USA v. Hager

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
SEAN L. HAGER,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:24-CR-30178-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendant Sean L. Hager’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Order
(Doc. 106), entered on July 13, 2026, which modified the conditions of his supervised release.
For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the Motion.
BACKGROUND
Sixteen years ago, Defendant Sean L. Hager pleaded guilty to four sex offenses and
was sentenced to a suspended term of seven years’ imprisonment followed by five years of
probation. (Doc. 113 at p. 2). The conviction arose from an illicit sexual relationship in which
Hager 	engaged 	between 	November 	and 	December 	2007. 	(Id). 	Upon 	conviction 	and
sentencing, Hager was enrolled in sex offender treatment but received no treatment before
he was released from supervision in 2014. (Id. at pp. 2–3). As a result of the conviction, Hager
was thereafter required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) in his place of residence. (Doc. 49 at p. 2).
From around April 2023 through October 2024, Hager registered as a sex offender in
St. Louis County, Missouri, while indicating he was a person experiencing homelessness
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when asked for his place of residence. (Doc. 49 at pp. 2–3). But on four separate occasions in
that timeframe, he indicated his place of residence—while still experiencing homelessness—
as Fenton, Missouri. (Id). Between March 1 and August 12, 2024, Hager was actually residing
in Cahokia Heights, Illinois, with his girlfriend. (Id). Hager did not update his registration to
reflect this change of address, nor did he register as a sex offender in the state of Illinois as
required. (Id).
In December 2024, Hager was indicted on one count of Failure to Register as a Sex
Offender (Doc. 1). He pleaded not guilty to the charge and proceeded to trial but was
convicted by a jury in October 2025. (Doc. 97 at p. 1). In March 2026, the undersigned
sentenced Hager to a term of time-served (he spent about six weeks in custody following his
arrest in this case) and a five-year term of supervised release. (Doc. 107 at p. 2).
In the final Pre-Sentence Report filed on March 12, 2026 (Doc. 90), Probation did not
include a condition of sex offender evaluation and potential treatment. (Id). A few months
later, the omission was discovered by Hager’s supervising officer, Sheryll Vilcinskas.
Once Officer Vilcinskas discovered the omission, she obtained her manager’s
approval to include the sex offender evaluation/treatment as a condition of Hager’s
supervised release and personally discussed the proposed modification with Hager.
(Doc. 113 at p. 4). (Id). She also notified Hager of his right to counsel and a hearing before
seeking a modification.
When Officer Vilcinskas spoke with Hager about the sex offender evaluation
condition and its omission from the PSR, she discussed three matters with him. (Doc. 113 at
pp. 3–4). First, she explained that if the condition was added, Hager would be required to
undergo a sex offender evaluation conducted by a qualified professional therapist and
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potential treatment if the evaluation necessitated it. (Id). In other words, Hager would not
automatically be required to undergo treatment; it depended on what the evaluation showed.
(Id). Second, Officer Vilcinskas assured Hager that the United States Probation Office would
bear any costs associated with the evaluation and treatment. (Id. at p. 4). Finally, Officer
Vilcinskas explained that the failure to include the evaluation in the PSR was an oversight
and was discovered pursuant to an audit she herself conducted in July 2026. (Id).
Hager then voluntarily signed the Waiver of Hearing to Modify the Conditions of
Supervised Release. (Id. at p. 5). Probation thereafter filed a Petition asking the Court to
modify Hager’s condition of supervised release to add the omitted condition to require Hager
to undergo a sex-offender evaluation and, if necessary, treatment as a condition of his
supervised release. (Id. at p. 4). Because Hager had waived his right to a hearing, the Court
modified the conditions of his supervised release and imposed the condition as requested.
L EGAL S TANDARD
A sentencing court is vested with the authority “to impose any condition of
supervised release that is reasonably related to one or more of the permissible goals of
sentencing.” United States v. Mercado, 777 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 2015). The conditions must
not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to serve the purposes
set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B) (“to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”),
3553(a)(2)(C) (“to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”), and 3553(a)(2)(D)
(“to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”). 18 U.S.C. §§ 3533(a)(2)(B),
3553(a)(2)(C), 3553(a)(2)(D). In short, the overarching goals of supervised release conditions
are deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of the public. Id.
