MILLER v. SEVIER et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
ARTHULA MILLER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB
)
MARK SEVIER, 	)
S. RILEY, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS TO EXHAUSTION DEFENSE
Plaintiff 	Arthula 	Miller 	filed 	this 	action 	contending 	that 	Defendants
deprived him of constitutionally adequate medical care while he was incarcerated
at New Castle Correctional Facility. Defendants moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Mr. Miller failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") before filing this lawsuit.
Because 	factual 	issues 	preclude 	summary 	judgment 	for 	Defendants, 	their
motions, dkts. [27], [31], are DENIED. The Court also GRANTS Mr. Miller's
motion for case status, dkt. [44], to the extent that it issues this order.
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, a way to resolve
a case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate
when there is no genuine dispute over any of the material facts, and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Comm.
Schs., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A "genuine dispute" exists when a
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Material facts" are those that
might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,
572–73 	(7th 	Cir. 	2021). 	It 	cannot 	weigh 	evidence 	or 	make 	credibility
determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-
finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need only
consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need
not "scour the record" for evidence that could be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind.
Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).
"[A] 	party 	seeking 	summary 	judgment 	always 	bears 	the 	initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying 	those 	portions 	of 	'the 	pleadings, 	depositions, 	answers 	to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving party
may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at
325.
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 2 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
II.
Factual Background
A. Plaintiff's Claims
Mr. Miller mailed his complaint on July 24, 2025, and it was filed with this
Court on July 30, 2025. Dkt. 1. The Court's screening order allowed Eighth
Amendment claims to proceed against Dr. Stephanie Riley and New Castle
Warden Mark Sevier based on Mr. Miller's allegations that Dr. Riley delayed
treating and scheduling surgery for a mass on Mr. Miller's throat and Warden
Sevier knew about the delay but failed to exercise his authority to do anything
about it. Dkt. 9.
B. Grievance Process
Defendants designated as evidence affidavits from Grievance Coordinator
Melissa Rutledge about the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC") and New
Castle's grievance process. See Dkts. 27-1, 33-1. During the relevant time, the
IDOC had a standardized Offender Grievance Process that allowed inmates to
resolve concerns and complaints related to their conditions of confinement. Dkt.
33-1 ¶¶ 4–5; see dkt. 33-2 (Offender Grievance Process). To fully exhaust a
grievance, an inmate had to timely complete each step of the Grievance Process
using the proper grievance forms. Dkt. 33-1 ¶ 4.
During the relevant period, the Grievance Process consisted of three steps:
(1) submitting a formal grievance on the required form within 10 days of the
incident being grieved; (2) submitting a Level 1 appeal, or a written appeal to the
facility Warden/designee within 5 days of receiving an unsatisfactory response;
and (3) submitting a Level 2 appeal, or a written appeal to the Department
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 3 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Offender 	Grievance 	Manager 	within 	5 	days 	of 	receiving 	an 	unsatisfactory
response. Id., ¶ 5; dkt. 33-2 §§ X–XII.
After an inmate submits a formal grievance, the grievance specialist must
return a copy of the grievance to the inmate with a "received" stamp within 2
business days. Dkt. 35-2 at 3 (Executive Directive # 25-24). Grievance specialists
must review the grievance within 10 business days of stamping it as "received."
Id. If an inmate does not receive a response within 30 business days of receiving
the date stamped copy of the grievance form, the inmate may file an appeal as
though the grievance had been denied. Id. at 4.
Ms. Rutledge's affidavit states that inmates do not have to ask anyone for
grievance forms. Dkt. 33-1 ¶ 15. They are available in the law library and can be
requested from case workers and unit team managers. Id.
C. Plaintiff's Attempts at Exhaustion
Ms. Rutledge is the custodian of all offender grievance records at New
Castle. Id., ¶¶ 7–8. She found that Mr. Miller filed two grievances related to
medical care for his throat, neither of which were appealed. Id., ¶¶ 10–12; see
dkts. 33-4, 33-5.
