Williams v. Campbell

SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
KENT WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DR. WALTER CAMPBELL, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:24-cv-00006-BLW
SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER
INTRODUCTION
The docket of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho shows that
the judges are doing their best to screen, manage, liberally construe, and adjudicate
cognizable claims raised in Kent Williams’ many pro se prisoner complaints. For
example, in Case 1:22-cv-00052-DCN, Williams v. Leeflang (Case 52), United States
District Judge David C. Nye observed that Plaintiff had “filed a pro se prisoner
Complaint (Dkt. 3), a First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 10), a Second Amended Complaint
(Dkt. 35), a revised Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 50), and a total of 33 Third
Amended Complaints (Dkts. 85 to 88-5),” representing his fifth opportunity to plead his
claims. Case 52, Dkt. 93 at 1. Judge Nye reviewed the nearly 600 pages of third amended
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complaints and decided that judicial economy was best served by severing Case 52 into
“several manageable chunks, based on the allegations of the same legal nature.” Id. at 8.
This Court has taken the same course of action with Plaintiff’s unwieldy pleadings
in this action, including severance of claims. In this Order, the Court takes judicial notice
of the federal and state court dockets, registers of actions, records, and opinions from
other cases of Plaintiff, including cases referenced in his amended complaint. Dkt. 10.
Fed. R. Evid. 201.
On October 24, 2019, Plaintiff had a case dismissed in the District of Idaho for
refusal to comply with General Order 342, requiring prisoner complaints to be 20 page or
less. See Williams v. Stewart, Case No. 1:18-cv-00343-DCN (Case 343). Dismissal as a
sanction was affirmed on appeal. See Case 343, Dkt. 29 (Ninth Circuit opinion issued
December 9, 2020).
On August 9, 2022 (liberal mailbox rule date), Plaintiff began this litigation by
submitting for mailing a 73-page Complaint that violated General Order 342. See Dkt. 2
in this case; see Case No. 1:22-cv-00346-BLW, Williams v. Atencio, et al. (Case 346),
Dkts. 3, 48.
Because in Case 346 Plaintiff had alleged claims that were beyond and within the
statute of limitations, the Court required Plaintiff to file two separate amended
complaints: one containing only pre-August 2020 claims, and the other containing only
post-August 2020 claims. Case 346, Dkt. 14 at 5. When Plaintiff filed his two amended
complaints, the Court notified Plaintiff it would address his post-August 2020 claims in
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Case 346, and all pre-August 2020 claims in a new case, No. 1:23-cv-00111-BLW (Case
111). See Case 346, Dkt. 27 at 2. The Court later severed the pre-August 2020 claims in
Case 111 into pre-August 2020 conditions of confinement and mail claims (adjudicated
in Case 111), and pre-August 2020 access to courts and due process claims, adjudicated
in new Case No. 1:23-cv-00585-BLW (Case 585). See Case 111, Dkt. 11 at 1-2.
After the Court reviewed Plaintiff’s amended complaint in original Case 346, it
required Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. After a review of the second
amended complaint in Case 346, the Court decided to adjudicate post-August 2020
Eighth and First Amendment free exercise claims in Case 346; post-August 2020 Fourth
Amendment claims in new Case No. 24-000004-BLW; and post-August 2020 access to
courts, due process, and mail claims in new Case No. 24-000006-BLW (this case). See
Case 346, Dkt. 48.
Therefore, the narrow subject matter of this case is only post-July 20201 First and
Fourteenth Amendment access to courts, due process, and mail claims he originally
asserted in Case 346. Dkts. 2, 7. Having reviewed the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 10), the
Court concludes that Plaintiff has included additional claims that cannot be adjudicated in
this case, but that should have been adjudicated in his other cases or should be
adjudicated in new cases grouped together for judicial efficiency. The Court will
1 The Court moved the statute of limitations deadline to July 2020 to provide for a 30-day period to exhaust
administrative remedies under Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the applicable statute
of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process).
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adjudicate in this case only the access to courts claims arising from Plaintiff’s
confinement at ISCI that arose no earlier than July 9, 2020.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it was unclear in which case he was authorized
to bring retaliation claims, but the Court disagrees that the claims should be brought here.
In addition, claims arising from Plaintiff’s confinement at the IMSI facility, as opposed to
the ISCI facility, will not be adjudicated in this case.
The Clerk of Court will be ordered to sever the following claims into new actions:
(1) mail, due process, and retaliation claims arising from Plaintiff’s
confinement at ISCI beginning no earlier than July 9, 2020;
(2) mail and retaliation claims arising from Plaintiff’s February 2021
confinement at IMSI; and
(3) access to courts claims arising from Plaintiff’s February 2021
confinement at IMSI.
