USA v. Bradley

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHONY D. BRADLEY,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-CR-30147-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Pending before the Court are three Motions filed by Defendant Anthony D.
Bradley: (1) a Motion for Leave to File Motions Out of Time (Doc. 48); (2) a Motion to
Dismiss Indictment (Doc. 56); and (3) a Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 57). For
the reasons set forth below, all three Motions are DENIED.
FACTUAL & P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
On October 28, 2024 while conducting a “proactive crime suppression detail”
in East St. Louis, law enforcement officers observed two Black male subjects wearing
tan sweatshirts outside the John De Shields housing projects. (Doc. 57, p. 2 (quoting
Investigative Report, p. 1)). Officer Bavetta stated that he recognized Defendant
Bradley because of prior investigations associated with firearms and narcotics and
alleges that he knew Bradley was on federal supervised release. (Id., p. 2 (quoting
Investigative Report, pp. 1–2)). Bavetta alleges that the two men turned and walked
toward an unoccupied silver Ford Mustang once they saw the law enforcement
vehicle. (Id., p. 2 (citing Investigative Report, p. 2)). Officer Bavetta states that he
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witnessed Bradley “pull a black object from the center of his waistband area” and
then “[open] the driver door of the Mustang and [bend] down near the floorboard [of
the car].” (Id., pp. 2–3 (citing Investigative Report, p. 2)). Bavetta alleges that he
identified this object as a handgun and that Bradley continued walking away from
the Mustang until detained. (Id., p. 3 (citing Investigative Report, p. 2)). Another
officer alleged that he saw the handgun on the floorboard of the Mustang through the
window. (Id., p. 3 (citing Investigative Report, p. 2)). Bavetta reports that Bradley did
not consent to a search of the vehicle and did not answer the officers’ questions;
subsequently, Sergeant Renner arrived on scene and used a vehicle lock out tool to
unlock the door of the Mustang without obtaining a warrant. (Id., p. 3 (citing
Investigative Report, pp. 2–3)). Renner recorded the firearm on his bodycam. (Id., p.
3 (citing Investigative Report, pp. 2–3)). Various pills were recovered from the
Mustang and the keys to the Mustang were found in the left pocket of Bradley’s jeans.
(Id., p. 3 (citing Investigative Report, pp. 2–3)). The Government reports that the
firearm in question was loaded with fourteen rounds of ammunition and had a silver
machinegun conversion device installed. (Doc. 58, p. 4 (citing id., Ex. 1, pp. 2–3)). The
recovered pill bottle lacked a prescription label; the seventeen pills inside were
forensically determined to be oxycodone. (Id. (citing id., Ex. 8)).
A Complaint was filed against Bradley on October 30, 2024. (See Doc. 1).
Bradley was arrested on October 31, 2024 and arraigned on November 1, 2024. (See
Docs. 6, 20). At the time of his arraignment, Bradley was represented by Assistant
Federal Public Defender Todd Schultz. (Doc. 18). On November 5, 2024, a grand jury
returned a one-count indictment charging Bradley with being a felon in possession of
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a firearm in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 20). United States Magistrate
Judge Gilbert C. Sison entered an order on November 18, 2024 establishing December
13, 2024 as the deadline for pretrial motions. (See Doc. 29). Attorneys Talmadge E.
Newton, IV and Dylan Ashdown were retained to represent Bradley on April 23, 2025
and Assistant Federal Public Defender Schultz was permitted to withdraw on the
same day. (Docs. 34, 35, 36, 37).
Bradley filed the pending Motion for Leave to File Pre-Trial Motions Out of
Time on October 21, 2025; in this Motion, he requests to file a Motion to Dismiss
Indictment 	and 	a 	Motion 	to 	Suppress 	Evidence 	out 	of 	time. 	(Doc. 	48). 	The
Government responded in opposition on November 4, 2025 and Bradley filed a Reply
on November 6, 2025. (Docs. 50, 54). In order to assess whether Defendant Bradley
had shown good cause for the delay, this Court permitted Bradley to file his two
Motions in order to assess his possibility of success on the merits. (Doc. 55). Bradley
filed both Motions on November 10, 2025. (Docs. 56, 57). The Government responded
to both on December 9, 2025. (Docs. 58, 59, 60).
