USA v. Larock et al

1
In the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
_____________
Case No. 25-cr-40006-TC-2
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff
v.
TRACY ANNE OAKES,
Defendant
_____________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Tracy Anne Oakes is charged with possession of cocaine with the
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Doc. 1. She
moves to suppress the evidence uncovered during a traffic stop. Doc.
48. For the following reasons, that motion is denied.
I
A
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985) (recognizing incorporation against
the states). Absent a recognized exception, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits suspicionless seizures or warrantless searches that violate a
person’s objectively reasonable expectation of privacy by invading a
constitutionally protected space or thing. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 406 (2012); see also United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307
(10th Cir. 2016). Traffic stops are seizures for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015), and
in a traffic stop “a passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the
constitutionality of the stop.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251
(2007).
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A warrantless stop is valid where the officer has reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that a traffic violation occurred. Kansas v. Glover, 589
U.S. 376, 380 (2020). In particular, the officer must have “a reasonable
articulable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of
the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the
jurisdiction.” United States v. Salas, 756 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2014)
(quotation marks omitted). The stop also must be “reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.” United States v. Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1090–91 (10th Cir.
2020).
Ordinarily, the traffic stop is circumscribed by the traffic violation
giving rise to the initial encounter. That means officers may conduct
unrelated inquiries during a stop only if that conduct does not prolong
the stop. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022)
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015)). For example,
it is accepted that officers may reasonably inquire as to the driver’s
license, automobile’s registration and proof of insurance, identity of
the individuals, and driver’s travel plans. United States v. Cates, 73 F.4th
795, 806 (10th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). But once the mission of
the stop has concluded, the motorist is generally free to leave. Morales,
961 F.3d at 1091.
There are, of course, justifications for continued detention. For ex-
ample, the driver may consent to further questioning. United States v.
Woody, 45 F.4th 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022). Or an officer may develop
reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity distinct from the traffic
violation. See United States v. Munoz, 162 F.4th 1210, 1219 (10th Cir.
2025). “To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer need
not ‘rule out the possibility of innocent conduct,’ or even have evi-
dence suggesting ‘a fair probability’ of criminal activity.” Pettit, 785
F.3d at 1379 (citations omitted). Instead, the officer needs only “a par-
ticularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal conduct under a
totality of the circumstances.” Munoz, 162 F.4th at 1219 (10th Cir.
2025) (quotation marks omitted); see id. at 1222 (finding that police de-
veloped reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after initiating a traf-
fic stop based on the totality of the circumstances). A non-exhaustive
list of factors that the Tenth Circuit has recognized as supporting rea-
sonable suspicion include nervousness, unusual travel plans, criminal
history, and travel route. See id. at 1220–22; see also Pettit, 785 F.3d at
1380–83 (holding that no one factor is determinative of reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity). Accordingly, an officer who develops
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reasonable suspicion of illegal activity “may initiate an investigatory
detention even if it is more likely than not that the individual is not
involved in any illegality.” Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1379–80 (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in
original).
As a general matter, the authority to detain a motorist while inves-
tigating reasonable suspicion does not include the right to search the
vehicle. Instead, a search of the vehicle must be justified by, for exam-
ple, probable cause. United States v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 817, 823 (10th Cir.
2023); see also United States v. Pinder, 121 F.4th 1367, 1371 (10th Cir.
2024) (allowing contemporaneous search incident to a lawful arrest).
“Probable cause to search a vehicle is established if, under the totality
of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains
contraband or evidence.” Phillips, 71 F.4th at 823 (quotation marks
omitted). When an officer smells drugs, such as marijuana emanating
from the vehicle, that observation is “entitled to substantial weight in
the probable cause analysis and can be an independently sufficient ba-
sis for probable cause.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Additional ob-
servations—such as nervous behavior and vague travel plans—obvi-
ously strengthen the existence of probable cause. See Munoz, 162 F.4th
at 1220–22.
B
In November 2024, Junction City police department canine of-
ficer, Nicholas Blake, received a text message from a Nebraska state
trooper.1 The trooper asked Blake if he had recently pulled over a gray
Hyundai Santa Fe; Blake had not. Blake then researched the Hyundai’s
historical license plate data and noticed that the vehicle was traveling
east through Colorado. Blake noticed that the Hyundai had made a
quick trip to southern California and that it had made similar trips over
the past two months. Blake also learned that the Hyundai had repeat-
edly traveled into Canada through Rooseveltown, New York. This
travel history aroused Blake’s suspicion that the Hyundai might be en-
gaged in criminal activity.
