Cheatham (ID 2000064842) v. Easley et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
RYAN CHRISTOPHER CHEATHAM,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 25-3241-JWL
TIM EASLEY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff is
currently incarcerated at the El Dorado Correctional Facility in El Dorado, Kansas (“EDCF”), the
events giving rise to his claims occurred at the Larned State Correctional Facility in Larned, Kansas
(“LSCF”). 	The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 	On December 22,
2025, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order (Doc. 6) (“M&O”) finding that the proper
processing of Plaintiff’s claims could not be achieved without additional information from
appropriate Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) officials. The Court’s M&O provides
that “[o]nce the report has been received, the Court can properly screen Plaintiff’s claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1015A.” (Doc. 6, at 6.) The Martinez Report (Docs. 11, 13, 16) (the “Report”) has now
been filed. The Court’s screening standards are set forth in the Court’s M&O.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff alleges that on July 4, 2025, Warden Easley, Major Graham, and Captain Bieberle
ordered or approved a use of force on Plaintiff at LSCF. (Doc. 1, at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that his
hands were in the air in a submissive position and Officer Cobb ordered the deployment of
pepperball projectiles. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Officers Hopkins and Ford were the two active
shooters. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he “was facing opposite of the two officers shooting with [his]
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back facing them and hands up.” Id. at 3, 5. Plaintiff alleges that “officers who disagreed with
the amount of force used stated there was over 100 shots.” Id. at 5. These officers stated that once
Plaintiff’s hands were up, he should have been told to step to the bean port to be cuffed up or told
to get down on the ground. Id. These officers also told Plaintiff that other options were available
where Plaintiff did not have a weapon in his hands at the time the shots started. Id. Plaintiff claims
that he was bleeding and bruised, and sustained injuries to his back and the back of his head. Id.
As Count I, Plaintiff alleges excessive force in violation of the Eighth and Sixth
Amendments. Id. at 4. As Count II, Plaintiff alleges cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Id. As Count III, Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff names as defendants: Tim Easley, LSCF Warden; (fnu) Graham, LSCF Major;
(fnu) Bieberle, LSCF Captain; (fnu) Cobb, Correctional Officer (“CO”) at LSCF; (fnu) Hopkins,
LSCF CO; and (fnu) Ford, LSCF CO. For relief, Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in damages and punitive
damages for emotional and mental damages. Id. at 7.
II. The Report
The Report addresses the use of force against Plaintiff at LSCF on July 4, 2025. The Report
provides that:
Use of Force Report 2026-08-0001 covers the use of force
against plaintiff beginning at 7:40 a.m. on July 4, 2025, at LSCF
after plaintiff refused to allow himself to be restrained when it was
time for him to leave the segregation exercise yard. Six facility staff
were involved and were identified as Corrections Officer I Tyler
Madewell, Correction Officer II Odane Bernard and Correction
Supervisor Is Tanner Lang, Anthony Hopkins, Jacob Ford and
Aaron Cobb. NOTE: Only CSIs Jacob Ford, Anthony Hopkins and
Aaron Cobb are named as defendants. The planned use of force was
authorized by Tim Easley and discussed with Ron Bieberle, who
was the shift supervisor. These two are also named as defendants.
(Exhibits 2, 4 and 14)
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The 	entire 	event 	is 	recorded 	by 	audio 	and 	video 	by
Corrections Supervisor II Angie Lines. (Exhibits 5, 8, 14 and 17-18)
Three 	photographs 	were 	also 	taken 	by 	Aaron 	Cobb
immediately after the use of force and three more were taken while
plaintiff was in crisis level cell. (Exhibit 19 and 20)
The reason for the use of force was because at around 7:40
a.m. plaintiff refused to be restrained and returned to segregation.
Plaintiff had a weapon (wire from the fencing wrapped around his
fingers) and plaintiff threatened staff if they entered his exercise
area. (Exhibits 2, 5(Attachment A), 12 and 14)
All other inmates were ultimately removed from the exercise
yard, which was a series of wire fence enclosures. (Exhibit 12)
A series of staff attempted to negotiate with plaintiff to allow
himself to be restrained and to return to his living unit. CSII Lines
first negotiated with plaintiff from 7:33 a.m. to 7:44 a.m. and again
from 9:50 a.m. to 9:55 a.m.. CSI Cobb negotiated with plaintiff from
8:32 a.m. to 8:50 a.m. and CSIII Bieberle also engaged plaintiff from
8:39 a.m. to 8:45 a.m.. Plaintiff was allowed to remain in the
exercise yard for an extra hour until 9:00 a.m. Lastly, corrections
Officer 	I 	Kim 	Converse 	began 	negotiations 	at 	9:57 	a.m..