LEGAL S TANDARD
A motion to suppress seeks to exclude evidence obtained in violation of a
defendant’s constitutional rights. The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST . amend. IV. The Supreme Court has explained
that “[i]n order to effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, this Court long ago conferred upon defendants
in federal prosecutions the right, upon motion and proof, to have excluded from trial
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evidence which had been secured by means of an unlawful search and seizure.”
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968).
“The Supreme Court has consistently held that ‘Fourth Amendment rights are
personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.’” United States v. Carlisle,
614 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978)).
In other words, “[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only
through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134, (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).
The Supreme Court has explained that whether a defendant can challenge a
search is an issue of substantive Fourth Amendment law. See Carlisle, 614 F.3d at
756 	(citing 	Rakas, 	439 	U.S. 	at 	143). 	That 	substantive 	law 	“protects 	against
warrantless intrusions by the government into areas in which that individual holds
a reasonable expectation of privacy.” United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767 (7th
Cir. 2007) (citing Unites States v. Yang, 478 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Additionally, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	determined 	that 	in 	certain
circumstances, police officers can lawfully conduct a warrantless search. In Terry v.
Ohio, the Court ruled that “police conduct, necessarily swift action predicated upon
the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat . . . as a practical matter could
not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
“[A]lthough most warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, 	the 	automobile 	exception 	to 	the 	warrant 	requirement 	permits
‘authorities to search a car without a warrant if they have probable cause.’” United
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States v. Devalois, 128 F.4th 894, 900 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2804 (2025)
(first quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); then quoting United States
v. Jackson, 103 F.4th 483, 486 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing cases)).
That being said, “when the government obtains evidence in violation of an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, the remedy is generally the exclusion of that
evidence—and evidence that is the fruit of the illegal search or seizure—at trial.”
United States v. McGill, 8 F.4th 617, 624 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Utah v. Strieff, 579
U.S. 232, 237–39 (2016)). “But this rule does not apply automatically. Rather, it
applies ‘only . . . where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs,’
and certain exceptions to the rule have arisen accordingly.” Id. (citing Strieff at 237–
39). One of these exceptions is the “good faith” exception, which applies when officers
“act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful.”
United States v. Rainone, 816 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation modified).
A NALYSIS
I. 	Timeliness
There is no dispute that Bradley’s pretrial motions were not timely filed. In his
Motion, Bradley argues that “continuing defense investigation, case evaluation, and
strategy discussions with the client have led counsel to this request to file motions
out of time” and that “Defense counsel believes these motions are necessary to ensure
the Defendant is provided Due Process and Equal Protection under the law.” (Doc.
48, pp. 1–2). The Government argues that “Defendant cannot show any justification
for the delay in filing either of his proposed motions” and that there are not any new
developments in the law related to either of his pretrial motions that would provide
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justification for the delay in the filing of both notions. (Doc. 50, pp. 2–3). The
Government also notes that Defendant’s current counsel requested four continuances
(in addition to the two continuances requested by Assistant Federal Public Defender
Schultz). (Id., p. 2 (citing Docs. 30, 32, 38, 41, 43, 45); see also Doc. 58, pp. 5–6). In his
Reply, Defendant Bradley argues that “defense priorities and strategies in any case
are constantly shifting” and that “[t]o deny the Defendant the ability to shift priorities
and strategies, especially as new counsel is onboarded to his case denies him the right
to Due Process under the 5th Amendment and the Effective Assistance of Counsel
under the 6th Amendment.” (Doc. 54, p. 1).
