Moss v. Continental Tire the Americas, LLC

3:24-cv-01477IlsdNov 21, 2025

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIAM MOSS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONTINENTAL TIRE THE
AMERICAS, LLC,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-CV-01477-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	a 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	filed 	by
Defendant Continental Tire The Americas, LLC. (Doc. 49). Having been fully
informed of the issues presented, Continental’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
R ELEVANT FACTUAL A ND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
Plaintiff William Moss is a former employee of Continental, having worked at
their location in Jefferson County, Illinois from October 2021 to November 2022. (See
Doc. 26). Moss alleges that he was subjected to various forms of discrimination and
retaliation while employed at Continental and brings the following claims in his
operative Amended Complaint: (1) race-based discrimination in violation of Title VII
of 	the 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	of 	1964, 	42 	U.S.C. 	2000e 	et 	seq.; 	(2) 	gender/sexual
harassment/discrimination in violation of Title VII; (3) retaliation in violation of Title
VII; (4) creation of a hostile workplace in violation of Title VII; and (5) discrimination
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (See id.).
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This Court entered a Scheduling Order in this case on March 21, 2025. (Doc.
34). Defendant Continental filed a Motion for Protective Order on July 16, 2025;
Continental requested this Court to ensure that Plaintiff’s deposition was completed
prior to taking Continental’s corporate representative’s deposition. (Doc. 39). This
Court granted Continental’s Motion for Protective Order on August 4, 2025. (Doc. 41).
Continental then filed a Motion to Compel (Doc. 42) on August 20, 2025; this Court
granted the Motion in part and denied it in part on September 24, 2025. (Doc. 48).
The instant Motion was filed on October 9, 2025. Plaintiff filed a Response on October
17, 2025. (Doc. 53). Continental filed a Reply on October 24, 2025. (Doc. 56). This
Court held oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss on November 10, 2025. (Doc. 58).
A PPLICABLE LAW A ND LEGAL S TANDARDS
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to obtain
discovery “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim
or defense.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need
not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. In addition to being relevant,
the discovery sought must be proportional to the needs of the case, “considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefits.” Motorola Sols., Inc. v. Hytera Commc’ns
Corp., 365 F. Supp. 3d 916, 924 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing F ED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(1) permits a party to “move for an order
compelling disclosure or discovery” provided that the motion includes “a certification
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that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or
party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court
action.” This certification is also required by Local Rule 26.1(c)(2) and the Court’s
Case Management Procedures. Rule 37(b) provides that failure to comply with a
discovery order issued by the court is a sanctionable offense, with potential sanctions
including dismissal of the action in whole or in part, default judgment, or holding a
party in contempt of court. See F ED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
“Under Rule 41(b), the district court has authority to dismiss a case if the
‘plaintiff fails to prosecute.’” Pouliot v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., No. 21-2735, 2025
WL 1275774, at *2 (7th Cir. May 2, 2025) (quoting F ED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)). “The court
may ‘infer a lack of intent to prosecute a case from a pattern of failure to meet court-
imposed deadlines.’” Id. (quoting Dickerson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ford Heights, 32 F.3d
1114, 1117 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Ledford v. Waldo, No. 23-2463, 2024 WL 1104785,
at *2 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 2024). “And the court does not need to impose less severe
sanctions before dismissing the case ‘[w]here the pattern of dilatory conduct is clear.’”
Pouliot at *2 (quoting Dickerson, 32 F.3d at 1117) (citing Ball v. City of Chicago, 2
F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 1993)). “The district court need only provide ‘due warning’ to
the plaintiff’s counsel that an imminent threat of dismissal is likely.” Id. (citing In re
Bluestein & Co., 68 F.3d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Ball, 2 F.3d at 755).