A few days later Blake saw the Hyundai exit off Interstate 70 and
pull into Junction City, Kansas. He observed it give a turn signal and
1 The following facts were found based on the witnesses’ testimony and the
evidence produced at the suppression hearing.
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then immediately move one lane to the right. Believing that this was a
violation of one of Kansas’s many traffic laws, Blake pulled over the
Hyundai. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1548(b) (“A signal of intention to turn
or move right or left when required shall be given continuously during
not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning.”).
Gina Larock was driving the Hyundai and Tracy Oakes was in the
passenger seat.2 Blake approached the Hyundai and asked the women
where they had been. The women did not mention that the Hyundai
had made a quick trip to southern California. Instead, they replied that
they had started to travel to Las Vegas but had to turn back to New
York because Larock’s father had died. Blake noticed that the women
were extremely nervous: He testified that he could see their pulses
beating in their necks. Given the women’s nervousness, the fact that
their answers conflicted with the license plate data, and the Hyundai’s
travel history, Blake immediately suspected the women of criminal ac-
tivity.
Blake, having obtained Larock’s license and registration, returned
to his patrol car and called in Larock’s information to dispatch. He
then exited his patrol car and had his canine, Chera, conduct an exte-
rior sniff of the Hyundai. Chera sniffed the Hyundai and alerted to the
presence of narcotics. Blake made Chera leave the area and sniff again,
and Chera then indicated to the presence of narcotics in the Hyundai.3
Blake then called for backup and made the women exit the vehicle. He
conducted a search of the vehicle, eventually locating forty-five kilo-
grams of cocaine.
Oakes takes issue with Chera’s exterior sniff of the Hyundai. As a
result, it is helpful to understand the nature of Blake and Chera’s rela-
tionship as well as the pair’s training and certifications. Blake testified
2 The driver, Gina Larock, was also indicted but has noticed her intent to
plead guilty. Doc. 51; see also Doc. 68 (postponing Larock’s change of plea
hearing because of weather-related travel issues). As a result, Larock has no
interest in this motion.
3 Blake explained that Chera alerts, which he described as engaging in a nat-
ural excitedness, when she smells narcotics and indicates, which he described
as a trained behavior once she has identified the strongest source of the odor,
by sitting.
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that he has been a canine officer for roughly sixteen years. Chera is
Blake’s third service dog. The pair certifies annually through the Heart
of America Police Dog Association, and its most recent certification
occurred in October 2024, before the stop in this case. That certifica-
tion included training in the detection of narcotics like cocaine, meth-
amphetamine, and fentanyl.
The United States indicted Oakes on one count of possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute. Doc. 1.4 Oakes now moves to
suppress. Principally, she contends that the initial stop was unlawful,
that it was prolonged unlawfully, and that Chera was unreliable. Doc.
48. The Government opposes each argument. Doc. 49. An evidentiary
hearing was held on March 18, where Blake testified.
II
Blake had reasonable suspicion to stop the Hyundai. And he did
not unlawfully prolong the stop with Chera, who was reliable. Accord-
ingly, Oakes’s motion is denied.
A
Oakes first argues that the stop was unlawful at its inception.5 Doc.
48 at 6–13. That argument fails because Blake reasonably suspected
the Hyundai of violating a Kansas traffic law.
Kansas law requires that “a signal of intention to turn or move
right or left . . . shall be given continuously during not less than the last
one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 8-1548(b). And Blake credibly testified at the hearing that
4 All document citations are to the document and page number assigned in
the CM/ECF system.
5 The Government conceded in its briefs and at the suppression hearing that
Oakes has standing to contest the initial stop and its duration. Doc. 49 at 9
n.18; see Armendariz v. City of Colorado Springs, 169 F.4th 1036, 1065 n.15 (10th
Cir. 2026) (declining to address Fourth Amendment standing when it was not
challenged because “standing is not jurisdictional”); see also United States v.
Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1499–500 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981)) (“[T]he issue of fourth amendment standing
could be waived if the government has ‘failed to raise [it] in a timely fashion
during the litigation.’”) (alterations in original).
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he saw the Hyundai signal and then move one lane to the right without
signaling properly: Blake’s dashboard camera video confirms as much.
