United States of America v. Leeds

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICIA A. LEEDS,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:22-cv-00379-AKB
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Patricia Leeds’s Second Motion for Reconsideration
of the Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order (Dkt. 48). Having reviewed the record and the
parties’ submissions, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented
and that oral argument would not significantly aid the decision-making process. Dist. Idaho Loc.
Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
The Court granted the Government summary judgment on March 7, 2025 (Dkt. 36).
Judgment was entered thereafter on August 25 (Dkt. 44). Defendant filed a first motion for
reconsideration on August 26 (Dkt. 45), which raised, among other issues, arguments concerning
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in the context of this Court’s summary judgment
adjudication (Dkt. 45-1 at 14). Defendant filed this second motion for reconsideration on
September 30 (Dkt. 48), advancing a different Seventh Amendment theory—namely, that the
Internal Revenue Service’s administrative assessment and imposition of Foreign Bank and
Financial Accounts (FBAR) penalties, as opposed to the Court’s resolution of the case on summary
judgment, violated Defendant’s jury-trial rights (Dkt. 48). The Court denied the first motion for
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reconsideration and now considers the second motion. Because the second motion is untimely,
under Rule 59(e) the Court lacks the discretion to grant it under that rule, and as explained below,
Leeds has not shown a right to relief under Rule 60(b).
LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move for reconsideration of a summary judgment order under either Rule
59(e) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Clifford v. Rice, 1999 WL 542867, at
*1 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (citing Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir.
1991)). Leeds cites both rules. Rule 59(e) is used to request a court’s substantive change of mind;
meanwhile, Rule 60(a) is used to correct a judgment to implement its intended purpose. Tattersalls,
Ltd. v. DeHaven, 745 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Garamendi v. Henin, 683 F.3d
1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 60(a) allows for clarification and explanation, consistent with
the intent of the original judgment, even in the absence of ambiguity if necessary for
enforcement.”).
Here, Leeds seeks substantively different rulings which are contrary to the Court’s
summary rulings and are not merely for clarification or explanation. Accordingly, Rule 59(e) is
the applicable rule. Under Rule 59(e), a district court may grant relief to, among other reasons:
(1) “correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests”; (2) “present newly
discovered or previously unavailable evidence”; (3) “prevent manifest injustice”; or (4) “if the
amendment is justified by an intervening change in controlling law.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron,
634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955
(9th Cir. 2013).
Relief under Rule 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy. Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934,
945 (9th Cir. 2003). Absent highly unusual circumstances, a court should not grant a motion for
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reconsideration. Id.; Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000).
Notably, a party may not use a motion for reconsideration to “raise arguments or present evidence
for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona
Enters., 229 F.3d at 890.
ANALYSIS
A. 	Timeliness
Under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed no later than twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e). The Court may not extend the deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2); see also Carter v. United
States, 973 F.2d 1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Leeds’s second motion for reconsideration is
untimely. The Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order granting summary judgment on
March 7, 2025 (Dkt. 36). Final judgment was entered on August 25, and Leeds filed her second
motion for reconsideration on September 30 (Dkts. 44, 48). Based on this timeline, Leeds filed her
second motion thirty-six days after the entry of judgment (Dkt. 44; Dkt. 48).
In addition to being untimely under Rule 59(e), Leeds’s motion also fails to satisfy
Rule 60(b)’s requirements. Rule 60(b) provides limited, extraordinary relief from a final judgment
only upon a showing of specific grounds, such as newly discovered evidence, fraud, mistake, or
other exceptional circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)–(6). Leeds does not identify newly
discovered evidence, mistake, fraud, or any other extraordinary circumstance arising after entry of
judgment that would justify relief under Rule 60(b) (see generally Dkt. 48). Instead, Leeds
advances a new legal theory that could have been raised before judgment, or at the latest, in her
first motion for reconsideration. Such use of Rule 60(b) is improper. Because Leeds filed her
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second motion for reconsideration too late and fails to establish any basis for relief under
Rule 60(b), the motion fails.
B. 	Leeds Has Waived Available But Previously Unraised Arguments
Even if the motion was timely, however, it still fails because it raises arguments which
Leeds could have but did not present earlier. Before any penalties were assessed against Leeds,
courts had addressed the scope of the Seventh Amendment in the context of civil penalties,
administrative enforcement schemes, and the distinction between public and private rights. See,
e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–55 (1989); Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977); see also SEC v. Jarkesy,
603 U.S. 109, 112-13 (2024) (discussing the historical development of relevant case law). Leeds
does not identify an intervening change in controlling law that created the argument she advances
now. Rather, Leeds relies on a legal theory that was available at every stage of this litigation but
not raised.
Leeds’s Answer included a demand for a jury trial but did not assert that the administrative
assessment of FBAR penalties itself violated that right to a jury trial (see generally Dkt. 20).
Further, in opposing summary judgment, Leeds only referenced the Seventh Amendment in a
footnote, explaining Leeds did “not claim that this summary judgment proceeding per se violates
Defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment . . . . Rather, if the
Court denies the government’s motion for summary judgment, Defendant will have a right to have
a jury evaluate the government’s evidence” (Dkt. 29 at 11 n.3). Notably, Leeds did not argue that
assessment of FBAR penalties violated the Seventh Amendment or that such an assessment barred
this Court from adjudicating liability on summary judgment. To the contrary, Leeds proceeded as
if the case was properly before the Court for judicial resolution (see generally Dkt. 29).
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After judgment was entered, Leeds again had an opportunity to raise her Seventh
Amendment challenge in her first motion for reconsideration. Indeed, that first motion expressly
invoked the Seventh Amendment and challenged the propriety of resolving willfulness on
summary judgment (Dkt. 45-1 at 14-15). Yet, even then, Leeds did not argue that the
administrative assessment of FBAR penalties constituted a separate Seventh Amendment
violation. This repeated omission is significant even if the Court had the discretion to grant the
instant motion. A party may not use successive motions for reconsideration to advance new
theories that were previously available but not asserted. Kona Enters., 229 F.3d 890.
Simply put, Leeds did not raise a Seventh Amendment challenge to the administrative
assessment or imposition of FBAR penalties until thirty-six days after the judgment was entered.
Leeds likewise failed to preserve this theory through any timely objection during the administrative
assessment process which culminated in September 2020, meaning Leeds waited over five years
to make the argument. Accordingly, the belated challenge is not a proper basis for reconsideration.
Even if the argument had not been foregone on multiple occasions, Leeds does not identify newly
discovered evidence, an intervening change in controlling law, clear error, or manifest injustice
that would justify reconsideration. See Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890. Relitigating the Court’s
summary judgment ruling based on a constitutional theory that was capable of being raised earlier,
was addressed in related form, and was not asserted, is insufficient. Id.
C. 	Constitutional Avoidance
Finally, even if the Court were inclined to reach the merits, it would decline to do so here.
The Ninth Circuit has made clear that courts should avoid deciding constitutional questions where
a case may be resolved on narrower, non-constitutional grounds. Correa v. Clayton, 563 F.2d 396,
400 (9th Cir. 1977) (“In reaching our conclusion, we are guided by the traditional principle that a
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federal 	court 	should 	not 	decide 	federal 	constitutional 	questions 	where 	a 	dispositive
nonconstitutional ground is available.”) (internal quotations omitted). Because the second motion
is untimely, rests on waived arguments, and is procedurally improper, resolution of the Seventh
Amendment issue Leeds now advances is unnecessary to the disposition of the motion.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Second Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 48) is
DENIED.
February 13, 2026
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