Minski (ID 2000017699) v. Lewis

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JAMES MINSKI,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 24-3014-JWB
SONYA LEWIS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 28.) The motion
is fully briefed and ripe for decision. (Docs. 29, 30, 31.) The motion is GRANTED for the reasons
stated herein.
I. 	Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff James Minski (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Mr. Minski”) is an inmate at Winfield
Correctional Facility in Winfield, Kansas. (Doc. 1 at 1.) He brings this action pro se, against Dr.
Sonya Lewis (hereinafter “Defendant” or “Dr. Lewis”), a dentist, who performed a tooth extraction
while Plaintiff was incarcerated. (Id.) Dr. Lewis is employed by a contractor, Centurion, which
provides medical services to inmates at the Winfield Correctional Facility. (Id.)
Beginning on May 7, 2023, Plaintiff began to complain of tooth pain. (Id. at 2.) Over the
next month Plaintiff made repeated requests to see a dentist at the facility. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff also
made (and was granted) repeated requests for pain medication to mitigate the discomfort he was
suffering due to his tooth. (Id.) On June 6, 2023, Plaintiff was seen by a dentist, Dr. Lewis. (Id.
at 4.) Dr. Lewis informed Plaintiff that his tooth extraction would have to be rescheduled for June
20, 2023. (Id.) Defendant, at Plaintiff’s request, agreed to prescribe more pain medication in the
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interim two weeks. 	(Id.) 	According to Plaintiff, no medication order was sent to him, and his
inquiry about the status of the pain medication was not returned until nearly a month and a half
later on July 29, 2023. (Id.) Plaintiff also requested more pain medication on June 17; this request
was also not answered until July 29. (Id.)
Plaintiff also allegedly experienced serious swelling of his jaw on two occasions after the
June 6 visit with Dr. Lewis. (Doc. 8-1 at 1.) He attests that two witnesses noticed the swelling.
(Id. at 1-2.) When Mr. Minski’s extraction date of June 20 arrived, he was told it would be another
week until he could be seen. (Doc. 1 at 5.) But, on June 22, Plaintiff was called to the dentist’s
office and examined. (Id.) Defendant determined Plaintiff’s tooth was now infected and needed
to be treated with antibiotics prior to extraction. (Id.) Once treatment was complete, Plaintiff had
his tooth extracted by Dr. Lewis on July 4, 2023. (Id.) Mr. Minski may have finally celebrated
independence from his ailing tooth that day, but the fifty-seven-day period from symptoms to
surgery is what prompted him to initiate this lawsuit. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed his complaint seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 2.)
He seeks damages in the amount of $1,500 per day as compensation for the pain he suffered due
to the delay in his procedure. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff’s claim is that of deliberate indifference to his
medical needs under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 3.)
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 28), where she asserts that Mr. Minski has
both failed to state a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment and has also failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies before filing suit, as required by federal law. (Doc. 29 at 3, 6.) Mr.
Minski responds that he did exhaust his remedies through the Kansas Department of Corrections
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and has adequately pled a claim of deliberate indifference. 	(Doc. 30 at 4, 10.) 	The court will
evaluate the parties’ arguments in turn.
II. 	Standard
A. Motion to Dismiss
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. 	Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences derived from
those facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278,
1283 (10th Cir. 2008). 	Conclusory allegations, however, have no bearing upon the court’s
consideration. 	Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007). 	Given
Plaintiff’s pro se status, the court construes his pleadings liberally, but it cannot act as his advocate
or construct arguments on his behalf. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836,
840 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
III. 	Analysis
A. Exhaustion
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies through
the Kansas Department of Corrections and his suit should therefore be dismissed. (Doc. 29 at 6-
8.) The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) governs prisoner lawsuits in federal court. Perttu
v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 464 (2025). The PLRA requires that prisoners, either federal or state,
exhaust available administrative grievance processes before filing a federal lawsuit. Id.; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). “A prison’s procedural requirements define the steps necessary for exhaustion[;] an
inmate may only exhaust by properly following all of the steps laid out in the prison system’s
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grievance procedure.” Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006)).
In Kansas, the prison grievance process is established by administrative regulation. 	See
K.A.R. § 44-15-101. 	Prisoners are responsible for first attempting informal resolution of the
matter. Id. at (b). If that fails, a grievance must first be filed via a form to “an appropriate team
member of the facility” where the inmate is incarcerated. Id. at (d)(1). If this fails, the prisoner is
supposed to file the grievance form with the prison’s warden. Id. at (d)(2). The final stage of the
grievance process requires the grievance to be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Corrections for the State of Kansas. Id. at (d)(3). Once the grievance has worked its way up this
chain, and the Secretary of Corrections (or designee) has issued a final decision, an inmate has
exhausted his administrative remedies. See Pusha v. Myers, 608 F. App’x. 612, 614-15 (10th Cir.