Although the parties dispute the precise distance of travel before the
lane change occurred, there is no dispute that it was less than the stat-
utorily required 100 feet.6 That evidence is sufficient to support Blake’s
finding of reasonable suspicion that the Hyundai violated Section 8-
1548(b). Phillips, 71 F.4th at 823 (finding that officer’s observation of
the defendant committing a traffic violation was “sufficient to support
the traffic stop”); State v. Gilliland, 490 P.3d 66, 71 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021)
(finding that police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop
when the officers observed the defendant turn left without signaling).
Oakes’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. She argues that the
Hyundai did signal for the requisite 100 feet. Doc. 48 at 6–7. She sup-
ports that argument by extrapolating from Blake’s dashboard camera
and satellite imagery from Google Maps that the Hyundai signaled for
100 feet before changing lanes. Id. at 7 (citing Doc. 48-1). Based on the
testimony and exhibits, this evidence is dubious. And, at best, it gives
rise to an argument that there would be insufficient evidence to estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Hyundai’s driver violated Sec-
tion 8-1548(b). But establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not
the inquiry for purposes of reasonable suspicion: The pertinent inquiry
is whether Blake had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect that the
Hyundai failed to signal as required. See United States v. Vercher, 358 F.3d
1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[R]easonable suspicion may rely on in-
formation less reliable than that required to show probable cause, and
it need not be correct.”) (citation omitted). Blake’s testimony estab-
lished that he had such a basis.
Oakes also argues that the stop was unlawful because Section 8-
1548(b) does not require a signal when changing lanes. Doc. 48 at 7.
Section 8-1548 reads as follows:
6 Blake testified that he initially observed the Hyundai signal for roughly
thirty-eight feet before making a lane change. He further testified that he re-
turned to the scene of the traffic top after the stop to precisely measure the
distance that the Hyundai had signaled and determined that the signal was
given for roughly fifty-three feet. Whether the Hyundai signaled for thirty-
eight or fifty-three feet is ultimately immaterial because there is no credible
evidence that it signaled for at least 100 feet as the statute requires.
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(a) No person shall turn a vehicle or move right or left
upon a roadway unless and until such movement can
be made with reasonable safety, nor without giving an
appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.
(b) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left
when required shall be given continuously during not
less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning.
. . .
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1548 (emphasis added). In Oakes’s view, the last
two words of the statute—before turning—mean that the statute re-
quires a signal only when turning and not when moving right or left.
See Doc. 48 at 8 (noting that the Section 8-1548(b) rule “expressly ref-
erences only ‘turning’ and not ‘moving right or left.’”) (emphasis in orig-
inal).
This argument is unpersuasive because there is a definitive con-
struction of the statute to the contrary. The Kansas Supreme Court has
expressly recognized that “K.S.A. 8–1548 requires a lane change signal
within 100 feet of the point where the vehicle makes the lane change
. . . .” State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276, 1281 (Kan. 1998). That conclu-
sion, standing alone, is sufficient to reject the creative construction of-
fered by Oakes. See Munoz, 162 F.4th at 1219 (“[I]t is axiomatic that
state courts are the final arbiters of state law.”). Indeed, at least three
district courts in Kansas have rejected the construction Oakes offers.
United States v. Morales, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1296 (D. Kan. 2015);
United States v. Ortega, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 (D. Kan. 2005); Lewis
v. City of Topeka, Kansas, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1214 (D. Kan. 2004).
But even if this were an open question, Oakes’s construction is
illogical in that it excises or ignores the phrase “to turn or move right or
left” from the statute. That is not how statutory construction works. See
Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 180 (2012) (“The provisions of a text should be interpreted
in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.”). As recog-
nized by DeMarco, Section 8-1548(b) is best interpreted as setting out
that “[a] signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required
shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred
(100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning [or moving right or
left].” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1548(b). Oakes cites no authority to the
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contrary or a basis to believe her position is sound. See Burrell v. Armijo,
603 F.3d 825, 835 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Kunzman, 54
F.3d 1522, 1534 (10th Cir.1995)) (noting that “issues nominally raised
but inadequately briefed need not be considered”).
Finaly, Oakes submitted a notice of supplemental authority several
weeks after the hearing. Doc. 69. In essence, she argues that an un-
published Kansas Court of Appeals decision found that Blake lacked
an objectively reasonable basis to believe the motorist violated Section
8-1548, and that it follows in this case, too, that the traffic stop was
unlawful at its inception. Id. at 1 (invoking State v. Flint, 2019 WL
4123075 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019)). That argument fails for a variety of
reasons.