“Under Rule 12(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, if a party does
not meet the deadline for filing a motion to suppress, the motion is untimely.” United
States v. Jackson, No. 22-CR-55, 2023 WL 3932853, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2023),
aff’d, 132 F.4th 1019 (7th Cir. 2025). That being said, “[t]he court may nevertheless
consider the motion if the party shows good cause for failing to file it in a timely
manner.” Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM . P. 12(c)(3); United States v. Jackson, 5 F.4th 676,
682 (7th Cir. 2021)).
This Court holds that Defendant Bradley has not shown good cause for his
failure to file timely pretrial motions. As the Government notes, the facts and law
utilized in his Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suppress have been available during
the pendency of this case. (See Doc. 50). For this reason alone, his Motion for Leave
to File Motions Out of Time (Doc. 48) must be denied along with his Motion to Dismiss
and Motion to Suppress.
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In Jackson, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination
that the defendant’s attorney had not provided good cause for the ten-month delay in
filing pretrial motions. 132 F.4th at 1020. They noted they “could stop there, but
Jackson then could seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that the lawyers’
unjustified delay violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to the assistance of
counsel.” Id. They continued, noting that “[o]ne question in such a proceeding would
be whether deficient legal assistance caused prejudice—in other words, whether a
timely motion to suppress would have been granted.” Id. They found it “prudent” for
the district judge to address this question “to fend off any collateral attack.” Id. (citing
2023 WL 3932853 at *3–7 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2023). For this reason, this Court will
assess whether or not Bradley’s two pretrial Motions would have been granted.
II. 	Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Bruen)
In his Motion to Dismiss, Bradley argues that “18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as applied
to him, is unconstitutional in violation of the Second Amendment, based on the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).” (Doc. 56, p. 1).
Before delving too deeply into the analysis, this Court notes that Bradley cites
to the Third Circuit’s opinions in Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96, 106 (3d Cir.
2023) (en banc) and in Range v. Attorney General, 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en
banc). (Doc. 56, pp. 2–3). Bradley correctly states that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings in
light of Rahimi. See Garland v. Range, 144 S. Ct. 2706 (July 2, 2024) (Mem.) (citing
Rahimi). Although the Third Circuit reached the same result after remand (finding
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that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional), this is not the law of this Circuit. See Range v.
Attorney General, 124 F.4th 218 (3rd Cir. 2024) (en banc). Bradley next cites a variety
of district court cases, all of which are currently pending on appeal before the Seventh
Circuit. (See Doc. 56, p. 3) (citing United States v. Prince, No. 1:22-CR-240, 2023 WL
7220127 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2023) (appeal pending, No. 23-3155); United States v.
Griffin, No. 1:21-CR-693, 2023 WL 8281564 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2023) (appeal pending,
No. 23-3330); United States v. Taylor, No. 23-40001-SMY (S.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2024)
(appeal pending, No. 24-1244); United States v. Cherry, No. 3:23-30112-SMY (S.D. Ill.
Feb. 1, 2024) (appeal pending, No. 24-1322); United States v. Crisp, No. 3:23-30006-
SMY (S.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2024) (appeal pending, No. 24-1406); United States v. Martin,
No. 4:23-40048-SMY (S.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2024) (appeal pending, No. 24-1438)). Bradley
also cites the Seventh Circuit decision in Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018 (7th Cir.
2023), which declined to address the Bruen historical test on the merits, instead
remanding the case for further development. See id. at 1021–25.
At the outset, the Court notes that Bradley does not point to a historical basis
for individualized assessments and, even if he had, he has not demonstrated that
Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him. As noted above, the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Atkinson required a party challenging the constitutionality of
Section 922(g)(1) to develop a historical record that justified individual assessments.
See 70 F.4th at 1023; see also United States v. Gutierrez, No. 22-2778, 2024 WL
1125080, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2024) (applying Atkinson in the context of a criminal
challenge to Section 922(g)(1)). As Atkinson did not develop this historical basis for
individual assessments, the Seventh Circuit found that his argument fell short and
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remanded the case to develop this record further. Atkinson, 70 F.4th at 1023. In a
similar vein, Bradley fails to develop any historical basis for individual assessment.
