 60. 	Although the dress code
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did not address dress length, Padmore, Dubois and Bertrand examined her dress. 	Id.
Ultimately, HR determined that she had not violated the City’s dress code. 	Id.
In September 2023, Arguello took a two-week honeymoon. 	Id. ¶ 61. 	No one
covered her work while she was away and she struggled to catch up once she returned.
Id. ¶¶ 61–62. On November 28, 2023, Arguello told Padmore that she was pregnant and
had a high-risk pregnancy, requiring her to attend additional medical appointments. 	Id.
¶ 63. 	Because Arguello has diabetes, she would need to have her blood drawn over her
lunch breaks. Id. Arguello and Padmore discussed her maternity leave. Id. ¶ 64. 	She
told him that she wanted to take three months of maternity leave and asked that her intern
provide coverage while she was out. 	Id. 	While discussing her pregnancy, Padmore
stated: “Now you’ll have another loudmouth in the house.” 	Id. ¶ 65.
In December 2023, Arguello submitted a report to the City Council overviewing
her work and requesting a budget increase and pay raise. 	Id. ¶¶ 66–68. 	Padmore was
unhappy that Arguello sent the report directly to City Council, specifically noting that
her requested increases were inappropriate. 	Id. ¶ 69. 	On December 12, 2023, for the
fourth time, Arguello told Padmore that she was underpaid. Id. ¶ 75. Padmore told her
that she was paid enough. 	Id.
In January 2024, HR told Arguello to clock out over lunch when attending medical
appointments. Id. ¶ 76. Before Arguello was pregnant, Padmore did not have her clock
out when she attended medical appointments over lunch and when they discussed her
pregnancy and additional appointments, he told her she could remain clocked in. 	Id.
Because the City did not ordinarily require employees to clock out for lunch, Arguello
expressed concern that she was being treated differently because she was pregnant. 	Id.
¶¶ 77–78. 	This policy made Arguello “disclose personal activities, including medical
appointments, that she conducted during her lunch breaks.” 	Id. ¶ 79.
Arguello’s doctor wrote her a note for a handicapped parking permit and she asked
that the City accommodate her pregnancy complications by providing her with a parking
space within one block of her work. 	Id. ¶¶ 80–81. 	At first, the City told her that she
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would need to pay for more expensive parking to be accommodated. 	Id. ¶ 82. 	But she
advocated for herself and she received an accommodated spot without this additional
charge a week after she submitted her request.2 See id. ¶ 82. 	That day, Bertrand and
Padmore expressed frustration with her that she had discussed her accommodations
process with another employee. 	Id. ¶ 83. 	The next day, Arguello emailed Bertrand to
document their conversation and explain that she was concerned the City had accused her
of interfering with its accommodations process. 	Id. ¶ 84. Arguello submitted, but later
withdrew, a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) about
the City’s accommodations process under the PWFA. 	Id. ¶ 85.
On February 17, 2024, the City Council held its live-streamed annual budget
meeting. 	Id. ¶ 95. 	Individuals attending the meeting publicly questioned Arguello’s
qualifications, credentials and programming. 	Id. 	Padmore stated that she “was a ‘poor
consultant’ regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and was not fulfilling her
duties.” 	Id. ¶ 96. 	The Council questioned her about updating the EEOC plan, which
she had been working on for five months. Id. ¶ 97. Although Padmore had told her that
the Council did not want to update the plan, he “told the Council that Arguello was the
resistant one because she did a poor job of DEI consulting.” 	Id. 	Padmore’s statements
affected her professional reputation and ability to get clients for her consulting business.
Id. ¶ 98.
On February 20, 2024, Arguello submitted a complaint to the City Council about
the conduct of Mackey, Bertrand, DuBois and Padmore. Id. ¶ 101. She also complained
about racial inequality and systematic barriers in the City’s organization. 	Id. 	The next
day, the City placed her on administrative leave. 	Id. ¶ 104. 	The memorandum placing
her on leave alleged that she had violated work rules without identifying the specific
policy, rule or standard that she had violated. 	Id. 	While on administrative leave,
2 Arguello acknowledges that she was granted this accommodation without additional expense.
Doc. 18-1 at 6.
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Arguello could not leave her home during work hours without prior approval from her
supervisor, perform her job duties, access her work equipment or represent the City. Id.
¶¶ 108–09. 	Requiring her to request time off to leave her home, including to attend
medical appointments, risked depleting the leave that she planned to use for her maternity
leave. 	Id. ¶ 108. 	The City did not require other employees placed on administrative
leave to remain in their homes during work hours.3 Id. ¶ 110.
While outside attorneys ordinarily conducted investigations, Padmore and Dubois
– who had been the subject of her complaints – conducted Arguello’s investigative
interview. 	Id. ¶ 118–20. 	The City held a pretermination hearing after the investigative
interview. 	Id. ¶ 124. 	The City wanted to conduct the hearing in person but Arguello
requested accommodations to have a remote hearing, presenting a note from her doctor
stating that an in-person meeting could endanger her pregnancy. Id. The City eventually
accommodated her request and held the hearing via email. Id. ¶¶ 124, 126. Collett held
the hearing and recommended that the City terminate her employment. 	Id. ¶ 127.