For one, it is untimely. Supplemental briefing is for pertinent and
significant authorities that could not have been found when the origi-
nal brief was filed. See D. Kan. R. CR1.3(c) (noting that notices must
“state reasons for the supplemental citations”). It is not an avenue or
an invitation to submit new arguments or authorities that could have
and should have been raised earlier. United States v. Romero, 132 F.4th
1208, 1220 n.4 (10th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 176 (2025). If
Oakes wanted to make that argument, the time in which to do so was
in her initial brief so that the Government could have responded to it
and the issue could have been addressed at the hearing. Her failure to
do so inhibited the adversarial process and prevented the parties from
meaningfully addressing that argument.
For another, Flint is inapposite. In Flint, the Kansas Court of Ap-
peals reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress be-
cause, to the Kansas Court of Appeals, it was clear from Blake’s dash-
cam video that Flint had signaled properly. Flint, 2019 WL 4123075, at
*4 (reversing district court’s conclusion to the contrary based on its
review of the dashcam video). Whatever may be said of the Kansas
Court of Appeals’ analysis in Flint seven years ago, it matters not to the
evidence presented by the parties in this case at the hearing. As noted,
the video confirms Blake’s testimony that it was objectively reasonable
for an officer on the scene to suspect that the Hyundai changed lanes
without signaling for 100 feet.
B
Oakes also argues that suppression is required because Blake un-
reasonably extended the stop. Doc. 48 at 13 (invoking Rodriguez v.
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United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)). She contends that Blake deviated
from his traffic mission when he deployed Chera immediately after
calling Larock’s information to dispatch. Id. at 14. That argument fails
because Blake had reasonable suspicion to believe Oakes was engaged
in drug trafficking.
As noted, a traffic stop constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure
and, as a result, must be reasonable. United States v. Baker, 108 F.4th
1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2024). This means that it must be “justified at its
inception and . . . the officer’s actions during the stop must be reason-
ably related in scope to ‘the mission of the stop itself.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Mayville, 955 F.3d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 2020)). In Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court held that a traffic stop “becomes unlawful if it is
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete” it. Baker,
108 F.4th at 1246–47 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350–51) (citations
omitted). And while there is no de minimis exception to the rule,
Mayville, 955 F.3d at 830, the question is only whether “police diligently
pursued the [traffic] investigation,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354, and not
whether they took the quickest route humanly possible to concluding
the stop. Mayville, 955 F.3d at 827. Thus, courts are not permitted to
“second-guess the logistical decisions of officers so long as their ac-
tions were reasonable and diligently completed within the confines of
a lawful traffic stop[ ] . . . because reasonableness—rather than effi-
ciency—is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
The Tenth Circuit has established a three-part test for analyzing
the lawfulness of a delay under Rodriguez. In particular, an unlawful sei-
zure occurs when an officer diverts from the traffic-based mission of
the stop to investigate ordinary criminal conduct, does so in a way that
“prolongs” (i.e., adds time to) the stop, and the investigative detour is
unsupported by any independent reasonable suspicion. Baker, 108
F.4th at 1248. That means “the government prevails if the officers’
actions did not divert from the traffic mission, the search was not pro-
longed, or reasonable suspicion existed.” Id. In other words, an of-
ficer’s conduct does not offend the Fourth Amendment if he or she
has, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Id. at
1247 (citing Mayville, 955 F.3d at 830).
Blake did not unlawfully prolong the stop because, based on the
totality of circumstances, he reasonably suspected that the Hyundai
was engaged in criminal activity. Contra Doc. 48 at 13. In particular, the
Hyundai had made a quick roundtrip to California. Blake testified that
in his experience only drug couriers make such trips, and that he had
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been personally involved in approximately thirty seizures of drugs
from individuals who had made such trips. That training and experi-
ence is entitled to deference. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419
(1981) (“[W]hen used by trained law enforcement officers, objective
facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined with permissible
deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of
a particular person and for action on that suspicion.”). Blake further
testified that where, as here, the vehicle had made repeated and quick
long-distance trips, it was “almost certain” that the vehicle was in-
volved in criminal activity. Again, courts have historically credited such
observations. See United States v. Hayes, 62 F.4th 1271, 1279 (10th Cir.
