Redmond v. Dairy Farmer of America

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ANTOINETTE REDMOND,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-CV-2126-JWB
DAIRY FARMERS OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s motion for partial dismissal of the amended
complaint. (Doc. 30.) The motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision. (Docs. 31, 45, 49.) The
motion is GRANTED for the reasons stated herein.
I. 	Facts
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s amended complaint. (Doc. 28.) The court
assumes their truth for the purposes of this motion. Plaintiff Antoinette Redmond (“Plaintiff” or
“Ms. Redmond”) is an African American resident of Kansas City, Missouri. 	(Id. at 1, 3.)
Defendant Dairy Farmers of America (“Defendant” or “DFA”) is a Kansas business with over
18,000 employees. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff was formerly an employee of DFA, beginning in April
2023. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff asserts she is a disabled as she is diagnosed with anxiety. (Id.) This “substantially
limits her ability to perform daily life activities.” 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff’s anxiety limits her “standing,
breathing, sleeping, focusing, and speaking” as well as limiting her “socially” and “mentally.”
(Id.)
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One year after her employment began, Plaintiff “requested reasonable accommodation”
from her employer by providing “Defendant FMLA and the requested documentation and doctors
notes supporting the need for accommodation.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff sought accommodations like
“Working from home”, “Breaks”, and “Office windows.” 	(Id.) 	After submitting this request,
Plaintiff was “subjected to discrimination.” (Id.) She was subjected to discrimination again “after
she complained of illegal employment practice.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she was “denied her
equal employment opportunity” because she was denied an accommodation, but other similarly
situated white and non-disabled employees were offered accommodations. (Id. at 5.) She asserts
that her denial was because of her skin color and disability. (Id. 5-6.)
Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on September 27, 2024. (Id. at 6.) She alleges that
during her employment she was subjected to various forms of harassment including but not limited
to being required to submit redundant and/or unnecessary paperwork for time off, disability, and
accommodations, being called excessively during her shifts, “nitpick[ing]” her work, and failing
to help Plaintiff with work tasks. (Id. at 6-7.) These acts of harassment harmed Plaintiff by causing
“worsen[ed]” anxiety, termination, “extreme emotional, physical, and economical hardship by loss
of income and future lost wages”, and interference with Plaintiff’s job performance. 	(Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff asserts she made several complaints as a result of these acts of harassment. (Id.)
For her troubles, Plaintiff raises four counts against Defendant: (1) racial discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) creation of a hostile work environment
in violation of Title VII; (3) retaliation in violation of “42 U.S.C. § 2000E-3”; and (4) disparate
treatment under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. at 8-13.) As compensation,
Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaratory judgment indicating that DFA violated her rights; (2) a permanent
injunction ordering DFA to stop discriminating against individuals on the basis of disabilities; (3)
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back wages and “all appropriate compensatory damages”; (4) punitive damages; and (5) attorney’s
fees. (Id. at 14.)
Defendants answered the amended complaint (Doc. 32), and filed the instant motion for
partial dismissal of the amended complaint. (Doc. 30.) The court considers the parties’ arguments
below.
II. 	Standard
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. 	Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences derived from
those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278,
1283 (10th Cir. 2008). 	Conclusory allegations, however, have no bearing upon the court’s
consideration. Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007).
III. 	Analysis
Defendant moves to dismiss three of Plaintiff’s four counts on the grounds that she failed
to exhaust her claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. 31
at 1.) The court agrees and therefore grants Defendant’s motion for the reasons explained below.
The claims that Defendant seeks to have dismissed fall under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 	(Doc. 28 at 8-12.) 	Prior to filing an action under Title VII, Plaintiff must
administratively exhaust her claims with the EEOC. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 F. App’x
707, 712 (10th Cir. 2008). 	The Tenth Circuit has said “[i]t is now well established that ‘each
discrete [discriminatory] action constitutes its own unlawful practice for which administrative
remedies must be exhausted.’” Id. at 718 (quoting Annett v. Univ. of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1238
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(10th Cir. 2004) (second modification in original)). 	The lawsuit may contain “allegations of
discrimination reasonably related to the allegations listed in the administrative charge, including
new acts occurring during the pendency of the administrative charge.” Arambaru v. Boeing Co.,
112 F.3d 1398, 1409 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. School Dist. #1, 864 F.2d
680, 682 (10th Cir. 1988)). 	“A claim is considered ‘reasonably related’ when ‘the conduct
complained of would fall within the scope of the [administrative] investigation which can
reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge that was made.’” 	Edwards v. Creoks Mental
Health Serv., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1092 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (quoting Deravin v. Kerik, 335
F.3d 195, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2003)) (modifications in original).