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D ISCUSSION
Requiring Hager to undergo a sex-offender evaluation to determine whether he needs
treatment is not “a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d). A sex-offender evaluation—and treatment, if necessary—is reasonably related to
deterring future criminal conduct, rehabilitating a defendant, and protecting the public. See
United States v. Russell, 81 F.4th 726, 30 (7th Cir. 2023) (finding that a sex offender evaluation
condition 	promoted 	the 	U.S. 	Sentencing 	Commission’s 	policy 	goals 	of 	deterrence,
rehabilitation, and protection of the public). As the Seventh Circuit explained in Russell, sex
offender evaluation that may lead to treatment is a modest condition. Russell, 81 F.4th at 730
(emphasis added). The fact that Hager’s current conviction is not for a sex offense does not
make the condition improper. Id. at 729–30.
The Court acknowledges that Hager’s conviction for a sex crime was nearly two
decades ago. (Doc. 113 at p. 2). The defendant in Russell similarly received a sex offense
conviction (albeit for a misdemeanor) in 2010, years before his sex offender evaluation
condition was imposed. 81 F.4th at 728. After acknowledging that sex offender treatment
might be unnecessary to deter or rehabilitate a particular defendant or to protect the public,
the Seventh Circuit noted that all that was required of the defendant in Russell was an
evaluation. Id. at 730. The passage of time between Hager’s sex offenses and the imposition of
the condition does not immunize him from the “modest” requirement of a sex-offender
evaluation. See Mercado, 777 F.3d at 538.
Hager calls the Court’s attention to United States v. Goodwin where the Seventh Circuit
found that several conditions imposed by the court were overbroad, vague, and unwarranted
in light of the defendant’s crime of failure to register as a sex offender and the purposes of
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sex offender treatment. See Doc. 107 at pp. 4–5 (citing 717 F. 3d 511, 513–14 (7th Cir. 2013)).
But the disputed conditions in Goodwin are markedly more intrusive and severe than the sex
offender evaluation required of Hager. The conditions were as follows: requiring the
defendant to install internet monitoring software on his computers; submitting to searches of
his person, car, computer, and other property; allowing his computer equipment to be
removed for comprehensive examinations; forbidding the defendant from having any
contact with minors except in the presence of an adult who has been made aware of
defendant’s prior sex offense; prohibiting the defendant from possessing material that
“depicts or alludes to sexual activity;” and placing content restrictions on defendant’s use of
the internet. 717 F. 3d at 523–26. Compared to these conditions, a requirement to submit to a
sex offender treatment evaluation does not appear “unduly harsh.” Id. at 522.
The court struck down another condition in Goodwin—sex offender treatment as
deemed necessary by the probation officer. 717 F. 3d at 525. It was treatment not an evaluation
that the court held improper—treatment that would have been at the defendant’s own
expense and “as deemed necessary by the probation officer.” Id. at 526. By contrast, Hager
would only have to undergo treatment if deemed necessary by a qualified professional
therapist. (Doc. 113 at p. 4).
Hager also cites United States v. Johnson, which involved a defendant who, at age
seventeen, was convicted of a misdemeanor sex offense, and was later convicted of a drug
offense and being a felon in possession of a firearm. 756 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2014). A special
condition of supervised release imposed at sentencing (omitted in the pre-sentence report)
required the defendant to participate in a sex offender treatment program. Id. at 539. Johnson
may similarly be distinguished because Hager will only be required to submit to an
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evaluation, which may or may not yield a need for treatment. Furthermore, the defendant in
Johnson would have had to incur the cost of the treatment himself—a situation not
encountered by Hager.
It is true that Probation failed to add the sex offender evaluation condition to the PSR.
However, as soon as the oversight was discovered, they took the necessary steps to rectify
the error and informed Hager of both the condition and its inadvertent omission. After being
advised of his right to counsel and a hearing, Hager willingly and voluntarily waived his
rights to both. The Court does not condone a practice of untimely additions to the PSR, but
based on the record, the omission does not appear to be as nefarious as Hager suggests.
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	October 9, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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