2023) (finding that police reasonably suspected the defendant of drug
trafficking when he had, among other things, “made multiple short
trips between [two distant cities]”); accord United States v. Batara-Molina,
60 F.4th 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 2023) (“To make such a long trip—only
to stay at the destination for such a short amount of time—is also con-
sistent with the behavior of a drug courier.”); Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1381
(“We have consistently held that implausible travel plans can contrib-
ute to reasonable suspicion.”) (alterations omitted).
Moreover, Blake testified that Oakes and Larock were extremely
nervous and that he could see their pulses in their carotid arteries. This
too served as a basis for reasonable suspicion. See Pettit, 785 F.3d at
1383 (finding that “abnormal nervousness” contributed to reasonable
suspicion).
Finally, Oakes and Larock lied about their travel plans. As noted,
they claimed that they were intending to go to Las Vegas, but stopped
short due to a family emergency and turned around before arriving
there. But Blake knew the vehicle in which they were driving had been
west of Las Vegas in southern California. This, too, further aroused
Blake’s suspicion. Cf. United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1152 (10th
Cir. 2010) (finding that evasiveness about travel plans contributed to
reasonable suspicion).
It may be true that just one of these facts, in isolation, would be
insufficient to support a probable cause determination. See Munoz, 162
F.4th at 1219 (noting that the reasonable suspicion analysis “precludes
a divide-and-conquer analysis, where the court views each factor that
would support reasonable suspicion in isolation”). And to be sure,
there are a host of lawful explanations for Oakes’s conduct. But “the
existence of a plausible innocent explanation does not preclude a find-
ing of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1220. The combination of these
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factors gave Blake reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be
afoot such that additional investigation—specifically an investigatory
detention and deploying Blake’s drug dog, Chera—was warranted to
determine if the Hyundai was engaged in drug running. See Baker, 108
F.4th at 1248 (noting that an element of the Rodriguez test is that “the
investigative detour is unsupported by any independent reasonable
suspicion”); United States v. Mercado-Garcia, 989 F.3d 829, 838–39 (10th
Cir. 2021) (finding that an officer deployed a drug dog after he had
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on similar facts).
United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165 (10th Cir. 2022), does not
suggest a different conclusion. Contra Doc. 48 at 14. In that case, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to sup-
press because police did not have reasonable suspicion to deviate from
the traffic mission to deploy a dog. Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1178. That was
because the officer’s reasonable suspicion analysis relied on factors
that should have been disregarded by the district court because they
were completely innocuous: The defendant had a duffle bag in the back
seat, did not fully roll down his window when the officer approached,
drove a rental car, had a driver’s license from one state and an identi-
fication card from another, and he could not locate the rental agree-
ment. Id.
Blake’s suspicion stands in stark contrast. The women exhibited
extreme nervousness, their travel plans were contradicted by the li-
cense plate data known to Blake at the time of the stop, and Blake had
knowledge of the Hyundai’s travel history of frequent, short-lived
cross-country trips. All of these factors are indicative of reasonable
suspicion. See United States v. Baker, 108 F.4th 1241, 1249 (10th Cir.
2024) (distinguishing Frazier because “the officer’s action—there,
spending three minutes in his car attempting to contact the K-9 han-
dler before starting other traffic tasks—objectively had nothing to do
with the traffic mission or safety during the stop”).
C
Oakes’s third line of attack is that Blake’s K-9 partner, Chera, was
unreliable. Doc. 48 at 16. It is established that a canine alert provides
probable cause to search a vehicle. United States v. Moore, 795 F.3d 1224,
1231 (10th Cir. 2015). The Government must show that the dog is
reliable by offering evidence that it has performed satisfactorily in a
certification or training program. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 247
(2013). But the defendant must have an opportunity to contest the
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dog’s reliability by, for example, questioning the efficacy of its certifi-
cation or training program. Id. District courts must weigh all the com-
peting evidence to ultimately determine “whether all the facts sur-
rounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense,
would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would
reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.” Id. at 248.
Chera’s alert was reliable. Contra Doc. 48 at 16. The Government
offered evidence of Chera’s training and certification. In particular,
Blake testified that he certifies Chera annually through the Heart of
America Police Dog Association, and that she was last certified in Oc-
tober 2024, roughly a month before the stop. There is no evidence or
meaningful argument that this organization is not respected or has cer-
tified Chera improperly. That largely dooms Oakes’s claim. See Harris,
568 U.S. at 246–47 (“If a bona fide organization has certified a dog
after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume
. . . that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search.”); see also
United States v. Beltran-Palafox, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1156 (D. Kan.