Negotiations were determined to have failed at 10:01 a.m.. Plaintiff
indicated he would not cooperate and return to his room. Plaintiff
was now ignoring the negotiator, was chanting loudly and would not
make any eye contact with her. Plaintiff had also wrapped his head
and face to protect against OCS spray from getting in his eyes and
was wearing extra clothing. The negotiator stepped away. (Exhibits
2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 17 and 18)
The security videos show the entire use of force including
the assembly of the team, the final negotiation, the uses of force, the
movement of plaintiff from the enclosure to his decontamination
shower, the medical check and, in the second short video, to his
crisis level cell. (Exhibits 17 and 18)
The first volley of pepper balls were deployed by CSIs
Hopkins and Lang at 10:02 a.m.. CSI Lang indicated he deployed 6
rounds into plaintiff’s torso and upper arms. Plaintiff refused to be
restrained. A second volley was deployed at 10:04 a.m.. CSI Lang
deployed another 6 rounds to plaintiff’s upper torso. Plaintiff still
refused to be restrained. A third volley was deployed at 10:05 a.m.
and plaintiff complied, allowing wrist and ankle restraints to be
applied.. Plaintiff was removed from the exercise yard at 10:09 a.m.
and taken to housing unit COU-5. Plaintiff’s clothing was removed
and he was given a security gown and security blanket. Plaintiff
received a 10 minute decontamination shower. (Exhibits 6, 10, 12,
14, 17 and 18)
CSI Lang returned 78 pepper balls to Central after deploying
12 pepper balls. CSI Hopkins deployed 55 pepper balls overall and
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returned 35 pepper balls to Central. It appeared that only a handful
of the pepper balls actually got through the fence intact so they
impacted on plaintiff. (Exhibits 6, 10, 14, 17 and 19)
Neither plaintiff nor staff reported any injury. Plaintiff
refused medical treatment in a statement to Registered Nurse
Williams, stating specifically that “I’m good Ms. Williams, I’m
good.”. The use of force report and attached medical record both
contain a copy of the four page record with that information. The
medical record contained no other mention of injury or treatment of
plaintiff related to this use of force so far as counsel could determine.
The medical record from June 1, 2025, to present is also attached.
The relevant four page medical record is attached to the use of force
report. (Exhibits 5, 13, 14, 15 and 17)
Plaintiff was placed on a four day suicide observation.
(Exhibit 16)
* * * *
Plaintiff 	sued 	Defendant 	Warden 	Tim 	Easley 	(Easley)
because Easley approved the use of force to be conducted against
plaintiff. Easley agrees that he did approve the use of force against
plaintiff and engaged in further discussion with Defendant Captain
Ronald Bieberle on various matters including the type of force to be
used.
The exercise area is a series of wire enclosures. Options for
uses of force included chemical spray, pepper balls and physical
intervention. The spray was not the best selection because it was in
open air and would dissipate quickly and could contaminate the
entire exercise area, requiring significant clean up before the area
could be used again. Physical intervention was not a preferred
option for a variety of reasons. The enclosure was large enough that
plaintiff could run around and avoid the five man team, as well as
risking injury to staff from the physical confrontation. The physical
approach works much better in small, confined cell areas. The use
of pepper balls seemed best because it could be better focused on
plaintiff, would have much less clean up and the risk of injury to
staff was minimized.
Plaintiff should have been returned to his living unit a little
after 7:00 a.m., but it was after 10:00 a.m. before force was actually
used. We tried to give plaintiff time to change his mind and
voluntarily return to his living unit, but he came to the exercise area
with the apparent intent to engage in a use of force, based on his
choice to wear extra clothing and by concealing his face to protect
against the use of chemical agents.
Beside allowing him to remain long past the scheduled time
for him to leave the exercise yard, four different staff attempted to
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negotiate with plaintiff to leave voluntarily. Lt. Lines spoke with
plaintiff from 7:33 a.m. to 7:44 a.m., M. Sgt Cobb from 8:32 a.m. to
8:50 a.m., Captain Bieberle from 8:39 a.m. to 8:45 a.m., Lt. Lines
again from 9:50 a.m. to 9:55 a.m. and finally COI Converse from
9:57 a.m. to 10:01 a.m.. Even as the team appeared and the use of
force began, CSI Cobb asked plaintiff to allow restraints to be placed
on him, and multiple times thereafter, even allowing more time to
pass, hoping the delay would change plaintiff’s mind.
Pepper ball technology is much like paintballs except for the
contents when the balls burst. The guns firing the pepper balls are
similar to paintball guns. The pepper balls can cause some bruising,
but the risk of serious injury, as might be the case with bean bags, is
not the same. And, pain compliance combined with the contents of
the pepper balls has proven effective.
