Luedtke v. Acting Warden

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMES LUEDTKE,
Petitioner,
v.
ACTING WARDEN, FCI
GREENVILLE,
Respondent.
Case No. 25-CV-01662-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Before the Court is a Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) filed by Petitioner James Luedtke. (Doc. 9). Having been
fully informed of the issues presented, the Motion for Relief from Judgment is
GRANTED in part as to Claim One only of James Luedtke’s Habeas Petition. (Doc.
1).
FACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
This Court has previously recounted the procedural background with respect
to Petitioner James Luedtke’s underlying criminal conviction and sentence and
subsequent 	collateral 	attacks 	in 	this 	Court’s 	prior 	November 	11, 	2025 	Order
dismissing his Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases
in the United States District Courts. (Doc. 7). The Court will therefore only briefly
summarize the procedural history herein. On September 2, 2003, before the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Luedtke was convicted by
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a jury on five criminal counts stemming from the underlying conduct of armed
robbery of a federally insured bank, use of a firearm during or in relation to a crime
of violence, felon in possession of a firearm, and aiding and abetting the making of
false statements during acquisition of a firearm. (See Doc. 7, pp. 1−2). Luedtke was
sentenced, in relevant part, to a total of 444 months of imprisonment and to pay
restitution in the total amount of $12,377.00. (See id., p. 2); United States v. Luedtke,
No. 03-CR-37-WCG (E.D. Wis. 2003). Luedtke is currently incarcerated at FCI
Greenville. (See id.).
Luedtke’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal on March 10, 2005.
See United States v. Luedtke, 125 F. App’x 732 (7th Cir. 2005). He then filed a 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which was denied and affirmed on appeal. See Luedtke v.
United States, No. 05-C-0489, 2005 WL 1229686 (E.D. Wis. 2005). Since then,
Luedtke has pursued five separate 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petitions. Three were denied in
the Eastern District of Kentucky between 2011 and 2014, one was dismissed in the
Eastern District of California in 2019 and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, and one was
dismissed in this District in 2024.1 He filed the instant, sixth Petition on August 29,
2025, which this Court dismissed on November 19, 2025. (Docs. 1, 7).
In his sixth Petition, Luedtke raised two issues. (See Doc. 1). In his first claim,
he argued that the Acting Warden unlawfully froze his prison trust fund account.
1 See Luedtke v. Berkebile, Case No. 7:11-cv-00080-HRW (E.D. Ky. 2011); Luedtke v. Farley, No. 7:12-
cv-00044-KKC (E.D. Ky. 2012); Luedtke v. Farley, No. 7:14-cv-0075-ART (E.D. Ky. 2014); Luedtke v.
Lake, No. 119-cv-01034-SKOHC, 2019 WL 4166776 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019). The fifth Petition was in
this District. Luedtke v. Lillard, Case No. 24-cv-01197-DWD (S.D. Ill. 2024). For a more developed
discussion of Luedtke’s filing history, see the Factual Background portion of the District Court’s Order
in that case. Id. (Doc. 18).
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(Id.). To assist in repayment of Luedtke’s restitution ordered in his sentence, inmates
are encouraged by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to participate in the Inmate
Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”). See 28 C.F.R. § 545.10; see also United
States v. Boyd, 608 F.3d 331, 333−34 (7th Cir. 2010). The program is voluntary, but
inmates will lose certain privileges for refusing to participate. See 28 C.F.R. §
545.10−11; Boyd, 608 F.3d at 334. Relevant to Luedtke’s Petition, 28 C.F.R. §
545.11(d)(6) specifies that, while non-participants in IFRP may be subjected to more
stringent spending limits, that these spending limits must be set to at least $25 per
month, excluding certain purchases. Luedtke admits to not participating in the
program, however he argues that his account had been frozen in violation of 28 C.F.R.
§ 545.11(d)(6), which requires him to have a spending limit of no less than $25.00 per
month. Luedtke contends his spending limit is currently $0.00 because of his refusal
to participate in the IFRP. (See Doc. 1).
