Torres v. McLanahan et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GLEN TORRES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ZACHARY MCCLANAHAN, JILIAN
CRANE, and BERNARD YOKOM, JR.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:24-CV-1455-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is currently before the Court on the motion for summary judgment on
the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendant Jilian Crane (Doc. 41). For the reasons
explained below, the motion is denied at this time. However, Defendant Crane may
request a Pavey hearing if she wishes to further contest the specific factual issue of
whether Plaintiff submitted multiple grievances that went unanswered.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Glen Torres, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
brought this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Plaintiff alleged in pertinent part that on October 11, 2023, he and the other inmates
in Menard’s segregation unit were intentionally served bugs in their breakfast (Doc. 1, p.
49; see also Doc. 70). Plaintiff further alleged that the officers on duty taunted him and the
other inmates about the bugs, and Major Zachary McClanahan told them the bugs were
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in response to inmates previously taking the yard hostage (Doc. 1, pp. 49-50). Plaintiff
claimed that he suffered from diarrhea and vomiting for four days after the incident, and
that McClanahan refused his requests for medical care (Id. at p. 50). Plaintiff also alleged
that when Nurse Practitioner Crane walked through the gallery, he told her about his
symptoms and asked for medical care, but she accused him of acting like a child and
instructed him to drink some water and ask the correctional officers for toilet paper (Id.).
Following a threshold review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
Plaintiff was permitted to proceed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claim against Major McClanahan for serving him oatmeal with bugs in it (Count 1) and
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Major McClanahan and
Nurse Practitioner Crane for refusing to provide Plaintiff with medical care for his
symptoms after eating tainted oatmeal (Count 2) (Doc. 11). He was later permitted to
amend his complaint to add a claim against Bernard Yokom, Jr., the Food Supervisor on
duty when the oatmeal was served (Doc. 47, pp. 3–5; Doc. 69).
While Defendants McClanahan, Crane, and Yokom all asserted exhaustion as an
affirmative defense, (Docs. 20, 24, 83), McClanahan and Yokom later withdrew it (Doc.
59, 60, 88, 89). Crane is the only Defendant who moved forward with filing a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 41; see also Docs. 42, 43).1 She argues
1 Defendant Crane filed her motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion while Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend his complaint was still pending (see Doc. 39, Doc. 41). The Court granted
Plaintiff’s motion but allowed Defendant Crane’s motion for summary judgment to stand despite the
amended complaint because the motion was already briefed and Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant
Crane remained substantively the same (Doc. 47, p. 6).
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that there is only one fully exhausted grievance regarding the oatmeal incident, but it is
insufficient to cover Plaintiff’s claim against her because it does not name her, describe
her, or otherwise mention any conduct attributable to her (Doc. 42, pp. 3, 7). Plaintiff filed
a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, claiming he filed
grievances other than the one Defendant Crane discussed, which all went unanswered
(Doc. 46). Crane was later given leave to file a late reply brief (Doc. 60), in which she
essentially argues that Plaintiff’s story is not credible for a variety of reasons and therefore
should not be believed by the Court (Doc. 55).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a). In making that determination, the Court “generally will construe all facts and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Apex Digital,
Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013).
The Court ordinarily cannot decide factual disputes on a motion for summary
judgment; that is a job for the jury at trial. See Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14
F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021) (“On summary judgment we do not weigh conflicting
evidence, resolve swearing contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party's
version of the facts is most likely to be true”); Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 806
(7th Cir. 2021) (“On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations,
weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for
a factfinder.”) (citations omitted); Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A]
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trial is the standard means of resolving factual disputes . . . .”). However, when the factual
dispute relates to exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has
instructed that the dispute should be resolved by the judge as a preliminary matter in an
evidentiary hearing, as opposed to waiting for a jury to decide at trial. Smallwood v.
Williams, 59 F.4th 306, 315 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir.
2008)). Accord Hernandez v. Lee, 128 F.4th 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2025); Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th
948, 957 (7th Cir. 2024).
DISCUSSION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit
about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available administrative
remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “To exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and
appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules require.” Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Accord Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 864
(7th Cir. 2016) (“[A] prisoner must comply with the specific procedures and deadlines
established by the prison’s policy.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
Seventh Circuit requires strict compliance with the exhaustion requirement. E.g.,
Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306, 313 (7th Cir. 2023).