On May 22, 2024, the City, through Padmore and DuBois, issued an investigative
summary. 	Id. ¶ 128. 	This summary alleged that Arguello had violated Iowa law, City
policies and administrative work rules. 	Id. 	The City contended that Arguello had
exceeded her authority by helping individuals file out-of-state civil rights complaints,
failing 	to 	obtain 	supervisory 	approval 	for 	professional 	actions 	and 	inaccurately
representing herself as acting on the City’s behalf. 	Id. 	Padmore terminated Arguello’s
employment on May 28, 2024. 	Id. ¶ 133. 	The EEOC issued Arguello a right-to-sue
letter on September 23, 2025. 	Id. ¶ 138.
3 Confusingly, Arguello claims that “other employees placed on administrative leave were not
placed on leave.” Id. ¶ 110.
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III. 	APPLICABLE STANDARDS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a pre-answer motion to dismiss
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The Supreme Court has provided the following guidance in considering whether a
pleading properly states a claim:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” As the Court held in [Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)], the pleading standard Rule
8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.
Id., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286,
106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). 	A pleading that offers “labels
and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” 	550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. 	Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further
factual enhancement.” 	Id., at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” 	Id., at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. 	A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Id., at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955. 	The plausibility standard is not akin to a
“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully. 	Ibid. 	Where a complaint pleads facts
that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” 	Id.
at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009).
Courts assess “plausibility” by “‘draw[ing] on [their own] judicial experience and
common sense.’” Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1128 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Also, courts “‘review the plausibility of the plaintiff's claim as
a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation.’” 	Id. (quoting Zoltek Corp.
v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010)). 	While 	factual
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plausibility is typically the focus of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, federal courts may
dismiss a claim that lacks a cognizable legal theory. 	See, e.g., Somers v. Apple, Inc.,
729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013); Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, L.L.C. v. Mortg.
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 2011); Target Training
Intern., Ltd. v. Lee, 1 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (N.D. Iowa 2014).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ordinarily the court “cannot
consider matters outside the pleadings without converting the motion into a motion for
summary judgment.” McMahon v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. C17-149-LTS, 2018
WL 3381406, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Iowa July 11, 2018); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	On
the other hand, when a copy of a “written instrument” is attached to a pleading, it is
considered “a part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Thus, when
the pleadings necessarily embrace certain documents, I may consider those documents
without turning a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 	McMahon,
2018 WL 3381406 at *2 n.2. 	These documents include “exhibits attached to the
complaint.” 	Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003).
When a complaint does not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, the
court must consider whether it is appropriate to grant the pleader an opportunity to
replead. 	The rules of procedure permit a party to respond to a motion to dismiss by
amending the challenged pleading “as a matter of course” within 21 days. 	See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). 	Thus, when a motion to dismiss highlights deficiencies in a
pleading that can be cured by amendment, the pleader has an automatic opportunity to
do so. 	When the pleader fails to take advantage of this opportunity, the question of
whether to permit an amendment depends on considerations that include:
whether the pleader chose to stand on its original pleadings in the face of a
motion to dismiss that identified the very deficiency upon which the court
dismissed the complaint; reluctance 	to allow a pleader to change legal
theories after a prior dismissal; whether the post-dismissal amendment
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suffers from the same legal or other deficiencies as the dismissed pleading;
and whether the post-dismissal amendment is otherwise futile.
Meighan v. TransGuard Ins. Co. of Am., 978 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (N.D. Iowa 2013).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
The defendants seek dismissal of all claims but Counts V and VII. 	Doc. 13 at 3-
4. 	First, they contend that the amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim of
discrimination on any basis, affecting Counts I, II, III, IV, VIII and IX, before addressing
individual claims. 	Doc. 20 at 2. 	Next, regarding Count VI, they claim that Arguello
has failed to state a plausible hostile work environment claim. 	Doc. 13 at 2. 	Finally,
they argue that Counts XI and XII must be dismissed because Arguello filed those claims
after the statute of limitations expired and has failed to state a claim for either defamation
or tortious interference. 	Id. at 3.
A. 	Counts I, II, III, IV, VIII and IX - Discrimination Claims
The defendants contend that Arguello’s “discrimination claims fail because the
Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege any adverse employment action occurred
because of [her] pregnancy, race, disability, or sex.” 	Doc. 13-1 at 5. “At the pleading
stage in the discrimination context, it is unnecessary to plead enough facts to establish a
prima facie case.” 	Ingram v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 91 F.4th 924, 927 (8th Cir. 2024).
“Nevertheless, the elements of a prima facie case remain relevant in determining the
plausibility standard as the elements ‘may be used as a prism to shed light upon the
plausibility of the claim.’” 	Id. (quoting Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th
Cir. 2016)).
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1. 	Counts I and II - Pregnancy and Disability Discrimination Claims
The parties analyze both Counts I and II as containing three separate claims:
discrimination, failure to accommodate and interference. Because many claims under the
PWFA utilize the standards established by the ADA, I will discuss the ADA claims first.
a. 	Count II – ADA Discrimination Claims
i. 	Disparate Treatment Claim
The ADAAA prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals on the
basis of disability. 	42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 	A plaintiff can demonstrate discrimination
through 	direct 	evidence 	or 	by 	raising 	an 	inference 	of 	discrimination 	through 	the
McDonnell Douglas4 burden-shifting framework. See St. Martin v. City of St. Paul, 680
F.3d 1027, 1033 (8th Cir. 2012). A prima facie case of disability discrimination requires
the plaintiff to show she: (1) had a disability within the meaning of the relevant statute,
(2) was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable
accommodation and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.