A NALYSIS
Defendant Continental raises the same issues with Plaintiff’s inadequate and
tardy discovery responses as raised and addressed by this Court on August 4, 2025
(Doc. 41) and September 24, 2025 (Doc. 48). They insist that Plaintiff Moss has not
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supplemented his Rule 26 disclosures since July 2, 2025 even after this Court ordered
him to so (Doc. 49, p. 3 (citing Docs. 41, 48)), has failed to execute and serve
employment authorizations after ordered by the Court to do so (id., p. 4), has failed
to supplement his responses to Continental’s Interrogatories (id., pp. 5–9), and has
failed to provide the documentation he was ordered to produce (id., p. 12). Continental
requests that this case be dismissed with prejudice and that this Court grant it
attorneys’ fees and costs associated with their Motion. (Doc. 49, pp. 12–13).
In opposition, Plaintiff insists that he “complied with the terms of the order to
the best of his ability and has addressed the issues raised in Defendant’s motion.
(Doc. 53, p. 1 n.1). Plaintiff’s counsel writes that because Moss does not have a
computer, “Plaintiff has had significant technological challenges through which his
counsel has tried to navigate without revealing confidences to opposing counsel.” (Id.,
p. 2 n.2). Plaintiff’s counsel insists that “Plaintiff has not engaged in any dilatory
conduct and has not been unresponsive” and that “Plaintiff’s counsel’s assistant
responded each time there was in inquiry” and that “more time was needed to try to
get the information from Mr. Moss.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s counsel also insists that
Continental failed to follow Rule 37(a)(1), Local Rule 26.1(b), and this Court’s Case
Management Procedures in that Defendant did not make an effort to meet and confer
with her prior to filing the instant Motion. (Id., pp. 4, 11–12). Additionally, Plaintiff’s
counsel argues that Plaintiff has made every effort to comply with this Court’s orders.
(Id., pp. 6–8). She also argues that Continental has not suffered prejudice and that it
has manufactured issues where none exist. (Id., pp. 14–20).
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Continental 	provides 	a 	very 	different 	narrative 	in 	its 	Reply. 	(Doc. 	56).
Continental argues that “Plaintiff makes unpersuasive excuses and misstates the
facts.” (Id., p. 2 (footnote omitted)). Continental notes that, unlike Rules 26 and 37,
evidence of a good-faith attempt to meet and confer is not required for a Rule 41
Motion. (Id., p. 2). Continental asserts that it has provided detailed answers to
Plaintiff’s written discovery requests and calls Plaintiff’s arguments “egregious,”
“inconsistent with reality,” “without support,” and a “flagrant violation of a Court
order.” (Id., pp. 3–5). Continental also insists that all of Plaintiff’s cited caselaw is
distinguishable from the instant case. (Id., pp. 5–6).
First, Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the “meet and confer” requirement are
meritless. As Continental notes, Rule 41 does not require the parties to provide this
certification. (See Doc. 56, p. 2). Moreover, it appears that Continental has made
extensive efforts to confer with Plaintiff prior to filing its various Motions with this
Court. (See id. (“Continental already filed a discovery motion under Rule 37—which
was granted—prior to which Continental attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff
on at least 17 occasions over seven months.” (footnote omitted)); see also Docs. 39, 42,
49).
Moving forward, it is undeniable that this is the third time that Plaintiff Moss’s
conduct during discovery has been brought before this Court. Plaintiff Moss was put
on notice on August 4, 2025 (Doc. 41) and September 24, 2025 (Doc. 48) that failure
to comply with this Court’s orders would result in dismissal of this case. Plaintiff was
“sternly and expressly warned” on September 24, 2025 that failure to comply with
this Order would result in dismissal of this case with prejudice for failure to follow a
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Court order in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). (Doc. 48 (citing
F ED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 681 (7th Cir. 2005);
Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Lucien v. Breweur, 9 F.3d 26, 29
(7th Cir. 1993)); see Pouliot, 2025 WL 1275774, at *2 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b));
see also Ledford, 2024 WL 1104785, at *2.