Principally here, Defendant claims that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient factual
allegations within the body of her EEOC charge that indicate she was raising claims of racial
discrimination, a hostile work environment, or retaliation. (Doc. 31 at 4.) According to Defendant,
while her charge does check the boxes indicating discrimination based on “race, disability,
retaliation, and gender” she provides “no facts in which an investigation of race discrimination,
hostile work environment, or retaliation could develop.” 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff first responds to this
argument by claiming that the court has already rejected it. (Doc. 45 in 3.) In so doing, Plaintiff
refers, quite misleadingly, to an order entered by Magistrate Judge Teresa James granting
Plaintiff’s motion to amend. 	(Doc. 26.) 	In that order, the Magistrate Judge declined to deny
Plaintiff’s motion to amend based on Defendant’s exhaustion arguments. (Id. at 4-7.) But in the
magistrate judge’s discussion she explicitly said “[f]urther, failure to exhaust is the main basis for
dismissal argued in Defendant’s pending Motion to Dismiss, and the Court finds such issues would
be more properly addressed on the merits in the context of a dispositive motion, rather than a
Motion to Amend.” (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff neglected to mention this caveat to the court. Plaintiff
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then goes on to oppose Defendant’s motion on its merits. 	The court addresses the arguments
regarding each claim below.
A. 	Racial Discrimination
In her charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC 1 , as noted above, Plaintiff checks the
“race” discrimination box. 	(Doc. 31-2 at 1.) 	Additionally, in the “Particulars” section of the
charge, before referring a reader to her attached narrative, Plaintiff asserts “she is an African
American woman with a disability.” 	(Id.) 	She then says, “other white employees are afforded
accommodation.” (Id.) But in her attached narrative, she makes not a single mention of race until
the very last sentence where she explains “[o]ther non-disabled, while [sic] employees have not
suffered such discrimination while employed at Diary [sic] Farmers of America.” (Id. at 3.)
This is simply insufficient to exhaust a claim for racial discrimination. 	Even given the
“liberal” construction that is afforded to EEOC charges, Plaintiff’s charge does not identify a single
fact that indicates racial discrimination. Smith v. Cheyenne Ret. Invs., L.P., 904 F.3d 1159, 1164
(10th Cir. 2018). All Plaintiff’s charge contains is a fact about her race, a conclusory allegation
that “other white employees are afforded accommodation”, and a similar conclusory statement at
the end of her narrative. (Doc. 31-2 at 1-3.) These are not “facts concerning the discriminatory
and retaliatory actions underlying each claim.” Smith, 904 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Jones v. U.P.S.,
Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). What matters is
whether what is alleged in the charge is “reasonably related” to what is alleged in the complaint;
allegations are reasonably related “when the conduct complained of would fall within the scope of
the [administrative] investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge that
1 The court can consider Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination at this stage. Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We have recognized however, that a document central to the
plaintiff's claim and referred to in the complaint may be considered in resolving a motion to dismiss, at least where
the document's authenticity is not in dispute.”).
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was made.” Creoks Mental Health Serv., 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (quoting Deravin, 335 F.3d at
200-01 (internal quotation marks omitted) (modification in original)).
Plaintiff resists this analysis by citing a Tenth Circuit case, Jones v. Needham, 856 F.3d
1284, 1290-91 (10th Cir. 2017), for the proposition that “when the facts in the charge would
prompt an investigation into that type of discrimination” the claim is exhausted “even if the charge
lacks specific wording.” (Doc. 45 at 4.) With this the court does not quarrel, and even under this
standard, Plaintiff loses. As explained above, there are virtually no facts alleged in the charge that
suggest 	racial 	discrimination. 	Merely 	stating 	that 	other 	white 	employees 	are 	afforded
accommodations is conclusory and lacks the factual detail required to prompt an investigation, let
alone guide one. (Doc. 31-2 at 1.)
The investigation that would grow out of the facts alleged in the charge of discrimination
would be entirely related to disability discrimination, not race. 	Therefore, Plaintiff failed to
exhaust her racial discrimination claim and count I must be dismissed.
B. 	Hostile Work Environment
Defendant makes a similar argument regarding Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.
(Doc. 31 at 6-7.) First, Defendant notes that it is construing Plaintiff’s hostile work environment
claim as one based on race. (Id. at 6, n. 2.) Plaintiff does not dispute this notion. See (Doc. 45 4-
6.) The court therefore agrees that Plaintiff’s claim in the amended complaint regarding a hostile
work environment is based on race. (Id.) Regarding race, the same analysis as in the preceding
section applies. 	Plaintiff barely mentions race in her charge and does not allege any facts that
would put Defendant on notice of her claims. (Doc. 31-2 at 1-3.)