Despite the strict exhaustion requirements, the PLRA “does not demand the
impossible,” and a prisoner need not exhaust remedies that are “genuinely unavailable
or nonexistent.” Smallwood, 59 F.4th at 313 (citation omitted). Administrative remedies
become “unavailable” when, for example, “prison employees do not respond to a
properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner
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from exhausting.” Pyles, 829 F.3d at 864 (citation omitted). “In such cases, the prisoner is
considered to have exhausted his administrative remedies.” Id. (citation omitted).
Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, “the burden of proof is on the defendants
to establish that administrative remedies were not exhausted, and not on the prisoner to
show that administrative remedies were unavailable.” Smallwood, 59 F.4th at 315
(citations omitted).
Here, Defendant Crane argued that Plaintiff’s grievance records from the ARB
contain only one grievance pertaining to the oatmeal incident that was fully exhausted
before Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on June 6, 2024: emergency grievance #K4-1023-0744,
which was authored and submitted on October 11, 2023, the date that the incident
occurred (Doc. 42, p. 3; see also Doc. 42-1, pp. 37–41 (records for grievance #0744)).
Defendant Crane contends that grievance #0744 is not sufficient to cover Plaintiff’s claim
against her because it does not name her, describe her, or otherwise mention any conduct
attributable to her (Doc. 42, p. 7). The Court agrees; there is simply nothing in the
grievance that indicates Plaintiff was complaining about Nurse Crane refusing or
otherwise failing to provide him with necessary medical care. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §
504.810(c) (requiring grievances name or at least describe each person “who is the subject
of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint”); Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 995
(7th Cir. 2020) (noting that the purpose of exhaustion is to give “a prison ‘notice of, and
on opportunity to correct, a problem.’”) (citation omitted); Roberts, 745 F.3d at 234
(explaining “fatal defect” in grievance was “the absence of anything in it to indicate that
[the defendant] was the target.”).
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That is not the end of the matter, however, because Plaintiff contends that he filed
other grievances “regarding retaliation, being fed bugs, and denial of medical,” which
were never responded to (Doc. 46, p. 4, para. 5). Specifically, Plaintiff argued that he had
inmates Makial Lucas and Latron Cross file multiple other grievances on his behalf in
October 2022 regarding Nurse Crane and the denial of medical treatment, but he never
received responses to any of them (Doc. 46, p. 5, para. 10–13). Plaintiff did not provide
any copies of these additional grievances, but rather supported his assertions with his
own declaration and declarations from Lucas and Cross (Doc. 46, p. 5; Id. at pp. 14–16
(Makial Lucas declaration, dated December 21, 2024); Id. at pp. 17–18 (Latron Cross
declaration, dated December 14, 2024); Id. at pp. 19–21 (Plaintiff’s declaration, dated
December 19, 2024)). According to the declarations, Makial Lucas wrote grievances for
Plaintiff on October 11 and October 15, 2023 (Doc. 46, pp. 14–21).2 Plaintiff said that he
had Latron Cross file another grievance for him “as of” October 30th (Doc. 46, p. 21), and
Cross said that he “dropped one personally” for Plaintiff on November 1st (Id. at p. 17).3
As Defendant Crane pointed out, there are a number of issues that make Plaintiff’s
story questionable (Doc. 55). First, Plaintiff’s story regarding his efforts to exhaust has
shifted over time, with new information trickling out as this case has progressed (see Doc.
2 It is unclear whether the grievance that Lucas wrote for Plaintiff on October 11th is grievance #0744
discussed above, or whether Plaintiff submitted two separate grievances that day (see Doc. 55, p. 7).
3 Plaintiff also asserted in an unsworn statement in his response brief that he “filed another grievance on
October 20, 2024” (Doc. 46, p. 5, para. 13). The Court suspects that Plaintiff intended to write 2023, not 2024.
At any rate, there is no mention of an October 20, 2023 or 2024 grievance in any of the declarations (see id.
at pp. 14–21).
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55, p. 4; compare Doc. 1, p. 4 with Doc. 48, p. 3 and Doc. 46, pp. 19–21). In short, Plaintiff
never explicitly stated that he submitted grievances about Defendant Crane that went
unanswered until Crane filed her motion for summary judgment, pointing out that
grievance #0744 was insufficient to exhaust against her (see Doc. 55, p. 4).