Because Continental admits that Moss did provide another set of supplemental
responses to Continental’s Interrogatories on October 3 (see Doc. 49), the question is
whether Moss’s responses are sufficiently fragmentary such that they violate this
Court’s September 24, 2025 Order. (Doc. 48). A recent Seventh Circuit case is
instructive. 	In 	Pouliot, 	the 	plaintiff 	submitted 	discovery 	responses 	that 	were
“woefully deficient” and did not relate to her legal claims in any way. 2025 WL
1275774 at *1. Moreover, the plaintiff’s contumacious conduct lasted for two years
prior to the district court’s dismissal of the case: “[t]he court correctly observed—and
Pouliot herself admits—that she engaged in a yearslong pattern of dilatory conduct
by failing to comply with court orders and ignoring discovery requests.” Id. (citing
Dickerson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ford Heights, 32 F.3d 1114, 1117 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also
McMahan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 892 F.3d 926, 932 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming district
court’s dismissal after plaintiff’s sixteen-month delay in prosecuting his case); Dukes
v. Cox, 657 F. App’x 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s dismissal after
plaintiff’s five-year delay in prosecuting her case). Additionally, the Seventh Circuit
held that it was not “fundamentally wrong” for the district court to determine that
Pouliot’s status as caregiver for her ill spouse “did not excuse her from her discovery
obligations.” Pouliot at *2 (citing Moffitt v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 236 F.3d 868, 872–
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76 (7th Cir. 2001); Dickerson, 32 F.3d at 1117–19). The Seventh Circuit also affirmed
another recent Rule 41(b) dismissal where the plaintiff exhibited “a clear record of
delay and contumacious conduct by failing to appear for status conferences, respond
to motions, or participate in discovery.” Ledford v. Waldo, No. 23-2463, 2024 WL
1104785, at *2 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 2024).
There 	are 	factors 	here 	pointing 	in 	either 	direction. 	Clearly, 	Moss 	has
responded 	to 	Continental’s 	motions 	and 	has 	participated 	in 	discovery; 	Moss’s
diligence and degree of participation are at the forefront of Continental’s Motion.
Notably, Moss has provided limited factual details to back up his claims since the
inception of this case. (See Docs. 25, 30). Moss’s counsel insists that Moss lacks
technological savviness and simply does not possess all of the documentation that
Continental demands. (See Doc. 54).
This Court specifically stated in its Order filed on March 10, 2025 that “if
Moss’s claims ‘are deficient, they can be pared off on summary judgment.’” (Doc. 30,
p. 9 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335, 1338
(7th Cir. 2024))). This Court is loath to dismiss a case prior to its adjudication on the
merits. After oral argument and after reviewing Moss’s responses to Continental’s
Interrogatories in camera, this Court holds that Moss has made a good faith, if
threadbare, effort to comply with this Court’s discovery orders and with Continental’s
discovery requests. At this stage, it appears that Plaintiff Moss’s purportedly
deficient 	responses 	to 	discovery 	are 	due 	to 	lack 	of 	information, 	to 	his 	own
technological 	limitations, 	and 	to 	genuine 	misunderstandings 	associated 	with
comprehension, not to any dilatory or vexatious motive. This Court holds that Moss’s
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responses do not represent flagrant disregard for this Court’s orders. Therefore, this
Court declines to sanction Moss via dismissal of this case. That being said, this Court
is concerned about the amount of time Continental was required to expend to obtain
basic written discovery responses from Moss. Thus, while this case will not be
dismissed as a sanction and Continental will not be awarded its costs and fees at this
point, this Court cautions Moss that additional discovery teeth-pulling on information
backing up his claims may result in the award of costs and fees at a later date should
discovery require additional expenditure of this Court’s resources.
In that vein, this Court will tolerate no additional delays in discovery absent
exceptional and unforeseen circumstances. This Court expects and demands that the
parties in this case work together to bring this case to a final adjudication on the
merits as expeditiously as possible. Additionally, Moss’s counsel of record shall take
special care to personally ensure that Plaintiff Moss fully complies with this Court’s
discovery orders.
C ONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Continental’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 49) is
DENIED. The stay on discovery is hereby LIFTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 21, 2025
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
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