But even if the court broadened the scope of its inquiry to just “hostile work environments”
in general, that would fail the exhaustion requirements as well. Plaintiff’s charge alleges zero facts
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that she ties to a hostile work environment. 	In her narrative, she says “[s]he provided the
information from her therapist with evidence and diagnoses to support her claims of anxiety and
depression causes [sic] from the hostile work environment.” (Doc. 31-2 at 2.) Near the end of her
narrative, Plaintiff also states, “[t]his employer interfered with Antoinnette[’s] disability and
created a hostile working environment.” (Id. at 3.) But other than these two statements, nothing
in Plaintiff’s single-spaced, two-page charge of discrimination explains how the process of filling
out 	disability 	and 	FMLA 	forms 	and 	attending 	appointments 	constitutes 	a 	hostile 	work
environment.
In her response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff simply refers to the charge’s
allegations related to her process of completing disability paperwork and attending medical
appointments and asserts that this puts DFA on notice of a hostile work environment claim. (Doc.
45 at 5-6.) Not so. Despite Plaintiff’s protest, her charge is far from “clear.” (Id. at 6.) For this
reason, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her hostile work environment claim and count II must be
dismissed.2
C. 	Retaliation
Lastly, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, again for failure to
exhaust. 	In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts she was retaliated against after she complained that
white employees were receiving accommodations, but she was not. 	(Doc. 28 at 7-8.) 	There is
nary a mention of facts even slightly alluding to this alleged retaliation in Plaintiff’s charge of
2 Additionally, Defendant points out to the court that in Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff’s counsel
cited a case called Smith v. Cheyenne Cnty. Hosp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1194 (D. Kan. 2020). Defendant (despite
remarkable efforts, see (Doc. 49 at 4, n. 13)), could not find this case. Neither could the court. Given that Defendant
points to other examples of Plaintiff quoting or citing cases that do not contain such quotes or propositions, the court
strongly suspects that these errors are attributable to the careless use of generative artificial intelligence (“AI”).
Plaintiff’s counsel is warned that further errors like these will lead to sanctions under Rule 11 and the court’s recent
standing order on the use of AI. See D. Kan. Standing Order 26-01; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
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discrimination. 	See (Doc. 31-2 at 1-3.) 	Plaintiff’s charge makes no reference to making
complaints. (Id.) While Plaintiff does check the retaliation box on the front page of her charge,
this is insufficient. (Id. at 1.) Charges must contain facts reasonably related to the allegations in
the complaint. See Smith, 904 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Jones v. U.P.S., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1186
(10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff’s argument that all a charge must contain is claims of “protected activity” followed
by an alleged adverse employment action is unsupported by the cited case. 	(Doc. 45 at 7.)
Moreover, Plaintiff’s charge does not mention any complaint made to DFA, which is the
“protected activity” serving as the foundation of her retaliation claim. See (Doc. 28 at 7-8.)
The reason for the exhaustion rule is very straightforward and well-illustrated by this case.
The exhaustion requirement is not a meaningless procedural hurdle that a plaintiff must clear
before bringing suit. Rather, the exhaustion requirement, and by extension, the setup of the EEOC,
reflects a congressional desire to afford employers notice before being subjected to suit while also
affording the parties an opportunity to administratively resolve claims before whipping open the
courthouse doors. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1); see also Smith, 904 F.3d at 1164 (citing
Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 625 (10th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by
Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2003)). Permitting plaintiffs to simply check a box
for each kind of discrimination, provide a narrative, and then waltz into federal court asserting
claims unrelated to that narrative would flout the statutory scheme. 	This court is not in such a
habit. 	Plaintiff’s retaliation claim has not been exhausted and therefore count III must be
dismissed.
IV. 	Conclusion
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As Defendant moved, the court grants the motion to dismiss with prejudice because
Plaintiff’s claims relate to actions that occurred more than 300 days ago,3 which means any refiling
of an EEOC charge would be fruitless. See Liggins v. G.A. & F.C. Wagman, Inc., No. 18-CV-72,
2019 WL 4039637, at *3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2019) (“However, if the plaintiff cannot exhaust his
administrative remedies—for example, if he is time-barred from filing an EEOC charge—
dismissal without prejudice would be futile, and the court may dismiss the claim with prejudice.”)
(comparing Lebron-Rios v. United States Marshal Serv., 341 F.3d 7, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2003) and
Robinette v. Union Hosp., No. 17-3471, 2018 WL 2106403, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2018) with
Williams v. West, 135 F.3d 128 (5th Cir. 1998)).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for partial dismissal of the amended
complaint is GRANTED with prejudice. (Doc. 30.)
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 14th day of April, 2026.
s/ John W. Broomes
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 Plaintiff’s termination was on September 27, 2024 (Doc. 28 at 8.), which is over 500 days ago. All relevant conduct
in this case occurred prior to her termination.
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