Higgins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 931 F.3d 664, 669 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Cody
v. Prairie Ethanol, LLC, 763 F.3d 992, 996–97 (8th Cir. 2014)).
At this time, the parties do not dispute the first two elements, instead contesting
whether Arguello suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.
Arguello alleges that “[t]he City’s decision to place Arguello on administrative leave and,
eventually 	terminate 	her 	employment 	was 	based, 	in 	part, 	on 	her 	request 	for
accommodations for her disability.” 	Id. ¶ 156. 	Other than this general allegation, she
alleges no facts supporting her claim that her disability led to an adverse employment
action. 	Without supporting facts, she has failed to state a plausible claim that her
4 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
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disability led to either her placement on administrative leave or termination. Therefore,
this claim is dismissed.
ii. 	Failure to Accommodate Claim
The defendants argue that Arguello’s failure to accommodate claim fails because
they accommodated her requests and she must “show she suffered an adverse employment
action because of the disability.” Doc. 13-1 at 8–9 (citing Ehlers v. Univ. of Minnesota,
34 F.4th 655, 659 (8th Cir. 2022). 	However, an employer commits “an adverse
employment action if the employee in need of assistance actually requested but was denied
a reasonable accommodation.” Dick v. Dickinson State Univ., 826 F.3d 1054, 1060 (8th
Cir. 2016).
Failure to accommodate claims are not evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis. Peeble v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2004). 	Instead,
“a modified burden-shifting analysis” is applied. Id. (citing Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota
& E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 2003)). “This is so because a claim against
an employer for failing to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee does not turn on
the employer's intent or actual motive.” 	Id. 	Rather, the alleged discrimination “is
framed in terms of the failure to fulfill an affirmative duty - the failure to reasonably
accommodate the disabled individual's limitations.” 	Id. at 767.
To prevail, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the employer knew about the employee's
disability; (2) the employee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her
disability; (3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in
seeking 	accommodations; 	and 	(4) 	the 	employee 	could 	have 	been 	reasonably
accommodated 	but 	for 	the 	employer's 	lack 	of 	good 	faith. 	E.E.O.C. 	v. 	Product
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Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Peyton v. Fred's Stores of
Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2009)).5
To determine whether Arguello has plausibly alleged a failure to accommodate
claim, 	I 	first 	must 	identify 	which 	requested 	accommodations 	she 	alleges 	that 	the
defendants denied. 	When Arguello told Padmore that she was pregnant in November
2023, she told him that because of her high-risk pregnancy and diabetes, she would need
to attend medical appointments over her lunch. 	Doc. 9 ¶ 63. 	The two appear to have
agreed on this accommodation and Padmore said she could remain clocked in when
attending medical appointments. 	See id. ¶¶ 63, 76. 	However, on January 4, 2024, HR
told her that she needed to clock out when attending appointments over lunch. 	See id. ¶
76. Arguello does not allege that she actually began to clock out when attending medical
appointments over lunch, only that she received conflicting instructions. 	Id.; see also
Doc. 13-1 at 8. 	And she does not allege that she was not allowed to attend medical
appointments over lunch. 	Therefore, she has not alleged that the defendants denied her
requests.
On January 18, 2024, Arguello requested that the defendants accommodate her
pregnancy complications by providing her parking within one-block of her work. 	Doc.
9 ¶ 81. 	Although the defendants initially resisted this request, they provided her a spot
seven days after her request. Id. ¶ 82. Thus, Arguello does not allege that the defendants
denied her requested accommodation, only that they delayed it for a week. 	“[A]n
employer's ‘unreasonable’ delay may constitute the denial of an accommodation in some
circumstances.” Marks v. Washington Wholesale Liquor Co. LLC, 253 F. Supp. 3d 312,
324 (D.D.C. 2017) (collecting cases analyzing whether delay in granting accommodation
was reasonable). “But ‘[a] relatively short delay of a few weeks (or even a few months)
in approving a request typically does not support such a claim.’” 	Smith v. CSRA, 12
5 The Eighth Circuit has used various iterations of tests for failure to accommodate claims. See
Tomshack v. Wilkie, 584 F. Supp. 3d 740, 754–57 (D.S.D. 2022) (collecting cases).
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F.4th 396, 415 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Marks, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 324) (alterations in
original).
Arguello argues that the defendants “initially refused to provide Arguello with a
reasonable accommodation when [they] required her to pay for her parking.” 	Doc. 18-
1 at 6. 	But, as she acknowledges, that was not the final accommodation she received
after she advocated for herself. 	Id. 	She argues that “[t]his is not the standard for the
interactive process.” Id. 	But failing to engage in the interactive process “does not itself
give rise to liability under the ADA.” Ehlers, 34 F.4th at 660 (citing Fjellestad v. Pizza
Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999)). 	Because the defendants granted
her request for a parking accommodation within a week, she has not alleged that they
denied her accommodation. Therefore, Arguello has failed to state a plausible failure to
accommodate claim under the ADA.
iii. 	Interference Claim
A plaintiff alleging an ADA interference claim “must show that 1) the charging
party engaged in activity statutorily protected by the ADA; 2) the charging party engaged
in, or aided or encouraged others in, the exercise or enjoyment of ADA protected rights;
3) the defendants interfered on account of the charging party's protected activity; and 4)
the defendants were motivated by an intent to discriminate.” 	Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm'n v. CRST Int'l, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1181 (N.D. Iowa 2018) (citing
Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 550-51 (7th Cir. 2017)).
