Snyder v. Wilson, et al.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JAMES FRANKLIN SNYDER,
Plaintiff,
v.
EMMA WILSON, DIANE
REMACLE, MELISSA CARR,
DIONNE GILLUM, AMANDA
MONTALVO, and GLENN
ARMSTRONG,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:23-cv-00176-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
In April 2023, Plaintiff James Franklin Snyder, who was an inmate at the Idaho
Department of Correction (IDOC), filed his original civil rights complaint in this case. Dkt.
3. He is pursuing his second Amended Complaint. Dkt. 26. Plaintiff was authorized to
proceed on claims that IDOC case managers Diane Remacle, Emma Wilson, and Melissa
Carr “orchestrated” moving him an unreasonable number of times among housing units
and prisons in retaliation for Plaintiff filing multiple court cases, limited to incidents arising
no earlier than March 9, 2021. Dkts. 24 at 10-11, 26-3 at 1.
Defendants have filed a Combined Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment and a Reply. Dkt. 39, 48. Plaintiff has filed a Response. Dkt. 44. He has also
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filed a Motion to Amend and a fifth proposed pleading entitled “Amended Complaint,”
which the Court will refer to as the “fourth Amended Complaint” throughout this Order.
Dkts. 45, 46. Based on the Court’s screening of the fourth Amended Complaint, the Court
will deny Defendants’ motions as moot, grant Plaintiff’s motion, and dismiss the fourth
Amended Complaint with leave to amend one claim in a new severed case.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Plaintiff was notified in the Initial Screening Order that an amended complaint
would replace a prior original complaint in full. Dkt. 12 at 15. Therefore, Plaintiff’s fourth
Amended Complaint supersedes in full the second Amended Complaint that is the subject
of Defendants’ pending motions. In the dismissal motion, Defendants correctly argue that
official 	capacity 	claims 	against 	them 	as 	state 	employees 	are 	barred 	by 	Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, and any such injunctive relief claims under Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908), are moot because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated.
The fourth Amended Complaint does not contain official capacity claims or injunctive
relief claims. See Dkt. 46 at 1. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 39) will be denied
as moot.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants seek summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff failed to properly
exhaust his claims before filing his lawsuit on April 9, 2023 (mailbox rule date of filing of
original complaint). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The recent case, Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S.
460, 475 (2025), complicates the procedures for exhaustion. In Perttu, the inmate brought
Eighth Amendment claims of sexual harassment against prison employee Petrru and First
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3
Amendment claims that Pettru had retaliated and threatened to harm the plaintiff for trying
to file grievance documents about the alleged abuse. The Supreme Court held that “parties
are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits
of a claim protected by the Seventh Amendment.” Id. at 479.1
Here, Plaintiff raises somewhat similar issues, that Defendants retaliated against
him for doing legal work. The scope of Pettru has not been explained by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and whether it would apply here is in question. But the Court need not
consider exhaustion and Pettru applicability because Plaintiff has replaced his second
Amended Complaint with a fourth Amendment Complaint, which is subject to dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied as moot.
REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
1. 	Introduction
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend must be considered in the particular procedural posture
of this case. His four prior pleadings are the original Complaint (Dkt. 3), a first Amended
Complaint 23 (Dkt. 22), a second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 26), and a third Amended
Complaint (later withdrawn) (Dkt. 36). Plaintiff submitted his fourth Amended Complaint
on April 2, 2025, when he was no longer incarcerated and before the deadline for the filing
of amended pleadings, June 20, 2025. See Dkt. 34. While Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is
timely, Defendants oppose the amendment on several grounds, such as futility and failure
to state a claim. Dkt. 49.
1 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
The Court has reviewed all of the parties’ filings, bearing in mind the following: (1)
the Court has a continuing screening authority to dismiss pauper claims “at any time”
during the litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); (2) the entire record before the Court
can be used to inform its screening decision; (3) Plaintiff’s many amendments have
prevented this case from moving past the beginning phase of proceedings; and (4) Plaintiff
was released from prison in January, giving him better access to obtain evidence and legal
help to aid amendment.
2. 	Standard of Law for Screening of All Prisoner and Pauper Pleadings
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 1 requires the Court to screen all pro se
prisoner and pauper complaints to determine whether they have stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for
relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient
for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)).
Complaints filed pro se are to be liberally construed and “held to less stringent
1 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must still
comply with the threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A
complaint 	is 	insufficient 	if 	it 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement.” Id. (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). At the pleading stage,
a litigant is not required to provide factual evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a); Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff has attached exhibits to the fourth Amended Complaint, which the Court
considers in screening. In addition, the dockets in Plaintiff’s other related cases and prison
records are relevant here, and the Court is permitted to take judicial notice of matters of
public record in considering dismissal, including records and reports of administrative
bodies. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff 	sues 	Diane 	Remacle, 	his 	IDOC 	case 	manager 	at 	the 	North 	Idaho
Correctional Institution (NICI), where inmates are placed when they are in state retained
jurisdiction or “rider” sentencing programs. See Attachment to Order, IDOC letter. He sues
Dionne Gillum, his case manager at the Idaho Correctional Center – Orofino (ICIO);
Melissa Car, his case manager at Idaho State Correctional Center (ISCC); and Glenn
Armstrong, warden of the St. Anthony Work Center (SAWC). Plaintiff also sues his former
public defender, Amanda Montalvo.