Bradley’s motion is threadbare and contains misstatements of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Bruen. For example, Bradley argues that the lack of a distinctly
similar 	historical 	regulations 	compels 	the 	conclusion 	that 	the 	statute 	is
unconstitutional as applied to him. (Doc. 56, pp. 4–7). However, Bruen noted that a
historical analogue need not be a “historical twin,” but rather a “relatively similar”
and “well-established and representative historical analogue” will pass constitutional
muster. 597 U.S. at 30; see Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (“The law must comport with the
principles underlying the Second Amendment, but it need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a
‘historical twin.’” (citing Bruen at 30)). Therefore, the history must not demonstrate
a tradition of permanently disarming those who are like Mr. Bradley, but rather
simply analogous laws that are relatively similar. Further, Bradley misstates Bruen’s
discussion on historical regulations relating to longstanding societal problems. (Doc.
56, p. 6). Bradley states that if the Founders could have passed a particular regulation
that would have confronted a longstanding societal problem but declined to do so, the
lack of a regulation means that the regulation is unconstitutional. (Id.). However,
Bruen made clear that such an absence of regulation merely serves as evidence of the
unconstitutionality of such a regulation, not proof of unconstitutionality. 597 U.S. at
26. It is possible that the Founders did not exercise the full extent of the Second
Amendment, and thus requiring a historical twin, as Bradley’s framing of Bruen
required, would too severely limit the scope of permissible regulations on firearms.
See Rahimi at 737–40 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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Even if that were not the case, this Court has issued various orders on similar
Section 922(g)(1) challenges that discussed the history and traditions standard. See
United States v. Ware, 673 F. Supp. 3d 947 (S.D. Ill. 2023); United States v. Dean, No.
22-CR-30117-SPM, 2024 WL 964675 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2024); United States v. Bowden,
No. 24-CR-30117-SPM, 2025 WL 870110 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2025); United States v.
Avila, No. 25-CR-30026-SPM, 2025 WL 1938537 (S.D. Ill. July 15, 2025). While some
of the laws mentioned in the Court’s previous history and traditions analysis would
certainly fail present-day constitutional scrutiny and may not be worthwhile to factor
into any future analysis under Bruen in retrospect, the Court finds, as others have
before it, that Section 922(g)(1) is part of the historical tradition “that delimits the
outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms” under the Second Amendment, such
that it is not unconstitutional as applied to Bradley. Bruen at 19.
As stated before, Bradley does little to rebut this conclusion. Rather than
addressing laws which may in fact be sufficiently analogous to Section 922(g)(1),
Bradley instead relies on conclusory statements of history. (Doc. 56, pp. 4–7). Surety
laws and going armed laws are just two examples of regulations which may be
relevant to this historical inquiry yet were not addressed by Bradley. See Rahimi, 602
U.S. at 693–97. The Supreme Court has previously articulated that the history of
these two laws established the principle that “[w]hen an individual poses a clear
threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.”
Id. at 698.
Bradley’s attempt to narrow the historical inquiry to only include laws which
permanently disarmed felons like Mr. Bradley fails, again, because it misstates the
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central holding of Bruen, that a historical analogue is required, not a historical twin.