Because Plaintiff asserts he did not have enough space in the 20-page amended
complaint ordered in this action to properly state his claims, he will be required to file a
second amended complaint of no more than 20 pages in each of the two new cases
focused on his IMSI confinement, due 30 days after entry of this Order.
Further, the Court concludes that the following claims asserted in this case are
unauthorized:
1. Eighth Amendment Claims
The Court permitted Plaintiff to pursue Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claims only in Case 346. See Case 346, Dkt. 48 at 3. He has repeated and
expanded on those claims in this case, including that prison staff entered his cell and beat
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him on or about December 17, 2020. Dkt. 10 at 14. Plaintiff may use these allegations in
the new severed case only as evidentiary facts to support his First Amendment retaliation
claims, but not as Eighth Amendment claims. All Eighth Amendment claims were, or
should have been, pursued in Case 346.
Another category of Eighth Amendment claims that does not belong in this case
encompasses mental health claims against all Defendants between May 23, 2016, and
June 2020 that were severed from Case 346 to be adjudicated in Case 23-cv-00584-BLW
(Case 584). See Case 584, Dkt. 3 at 2.
The unauthorized claims will be dismissed without prejudice to the extent they
must be or should have been brought in Plaintiff’s other cases.
2. First Amendment Free Exercise Claims
The Court permitted Plaintiff to pursue First Amendment free exercise claims in
Case 346. See Case 346, Dkt. 48 at 3. Plaintiff brought his current lack of a Bible claim in
that case, and he was required to pursue it in that case. Therefore, all First Amendment
Free Exercise claims in this case are subject to dismissal and will be considered only
background information for his retaliation claims in the new severed case.
REVIEW OF POST-JULY 2020 ACCESS TO COURTS CLAIMS
1. First and Fourteenth Amendment Access to Courts Backward-Looking
Claims: Failure to Provide Supporting Fact
Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from loss of a suit that cannot
now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412–15
(2002). To state a backward-looking access to courts claim, a prisoner must allege facts
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supporting three elements: (1) official acts that frustrated the inmate’s litigation; (2) loss
of a “nonfrivolous” or “arguable” underlying claim that is set forth in the Complaint,
including the level of detail necessary “as if it were being independently pursued”; and
(3) specific allegations showing that remedy sought in the access to courts claim is not
otherwise available in a suit that could be brought. Id. at 415-17.
Plaintiff attempts to show that he lost several cases, but he has failed to meet the
second Christopher element. He has not provided facts showing loss of a “nonfrivolous”
or “arguable” underlying claim supported by the level of detail necessary “as if it were
being independently pursued.” We do not know exactly which claim was lost or why it
was meritorious. The following do not satisfy the second Christopher element:
A. Direct Appeal Claim
Plaintiff’s first claim arises from confinement in a suicide watch or restrictive cell
assignment between April 11, 2017, to April 29, 2017. Dkt. 10 at 3-4. He was placed in a
restrictive cell and had no court access, no access to pen or paper, no access to a
telephone, and no legal mail sent in or out. Id. He had no contact with anyone outside of
the prison during these 18 days. He alleges that, during this time frame, he was working
on his pro se criminal appeal, and he could not “research, write, or perfect it.” Id. at 3. He
also could not obtain trial records.
Plaintiff received his legal mail on July 11, 2017. Id. at 5. The Idaho Supreme
Court denied and dismissed his direct appeal six months later on January 11, 2018.
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Plaintiff asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court rejected some of his claims for
failure to cite to the record to support his claims, and that this failure was due to
Defendants’ refusal to provide access to his legal files during his suicide watch
confinement. Dkt. 10 at 5-6. Plaintiff himself does not identify any direct appeal claim
that was rejected for lack of record support. The Idaho Supreme Court opinion shows
Plaintiff’s suppression motion claim was rejected because he did not support allegations
that the district court had fabricated and grossly embellished the facts. See State v.
Williams, 163 Idaho 285, 300, 411 P.3d 1186, 1201 (Ct. App. 2018). The appellate court
concluded that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the district court’s
findings of fact. Id.
Plaintiff later received the transcripts, and therefore had record citations to support
his claim, if any existed. He has not provided the record citations in his Amended
Complaint to show that this claim was meritorious or even pinpointed this claim as the
particular one that was lost due to suicide watch conditions of confinement. Without any
reference to a claim that was lost, Plaintiff’s vague allegations that he was unable to
conduct additional research and perfect his direct appeal briefing fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
A general lack of access to legal materials is not sufficient. In Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343 (1996), the Supreme Court emphasized that there is no “abstract, freestanding
right to a law library or legal assistance,” id. at 351, and that the right to access the courts
is the right to bring to court a grievance that the inmate wishes to present, not a right to
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“litigate effectively once in court,” id. at 354. While prison officials may not impede a
prisoner’s right to access the courts, such a claim can proceed only if an injury is stated,
whether backward- or forward-looking. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415 (a forward-
looking prisoner action to remove roadblocks to future litigation requires the plaintiff to
identify a “nonfrivolous,” “arguable” underlying claim). These allegations fail to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. State Post-Conviction Claim
Plaintiff alleges that, due to prison policies, he was “chilled from representing
[him]self” in the post-conviction action in the district court and on appeal. He asserts that
he lost the post-conviction matter because of “the ineptitude of the [illegible] public
defender,” Dkt. 10 at 6, and that he would have won the post-conviction matter or the
appeal had Defendants not limited his litigating abilities and resources.
The Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in the post-conviction case shows that prison
officials sometimes refused to permit Plaintiff to attend hearings with his counsel about
the topic of self-representation when prison officials deemed him mentally unfit to attend.
See Williams v. State, No. 48467, 2024 WL 26467 at *23 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2024).
Plaintiff alleges that, without Defendants’ interference, he would have been permitted to
proceed pro se instead of having to rely on a “disastrous” appointed attorney who did not
develop the record; Plaintiff would have raised omitted meritorious arguments himself;
and Plaintiff would have properly cited to the record. Dkt. 10 at 6. Even though that case
has been completed and Plaintiff has the state court record, he still has not shown which
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claims were meritorious, which parts of the record supported those claims, or what his
arguments would have been. This claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
C. Federal Civil Rights Claims
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts he lost civil rights claims or had cases dismissed
because of Defendants’ actions, he still has not shown under the second Christopher
element which claims were meritorious, what evidence supports those claims, what his
arguments would have been, or how Defendants’ actions caused loss of the meritorious
claims. For example, he states he did not receive legal mail in July 2020, but he does not
provide sufficient supporting facts about any particular civil rights claim that was
meritorious or that was lost as a result of Defendants’ limiting his access to the courts.
D. Conclusion
All of these access to courts claims are too vague to permit Plaintiff to proceed
and therefore fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff has had
sufficient opportunity to plead his facts throughout the history of this action, going back
to original Case 346. As a result, no further opportunity to amend will be granted.
2. First and Fourteenth Amendment Access to Courts Claims:
Backward-Looking Claims: Untimely, Unripe or beyond Scope of Suit
A. Claims Filed Too Late
The statute of limitations period for filing a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 is determined by the statute of limitations period for personal injuries in the state
where the claim arose. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (later overruled only as to
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claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, not applicable here). Idaho
Code § 5-219, providing for a two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries,
governs federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho. The statute of limitations is tolled
while the inmate exhausts administrative grievance procedures. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d
926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff’s original complaint in Case 346 was filed, at the earliest, on August 9,
2022. Therefore, claims that ripened earlier than July 9, 2020, are untimely, and no
adequate excuse has been shown for the untimely filing.
Plaintiff has been warned several times that the Court will not construe Plaintiff’s
repeated return trips to the suicide watch unit as one continuous course of conduct.
Plaintiff often finds himself repeatedly placed in the suicide unit because he believes he
has a First Amendment right to refuse to answer questions from mental health providers
about whether he has suicidal ideation; they subsequently place him there out of an
abundance of caution for his safety. See Case 584, Dkt. 6 at 3. He then complains that the
conditions of confinement in the suicide watch unit—where nearly all items and
privileges are taken away—are too harsh. Id., Dkt. 3 at 5.
For statute of limitations purposes, as soon as Plaintiff was released each time, the
allegedly unlawful conditions ended, and he had the information needed to file a timely
suit challenging that particular confinement.
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The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s first claim, arising from April 11, 2017 to
January 11, 2018—when construed as a ripe claim not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, see
infra—is too late. Dkt. 10 at 3.
B. Claims that Remain Unripe
Timeliness considerations are different when a § 1983 access to the courts claim
involves a criminal conviction or sentence. The principle of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994), provides that a state prisoner’s § 1983 claim is premature if its success
“would necessarily imply the invalidity of [a] conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487. Before
the claim can be raised in a civil rights action, the plaintiff must show that the conviction
or sentence was invalidated in a procedurally proper action, such as a direct appeal, state
post-conviction matter, or federal habeas corpus case. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,
81 (2005). If the invalidation pre-requisite is not met, the civil rights claim is not ripe. As
a result, such a claim does not begin to run until the conviction is reversed, expunged or
declared invalid. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489.
The Heck rule has been applied to access to courts cases in the Ninth Circuit. See,
e.g., Delarm v. Growe, No. 215CV2258KJMKJNP, 2016 WL 1722382, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 29, 2016); Collins v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 3: 10-cv-0697 RCJ V, 2011 WL
768709, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan.26, 2011); Cole v. Sisto, Civ. No. S–09–0364 KJM P, 2009
WL 2230795, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2009) (relying on Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d
589 (7th Cir. 1998)).