First, on June 26, 2026, Mr. Miller filed a grievance against "the medical
department," 	complaining 	about 	the 	delay 	in 	treating 	his 	painful 	throat
condition. Dkt. 41-1 at 33. This was marked as received on June 27 and assigned
Grievance Number 25-218915. Id. On June 30, Ms. Rutledge returned the
grievance as untimely, stating that it complained about an incident that had
occurred more than 10 days before Mr. Miller filed the grievance. Id. at 37. Mr.
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 4 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
Miller's affidavit states that he submitted a revised grievance on July 1 along
with a letter to Ms. Rutledge that he was grieving an ongoing condition. Dkt. 40
¶¶ 17–18. He made copies of the grievance and the letter, which he attached as
exhibits. Dkt. 41-1 at 11, 13. Mr. Miller never received a stamped copy of his
renewed grievance, nor did he receive a response to it. Dkt. 40 ¶¶ 20–22.
The second grievance Ms. Rutledge had a record of is Mr. Miller's July 24,
2026, grievance stating that he had filed multiple medical requests about the
growth in his throat but had yet to receive the recommended medical care. Dkt.
33-4 at 3. This was marked as received on July 24 and assigned Grievance
Number 25-225060. Id. Ms. Rutledge responded on October 1 that Mr. Miller
had been seen by the medical provider and scheduled for surgery. Id. at 1. Mr.
Miller marked "agree" on the response form and did not appeal. Id.
Mr. Miller's affidavit states that on July 9, 2025, he submitted a grievance
complaining about his interaction with Warden Sevier the day before. Dkt. 36 ¶
7. Mr. Miller never received a stamped copy of the grievance. Id. ¶ 8. He then
submitted 	another 	grievance 	and 	a 	letter 	to 	Ms. 	Rutledge 	on 	July 	14,
complaining about not receiving a stamped copy of the July 9 grievance. Id. ¶¶
9–10. Mr. Miller never received a response to either grievance. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16.
III. Discussion
The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies
before 	suing 	over 	prison 	conditions. 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1997e(a). 	"[T]he 	PLRA's
exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether
they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 5 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532
(2002). "To exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must comply strictly
with the prison's administrative rules by filing grievances and appeals as the
rules dictate." Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006)). A "prisoner must submit inmate complaints
and appeals 'in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules
require.'" Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
While the exhaustion requirement is strict, it "hinges on the availability of
administrative remedies: An inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies,
but need not exhaust unavailable ones." Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016).
"[T]he 	ordinary 	meaning 	of 	the 	word 	'available' 	is 	'capable 	of 	use 	for 	the
accomplishment of a purpose,' and that which 'is accessible or may be obtained.'"
Id. The availability requirement "has teeth." Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306,
313 (7th Cir. 2023). "The PLRA exhaustion requirement does not demand the
impossible . . . [r]emedies that are genuinely unavailable or nonexistent need not
be exhausted." Id. Ross v. Blake identified "three kinds of circumstances in which
an administrative remedy, although officially on the books," is not "available": (1)
when "it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently
unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates"; (2) when it is "so opaque
that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use," such as when no
ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it; or (3) when "prison administrators
thwart 	inmates 	from 	taking 	advantage 	of 	a 	grievance 	process 	through
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 6 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." 578 U.S. at 643−44. "Because
exhaustion is an affirmative defense," Defendants face the burden of establishing
that "an administrative remedy was available and that [Plaintiff] failed to pursue
it." Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015).
Defendants 	initially 	argued 	that 	Mr. 	Miller 	failed 	to 	exhaust 	his
administrative remedies by not filing any grievances related to his claims against
them. Dkts. 28, 32. Mr. Miller then designated contrary evidence with his
responses that he submitted grievances against Warden Sevier on July 9 and
July 16 and that he submitted grievances against Dr. Riley on June 26 and July
1. Warden Sevier did not file a reply. Dr. Riley replied that Mr. Miller's June 26
grievance was not properly exhausted because it was rejected as untimely. Dkt.
42 at 4–5. The reply does not address Mr. Miller's testimony that he submitted
another grievance related to the ongoing delay in his medical care on July 1. Dr.