597 U.S. at 27–29; see Rahimi at 692. This attempt to limit the historical analysis
also fails because it misrepresents Section 922(g)(1) as a permanent disarming of
felons. While § 922(g)(1) does disarm felons, it does not do so permanently, as the law
does contain mechanisms to render the disarmament non-permanent. Importantly,
this prohibition does not permanently extend to felons who have received a pardon,
have had their record expunged, or who have received a restoration of their civil
rights. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
The Government cites to United States v. Gay, 98 F.4th 843 (7th Cir. 2024),
reh’g denied, No. 23-2097, 2024 WL 3816648 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024) for the
proposition that an as-applied constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) is only designed
for those who are law-abiding citizens. (Doc. 61, p. 19 (citing 98 F.4th at 846–47)). In
Gay, the Defendant had been “convicted of 22 felonies, including aggravated battery
of a peace officer and possessing a weapon while in prison.” Id. at 847. The Seventh
Circuit noted that “[i]nstead of contesting § 922(g)(1) through a declaratory-judgment
action, as Range did, Gay violated the law in secret and tried to avoid detection. He
fled from the police by car and on foot, and flight to avoid prosecution is a crime in
most if not all states.” Id. (citing United States v. Holden, 70 F.4th 1015 (7th Cir.
2023)).
The preceding analysis notwithstanding, Bradley has not made a sufficient
showing that Section 922(g)(1) would be unconstitutional as applied to him. A court
may consider Bradley’s criminal record in determining whether the defendant “poses
a clear threat of physical violence to another.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. The Court
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determines 	that 	Bradley’s 	criminal 	history 	demonstrates 	such 	a 	threat; 	the
Government reports that Bradley’s criminal history includes “Second Degree Murder,
Tampering with Witnesses, and multiple cases involving illegal firearm possession.”
(Doc. 61, p. 47; see also id., p. 1 n.1). The Government argues that “[t]his criminal
record more than supports a finding of dangerousness (even assuming that label is
relevant to the § 922(g)(1) constitutionality analysis) as it reflects the risk Defendant
poses to public safety, his disregard for the law, and society’s inability to trust that
he will use a weapon responsibly.” (Id., p. 47 (citing United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d
1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Price, 656 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D. Ill. 2023)
(Doc. 22, p. 5 n.2))); see also United States v. Gay, 98 F.4th 843, 846–47 (7th Cir.
2024)). Thus, there is no colorable argument that Defendant Bradley is a “law-abiding
citizen” with his criminal history.
While this Court is not willing to say that an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1)
could never be successful, the facts of this case do not cast any doubt on the
constitutionality of this prohibition. In this case, neither the underlying felony nor
the amount of time that has lapsed since the committing of that felony demonstrates
that Section 922(g)(1) as applied to Bradley is unconstitutional. Rather, the facts of
this case firmly place Bradley’s prohibition on the possession of firearms within the
limits of the Second Amendment. For these reasons, the Court finds that Bradley’s
Section 922(g)(1) charge in the Indictment is constitutional and his Motion to Dismiss
the Indictment (Doc. 56) would have been denied on the merits if timely filed.
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III. 	Motion to Suppress
A. 	Standing
In his Motion to Suppress, Bradley argues that he has standing to contest the
constitutionality of the warrantless search of the silver Mustang at issue in this case.
(See Doc. 57). He states that the car in question was a rental car rented by his
significant other. (Doc. 57, p. 5). He noted that the keys to the car were found in
Bradley’s own pocket when he was detained. (Id.). Bradley relies on the Supreme
Court’s holding in Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395 (2018) for the proposition that
“someone in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it even if the rental agreement does not list him or her as an
authorized driver.” (Doc. 57, p. 5 (quoting Byrd at 398–99)). The Government does
not dispute Bradley’s standing. Therefore, this Court holds that Bradley has standing
to challenge the warrantless search of the silver Mustang in question.
B. 	The Search
Bradley argues that law enforcement did not have probable cause to search the
silver Mustang. (Doc. 57, pp. 5–7). Bradley insists that the fact that Bradley was
present in a “very high crime” area and walked away from police is not enough to
establish reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause. (Id., pp. 6–7 (citing United
States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 2018); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
124, (2000); United States v. Bohman, 683 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d
860, 865 (7th Cir. 1999))). He also argues that the fact that the officer recognized
Bradley is insufficient to establish probable cause and to justify detaining him for
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questioning. (Id., p. 7 (citing United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir.