2015).
Plaintiff has submitted records from the grievance process alongside his complaint that
demonstrate he has adequately exhausted his remedies such that an action in district court is
appropriate. See (Doc. 1-1 at 8.) Plaintiff filed his initial “Inmate Grievance Form” on the standard
form to be sent to the warden. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff complained that he suffered an unnecessarily
long delay from his initial onset of tooth pain to extraction. (Id. at 16.) Mr. Minski alleged his
“mood, sleep, and diet” were affected. 	(Id.) 	Mr. Minski emphasized the fact that the Winfield
Correctional Facility is a “long-term care (medical) facility.” (Id.) He then explained that delays
in care should not happen because “there should be staff available” at a medical facility. (Id.) The
medical center’s response to the grievance indicated “Resident Minski’s concerns with his dental
pain has [sic] been addressed with the extraction of his tooth.” (Id. at 13.) The warden’s response
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indicated “no action taken.” (Id. at 12.) Mr. Minski appealed to the Secretary of Corrections. (Id.
at 9.)
Attachments to Plaintiff’s complaint indicate receipt of an “Official Grievance Response”
from Darcie Holthaus, the Secretary of Corrections Designee on September 5, 2023. 	(Id. at 8.)
The response says there is “no further recommendation” of action at the time of the complaint but
that Mr. Minski “deserve[d] an apology and assurance that such a delay will not happen again once
the facility has gotten back to staffing ideals.” (Id.)
Defendant claims that Plaintiff has not properly exhausted his claims because he did not
make clear in his prison grievances that his complaints are with Dr. Lewis. 	(Doc. 29 at 6-7.)
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has raised what is essentially a complaint about staffing through
the prison grievance process and then has turned around and sued the dentist in federal court. (Id.)
In support of her argument, Defendant points to language in Plaintiff’s grievance that purportedly
“absolves” Defendant and all medical staff of wrongdoing. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff’s grievance stated:
“none of the medical staff at this facility did anything wrong, that I’m aware of. All the staff here,
medical, security and administrative, acted promptly, professionally, and with care, at every turn
of the ordeal. Each person that had any involvement with me during this ordeal did all that was
within their ability.” (Doc. 1-1 at 16.) Plaintiff rebuts Defendant’s argument by saying he was
not including Dr. Lewis in this statement but rather was referring to the support staff. (Doc. 30 at
7.) 	Mr. Minski supports this distinction by explaining that Dr. Lewis was not a full-time staff
member at the correctional facility but instead only worked there ten hours per week. 	(Id.)
According to Mr. Minski, his statement only applied to those who were full-time staff at the
facility. (Id.)
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Regardless of the staffing distinctions, the court finds that Defendant’s argument that Mr.
Minski failed to exhaust because “his grievance is not . . . related to any specific claims against
Dr. Lewis” to be incorrect. A review of Mr. Minski’s grievances indicates a consistent concern
with decisions possibly within the purview of the dentist, to include scheduling. (Doc. 1-1 at 10,
16.) 	Moreover, the PLRA does not require hair splitting over who the grievance was directed
against for exhaustion purposes.
As explained above, the PLRA looks to state law to determine what a prisoner must do to
exhaust his remedies. The cases cited by Defendant confirm this point. See Sanders v. Williams,
2010 WL 1631767 at *11 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2010) (“The Court . . . begins, therefore, by
determining what information the prison policies required Sanders to disclose in the grievance
procedure and whether Sanders fully exhausted the remedies that were available to him.”); Barnes
v. Allred, 482 F. Appx. 308, 311 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing to Bureau of Prisons regulations to
determine whether a plaintiff had sufficiently exhausted his remedies within the federal prison
system). In Kansas, an inmate grievance report must contain, among other administrative things,
“a specific complaint that states what or who is the subject of the complaint, related dates and
places, and what effect the situation, problem, or person is having on the inmate that makes the
complaint necessary.” 	K.A.R. § 44-15-102 (b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 	Mr. Minski complied
with this requirement. 	Accordingly, the court finds that Mr. Minski adequately exhausted his
administrative remedies.
B. 	Failure to State a Claim
Defendant next contends that Plaintiff has failed to properly state a claim for deliberate
indifference and therefore his complaint should be dismissed. 	(Doc. 29 at 3.) 	“Deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment.” Redmond v.