3. 	Claims of “Deliberate Fabrication of Evidence” against All Defendants
A. Factual Insufficiency
Plaintiff brings claims that Defendants have falsely stated he has a sex offense on
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6
his criminal record and he is a member of the Mexican Mafia. The record reflects that the
first “rumor” is derived from public records, and the second, from Plaintiff.
As to the sex offense rumor, Plaintiff states that “someone in Kootenai County had
sent Diane Remacle all the false records and Snohomish County altered summary of a case
that I was never even arrested on.” Dkt. 146 at 15. Plaintiff provides a “Defendant Case
History” dated 08/15/15 from the Pend Oreille District, showing that on December 22,
2004, he had a rape charge; and on December 8, 2004, he had an unlawful harboring of a
minor charge. Dkt. 44 at 163-64. Plaintiff has written “Dismissed” in his own handwriting
on the exhibit. He has also written: “I appealed all cases to Supreme Court. I have letter
from Justice Roberts. He stated how well my Habeas Corpes was wrote.” Dkt. 44 at 163
(verbatim). Plaintiff has not provided sufficient factual allegations showing the date these
charges 	were 	dismissed 	or 	these 	convictions 	were 	overturned 	by 	any 	court. 	Five
amendments is sufficient opportunity to have provided this information. The Court
concludes that there are no facts showing that Plaintiff did not have 2004 rape and unlawful
harboring of a minor charges on his record and that he did not sufficiently provide
Defendants with official documents showing these charges had been dismissed. Dkt. 44 at
163-64.
As to the Mexican Mafia membership rumor, the record shows that Plaintiff himself
originated this rumor. During Plaintiff’s emergency room hospital visit for a potential
overdose of methamphetamine on June 29, 2021, a witness reported that Plaintiff appeared
delusional and made aggressive comments toward health care providers, including, “Dr. is
a [expletive] who is not allowed to put me on a hold … I’m part of the Mexican mafia. I
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
know people and all I have to do is make one phone call.” Plaintiff’s statement is
documented in his federal civil rights case, 2:21-cv-00328-BLW, Snyder v. Robinson, Dkt.
25-3 at 14 (statement of Mental Health Specialist Katie Robinson, in Kootenai County
Hospital medical records); and in Kootenai County Case No. CR28-21-11291, State v.
Snyder (Case 11291), where the incident was the subject of a criminal conviction for
battery upon certain personnel. See Attachment to Order, September 2, 2021 Judgment.
Because Plaintiff himself started this rumor, because it is now contained in public records,
and because there is no accurate way for prison officials to confirm whether it is true or
not, it cannot be the basis of a falsified documents claim.
B. Legal Insufficiency
Even if Plaintiff’s prison file contains allegedly false information, he cannot proceed
under the general rule—that the mere presence of allegedly false information in a convicted
felon’s prison records does not violate his constitutional rights or state a cognizable claim
under § 1983. Aguilar v. Superior Ct. of California, No. 119CV01802NONEEPG, 2020
WL 5891392, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom. 	Aguilar 	v. 	Superior 	Ct. 	of 	California, 	Cnty. 	of 	San 	Bernardino, 	No.
119CV01802NONEEPGPC, 2020 WL 7342690 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2020).
Two exceptions to the general rule are retaliation claims or liberty interest claims.
i. 	Retaliatory False Records
In Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268-69 (9th Cir. 1997), the court recognized that
a prisoner may bring a false records claim if the records were created in retaliation for the
exercise of a constitutional right. But Plaintiff was warned in the Successive Review Order
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8
(Dkt. 25) that claims asserting that false information was used to support imposition of or
a change in a criminal sentence are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994). In his fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not address Heck, but simply asks
the Court not treat this civil rights case as an “appeal” of his state criminal case. Dkt. 46 at
2. The Court has not construed this case as an appeal, nor could it, because the state and
federal court systems are different jurisdictions.
The Heck bar prevents a party from challenging a criminal conviction or sentence
in a civil rights action. Heck continues to bar civil rights challenges after a convicted felon
has completed a sentence, except in instances where only good time credit is being
challenged. See Galanti v. Nevada Dep't of Corr., 65 F.4th 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 144 S. Ct. 527 (2023); Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1191–92 (9th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Nonnette, 316 F.3d at 878 n. 7; Snyder v. City of Coeur d'Alene, No.