Riley instead argued that the fact that the July 24 grievance was resolved, and
not appealed, shows that Mr. Miller did not exhaust the available administrative
procedures. Id. at 5–6.
Mr. Miller's designated evidence shows two factual issues that prevent the
Court 	from 	granting 	summary 	judgment 	for 	Defendants 	on 	the 	issue 	of
exhaustion. See Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., 892 F.3d 887,
893 (7th Cir. 2018) ("As we have said many times, summary judgment cannot
be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants.").
First, Mr. Miller has designated evidence that he submitted grievances
against Warden Sevier on July 9 and July 14. Warden Sevier does not argue that
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 7 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
Mr. Miller should have appealed these grievances to the final level, and Ms.
Rutledge's failure to provide stamped copies of the grievances or responses could
show that the Grievance Process was a "dead end." Ross, 578 U.S. at 644; see
Smallwood, 59 F.4th at 314 (citing Lanaghan v. Koch, 902 F.3d 683, 688 (7th
Cir. 2018)) (explaining that the grievance procedure can operate as a "dead end"
even "in the absence of affirmative misconduct by prison officials."). "When
prison officials fail to timely respond to a prisoner's grievances, for example,
administrative remedies are unavailable." Jones v. Lamb, 124 F.4th 463, 468
(7th Cir. 2024) (citing Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 682 (7th Cir. 2005))
(reversing summary judgment for prison officials when they failed to respond to
the prisoner's grievances within the time proscribed in the grievance policy or
notify him of a delay).
Second, Mr. Miller designated evidence that he submitted a corrected
grievance related to Dr. Riley's medical care on July 1 after Ms. Rutledge
returned the June 26 grievance as untimely. As with the grievances against
Warden Sevier, the fact that Mr. Miller did not receive a stamped copy or a
response within the given time frame could show that the Grievance Process was
not available.
Because Mr. Miller's affidavit states that he filed those grievances before
filing 	the 	lawsuit, 	Defendants 	are 	not 	entitled 	to 	summary 	judgment 	on
exhaustion, and the Court does not address Mr. Miller's July 24 grievance.
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 8 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
Defendants have the burden of proving that the Grievance Process was
available to Mr. Miller as a matter of law. They have not met their burden, so
Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the exhaustion defense.
IV. Rule 56(f) Notice and Further Proceedings
The motion for case status, dkt. [44], is GRANTED to the extent that the
Court issues this order.
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motions for summary judgment,
dkts. [27], [31], are DENIED. Moreover, neither Defendant responded to Mr.
Miller's evidence that he never received stamped copies back of the relevant
grievances that he submitted. The Court therefore gives the Defendants notice
under Rule 56(f)(1) of its intent to grant summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor
on the issue of exhaustion. The Defendants have through November 6, 2026,
to show cause why summary judgment should not be granted in Mr. Miller's
favor 	on 	exhaustion.1 	Alternatively, 	the 	Defendants 	may 	withdraw 	their
affirmative defense by this date.
SO ORDERED.
1 The Entry Directing Development of Exhaustion Defense and Issuing Partial Stay, dkt.
19, states that "if Plaintiff responds with evidence that the administrative remedy
process was unavailable, the movant may and should consider whether selecting one of
the other two options outlined above is the appropriate course—that is, conceding that
a Pavey hearing is necessary or withdrawing their affirmative defense. Alternatively, the
reply must directly confront the plaintiff’s evidence regarding availability and explain
why summary judgment is warranted despite that evidence." Thus, if Defendants intend
to provide evidence to contradict Mr. Miller's affidavits, they must show cause why such
evidence should not be considered untimely.
Date: 10/9/2026
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 9 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
Distribution:
ARTHULA MILLER
135730
NEW CASTLE - CF
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels
1000 Van Nuys Road
NEW CASTLE, IN 47362
Benjamin Daniel Ice
Barrett & McNagny
bdi@barrettlaw.com
Joseph Thomas Lipps
BBFCS ATTORNEYS
jlipps@bbfcslaw.com
Case 1:25-cv-01536-JPH-KMB Document 45 Filed 10/09/26 Page 10 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>