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Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 939 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). 	The Tenth Circuit recognizes two kinds of deliberate
indifference cases: failure to treat a medical condition properly and denial of access to medical
treatment. 	Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2000). 	These claims have an
objective and subjective element that a Plaintiff must plead. Crowther, 882 F.3d at 939.
The objective component requires that the alleged injury is sufficiently serious. 	Id. 	“A
delay in medical care is only sufficiently serious if ‘the plaintiff can show the delay resulted in
substantial harm.’” 	Id. (quoting Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005). 	Substantial
harm can include “lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.” 	Mata, 427 F.3d at
751. If “even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention” then the
condition is sufficiently serious under the objective prong. 	Id. (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
The subjective component requires Plaintiff to show that the responsible prison official
“knew the inmate faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.” Crowther, 882 F.3d at 939-40 (citing Martinez v. Beggs, 563
F.3d 1082, 1088-89 (10th Cir. 2009)). “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994). 	But “intentional denials, delay, or interference with medical care will meet the
subjective prong of the test.” 	Crowther, 882 F.3d at 940 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05).
Sufficient awareness of facts “from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists” will satisfy the subjective prong when the “risks would be obvious to a
reasonable person.” 	Estate of Jensen by Jensen v. Clyde, 989 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 2021).
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Furthermore, “a prisoner may satisfy the subjective component by showing that defendants’ delay
in providing medical treatment caused either unnecessary pain or a worsening of [his] condition.
Even a brief delay may be unconstitutional.” Mata, 427 F.3d at 755.
Dr. Lewis contends that Mr. Minski has failed to plead facts that demonstrate a “medical
condition sufficiently serious” such that “Dr. Lewis was deliberately indifferent” to that condition.
(Doc. 29 at 4.) 	The court agrees and finds that Mr. Minski has not adequately plead either
component of the deliberate indifference test. 	The complaint states that Mr. Minski suffered
serious pain because of his toothache and the delay in treating it. (Doc. 1 at 4-5; Doc. 10 at 3.)
This pain and suffering allegedly included severe swelling of Plaintiff’s jaw. (Doc. 10 at 3.) Still,
other courts have held that similar claims of tooth pain are insufficient under the objective prong.
See Greene v. Pollard, 335 F. Appx. 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2009).
In Greene, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint where he
alleged “constant aching and sensitivity in his upper left canine tooth as well as another lightly
chipped tooth.” Id. Greene wanted the prison dentist to perform a certain type of procedure to
solve the toothaches. 	Id. 	The prison dentist was unwilling, reportedly saying “I only fill teeth
with decay or pull ‘em.’” Id. After the dentist’s refusal, Greene’s pain allegedly got worse and
“interfere[d] with his eating and sleeping habits” and that the tooth “deteriorated.” Id. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed dismissal of Greene’s complaint because “the only symptoms he alleged . . . were
a constant aching in his tooth and a sensitivity to hot and cold temperatures.” Id. at 614. Those
symptoms fell “short of a condition such as tooth decay or gum infection, which [the court has]
recognized as serious because of the substantial risks to health if left untreated.” Id.
A review of Plaintiff’s complaint shows remarkably similar concerns. Plaintiff’s complaint
alleges “pain in tooth” and “increased pain” which led to the submission of sick call forms. (Doc.
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1 at 2.) Plaintiff ends his complaint alleging “having to miss many meals, suffering loss of sleep,
and both emotional and physical distress. There were times when even trying to drink water was a
painful experience.” (Id. at 5.) A review of Plaintiff’s prison grievances, attached to his complaint,
is consistent with his allegations: concerns about tooth pain. 	(Doc. 1-1 at 1-2, 4-6, 8-18.) 	He
described his tooth as “extremely sensitive” and “throbbing.” 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff’s response to the
court’s show cause order repeats the same symptoms. (Doc. 10 at 5.)
The other cases that Plaintiff uses to support his pleadings are markedly different from this
case. While dental care is undeniably one facet of the adequate medical care owed to prisoners,
the cases that Defendant cites are considerably more severe than the facts alleged here. See e.g.,
Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995) (Plaintiff was found to have an infected tooth and was
then forced to wait months for extraction); McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Plaintiff alleged a dental procedure was performed negligently resulting in months of pain and
dangerous medical conditions); Williams v. York, 891 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 2018) (Plaintiff sued
prison officials who were allegedly responsible for delays in his medical treatment for tooth pain
that became “boil type sores”). 	As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
pleading requirements of the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test.
Defendant Lewis also contests Plaintiff’s pleading of the subjective prong. (Doc. 29 at 4.)