1:23-CV-00176-BLW, 2025 WL 252640, at *2–3 (D. Idaho Jan. 21, 2025) (another of
Plaintiff’s cases). Therefore, even if Plaintiff has completed serving his time for a past
conviction, Heck bars him from challenging the conviction or sentence in a civil rights
action. Rather, he must challenge any alleged false information in the criminal action.
Plaintiff had several criminal convictions and sentences and was moved in and out
of drug court, mental health court, and the retained jurisdiction (rider) program by the state
court judges. Hence, the following claims are subject to Heck:
x 	Remacle, an IDOC case manager at NICI, “violated [his] rights to remove
[him] from drug court.” Dkt. 46 at 10.
x 	Dionne Gillum, an IDOC case manager at ICIO, prevented him from
remaining in the retained jurisdiction program instead of being returned
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to prison. Dkt. 46 at 13.
x 	Plaintiff’s criminal attorney, Amanda Montalvo, interfered in his parole,
his placement in mental health court, and his judgment and sentence. Dkt.
44 at 9. “Amanda falsified my current original judgment and sentence and
upon 	doing 	went 	into 	Snyder’s 	criminal 	history 	and 	added 	Child
Molesting accusations to further cause so much … retaliation….” Id. at
10.
x 	Montalvo “knowingly had [him] attacked by cops, hospital staff, security,
jailers in Kootenai County, IDOC [and] staff.” Dkt. 46 at 20. (These
allegations are the same as the basis of his criminal conviction for battery
upon certain personnel and cannot be challenged under § 1983.)
All claims aimed at Plaintiff’s criminal judgment and all aspects of his sentencing
should have been raised in state court initial, direct appeal, or post-conviction proceedings.
Claims barred by Heck are subject to dismissal without prejudice.
ii. 	Liberty Interest in Not Having False Records
Prisoners have “no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or
wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty
interest,” so long as they are “not ... deprived of a protected liberty interest without due
process of law.” Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
A plaintiff must provide facts showing he has a liberty interest in having his criminal
history record corrected. Such an interest may arise from a state statute or the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
459-60 (1989).
To the extent Plaintiff is asserting that his record should have been corrected so the
parole board did not include the alleged false charges when deciding whether Plaintiff was
suitable for parole, he does not have a liberty interest in such a claim. There is no liberty
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interest in parole eligibility arising from the United States Constitution. Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Swarthout v.
Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (“There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no
duty to offer parole to their prisoners.”).
Neither is there a liberty interest in parole arising from Idaho state law. Federal
courts must look to decisions of the highest state court to determine whether there is a state-
created liberty interest in parole. Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,
1127 (9th Cir. 2006). 2 In Banks v. State of Idaho, 920 P.2d 905 (Idaho 1996), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that, as a result of the Idaho statutory scheme’s language, in Idaho
“parole is not an automatic right or liberty interest.” Id. at 908. Plaintiff may not proceed
under a liberty interest theory on any false records claim.
4. 	Other Claims against Public Defender Amanda Montalvo
Plaintiff brings additional claims against his criminal defense attorney, Amanda
Montalvo, who worked under a public defender contract. He asserts that Montalvo
fabricated evidence and otherwise erred or intentionally harmed him in his state criminal
case. Even if these claims were not barred by Heck, they fail to state a claim.
The law is clear that a public defender does not act under color of law when
representing an indigent defendant in criminal proceedings. Cox v. Hellerstein, 685 F.2d
2 Sass was overruled on other grounds by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d. 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(any right to release on parole arose from state law, and did not arise from federal constitution), which itself
was overruled by implication in Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) (“No opinion of ours supports
converting California’s ‘some evidence’ rule into a substantive federal requirement.”).
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1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal criminal context). In West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988),
the Court explained that when a public defender hired by the State is “representing an
indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding, the public defender “is not acting on
behalf of the State; he is the State’s adversary.” Id. at 50 (relying on Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312 (1981) (internal citations and alterations omitted)).
The only exception to this rule is when a plaintiff alleges facts showing that his
defense attorney conspired with state officials to obtain a conviction; in such case, the
attorney may be held liable under § 1983. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.
1996) (“Although the Attorney Defendants are themselves private actors, private parties
who corruptly conspire with a judge in conjunction with the judge’s performance of an
official judicial act are acting under color of state law for the purpose of § 1983, even if
the judge himself is immune from civil liability”) (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28
29 (1980)). As stated above, this type of claim is presently barred by Heck.
Allegations that Montalvo may have intentionally harmed Plaintiff in his criminal
proceedings or that she surrendered her license to the Idaho State Bar in 2023 for some
type of misconduct does not change the outcome of this § 1983 analysis.
5. 	Other Retaliation Claims
A First Amendment retaliation claim must allege the following: “(1) An assertion
that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that
prisoner’s protected conduct, ... that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his
First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate
correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote
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omitted).