The 	parties 	primarily 	contest 	whether 	Arguello 	pleaded 	that 	the 	defendants
interfered with her protected activity and whether the City’s responses to her invocation
of rights under the ADA were motivated by an intent to discriminate. Doc. 13-1 at 8–9;
Doc. 18-1 at 6; Doc. 20 at 3. 	In her amended complaint, Arguello alleges that “on
January 	25, 	2024, 	Bertrand 	and 	Padmore 	expressed 	frustration 	and 	attempted 	to
intimidate Arguello because she exercised her rights under the ADA.” 	Doc. 9 ¶ 152.
Without more, this is a conclusory allegation that is not supported by any specific factual
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contentions. 	Arguello does not allege with any specificity what Bertrand and Padmore
actually did to intimidate her because she had exercised her rights. Thus, she has failed
to plausibly allege an ADA interference claim. Count II must be dismissed in its entirety.
b. 	Count I – Pregnancy Discrimination Under the PWFA
Arguello argues three pregnancy discrimination claims under the PWFA: (1) the
City discriminated against her by placing her on administrative leave and terminating her
employment, (2) the City failed to provide her reasonable accommodations and (3) the
City interfered with her ability to exercise her rights under the PWFA. 	Doc. 9 ¶¶ 141–
45. 	She 	incorporates 	the 	same 	factual 	basis 	as 	that 	underlying 	her 	disability
discrimination claim. See Doc. 9.
Arguello claims that her “pregnancy and decision to request accommodations due
to her pregnancy were factors in the City’s decision to place Arguello on administrative
leave and ultimately terminate her employment.” 	Doc. 9 ¶ 145. 	The PWFA prohibits
an 	employer 	from 	taking 	“adverse 	action 	in 	terms, 	conditions, 	or 	privileges 	of
employment against a qualified employee on account of the employee requesting or using
a reasonable accommodation to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions of the employee.” 	42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-1(5). 	Arguello
merely paraphrases the statutory language without providing any factual allegations to
support her claim. Therefore, I find that she has failed to state a plausible claim and this
aspect of her claim is dismissed.
Next, Arguello argues that the City resisted giving her accommodations related to
attending medical appointments and a parking space. 	Doc. 9 ¶ 142. 	The PWFA
mandates that employers “make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations
related 	to 	the 	pregnancy, 	childbirth, 	or 	related 	medical 	conditions 	of 	a 	qualified
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity. 	42
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U.S.C. § 2000gg-1(1). 	The section of the ADA addressing failure to accommodate
utilizes nearly the same language.6
Where the language of the PWFA mirrors the language of the ADA, it is
appropriate to use the legal standards of the ADA. 	See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm'n v. Sec. Assurance Mgmt., Inc., No. CV 25-00181, 2025 WL 2911781, at *4
n.4 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2025) (“Where the language of the PWFA mirrors that of the ADA
or Title VII, the Court applies the legal standards governing ADA and Title VII claims
to Plaintiff's corresponding PWFA claims, as the PWFA, ADA, and Title VII all share
the same purpose: eliminating workplace discrimination.”). The parties have also applied
the ADA to the PWFA. See Doc. 13-1 at 8–9; Doc. 18-1 at 5–7. In this case, the alleged
facts for the failure to accommodate claims under the ADA and PWFA share the same
alleged factual basis. 	They also fail for the same reason – Arguello has failed to allege
that the defendants denied an accommodation request.
Arguello also brings a claim for interference with her rights under the PWFA.
Doc. 9 at 21 ¶ 144. 	The PWFA makes it “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or
protected by this chapter.” 	42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-2. 	This again mirrors the language in
the ADA and the parties have applied the ADA law.7 Doc. 13-1 at 8–9; Doc. 18-1 at 5–
7. 	Likewise, Arguello relies on the same allegations pleaded in support of her ADA
interference claim. This means her PWFA interference claim fails, as she did not allege
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (It is unlawful to not provide “reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.”)
7 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (“It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with
any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or
enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.”).
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specific facts as to how Padmore and Bertrand attempted to intimate her. As with Count
II, Count I must be dismissed in its entirety.
2. 	Counts III, IV, VIII and IX – Race and Sex Discrimination
Arguello brings race and sex discrimination claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. 	Doc. 9. 	“Title VII and Section 1981 claims are analyzed under the same
framework.” 	Lake v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 596 F.3d 871, 873 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010). To
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must make a minimal evidentiary
showing that he or she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the
position or met his or her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) suffered an adverse
employment action and (4) that the circumstances of his or her employment, or adverse
employment action, give rise to an inference of discrimination. 	Banks v. Deere, 829
F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir. 2016); Young, 754 F.3d at 577; see also Mahn v. Jefferson Cty.,
Mo., 891 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 2018) (establishing a prima facie case requires a
minimal evidentiary showing). Establishing a prima facie case creates a presumption that
the employer discriminated against the plaintiff. 	Banks, 829 F.3d at 666.