Dr. Lewis claims that Mr. Minski does not “plead that any delay, prior to his first appointment
with Dr. Lewis was due to the actions of Dr. Lewis.” (Id.) “Thus, the length of any perceived or
alleged delay in extraction of the tooth was only 12 days, in which 10 of those days were due to
the treatment of Mr. Minski’s infection.” (Id.) The court agrees. To understand why Mr. Minski’s
complaint does not bear out liability for Dr. Lewis, the court must closely examine the timeline of
the alleged events. 	Mr. Minski alleges that he first placed a sick call request on May 7, 2023.
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(Doc. 1 at 2.) He alleges that the following day on May 8, he was scheduled to see the dentist on
June 6. (Id.) Plaintiff declined pain medication for his tooth on this day. (Id. at 4.) On May 12,
however, his pain had worsened, and he placed a request for pain medication. (Id.) That request
was granted, and Mr. Minski received a three-day supply of medication. (Id.) On May 16, having
exhausted that supply, Mr. Minski asked for more pain medication; he was issued a thirty-day
supply on May 18. (Id.) On June 6, Plaintiff was seen by the dentist but was told that his extraction
would have to wait until June 20. (Id.) Plaintiff allegedly requested more pain medication and
was told it would be ordered. (Id.) On June 11, Plaintiff inquired about the pain medication orders.
(Id.) Having received no response Plaintiff requested more pain medication on June 17. (Id.) On
June 22, two days after his scheduled appointment, Plaintiff was seen by the dentist. (Id. at 4-5.)
Plaintiff was then diagnosed with an infection for which he was prescribed antibiotics and pain
medication. (Id. at 5.) On July 4, the tooth was extracted. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff did not receive a
response to his last pain medication request until July 29. (Id. at 4.)
From these facts, the court gathers that there are three possible buckets of liability. The
first bucket is the delay in seeing a dentist after complaining of pain, that occurred from May 7
and lasted nearly one month to June 6. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Mr. Minski does not allege that his pain or
this time period is attributable to some deliberate indifference by Dr. Lewis. Therefore, this time
period cannot be the basis of Eighth Amendment liability.
The second possible period of liability is the two-week delay between June 6, when
Plaintiff first saw Dr. Lewis, and June 20, the date that he was scheduled for his extraction. (Id. at
4-5.) The court notes here that Plaintiff was rescheduled from June 20 and was not seen until June
22. (Id. at 5.) Mr. Minski does not allege that this inability to extract for 16 days is attributable to
deliberate indifference by Dr. Lewis. Rather he alleges that she failed to fill pain medication orders
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that he requested during the June 6 meeting and later on June 17. (Id. at 4.) But this argument,
given the facts in Mr. Minski’s own complaint, is perplexing. Mr. Minski pled that he received a
thirty-day supply of pain medication on May 18. (Id. at 4.) Basic math says that medication should
have lasted him until June 17. The delay from the end of his thirty-day pain medication series to
his dental visit on June 22 is only five days. Before June 17, the delay does not look like deliberate
indifference but rather the dentist electing not to prescribe excess pain medication prior to the
exhaustion of a previous supply. Between June 17 and June 22, there are simply no facts alleged
to suggest Defendant was deliberately indifferent. 	“The ‘negligent failure to provide adequate
medical care, even one constituting medical malpractice, does not give rise to a constitutional
violation.’” (Doc. 6 at 5) (quoting Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir.
1999)).
The final period of possible liability is the dentist’s apparent failure, according to Mr.
Minski, to anticipate the possibility of infection in the time period between his first visit on June
6 and his scheduled extraction date. (Id.) Mr. Minski’s tooth became infected during this period
but he was told by the dentist on June 6 that “it would be okay.” (Id.) But Mr. Minski does not
allege that Dr. Lewis’ care fell below the appropriate standard of care for a dentist. Mr. Minski
has not pled that Dr. Lewis knew the tooth would become infected on June 6 or that swelling of
his jaw would occur. In the absence of such allegations, the court cannot conclude that Dr. Lewis
was deliberately indifferent, even construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally.
As a result, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. While the
court understands Mr. Minski may have suffered pain during his ordeal, based on these allegations
against this defendant, the court is forced to repeat that “claims of negligence or medical
malpractice, 	without 	some 	more 	culpable 	state 	of 	mind, 	do 	not 	constitute 	‘deliberate
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indifference.’” 	Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). 	Bare recitations of the
standard will not suffice to establish a culpable state of mind, even at the motion to dismiss stage.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 28.) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 14th day of November, 2025.
s/ John W. Broomes
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF 	UNITED 	STATES 	DISTRICT
JUDGE
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