The timing of an official’s action can constitute circumstantial evidence of
retaliation, but there generally must be something more than simply timing to support an
inference of retaliatory intent. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995).
Retaliation is not established simply by showing adverse activity by the defendant after
protected speech; the plaintiff must show a nexus between the two. See Huskey v. City of
San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that a retaliation claim cannot rest on
“the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally, ‘after this, therefore because of
this’”).
Plaintiff’s complete allegations supporting his retaliation claim against NICI
case manager Diane Remacle are as follows:
Diane Remacle had been the center of every move by
idoc and discriminating against me calling me sex offender
names and Mexican Mafia. Which she did this in AP drug class
and the inmates that were released like Cody Babbs will testify
to the truth. I was moved to every single unit and my
medication was changed. I told this stuff to Diane Remacle and
she would not do anything. The job of a case manager is to
ensure the security and well being of each inmate as they pass
through the IDOC institutions, protecting the inmates from
harm, if need be and securing a stable environment for each
inmate. 	As 	to 	in 	which, 	she 	defied 	her 	duties 	to 	cause
retaliation….”
Dkt. 46 at 12.
On his fifth opportunity to plead, Plaintiff has asserted insufficient facts to state a
retaliation claim against Remacle. No plausible facts show that a single case manager at a
single facility controls moves among all IDOC facilities. No facts show Remacle had
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authority over internal facility moves or facility-to-facility moves. Plaintiff has not set forth
which dates he was moved, who was responsible for the moves, what reasons were given
for the moves, or where he was moved to and from on each occasion. Plaintiff’s criminal
records show that he was moved in and out of NICI several times when his sentencing
terms were changed—moves which are Heck-barred.
Plaintiff has not stated when he exercised a First Amendment right to access the
courts that allegedly prompted Remacle’s transfers of him. He has not provided facts about
the court case he was working on, which communications about his legal work he had with
Remacle, whether she entered any case management notes in his file about his access to
courts, why she would have a motive or reason to stop him from doing legal work, or when
any of this occurred. Plaintiff’s facts do not support a causal nexus to support retaliation
for exercise of a First Amendment right.
Plaintiff merely alleges that Remacle did nothing to change his medications when
he complained. These allegations do not address the elements of retaliation. Plaintiff has
not provided facts showing that Remacle had authority to change his medications. Remacle
was a case manager, not a medical doctor or other prescription-dispensing professional. He
cannot proceed on any retaliation claim against Remacle for lack of facts supporting a
plausible claim.
Plaintiff alleges that ICIO case manager Dionne Gillum “would get everyone else
process[ed] and denied Snyder equal protection with the due process of state and federal
law in retaliation for [his] legal work….” Dkt. 46 at 13. Plaintiff has provided no details
about his exercise of the constitutional right to work on legal cases in prison that
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specifically provided a plausible predicate to Gillum allegedly retaliating against him.
Plaintiff states that “Gillum and ICIO took all Snyder’s legal documents, work and mail
for the next quarter of a year. Keeping Snyder in segregation, insolation from the prison
population.” Id. at 13. Simply attaching the word “retaliation” to this set of facts does not
state a claim. This claim is better construed as an access to courts claim, which the Court
addresses below.
Plaintiff also alleges Gillum arranged a special transport for him on January 15,
2023, allegedly the day after he lost his case, “Snyder v. Ramirez.” Dkt. 45 at 14. Then a
day after his last case was closed, Gillum and staff gave him back his “material items.” Id.
The Court takes judicial notice of the docket sheet and case filings in Snyder v. Ramirez,
Case No. 1:22-cv-00311-REP (Case 311), a federal habeas corpus case. Case 311 was
dismissed with prejudice on September 7, 2023. See Case 311, Dkts. 56, 67. Plaintiff has
provided nothing showing Gillum arranged a special transport on that date, or a later date
when the United States Supreme Court dismissed his petition for writ of certiorari,
December 16, 2024. See Case 311 at Dkt. 66. The date of January 15, 2023, the alleged
“special transport” date, does not correspond to any court order in Case 311.
Even if Plaintiff had provided facts from which such a timeline could be gleaned,
he cannot rely on mere chronology to state a retaliation or access to courts claim. He must
show a causal nexus. There is no plausible reason for IDOC personnel to have kept Plaintiff
in one housing unit as opposed to another simply because he had a federal habeas corpus
petition pending. Grants of federal habeas corpus are extremely rare, and Plaintiff has not
provided facts showing that prison officials monitored his habeas corpus case in particular
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of all the habeas corpus cases filed in federal court. Plaintiff does not explain why Gillum
would have a personal interest in a habeas corpus action such that she would retaliate
against Plaintiff for filing or maintaining one.
