Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
EVANSVILLE DIVISION
JULIE A. J., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:25-cv-00003-CSW-RLY
)
FRANK J. BISIGNANO Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER ON MOTION FOR EAJA FEES
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s First Motion for Attorney Fees
Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (Dkt. 25). The
Court GRANTS the motion for the reasons set forth below.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
On January 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Complaint seeking judicial review of
the ALJ’s unfavorable finding denying Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits.
(Dkt. 1). The Court granted Defendant’s motion to remand and entered judgment
on July 30, 2025, reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanding for
further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Sentence
Four”). (Dkt. 23). Plaintiff timely filed the instant Motion with supporting
documentation on October 18, 2025, requesting an EAJA attorney fee award in the
amount of $1,460.25. (Dkt. 25).
II. 	DISCUSSION
Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), a “court shall award to
a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . .
incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In order to succeed on a Petition for EAJA fees,
Case 3:25-cv-00003-CSW-RLY Document 31 Filed 11/19/25 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

the movant must, within thirty days of final judgment in the action1, file an
application (1) showing that he is a “prevailing party,” (2) providing the Court with
an itemized statement that represents the computation of the fees requested, and
(3) alleging that the position taken by the United States was “not substantially
justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Additionally, the Court may, in its discretion,
reduce or deny the award of fees and expenses if the prevailing party “engaged in
conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the
matter in controversy” during the course of the proceedings. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(C).
There is no question that Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this case. See
Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff whose complaint is
remanded to an administrative law judge for further consideration qualifies as a
“prevailing party” under section 2412(d)(1)(B) of the EAJA). Plaintiff has provided
appropriate documentation for her fee request.
Next, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that his pre-litigation
conduct, including the ALJ’s decision itself, and his litigation position were
substantially justified. See Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Commissioner has filed a response to the Motion in which he states that he
does not object to the fee request. (Dkt. 29). The Court also is not aware of any
“conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the
matter in controversy” by Plaintiff or her counsel. Therefore, the Court will not
reduce or deny an award of fees or expenses on such grounds.
Finally, the Court must determine whether the amount of the fee award
sought by Plaintiff is reasonable pursuant to the terms of the EAJA. As a threshold
requirement, section 2412(d)(1)(B) of the EAJA requires Plaintiff to submit “an
itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing
[o]n behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees
and other expenses were computed.” Plaintiff has done so. (See Dkt. 25-2).
1 When a case is remanded pursuant to Sentence Four, “the filing period begins after the final
judgment (‘affirming, modifying, or reversing’) is entered by the court and the appeal period has run,
so that the judgment is no longer appealable.” 	Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991).
Case 3:25-cv-00003-CSW-RLY Document 31 Filed 11/19/25 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

Plaintiff’s counsel spent 1.0 hour on her case in 2024 and 5.6 hours on her case in
2025, which the Court finds to be reasonable.
A reasonable EAJA fee is calculated under the lodestar method by
multiplying a reasonable number of hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate.
Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 602 (2010). Although the hourly rate is statutorily
capped at $125.00 per hour, the language of the statute permits the Court to allow
for “an increase in the cost of living” to arrive at a higher hourly rate. 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(A). In order to prove that such an increase is justified, the Seventh
Circuit has held that “an EAJA claimant may rely on a general and readily
available measure of inflation such as the Consumer Price Index, as well as proof
that the requested rate does not exceed the prevailing market rate in the
community for similar services by lawyers of comparable skill and experience.”
Sprinkle v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2015). Reliance solely on a readily
available measure of inflation is not sufficient, as an inflation-adjusted rate might
result in a rate higher than the prevailing market rate in the community for
comparable legal services, creating a windfall, which is to be avoided. Id. at 428–29.
Plaintiff sets out the appropriate calculation of the applicable hourly rates
permitted by the EAJA, taking into account the increase in the cost of living, as set
forth in the Consumer Price Index, since the statutory hourly rate was set at
$125.00 per hour in March 1996.2 (See Dkt. 25-2). The Court finds that the rate
requested by counsel does not exceed the prevailing market rate in the community
by lawyers of comparable skill and experience and is consistent with the rate
approved in other similar cases in this district.
III. 	C ONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion (Dkt.
25) 	and awards fees in the amount of $1,460.25. An award under the EAJA
belongs to Plaintiff and not her attorney and can be offset to satisfy any pre-existing
debt that Plaintiff owes the United States. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010).
2 The EAJA was amended in 2011 and 2019 without change to this rate.
Case 3:25-cv-00003-CSW-RLY Document 31 Filed 11/19/25 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

However, if Defendant verifies that Plaintiff does not owe a pre-existing debt
to the government subject to the offset, Defendant shall direct that the award be
made payable to Plaintiff's attorney pursuant to the EAJA assignment duly signed
by Plaintiff and counsel.
SO ORDERED.
Date: November 19, 2025
Distribution:
Distributed electronically via ECF to counsel of record.
Case 3:25-cv-00003-CSW-RLY Document 31 Filed 11/19/25 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>