“A plaintiff can create an inference of discrimination by showing that she was
treated differently than similarly situated persons who are not members of the protected
class.” Yang v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 79 F.4th 949, 964 (8th Cir. 2023). “Comparator
employees must be similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Ingram, 91 F.4th at 928
(quoting Blackwell v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 822 F.3d 431, 435 (8th Cir. 2016))
(internal quotations omitted). 	“The comparators ‘must have dealt with the same
supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct
without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.’” 	Ebersole v. Novo Nordisk,
Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 925 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Burton v. Ark. Sec'y of State, 737 F.3d
1219, 1229 (8th Cir.2013)). “The comparators need not have committed the exact same
offense but must have engaged in conduct ‘of comparable seriousness.’” 	Ebersole, 758
F.3d at 925 (quoting Burton, 737 F.3d at 1231).
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Arguello’s amended complaint alleges that the defendants discriminated against
her based on her race and sex, leading to adverse employment outcomes (placement on
leave and discharge). 	Doc. 9 ¶¶ 166, 172, 195, 202. 	In Counts VIII and IX, Arguello
also claims that the City and Padmore discriminated against her “in the terms and
conditions of her employment contract, including by subjecting her to discriminatory
terms 	of 	employment, 	denying 	her 	equal 	resources 	and 	support[] 	and 	publicly
undermining her professional competence. 	Id. ¶¶ 195, 202. Of course, I am not bound
by these legal conclusions unless they are supported by specific factual allegations in the
amended complaint. 	See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
a. 	Counts III, VIII and IX – Race Discrimination
Arguello contends that her “race played a part in the decision to place Arguello
on leave, and, ultimately, terminate her employment.” 	Id. ¶ 166. She asserts that non-
Black employees were treated more favorably, including not being “placed on leave or
terminated despite substantiated findings of performance deficiencies,” “were not forced
to remain at their home while on administrative leave” and “were not placed on leave
during investigations into their conduct.” Id. ¶ 164. Again, this is merely legal language
couched as a factual allegation.
Mackey, who is Native American, is the only comparator employee whose race
Arguello has identified.8 While an outside attorney investigated Mackey, she “remained
in her role without being placed on leave, having her job duties restricted, or being
assigned to home confinement.” 	Id. ¶ 48. 	Ultimately, the outside attorney concluded
that “Mackey had displayed hostility toward Arguello, spoke negatively about Arguello
in public settings, paid her niece to spy on Arguello, and failed to engage in meaningful
8 Arguello has not identified the race of other employees who underwent investigation. See Doc.
9 ¶¶ 19, 25.
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efforts to collaborate with Arguello.” Id. ¶ 53. However, Mackey (who reported to the
HRC) was not disciplined by the City Council or the HRC. 	Id. ¶¶ 8, 54.
In contrast, the internal investigative summary into Arguello found that she had
violated City policies, administrative work rules and Iowa law, concluding that she had
“exceeded her authority by assisting individuals with filing out-of-state civil rights
complaints, misrepresented herself as acting on behalf of the City, and failed to obtain
supervisory approval for certain professional actions.” 	Id. ¶ 128. 	While Arguello’s
sanctions – being placed on leave and discharged – were undoubtedly more serious than
those Mackey faced, the alleged misconduct differs.
In addition, Arguello and Mackey had different job titles and roles, and Mackey
was supervised by the HRC while Arguello was supervised by Padmore. Based on all of
these differences, Arguello has failed to allege that Mackey is a proper comparator
employee. Arguello’s assertions are insufficient, even at the motion to dismiss stage, to
allow me to draw the reasonable inference that she was discriminated against based on
her race. Therefore, Counts III, VIII and IX must be dismissed in their entirety.
b. 	Count IV - Sex Discrimination
Arguello alleges that her “sex was a motivating factor in the City’s decision to
place Arguello on administrative leave, force her to remain home while on leave, impose
restrictive conditions that barred her from performing her work duties during her
pregnancy, and, ultimately, terminate her employment.” 	Doc. 9 ¶ 172. Without factual
development, she contends, “Male employees were not treated similarly.” 	Id.
Arguello 	attempts 	to 	use 	Padmore, 	and 	two 	unnamed 	male 	employees 	as
comparators. In 2022, an outside attorney investigated whether Padmore and another
male employee had treated women poorly in the workplace. 	Id. ¶ 19. 	During the
investigation, they were not placed on administrative leave, did not have to work from
home and did not lose their job duties. 	Id. 	Arguello does not identify the outcome of
the investigation. 	Id.
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As with Mackey, Arguello has failed to plead sufficient facts to plausibly allege
that Padmore and the two unnamed male employees are proper comparators. 	They did
not have the same roles or supervisors. 	Nor has Arguello alleged with any specificity
what these male employees were accused of, or the outcome of the investigation. Thus,
her allegations do not rise to the level of showing that the alleged misconduct by the male
employees was similar to, or as serious as, her own alleged misconduct.
Nor is the male employee who allegedly called Arguello “hot,” and touched his
penis, a proper comparator. Arguello does not allege any specific information about who
supervised the employee or the outcome of the investigation. 	Id. ¶ 25. 	For all of these
reasons, Arguello has failed to plausibly allege that she was discriminated against based
on her sex. Count IV must be dismissed.
B. 	Count VI – Hostile Work Environment
Arguello claims that the defendants created a hostile work environment based on
her sex and pregnancy, violating her rights under Title VII. Doc. 18-1 at 7–9. A hostile
work 	environment 	exists 	when 	“the 	workplace 	is 	permeated 	with 	discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.”