Under the heading of “Glenn Armstrong,” SAWC warden, Plaintiff asserts that he
was moved 12 hours across the state to SAWC immediately after he filed this federal civil
rights case in April 2023. Dkt. 46 at 16. He does not state who was responsible for moving
him. There are no allegations that Armstrong had authority or was responsible for moving
Plaintiff from another facility into SAWC.
Nor has Plaintiff shown how his move to SAWC was an adverse action. SAWC is
a minimum security prison where—unlike other facilities—inmates can leave to go to work
and come back. 3
Although this case was filed in April 2023 and Plaintiff asserts that is when
Armstrong’s retaliation began, Plaintiff did not add Glenn Armstrong as a defendant until
March 17, 2025. See Dkt. 36 (third Amended Complaint, later withdrawn by Plaintiff).
There are no facts showing why Armstrong would have retaliated against Plaintiff before
March 17, 2025. There are no facts showing that Armstrong had a relationship with any of
the defendants who worked at other facilities around the state or would have had a motive
to retaliate against Plaintiff for having filed the lawsuit.
3 SAWC is 400-bed work camp for minimum- and community-custody men. The facility provides residents
with opportunities for full-time, constructive, paid employment with government agencies, nonprofit
organizations and private employers. The program helps residents develop good work habits, and
marketable work skills while providing a financial resource to meet the residents' immediate and future
needs. 	See 	https://www.idoc. 	idaho.gov/content/locations/prisons/st-anthony-work-camp 	(accessed
10/13/2025).
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Plaintiff alleges that at SAWC, he “wrote the case and staff knew everything about
it and in my case, because mom helped me do the legal work over JPAY MESSAGING.”
Dkt. 46 at 16. Simply because all staff had access to Plaintiff’s J-pay messaging does not
mean that they read his pleadings and found reason to retaliate even though they were not
named in the pleadings and likely did not know the other state defendants. All of this is too
speculative to support a retaliation claim against Armstrong this late in the litigation.
Plaintiff asserts that Melissa Carr, his case manager at ISCC, moved him to the
maximum security facility based on alleged false Mexican Mafia and criminal record
rumors. He was moved back, but she “refused to help fix my records, stop retaliating.” Dkt.
46 at 20.
These are insufficient allegations to support a retaliation claim. The Court has
rejected Plaintiff’s retaliation claims based on the rumors, as explained above. Here,
pairing the word “retaliation” with Plaintiff’s prison moves does not show he can meet the
elements of a retaliation claim based on other facts (of which there are none). Plaintiff does
not provide facts showing that Carr had authority to move Plaintiff, that Plaintiff first
exercised a constitutional right that was a predicate to any retaliation, or that Carr had any
interest or stake in not having Plaintiff do legal work, reside at her facility, or be under her
case management such that she would have been prompted to retaliate.
Plaintiff has had ample time to obtain facts to support his claims. He cannot proceed
on retaliation claims against any defendant on implausibility grounds.
7. 	Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Remacle discriminated against him by calling him “sex
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offender names and Mexican Mafia” in “AP drug class.” Dkt. 46 at 12. Plaintiff alleges
that “Gillum would get everyone else process[ed] and denied Snyder equal protection with
the due process of state and federal law in retaliation for [his] legal work, false records [sic]
and Gillum even stated IDOC is profiling me and will keep me in higher security housing
due to gang affiliation and past sex crimes.” Dkt. 46 at 13.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike” by governmental entities. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920). However, “[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in
fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Tigner v. Texas, 310
U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
An equal protection claim may be established by showing that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff's membership in a
protected class, Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), or that similarly-
situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to
a legitimate state purpose, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Lazy
Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008).
If there is “an obvious alternative explanation” for the state action, a plaintiff must
provide factual allegations that give rise to a plausible inference that the action was the
result of unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of “race, religion, or national origin.”
Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77, 682 (2009). A plaintiff must provide sufficient
allegations pointing to a discriminatory motive that “nudg[es]’ his claim of purposeful
discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Id. at 683 (quoting Bell
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 18
Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
As to Plaintiff’s general discrimination claims, he has not alleged that he is a
member of a protected class. Sex offenders are not a protected class under the Equal
Protection Clause. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff also asserts that he is not a sex offender. Thus, the general claims fail.
As to discrimination based on Plaintiff being falsely labeled a sex offender, to the
extent that these claims assert that Plaintiff’s criminal sentencing and placement in
alternative sentencing programs are implicated, they are barred by Heck, as explained
above. To the extent that Plaintiff asserts he was discriminated against because Defendants
treated him as a sex offender when he was not, he has not alleged when or where in his
criminal records the sex offender notations were corrected or clarified such that Defendants
should have referred to them only as charges. He has not shown that he was treated
differently from other inmates with similar notations in their records, or that there was not
a rational relationship for the different treatment. There are no allegations that he was
forced into a sex offender treatment program, which have triggered a due process analysis,
such as in Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997).