1997))).
In opposition, the Government argues that seizure of the weapon at issue does
not fall under the protection of the Fourth Amendment because Bradley knowingly
exposed it to the public. They argue that Bradley did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy because the firearm in question was visible through the
vehicle’s window. (Doc. 58, pp. 6–7 (quoting United States v. Thompson, 811 F.3d 944,
948 (7th Cir. 2016); Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); United States v. Ware, 914 F.2d 997, 1000 (7th
Cir. 1990)). They argue that all three elements of the plain view doctrine are met,
arguing that (1) officers were on public property when they saw and recognized
Bradley, (2) the weapon in question was in plain view through the silver Mustang’s
window, and (3) the incriminating nature of the weapon was plainly apparent. (Id.,
pp. 7–8 (citing United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 262 (7th Cir. 2016); 720 I LL.
COMP . STAT . 5/24-1(a)(4))). The Government argues that Byrd v. United States is
distinguishable because it involved the search of a vehicle trunk, not a firearm in
plain view through the vehicle’s window. (Id., p. 8 (citing 584 U.S. 395, 398–99
(2018))).
The Government also argues that the warrantless seizure of the firearm is
justified under the community caretaking doctrine established by the Supreme Court.
(Id., p. 9 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); United States v. Lugo,
978 F.2d 631, 636 (10th Cir. 1992))). They note that “the reporting officer identified
that the John DeShields Homes and surrounding area are considered high crime
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areas which include instances of ‘shootings, narcotic sales, illegal firearms possession,
and carjackings’” (id. (citing id., Ex. 1, p. 2)) and that “[a] machinegun in plain view
on the floorboard making it readily accessible to children, vandals, or thieves is
plainly dangerous” (id.).
Finally, the Government also argues that the warrantless search in question
is justified by the automobile exception. (Id., p. 10 (citing Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153–56 (1925); United States v. Pittman, 411 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.
2005))). The Government provides an image of Bradley from the date in question (Doc.
58, p. 12, Ex. 8) that shows that lighting conditions at the time of Bradley’s arrest did
not prevent police from clearly identifying Bradley. They note that Bradley walked
away from law enforcement, bent down to leave the firearm inside the car, walked
away, and then refused to comply with law enforcement commands when they
attempted to stop him. (Id., p. 13). Moreover, as discussed supra, the firearm was in
plain view through the window of the silver Mustang.
This Court holds that probable cause existed to search the vehicle in question.
Therefore, considering the above, this Court holds that the search of the silver
Mustang did not violate Bradley’s rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
Therefore, even if it had been timely filed, Bradley’s Motion to Suppress would not
succeed on the merits, as the warrantless seizure of the firearm and pills from the
silver Mustang comported with (1) the plain view doctrine; (2) the community
caretaking doctrine, and (3) the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
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C. 	Evidentiary Hearing
Additionally, while Bradley requests an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 57, p. 7), this
Court concurs with the Government that Bradley has not met his burden to allege
any disputed material facts (Doc. 58, pp. 14–15). Therefore, this Court holds that an
evidentiary issue is not required. See United States v. Dixon, 137 F.4th 592, 610 (7th
Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018))
(citing United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011)).
C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Anthony D. Bradley’s Motion for Leave
to File Motions Out of Time (Doc. 48) is DENIED and his Motion to Dismiss
Indictment (Doc. 56) and Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 57) are both DENIED.
Bradley’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suppress are both denied (1) for being
untimely filed without good cause and (2) because both would fail on the merits even
if timely filed. Therefore, Bradley has failed to show good cause for failing to timely
file his Motions and, in addition, the Indictment at issue does not violate the Supreme
Court precedent established in Bruen and the search of the vehicle in this case did
not violate Bradley’s Fourth Amendment rights.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	January 7, 2026
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
Case 3:24-cr-30147-SPM Document 63 Filed 01/07/26 Page 16 of 16 Page ID
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