Eliserio v. United Steelworkers of Am. Loc. 310, 398 F.3d 1071, 1076 (8th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotations omitted). The Eighth Circuit has stated:
To establish a prima facie case for hostile work environment, a plaintiff
must show: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subject to
unwelcome harassment; (3) a casual nexus exists between the harassment
and 	the 	protected 	group 	status; 	(4) 	the 	harassment 	affected 	a 	term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) her employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper action.
Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 998 F.3d 789, 799 (8th Cir. 2021).
“[T]he elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon
the plausibility of the claim.” Id. (quoting Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th
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Cir. 2016)). 	Whether “the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment—involves ‘both objective and subjective components.’” 	Warmington, 998
F.3d at 799 (quoting Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1056). “At the pleading phase, the court must
determine whether the alleged harassment is ‘severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment and the victim must subjectively believe
her working conditions have been altered.’” 	Id.
Courts examine the totality of the circumstances “[t]o determine whether a
complaint alleges an objectively hostile work environment.” 	Id. 	In making this
determination, courts “may consider circumstances such as the ‘frequency and severity
of the discriminatory conduct,’ whether the conduct was ‘physically threatening or
humiliating, as opposed to a mere offensive utterance,’ and whether the ‘conduct
unreasonably interfered with the employee's work performance.’” Id. (quoting Blomker,
831 F.3d at 1057). 	“A hostile work environment claim must allege more ‘than a few
isolated incidents.’” 	Id. 	“Courts must ‘filter out complaints attacking the ordinary
tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-
related jokes, and occasional teasing.’” 	Id.
Arguello alleges that “[s]he experienced repeated derogatory comments from
colleagues and supervisors, exclusion from meetings and opportunities, threats from City
volunteers, and public questioning of her competence and professional contributions.”
Doc. 9 ¶ 182. However, not all criticism of work is harassment. See Hannoon v. Fawn
Eng'g Corp., 324 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2003). A “casual nexus” must also “exist[]
between the harassment and the protected group status.” 	Warmington, 998 F.3d at 799.
Arguello identifies only two alleged incidents with any nexus to her sex or pregnancy
over three years.9 See Doc. 18-1 at 7; Doc. 9 ¶ 5. First, Arguello alleges that in 2022,
an unidentified male employee told “her she was ‘hot’ and, at the same time, touched his
9 It is unclear whether the two incidents in which HR investigated alleged violations of the dress
code constituted harassment.
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penis.” 	Doc. 9 ¶ 25. 	Second, Arguello contends that when Padmore discussed her
pregnancy, he stated, “Now you’ll have another loudmouth in the house.” 	Id. ¶ 65.
If the incident with the male employee occurred as Arguello describes, it was
deplorable and wildly inappropriate. Similarly, the alleged remark by Padmore, if made
in the manner Arguello alleges, was rude and unprofessional. 	However, two isolated
incidents of inappropriate behavior over three years is not sufficient to state a plausible
hostile work environment claim because the actions were not sufficiently severe or
pervasive. 	See Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1058 (collecting cases in which courts rejected
hostile work environment claims based on isolated instances of sexually inappropriate
behavior). Count VI must be dismissed.
C. 	Counts XI and XII – Defamation and Interference with Business Relations
In her amended complaint, filed April 29, 2026, Arguello adds Counts XI and
XII. Doc. 9 ¶¶ 210–21. 	These claims for defamation and interference with business
relations arise from comments Padmore allegedly made on February 17, 2024. Id. 	The
defendants argue that these claims fail because Arguello first asserted them after the
statute of limitations expired. Doc. 13-1 at 18–21.
Iowa law establishes a two-year statute of limitation for “injuries to the person or
reputation.” 	Iowa Code § 614.1(2). 	Iowa courts “look beyond the label placed on the
claim by the parties and instead focus on ‘the actual nature of the action’ to determine the
applicable limitations period.” 	Hallett Const. Co. v. Meister, 713 N.W.2d 225, 230
(Iowa 2006) (quoting Bob McKiness Excavating & Grading, Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc.,
507 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Iowa 1993)). 	“When [the Iowa Supreme Court] has been called
upon to pinpoint ‘the actual nature of the action’ it has looked to what harm the plaintiff
has alleged in the suit.” 	Tracy v. Peter M. Soble, P.C., 2011 WL 944420, at *3 (Iowa
Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2011). Arguello alleges that Padmore’s comments interfered with her
business relationships by harming her reputation. Doc. 9 ¶¶ 219–21. Because both claims
relate to reputational injuries, they are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
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Therefore, the claims are barred by the statute of limitations unless they relate back to
the original complaint.
Arguello argues that the new claims relate back because “[i]n her original
Complaint, filed before February 17, 2026, [she] asserted the facts that form the basis of
her defamation and interference with business relations claims.” Doc. 18-1 at 10 (citing
Doc. 1 ¶¶ 93–97). 	The defendants contend that the claims do not relate back because
although the original complaint included the facts central to the new claims, it did not
provide them with notice of “non-employment claims arising out of the Complaint’s
background factual allegations.” Doc. 20 at 5.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an amended pleading relates back to
the date of the original pleading when:
(A) 	the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows
relation back;
(B) 	the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in
the original pleading; or
(C) 	the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against
whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the
period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the
party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) 	received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced
in defending on the merits; and
(ii) 	knew or should have known that the action would have been
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.