As to “discrimination” based on the alleged “Mexican Mafia” designation, there is
a rational alternative explanation—that Plaintiff himself is the origin of his Mexican Mafia
membership “fact” and that it is included in the public records of a criminal and a civil
case. As noted above, there is little prison officials can do to verify whether Plaintiff’s
statement was true or untrue, and, thus, they did not violate his equal protection rights by
treating him as though his statement was true, because he originated it and it was
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 19
unverifiable.
Plaintiff has not stated a plausible discrimination, equal protection, or due process
claim against any defendant, and these claims are subject to dismissal with prejudice.
8. 	Defamation and Slander Claims
Plaintiff alleges that all named defendants engaged in defamation and slander—
claims generally are not cognizable in § 1983 actions. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697–
710 & nn. 3–4, (1976). An exception is that defamation by government officials may
support a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deprivation of property or liberty if a plaintiff
can meet the “stigma plus test.” Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968,
982 (9th Cir. 2002). To meet the stigma plus test, a plaintiff must allege “the public
disclosure of a stigmatizing statement by the government, the accuracy of which is
contested, plus the ‘denial of some more tangible interest[], such as employment,’ or the
alteration of a right or status recognized by state law.” Id. Plaintiff has not alleged facts
showing that he meets the “stigma plus test,” especially given the insufficient of his factual
allegations as to the rumors, discussed above. These claims are subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim.
9. 	Access to Courts Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants prevented him from accessing the courts. Under
the First Amendment, prisoners have a right to access the courts for the purpose of filing
of direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 346, 354 (1996). Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the loss
of a suit that cannot now be tried. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412–15 (2002).
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To state an access to courts claim alleging that a prisoner suffered the loss of a suit
that cannot now be brought, a prisoner must allege facts supporting three elements: (1)
official acts that frustrated the inmate’s litigation; (2) loss of a “nonfrivolous” or “arguable”
underlying claim that is set forth in the Complaint, including the level of detail necessary
“as if it were being independently pursued”; and (3) specific allegations showing that
remedy sought in the access to courts claim is not otherwise available in a suit that could
be brought. Id. at 415-17. There is “no abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal
assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
Plaintiff has not shown loss of a claim with the type of detail necessary to show it
is nonfrivolous or arguable. He must provide detailed facts showing an actual injury, but
he has provided only speculation.
Plaintiff asserts that Gillum and others took all of his legal documents, work, and
mail for a quarter of a year. Dkt. 46 at 13. He has not stated any Christopher injury to any
court case or claim resulting from this alleged action.
Plaintiff alleges that Remacle and Gillum made sure he had no law library, because
they did not want him to expose to the public that the state of Idaho had falsified his
criminal history. Id. However, public records already contained this information they
allegedly wanted to hide, and he has not stated any Christopher injury to any court case or
claim resulting from these acts.
Plaintiff alleges that Wilson would not address any of his complaints about the law
library application not working on his J-Pay tablet. Construed as an access to courts claim,
it fails for lack of any identified Christopher injury to any court case or claim.
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Plaintiff also asserts that various prison staff took adverse actions against him
regarding his general access to courts. An unidentified paralegal never responded to
Plaintiff’s requests for law books or help. Dkt. 46 at 17. “Once a Sgt for SAWC prison saw
Snyder doing legal work. Staff shut off all inmate’s law library function at the mother Atlas
program computer.” Id. Plaintiff sent concern forms and grievances to Armstrong, but he
did not restore Plaintiff’s access to the law library. Id. Even if this is all true, Plaintiff has
not sufficiently alleged that he suffered an actual injury to a case or claim as a result of
having no access to a prison law library.
10. Legal Mail Claims
Plaintiff states that Remacle permitted IDOC staff to open his legal mail outside of
his presence for security reasons, because he had been identified as a Mexican Mafia
member. Dkt. 46 at 12. He does not elaborate on what he means by “legal mail.” The Court
construes this claim in the context of his other contemporaneous allegations about legal
mail, which focus only on the opening of mail from the courts. See Dkt. 44 at 9 (“At
1130am on Wednesday October 11 th Snyder just received legal mail that was already
opened from United States Supreme Court.”).
Court mail is not considered privileged legal mail, because it is a matter of public
record. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), opinion amended on denial of
reh'g, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has provided no facts showing that mail to
or from his attorneys was opened outside his presence and that, if this happened,
Defendants had anything to do with it. There are no dates or other facts supporting any
such claim. He may not proceed.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 22
Plaintiff states that Wilson allowed staff to steal his legal mail and open everything
outside his presence. Id. at 16. Plaintiff provides no dates and no details of what was stolen
or opened. He does not show that Wilson supervised mail staff. He may not proceed.
11. Housing Claims
There is no constitutional right to be housed in a particular unit in prison or the
facility of one’s choice. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 255 (1976); McCune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24, 38 (2002).