Luedtke’s second claim is that his order to pay restitution as part of his
criminal sentence was unlawful. (Id). He asserts that the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) is unconstitutional and was unlawfully
enacted. (See id., p. 18). Luedtke claims that but for the unlawful enactment of
AEDPA, his liability on restitution would have already expired, as he was sentenced
twenty years ago or more. (Id., p. 21). This Court dismissed Luedtke’s second claim
after concluding that it was not cognizable under § 2241 because it was not related to
the administration of his IFRP schedule nor was it related to the constitutionality or
execution of his sentence. (See Doc. 7, p. 8–10). In very limited circumstances,
prisoners may challenge convictions with § 2241 under the § 2255 “savings clause”;
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however, this Court concluded that the savings clause was not applicable here. (Id.)
Luedtke did not dispute the dismissal of his second claim on these grounds and so
this Court will not address it in this Order.
Luedtke’s first claim was dismissed because of his failure to concretely
establish that he had exhausted administrative remedies. (Id.) Petitioners are
required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal district
courts, including before filing a § 2241 petition. See Ihmoud v. Jett, 272 F. App’x 525,
526 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Richmond v. Scibana 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004);
Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004); McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884, 887
(7th. Cir. 1999)); Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1989)). To exhaust
administrative remedies, petitioners must “file complaints and appeals in the place,
and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286
F.3d, 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). The BOP’s administrative remedy process consists
of four tiers that require completion prior to a petitioner bringing their Petition in
federal court. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13–15.
While Luedtke claimed in his Petition to have completed this process, it was
not clear from a plain reading of the Petition that he had done so. His Petition
indicated that he filed an initial complaint through the Bureau of Prisons on March
1, 2025, which was denied on April 11, 2025. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Elsewhere, he summarily
asserted that “all administrative remedies have been exhausted,” but offered no
supporting documentation or factual context. (Id., p. 17). When prompted to identify
subsequent appeals on page three of the § 2241 form, Luedtke acknowledged that he
did not pursue a second or third appeal and provided no explanation for his failure to
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do so. (Id., p. 3). Further, he did not attach any materials showing an appeal to either
the Regional Director or the General Counsel. Accordingly, this first claim was
dismissed under Rule 4 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (See Doc. 7).
Following 	the 	dismissal 	of 	his 	Petition, 	Luedtke 	filed 	the 	instant 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration on December 1, 2025. (Doc. 9).
LEGAL S TANDARD
Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule
of 	Civil 	Procedure 	60(b) 	“is 	an 	extraordinary 	remedy 	and 	is 	granted 	only 	in
exceptional circumstances.” Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Dickerson v. Board of Educ., 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994)); see Gonzalez-Koeneke
v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582,
584 (7th Cir. 2008)). Rule 60(b) states that a party may seek relief from a judgment
for one or more of the following reasons: (1) “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect”; (2) “newly discovered evidence”; (3) “fraud”; (4) “the judgment is
void”; (5) “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable”; or (6) “any other reason that justifies relief.” If the asserted ground
for relief from the prior judgment does not fall within one of the specific categories
enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1)−(5), relief may be available under the residual provision
of the rule, 60(b)(6), which requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances
justifying the reopening of a final judgment. Arrieta, 461 F.3d at 865. Mendez v.
Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2013).
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DISCUSSION
In his Motion, Luedtke argues that he is entitled to relief because (1)
exhaustion is an affirmative defense that cannot be raised by this Court and (2) the
court erred in dismissing his Petition for lack of evidence of exhaustion. (Doc. 9). With
his Motion, Petitioner attached a document that appears to be a response to a BP-11
appeal form. (See Doc. 9, Ex. 1).
Luedtke 	first 	argues 	that the 	exhaustion 	requirement is 	an affirmative
defense, citing Jones v. Bock in support, and that this Court cannot raise the issue.
See 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Further, he contended that this Court erred in not taking
his claims of exhaustion at face value, arguing that a “a court must accept all of the
allegations in a complaint as true.” Wesley v. Osemobor, 2025 WL 1825426, Case No.
25-C-503 (E.D. Wis., July 2, 2025). The Court does not find that it committed any
mistake or otherwise acted inadvertently or neglectfully in analyzing the issue of
exhaustion of administrative remedies at the Rule 4 preliminary review stage. Jones
v. Bock, the case Luedtke points to, states that “[f]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative
defense under the PLRA, and inmates are not required to specially plead or
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” 549 U.S. 199 (2007). However, Jones v.