Fed R. Civ. P. 15(c). 	At issue is whether the claims Arguello added in the amended
complaint “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to
be set out--in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P 15(c)(1)(B).
“To arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, the claims must be
tied to a common core of operative facts.” 	Dodd v. United States, 614 F.3d 512, 515
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(8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	“An amended motion may
raise new legal theories only if the new claims relate back to the original motion by
‘aris[ing] out of the same set of facts as [the] original claims.’” 	Id. (quoting Mandacina
v. United States, 328 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2003)) (alterations in original). 	“The
facts alleged must be specific enough to put the opposing party on notice of the factual
basis for the claim.” 	Id.
Arguello’s original complaint alleged that Padmore’s statements on February 17,
2024, “affected Arguello’s professional reputation and ability to get clients.” 	Doc. 1 at
15 ¶ 96. 	While paltry and threadbare, this allegation provided sufficient notice for the
later-added new claims. 	Because the new claims are not barred by the statute of
limitations, I will address each individually.
1. 	Count XI – Defamation
Arguello’s defamation claim against the City and Padmore is based on Padmore’s
statements at a February 17, 2024, publicly live-streamed budget meeting. 	Doc. 9 ¶¶
210–15. Arguello alleges that Padmore stated that she “was a ‘poor consultant’ regarding
diversity, equity, and inclusion” and represented that “Arguello was resistant to updating
the [EEOC] plan.” 	Id. ¶ 211. 	Arguello alleges that Padmore had previously given her
positive performance evaluations and had told her that the City Council was resistant to
updating the plan. 	Id. ¶¶ 211–12. 	Because of these inconsistencies, she argues
Padmore’s statements at the meeting were false. 	Id.
The defendants contend that Arguello’s defamation claim fails because “[t]he
alleged statements are nonactionable opinions, incapable of being reasonably interpreted
as stating facts.” 	Doc. 13-1 at 18. 	Arguello argues that because Padmore spoke as
Arguello’s supervisor, and presumably knew about her performance, “[w]hether a
reasonable listener would interpret these statements as an opinion and not a factual
observation of Arguello cannot be resolved at this point in the litigation.” 	Doc. 18-1 at
11. 	The defendants assert that “Padmore’s role as [Arguello’s] supervisor cannot
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transform indefinite assessments with no precise, objectively verifiable meaning into
facts.” 	Doc. 20 at 6. 	Thus, his statements about her “consulting ability and workplace
performance 	are 	nonactionable 	opinions 	and 	evaluative 	workplace 	judgments, 	not
verifiable statements of fact.” 	Id.
“To establish a prima facie case in any defamat[ion] action, a plaintiff must show
the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the
plaintiff.” 	Andrew v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Hosp., 960 N.W.2d 481, 489 (Iowa 2021)
(quoting Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 464 (Iowa 2013)) (alteration in original).
“One limit on a defamation claim is that ‘[o]pinion is absolutely protected under the First
Amendment.’” Andrew, 960 N.W.2d at 489 (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164,
177 (Iowa 2004), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 880
N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)) (alterations in original). 	The Iowa Supreme Court has
recognized that opinions may often imply an assertion of fact such that they would not be
entitled to protection:
the framework of analysis is no longer whether the alleged defamatory
statement is fact or opinion. 	Rather the framework of analysis now is
whether the alleged defamatory statement can reasonably be interpreted as
stating actual facts and whether those facts are capable of being proven true
or false. 	Under this analysis, “statements of opinion can be actionable if
they imply a provable false fact, or rely upon stated facts that are provably
false.” 	Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 313 (D.C. Cir.
1994). 	The statement that the plaintiff must prove false is not the literal
wording of the statement but what a reasonable reader or listener would
have understood the author to have said.
Yates v. Iowa West Racing Ass’n, 721 N.W.2d 762, 770–71 (Iowa 2006) (citing Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1990)). The Iowa Supreme Court has adopted
the following four-factor test to determine whether a statement is an opinion: (1) whether
the “statement ‘has a precise core of meaning for which a consensus of understanding
exists or, conversely, whether the statement is indefinite and ambiguous’”; (2) the degree
to which the statement is “objectively capable of proof or disproof”; (3) “the context in
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which the” statement occurs; and (4) “the broader social context into which” the
statement fits. Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 47 (Iowa 2018)
(quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
Under this test, whether Arguello was a poor consultant is a matter of opinion. In
Yates, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that the statement “substandard and poor
performers” constituted an opinion. 	721 N.W.2d at 773. 	In reaching this conclusion,
the court applied the first two factors and noted that the phrase “substandard and poor
performers” lacked “a precise and verifiable meaning and [was] therefore less likely to
give rise to clear factual implications.” Id. The question of whether Arguello was a poor
consultant lacks a precise core of meaning, rendering this subjective judgment incapable
of proof or disproof. 	The third and fourth factors involve the context in which the
statement occurred – both its narrow context within the discussion and broader social
context. Andrew, 960 N.W.2d at 493. As pleaded by Arguello, these factors add nothing
to suggest that Padmore’s statements were anything other than his opinion about whether
Arguello was a poor consultant. 	Thus, this statement cannot form the basis of a
defamation claim.