Plaintiff asserts that Gillum stated the IDOC was profiling him and kept him in
higher security housing due to gang affiliation and past sex crimes. As noted above, it was
reported in a criminal case and a civil case that he himself stated that he was a member of
the Mexican Mafia. There is also a rape charge on his criminal record; Plaintiff has pointed
to no clear resolution of that charge. Prison officials likely had no way to verify whether
Plaintiff was or was not affiliated with the Mexican Mafia, and, thus, they were entitled to
take precautions in housing him. In addition, Plaintiff’s 2021 charges and subsequent
criminal conviction for battery on certain personnel in Case 11291 may also have been an
adequate reason for Plaintiff to be kept in more restrictive housing. These allegations
regarding Plaintiff’s disagreement with his housing fail to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	he 	asked 	Emma 	Wilson 	to 	move 	him 	from 	ISCC
medium/maximum security and place him in minimum security. She allegedly told him
that, with the child molestation and rape accusations and his membership in the Mexican
mafia, he must be kept in a more secure housing unit. Dkt. 46 at 15. There is no date this
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 23
occurred and no facts showing that Wilson had authority to move him. Because there
inadequate factual grounds to show that IDOC officials should not have used the
information in public records in housing decisionmaking, this claim fails to state a claim
upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted. 	The 	federal 	courts’ 	“duty 	to 	protect 	inmates’
constitutional rights does not confer the power to manage prisons or the capacity to second-
guess prison administrators, for which we are ill-equipped.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283,
1290 (9th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff 	also 	asserts 	that 	Wilson 	moved 	him 	nonstop—33 	times 	through 	5
institutions. Dkt. 46 at 16. Plaintiff has not alleged that Wilson, a case manager at one
IDOC facility, had authority to move him to and from various institutions. Plaintiff has
also alleged that Remacle was the mastermind behind all of these moves, which is contrary
to the allegation that Wilson played this role. Two and half years into this lawsuit, Plaintiff
has not shown when he was moved, where he was moved, or why he was moved. These
allegations lack sufficient facts to state a plausible civil rights claim within prison officials’
expertise and broad discretion to house inmates where they see fit.
Plaintiff asserts that ISCC case manager Melissa Carr said he would be moving to
the maximum security institution because of his criminal records and Mexican Mafia ties.
Dkt. 46 at 19. Within three days, he was moved back and placed under Wilson’s case
management. Id. These allegations are based on inadequate factual grounds and do not
support a claim.
12. Sexual Abuse Claim: Defendant Wilson
Plaintiff alleges that Wilson “would make gross sexual gestures with her tongue at
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 24
[Plaintiff]” in their meetings in order to act disrespectfully to Plaintiff. Dkt. 46 at 24. There
are no dates of these incidents, and Plaintiff does not state that he ever reported this conduct
to any other staff or supervisors.
There is no question that sexual abuse is conduct which is “inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency” and “repugnant to the conscience of mankind,” and
therefore violates the Eighth Amendment. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)
(internal citations omitted). Verbal sexual harassment can constitute an Eighth Amendment
claim if the resulting harm was sufficiently severe. See Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338
(8th Cir. 1997).
In Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2004), inmate Austin asserted that a
correctional officer allegedly exposed his penis to the inmate through the glass of an
officer’s control booth for approximately 30 seconds, and said, “come suck this white dick,
boy.” Id. at 1169-72. The Ninth Circuit held that the incident was not enough to meet the
standard for sexual abuse under the Eighth Amendment. That Court reasoned:
Although prisoners have a right to be free from sexual
abuse, whether at the hands of fellow inmates or prison guards,
see Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000),
the Eighth Amendment's protections do not necessarily extend
to mere verbal sexual harassment. See e.g., Blueford v. Prunty,
108 F.3d 251, 254-55 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that prison guard
who engaged in "vulgar same-sex trash talk" with inmates was
entitled to qualified immunity); Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d
614, 624 (9th Cir.1997). Williams was in an elevated, glass-
enclosed control booth when he exposed himself to Austin and
this isolated incident lasted for a period of no more than 30-40
seconds. Williams never physically touched Austin. In the light
of these facts, the district court properly concluded that this
incident was not sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 25
Id. at 1172. Clearly, the sexual misconduct allegations against Wilson here do not
rise to the level of those in Austin, and even the allegations in Austin did not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation. This claim is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
cognizable claim.
13. Disciplinary Punishment Claim: Defendant Armstrong
Armstrong issued Plaintiff a Disciplinary Offense Report (DOR) three months after
Plaintiff left SAWC. The DOR asserted that Plaintiff unlawfully possessed and defaced an
institutional library book. Dkt. 46 at 18. Contrarily, Plaintiff asserts that he was gifted the
book from another inmate. The DOR of “destruction of property over $25” required
Plaintiff to pay $140.00 to replace the book. Dkt. 46-5 at 23-24. Plaintiff asserts that
Armstrong’s actions in affirming the DOR on appeal violated his constitutional rights. Id.
at 26.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government
from depriving an individual of a liberty or property interest without following the proper
procedures for doing so. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558-66 (1974). Prison
officials may enforce any sanctions that are within “the normal limits or range of custody
which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
478 (1995) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). Construed as a claim that
the government deprived Plaintiff of property, all that was required was notice and some
type of hearing, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 57-58, which was accomplished in the DOR process.