2010) (concluding that K-9 and handler certified by Heart of America
Police Dog Association was “well-certified” and reliable). But Blake
also testified that he regularly performs controlled training exercises
with Chera, two of which occurred in October a month before the
stop. See Harris, 568 U.S. at 246–47 (noting that courts can presume
that a dog’s alert was reliable “if the dog has recently and successfully
completed a training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating
drugs”).
Oakes’s counterarguments are unavailing. She first takes issue with
Chera’s trainings, arguing at the suppression hearing that they were in-
adequate because they were controlled tests where Blake, as Chera’s
handler, knew the location of the drugs. But the Supreme Court has
explained that controlled tests rather than blind tests are a better meas-
ure of a dog’s ability because blind tests in the field do not capture a
dog’s false negatives. Harris, 568 U.S. at 245. And dogs may alert to a
lingering or residual odor of drugs in the place to be searched even
though there are no drugs present at the time the sniff and search were
conducted. Id. at 246. “The better measure of a dog’s reliability thus
comes away from the field, in controlled testing environments.” Id.;
accord Beltran-Palafox, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (noting that “the con-
trolled testing environment is the best way to measure a drug dog’s
reliability”).
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Oakes also argues that Blake improperly cued Chera by having her
rework the area where she alerted until she indicated. Doc. 48 at 18; see
Harris, 568 U.S. at 247 (noting that probable cause may be undermined
“if, say, the officer cued the dog”). As an initial matter, Blake had prob-
able cause to search the Hyundai as soon as Chera alerted to the pres-
ence of narcotics. See Moore, 795 F.3d at 1232 (“We have held that an
alert, or a change in a dog’s behavior in reaction to the odor of drugs,
is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle, and that a
final indication is not necessary.”); see also United States v. Parada, 577
F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We decline to adopt the stricter rule
urged by [the defendant], which would require the dog to give a final
indication before probable cause is established.”). But in any event, the
evidence offered at the suppression hearing does not show that Blake
cued Chera, impermissibly or otherwise. Contra Doc. 48 at 18. Blake, a
dog handler with over a decade of experience and on his third K-9
partner, credibly testified that Chera provides two types of signals: an
“alert” when she smells narcotics and an “indication” when she has
locates the strongest source of the narcotics’ scent. He explained that
Chera first alerted to the presence of narcotics, so he had her leave the
area and sniff again to confirm the alert and get a more precise indica-
tion of where the narcotics were located. He then testified, without
contrary evidence, that it is common for a dog to rework an area in
order to sharpen an alert into an indication. There is no evidence that
Chera’s alert and indication were anything other than her discovery of
the forty-five kilograms of cocaine in the Hyundai.
D
Finally, Oakes argues that Blake’s use of the Hyundai’s historical
license plate data violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Doc. 48 at
20. Relying on Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), she argues
that Blake’s “database-driven, long-horizon reconstruction” of her
movements brings this case within Carpenter’s ambit. Id. at 22–23. Not
so.
As an initial matter, Oakes has made no argument that she had a
subjective expectation of privacy in the Hyundai’s license plate that
society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. See Carpenter, 585 U.S.
at 304 (“When an individual seeks to preserve something as private,
and his expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable, we have held that official intrusion into that private
sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported
by probable cause.”) (quotation marks omitted).
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And it is difficult to see how she or any other motorist could do so
in light of existing precedent. The Supreme Court has recognized that
“[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.” United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). Indeed, the
Tenth Circuit has held that one does not have a privacy interest in a
license plate, which is by its nature in the public view. United States v.
Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 974 (10th Cir. 1989); see also New York v. Class,
475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (“[I]t is unreasonable to have an expectation
of privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinar-
ily in plain view from the exterior of the automobile.”). And recently
the Fifth Circuit rejected the very argument that Oakes makes in this
case, noting that there is no privacy interest in a license plate number
and that license plate readers are outside Carpenter’s reach. United States
v. Porter, 170 F.4th 381, 387 (5th Cir. 2026). Oakes cites no authority
to the contrary.
III
For the foregoing reasons, Oakes’s Motion to Suppress, Doc. 48,
is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
Date: April 15, 2026 s/ Toby Crouse
Toby Crouse
United States District Judge
Case 5:25-cr-40006-TC Document 71 Filed 04/15/26 Page 14 of 14