Bock involed claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, otherwise known as the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Luetke’s filing is a habeas corpus Petition brought
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As this Court stated in its dismissal of the Petition,
exhaustion of administrative remedies is required for claims brought under § 2241 in
the Seventh Circuit. See Ihmoud, 272 F. App’x at 526; see also Greene, 875 F.2d at
641. Further, Rule 4 provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district
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judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” (emphasis added). Therefore,
this Court was entirely within its discretion to deny the Petition at this stage if it
appears that exhaustion has not been satisfied. The Court will not grant Rule 60(b)
relief for this reason.
Luedtke next argues that this Court erred in dismissing his case and granting
judgment against him because he claims that he did, in fact, satisfy the Corut’s
exhaustion requirement. To support this contention, he attached a document that
appeared to be a response to a submitted BP-11 form from the relevant BOP General
Counsel. (Doc. 9, Ex. 1). Specifically, the document Luedtke attaches is a pink form
titled “Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal” in which Luedtke wrote that
his account was illegally frozen and that he sent his BP-10, the yellow form on
January 30, 2025. (See id.). Luedtke filed the pink BP-11 form on March 1, 2025,
claiming that the lack of response to his BP-10 form constitutes a denial pursuant to
28 C.F.R. § 542.18. (See id.). The second attachment to Luedtke’s Motion appears to
be a response to his BP-11 from Timothy Barnett, Administrator of National Inmate
appeals, dated May 8, 2025. (Id., Ex. 2). Barnett provides, in the Response, that his
office had “reviewed documentation relevant to your appeal and, based on our
findings, concur with the manner in which the Warden and Regional Director
responded to your concerns at the time of your Request for Administrative Remedy
and subsequent appeal.” (Id.).
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Based on this information, while Luedtke has not provided this Court with all
documentation related to the exhaustion of his administrative remedies (including
his BP-8, BP-9, and BP-10 forms and responses thereto, if any), the Court is able to
infer that Luedtke exhausted his administrative remedies such that his Petition may
survive Rule 4 preliminary review. It appears to this Court that Luedtke completed
the final tier of the BOP’s administrative review process by submitting a BP-11 form
related to the encumbrance on his funds and received a denial from the National
Inmate Appeals on May 8, 2025. Accordingly, the Court finds that this evidence
warrants granting Luedtke relief from the final judgment entered against him in this
matter and reopening this matter such that his first claim survives preliminary
review. See Rule 60(b). This order does not prevent Respondent from arguing, in the
future, that Luedtke has failed to completely exhaust his administrative remedies.
As to his second claim, Luedtke has made no argument that this Court erred
in granting judgment against him and dismissing those claims related to the
unconstitutionality of his sentence to pay restitution pursuant to AEDPA. This Court
finds there is no basis to reverse its decision to dismiss that claim, and Luedtke shall
not proceed on this claim moving forward.
C ONCLUSION
For the reasons provided herein, Petitioner James Luedtke’s Motion for Relief
from Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (Doc. 9) is
GRANTED in part with respect to his first claim for relief brought in his Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Luedtke’s Motion is DENIED in part with respect to all
other requests for relief, including relief from judgment entered as to his second
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claim. The Court’s Order issued on November 19, 2025 (Doc. 7) is VACATED in part
with respect to dismissing Claim One of Luedtke’s Petition and the Clerk’s Judgment
entered on November 19, 2025 is VACATED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
reopen this matter.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall answer or otherwise plead
on or before February 6, 2026. This preliminary order to respond does not preclude
the Government from raising any objection or defense it may wish to present. Service
upon the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois, 750 Missouri
Avenue, East St. Louis, Illinois, shall constitute sufficient service.
Luedtke is ADVISED of his continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court
(and opposing parties) informed of any change in his whereabouts during the
pendency of this action. This notification shall be done in writing and not later than
fourteen (14) days after a transfer or other change in address occurs in accordance
with Local Rule 3.1(b)(2). Failure to provide such notice may result in dismissal of
this case or other sanctions. See id.; F ED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 7, 2026
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
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