Second, there are times where the information Plaintiff provided in his response
brief is inconsistent with or unsupported by the declarations (see, e.g., Doc. 55, p. 4). The
Court also notes that, at times, the information Plaintiff provided within his response
brief is internally inconsistent.4 As a result of the discrepancies within and between
Plaintiff’s briefs and the various declarations, the Court is uncertain just how many
grievances Plaintiff is claiming to have submitted that went unanswered, who wrote
them, or how they were submitted.
Finally, Plaintiff and his fellow declarants provided few, if any, details about the
content of the unanswered grievances (see Doc. 55, p. 5; see also Doc. 46, pp. 14–21).5 The
most that was said is that one or two of them were “regarding” or “on” Nurse Crane
(Doc. 46, p. 5, para. 10, 11; id. at 20). For others, it is suggested but not explicitly stated
4 As one example, Plaintiff stated in his response brief that he “had Makial Lucas personally file a grievance
for [him] regarding Nurse Crane” because “[he] could not physically do it himself,” (Doc. 46, p. 5, para.10),
seemingly because he was too ill (see id. at p. 4, para. 6, 7). However, later in his response brief, Plaintiff
says that he had Lucas file a grievance for him because he “has a writing disability” and Lucas’s
handwriting is “better and clear” (Doc. 46, p. 8).
5 Defendant Crane also argued that Plaintiff’s assertion about multiple grievances going unanswered is
belied by the evidence, which shows that the prison responded to other grievances that Plaintiff submitted
before and after the incident (Doc. 55, pp. 4, 6). The Court, however, disagrees that this is a reason to doubt
Plaintiff’s sworn statement. As the Seventh Circuit previously explained, the fact that the prison responded
to and returned other grievances during the relevant time frame “says nothing” about whether the
particular grievances at issue were responded to. Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 868 (7th Cir. 2016). It is
“at best very week evidence[.]” Id.
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that they were about Nurse Crane (see, e.g., id. at pp. 14–21).
While these issues certainly give the Court reason to question the truth of
Plaintiff’s story, the Court cannot say—and Defendant Crane does not expressly argue
(see Doc. 55)—that these issues make Plaintiff’s story so “utterly implausible” that it can
be rejected outright without holding an evidentiary hearing because “no reasonable
person could resolve the material factual disputes in [Plaintiff’s] favor.” Whitaker v.
Dempsey, 144 F.4th 908, 914, 917, 918 (7th Cir. 2025) (“The utter-implausibility exception
to the general prohibition on resolving factual disputes at summary judgment is reserved
for the ‘exceptional’ and ‘extreme’ case.”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Jackson, 105 F.4th at 958 (“For the district court to [find] for the prison
officials without first holding a Pavey hearing, the prison officials . . . must ‘establish
affirmatively’ that the evidence is so one-sided that no reasonable factfinder could find
that [the prisoner] was prevented from exhausting his administrative remedies.”).
It is possible that Plaintiff concocted his story on the fly in an effort to create an
issue of material fact, but it is not manifestly apparent. Furthermore, it is not outside the
realm of possibility that Plaintiff may be able to explain the variations and inconsistencies
in his story. On the other hand, it may well be that Plaintiff’s contentions do not withstand
scrutiny on cross-examination at a Pavey hearing. Ultimately, the concerns with and
variations in Plaintiff’s story amount to an issue of credibility. But see Whitaker, 144 F.4th
at 918 (“[I]n rare cases, ‘a party's inconsistent and contradictory statements transcend
credibility concerns and go to the heart of whether the party has raised genuine issues of
material fact to be decided by a jury.’”) (quoting Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
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Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2011)) (emphasis in original). And the Court cannot
decide whether to believe or disbelieve Plaintiff based on the papers alone; it can only do
so after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Ingram v. Watson, 67 F.4th 866, 871 (7th Cir.
2023) (“[T]he court also cannot disbelieve statements in affidavits without holding a
hearing.”); Roberts, 745 F.3d at 234 (explaining it that credibility determinations should
not be made prior to the district court conducting an evidentiary hearing). Consequently,
Defendant Crane’s motion for summary judgment is denied at this juncture.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Jilian Crane’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion
(Doc. 41) is DENIED at this time. However, if Defendant Crane wants to continue to
pursue the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies with respect
to the issue of whether Plaintiff submitted grievances that went unanswered, she must
request a Pavey hearing within 14 days of this Order. If no request is made, the Court will
enter a scheduling order for discovery on the merits of this case. Alternatively, the parties
may request that this case be referred for alternative dispute resolution.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 7, 2026
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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