More recently, the Supreme Court has held that the negligent or intentional
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deprivation of personal property by prison officials will not support a due process claim
under § 1983 if the prisoner has an adequate remedy under state law. 	See Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Idaho law provides a private right of action for
conversion. 	See, e.g., Taylor v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642, 662 (Idaho 2010) (a valid
conversion claim requires that (1) the tortfeasor exercised wrongful dominion of property,
(2) the plaintiff owned or possessed the property, and (3) “the property in question is
personal property.”). 	Therefore, Plaintiff has (or had) an adequate state law remedy for
Defendant Armstrong’s allegedly wrongful conversion of Plaintiff’s private property and
he may not proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Plaintiff may not proceed under any theory on a constitutional cause of action
regarding the outcome of the book dispute.
15. Failure to Protect: Defendant Carr
Plaintiff asserts that Carr moved a known gang member into his cell at 1:30 a.m. on
the day before Plaintiff was to be released from ISCC custody. Dkt. 46 at 20-21. Plaintiff
asserts that he complained, but an unknown staff sergeant and Carr would not move the
gang member inmate from his cell. Plaintiff asserts that the gang member injured him by
beating him with a combination padlock and his fists.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners against
cruel and unusual punishment. An Eighth Amendment claim has two components. The first
is an objective showing: that a plaintiff is “incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm” or has been deprived of “the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities” as a result of Defendants’ actions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 27
834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The 	second 	component 	is 	a 	subjective 	showing: 	that 	Defendant 	acted 	with
“deliberate indifference,” which “entails something more than mere negligence,” but “is
satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or
with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835. To exhibit deliberate indifference, a
prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Specifically 	as 	to 	inmate-on-inmate 	violence, 	prison 	officials 	who 	act 	with
deliberate indifference “to the threat of serious harm or injury” by one prisoner against
another are subject to liability under the Eighth Amendment through § 1983. Berg v.
Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). “Having incarcerated persons with
demonstrated proclivities for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct, having
stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to
outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its
course.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (citation and punctuation omitted).
Plaintiff may be able to state a cognizable claims with these allegations. This claim
is two years newer than the claims upon which Plaintiff was proceeding in the second
Amended Complaint. The Court will order the Clerk of Court to sever this claim from this
case into a new lawsuit. Plaintiff will be required to file a new complaint that provides
sufficient factual information to support the claim, within 30 days after the new case is
opened, or the claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk will be ordered to file this Order in the new case and notify Plaintiff of
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 28
the new case number. Notwithstanding the severance, the date of the filing of the fourth
Amended Complaint in this action (April 2, 2025) will be the operative filing date for
statute of limitations purposes for this claim and the new case. That means Plaintiff’s
injuries asserted in the new action must have occurred no earlier than April 2, 2023, to
meet the statute of limitations. The claim in this case will be dismissed without prejudice
in this case.
16. State Law Claims
Petitioner requests that the federal court exercise jurisdiction over his state law
claims. Dkt. 46 at 5. The Court declines to do so, given that there are no remaining federal
claims to anchor any state law claims. The state law claims will be dismissed without
prejudice in this action. If Petitioner desires to assert a state law claim related to his severed
claim in his new case, he may do so.
17. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff may not proceed
on his fourth Amended Complaint. Further amendment in this case would be futile and a
waste of judicial resources. Accordingly, the fourth Amendment Complaint (Dkt. 46) will
be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
with the exceptions set forth below.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. 	Defendants’ Motion for Summary Dismissal (Dkt. 39) is DENIED as
MOOT.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 29
2. 	Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 39) is DENIED as
MOOT.
3. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Dkt. 45) is GRANTED.
4. 	Plaintiff may not proceed on his fourth Amended Complaint (Dkt. 46). The
following claims are dismissed without prejudice: (1) those subject to Heck
v. Humphrey; (2) the failure-to-protect claim against Melissa Carr upon
which he is permitted to file a new complaint in a new action; and (3) any
state law claims. All other claims are dismissed with prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
5. 	The Court will not entertain any further filings from Plaintiff in this case.
Plaintiff shall not file a motion for reconsideration or any other document
except a notice of appeal and a new in forma pauperis application if he desires
to appeal.
6. 	At this time, Plaintiff’s in forma status is revoked, because he has been out
of prison for nearly a year and his current in forma pauperis application is
out of date. He must file a new in forma pauperis application if he desires to
proceed with an appeal without paying the filing fee.
DATED: February 4, 2026
_________________________
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge
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