The second statement was that “Arguello was resistant to updating the [EEOC]
plan.” 	Doc. 9 ¶ 211. 	This statement necessarily describes actions that Arguello had
undertaken and is not a mere opinion about Arguello’s job performance (like “poor
performer”). 	While somewhat vague, I find that the statement that Arguello resisted
implementing the EEOC plan has a meaning that could be proven on verifiable facts,
such as statements or actions on her part. 	Thus, the second statement is not a protected
opinion. 	At this stage of the case, Arguello has pleaded a plausible defamation claim
based on Padmore’s alleged statement that she had resisted updating the EEOC plan.
That aspect of Count XI will proceed.
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2. 	Count XII – Tortious Interference
Arguello alleges that Padmore’s statements at the budget meeting10 interfered with
existing and prospective business relations related to her DEI consulting business. Doc.
9 ¶¶ 218–19. 	For the reasons discussed with regard to Count XI, only Padmore’s
statement that she resisted updating the EEOC plan can be considered because his
statement that she was a poor consultant is an opinion protected by the First Amendment.
Activity protected by the First Amendment cannot serve as the basis for a tortious
interference claim. 	See, e.g., Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Because the appellee’s statements were an opinion, “[a]ppellants cannot state a claim for
intentional interference with economic relations and prospective economic advantage
because protected speech cannot be the basis for such a claim.”); Jefferson Cnty. Sch.
Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 857 (10th Cir. 1999)
(collecting cases in which federal courts have rejected “a variety of [business] tort claims
based on speech protected by the First Amendment”). 	As such, Count XII cannot be
based on the “poor consultant” statement.
As for Padmore’s second statement, the elements of tortious interference with
contract under Iowa law are:
(1) plaintiff had a contract with a third-party; (2) defendant knew of the
contract; (3) defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with the
contract; (4) the interference caused the third-party not to perform, or made
performance more burdensome or expensive; and (5) damage to the plaintiff
resulted.
Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 399 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Jones v.
Lake Park Care Ctr., Inc., 569 N.W.2d 369, 377 (Iowa 1997)). 	“Iowa courts apply the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in analyzing intentional interference claims.” 	CRST
Expedited, Inc. v. TransAm Trucking, Inc., 960 F.3d 499, 504 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing
10 She also alleges that his “other communications” also had this effect. 	Doc. 9 ¶ 219. 	It is
unclear what she includes as “other communications.”
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Kern v. Palmer Coll. of Chiropractic, 757 N.W.2d 651, 662 (Iowa 2008)). 	In addition
to interference with established contractual relationships, Iowa law “recognize[s], as a
tort, interference with prospective contractual relationships.” 	Iowa Coal Min. Co. v.
Monroe Cnty., 555 N.W.2d 418, 437 (Iowa 1996).
“Proof 	of 	intentional 	interference 	with 	a 	prospective 	contract 	or 	business
relationship essentially calls for evidence on the same elements relative to 	future
business.” 	Burke v. Hawkeye Nat. Life Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Iowa 1991)
(emphasis 	in 	original). 	The 	elements 	of intentional 	interference 	with 	prospective
contracts 	or 	business 	relations 	are: 	(1) 	“[a] 	prospective 	contractual 	or 	business
relationship,” 	(2) 	“the 	defendant 	knew 	of 	the 	prospective 	relationship,” 	(3) 	“the
defendant 	intentionally 	and 	improperly 	interfered 	with 	the 	relationship,” 	(4) 	“the
defendant's interference caused the relationship to fail to materialize” and (5) damages
resulted. 	Blumenthal Inv. Trs. v. City of W. Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 269 (Iowa
2001).
Padmore argues that it “is implausible on its face that anything Padmore said at a
City 	Council 	meeting 	would 	have 	any 	impact 	on 	[Arguello’s] 	private 	consulting
business.” 	Doc. 20 at 6 (emphasis in original). 	Based on the scant allegations in the
amended complaint, I agree. 	“A claim is facially plausible ‘where the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” 	Wilson v. Ark. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 850 F.3d
368, 371 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1055). 	In light of Arguello’s
limited factual allegations, it is implausible that Padmore’s isolated comment that she
“was resistant to updating the [EEOC] plan” could have “interfered with Arguello’s
existing and prospective business relationships.” Doc. 9 ¶ ¶ 211, 219. As such, Count XII
must be dismissed.
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D. 	Leave to Amend
Arguello seeks leave to amend Count IX to bring it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc.
18-1 at 10. Because I have found dismissal to be necessary on another basis, and Arguello
has not explained how any potential amendment might cure that deficiency, there is no
reasons to permit an amendment. 	See, e.g., Meehan v. United Consumers Club
Franchising Corp., 312 F.3d 909, 914 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district court was not
required to engage in a guessing game” when the plaintiffs did not explain how they
“would amend the complaint to save the claim.”).
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, defendants’ motion (Doc. 13) to dismiss is
granted in part and denied in part, as follows:
1. 	The motion is granted as to Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VIII, IX, X and XII,
which are hereby dismissed in their entirety. The motion is also granted as to the “poor
consultant” statement alleged in Count XI. 	That basis for defamation liability is
dismissed.
3. 	The motion is denied as to the “resistant to updating the [EEOC] plan”
statement alleged in Count XI. Count XI will proceed as to that statement only.
4. 	As a result of this order, the only claims of the amended complaint (Doc.
9) that will proceed are Counts V and VII, along with the “resistant to updating the
[EEOC] plan” statement alleged in Count XI.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of October, 2026.
__________________________
Leonard T. Strand
United States District Judge
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