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Here, Plaintiff asserts that he would have won his direct appeal or post-conviction
actions—implying that his conviction would have been invalidated—but for Defendants’
actions in thwarting his efforts to properly pursue his direct appeal and his state post-
conviction action. Construing these claims as unripe means they are presently barred by
Heck v. Humphrey. They will be dismissed without prejudice, awaiting proper
invalidation of Plaintiff’s convictions and sentences.
FRIVOLOUSNESS, REPETITIVENESS, AND
THREE STRIKES IMPLICATIONS
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 introduced the “three strikes” provision
to address the growing trend of frivolous civil rights actions filed by prison inmates. See
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This provision prohibits a prisoner from
filing lawsuits or appeals in forma pauperis if he previously filed three other actions in
federal court that were dismissed on the grounds of frivolousness, maliciousness, or
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
On March 20, 2023, in Case 111, the Court conducted a statute of limitations and
Heck v. Humphrey analysis on Plaintiff’s allegations that claims arising from his state
criminal direct appeal and state post-conviction action challenging his state criminal
convictions and sentences were subject to dismissal, “awaiting proper invalidation of
Plaintiff’s convictions and sentences.” Case 111, Dkt. 2 at 5. Nevertheless, Plaintiff
submitted the same claims in his Amended Complaint in this action filed on October 16,
2025.
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To the extent that these claims already have been adjudicated and declared unripe
until Plaintiff obtained proper invalidation of his convictions and sentences—which he
knew he did not have when he file the Amended Complaint—they are repetitive, and
therefore malicious and frivolous. “It is malicious per se for a pauper to file successive In
Forma Pauperis suits that duplicate claims made in other pending or previous lawsuits.”
Brinson v. McKeeman, 992 F.Supp. 897, 912 (D. Tex. 1997); see Scott v. Weinberg, 2007
WL 963990, at *12 (D. Wash. 2007) (malicious suits include those that are “plainly
abusive of the judicial process or merely repeat[] pending or previously litigated
claims”); Thomas v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 2005 WL 1074333, at *5 (D. Va. 2005)
(repetitive lawsuit was frivolous and malicious where plaintiff was told in his previous
suit that he had not stated a claim).
To the extent that his claims are barred by the statute of limitations, they are
deemed frivolous and can be dismissed sua sponte after notice to the plaintiff. See Fogle
v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2006); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 54 (2d
Cir. 1995); Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994); Puett v. Carnes, 21
F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpubl.) (“Because it is clear from the face of the complaint
that Puett’s claim is time-barred, the district court properly dismissed this claim as
frivolous.”).
Finally, a dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey constitutes a strike under § 1915(g)
for failure to state a claim when Heck’s bar to relief is obvious from the face of the
complaint. Washington v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dep't., 833 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th
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Cir. 2016). It is obvious from the Amended Complaint that the unripe claims duplicated
those in Case 111 that were declared to be unripe and that the claims clearly imply that
Plaintiff’s criminal conviction or sentence is invalid.
To the extent that the Court has concluded that Plaintiff has not met the second
Christopher element in his Amended Complaint, the claims fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Each of these reasons qualify this case’s dismissal as a strike under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g).
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Motion to Review Amended Complaint (Dkt. 9) is GRANTED to the extent
set forth above.
2. The Motion for Extension of Time to File Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8) is
GRANTED to the extent that the Amended Complaint is considered timely filed.
3. The unauthorized claims will be dismissed without prejudice to the extent they
must be or should have been brought in Plaintiff’s other cases.
4. The Clerk of Court will sever the following claims into three separate new actions
and file the Amended Complaint from this action (Docket 10) and this Order in
each new case:
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(a) mail, due process, and retaliation claims arising from Plaintiff’s
confinement at ISCI beginning no earlier than July 9, 2020, wherein the
Court will issue a screening order;
(b) mail and retaliation claims arising from Plaintiff’s February 2021
confinement at IMSI, wherein Plaintiff will be required to file a second
amended complaint of no more than 20 pages, due 30 days after entry of
this Order.
(c) access to courts claims arising from Plaintiff’s February 2021
confinement at IMSI, wherein Plaintiff will be required to file a second
amended complaint of no more than 20 pages, due 30 days after entry of
this Order.
5. As to the remaining claims in this action (the access to courts claims arising from
Plaintiff’s confinement at ISCI that arose no earlier than July 9, 2020), the claims
are DISMISSED for the particular reasons set forth above, and Plaintiff may bring
only those claims presently barred by Heck v. Humphrey in a later civil rights
action if he invalidates his state criminal conviction and sentence.
6. Plaintiff is issued a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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DATED: February 11, 2026
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge
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