CSI Lang and CSI Hopkins did deploy a series of pepper
balls and then waited two minutes for the chemical to take effect.
Plaintiff was again asked to cuff up and refused. A second volley
was utilized and plaintiff seemed for a moment like he was going to
comply, then walked away from the door through which he would
have been restrained. More pepper balls were fired by CSI Hopkins
and plaintiff gave up and agreed to be restrained. No further pepper
balls were fired once he complied with instructions and was then
restrained.
Plaintiff’s choice to remain in the exercise yard past his
allowed time interfered with the schedules for other inmates to use
the area and required additional staff to supervise and move other
inmates out of the area before the use of force was conducted.
A use of force review committee comprised of Warden
Easley and senior staff from a variety of departments looked at video
of the situation as it unfolded and concluded the force used was both
reasonable and necessary.
Warden Easley’s approval of the use of force against
plaintiff and the use of force itself were a correct, reasonable and
appropriate response to the situation. The decision to use the pepper
ball guns instead of rushing in to physically restrain plaintiff was the
best for all involved.
Both security staff and plaintiff could have been injured in
such a case. As it was, plaintiff received only the most minor of
injuries, no staff were injured and plaintiff received immediate
medical care and confirmed to the nurse that he was alright. This use
of force was not used purely to cause plaintiff pain, but was intended
to restore discipline to the area and to allow the exercise yard to
return to normal after he was returned to his living area or, in this
case, placed in crisis level housing. (Exhibit 2)
(Doc. 11, at 4–9.)
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The Report provides that Warden Easley was the one that authorized the use of force, and
neither Major James Graham nor Captain Ron Bieberle authorized the use of force against
Plaintiff. Id. at 7, 9. Captain Bieberle was aware of the situation and did discuss it with Warden
Easley. Id. at 9. It appeared that other inmates in the exercise area may need to be restrained, but
they cooperated and allowed themselves to be restrained. Id.
The Report provides that Plaintiff received a disciplinary report on July 4, 2025, directly
related to his refusal to leave the segregation exercise area. Id. at 16. “Plaintiff received report
25-0545 for disobeying orders and threatening or intimidating at 7:50 a.m. on July 4, 2025” and
pled guilty to both charges Id. (citing Exhibit 12.)
The medical records submitted with the Report show that Plaintiff was seen by medical
after his decontamination shower following the incident. (Exhibit 13, at 61.) The medical record
for July 4, 2025, provides that Plaintiff stated “I’m good Ms. Williams, I’m good” and denied any
issues, problems or concerns at that time. Id. at 62. The medical record also states that Plaintiff
was “joking and laughing with staff about incident. Noted several areas of circular bruising from
pepper balls deployed. 	Pt denied any pain or discomfort at this time.” 	Id. at 63. 	Plaintiff’s
July 17, 2025 medical record indicates that he complained of sharp pains in his back and down his
left foot when he moves certain ways. Id. at 124.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges excessive force in violation of the Eighth and Sixth Amendments. He also
claims “cruel and unusual punishment” and “deliberate indifference.” Plaintiff does not have an
excessive force claim under the Sixth Amendment. 	Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force, cruel and
unusual punishment, and deliberate indifference are all the same claim under the Eighth
Amendment. 	See Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 419 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that
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“claims of excessive force involving convicted prisoners arise under the Eighth Amendment”).
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” applies to the
treatment of inmates by prison officials. 	See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319–21 (1986).
Prison officials violate inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights when they subject them to the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 319.
Plaintiff must prove both an objective component and subjective component to succeed on
an excessive force claim. Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003). To establish
the objective component, Plaintiff must show that “the alleged wrongdoing was objectively
harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. Not every isolated battery or injury to
an inmate amounts to a federal constitutional violation. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992) (stating that not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of
action”) (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (“Not every push or shove,
even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s
constitutional rights.”)). “Physical injury is not required, but the force must be ‘objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation[.]’” Blake v. Wallace, 2024 WL 5087805, at *3 (10th
Cir. 2024) (unpublished) (citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2010); Redmond v.
Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 936 (10th Cir. 2018)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel
and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of
physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10.
To establish the subjective component, Plaintiff must show that Defendants “act[ed] with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Cochran, 339 F.3d at 1212 (citation omitted). “In order to
establish such a claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that the defendant officials engaged in the
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‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’ ” Reed v. Smith, 1999 WL 345492, at *4 (10th Cir.
1999) (citation omitted). 	“An official’s state of mind is sufficiently culpable ‘if he uses force
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a good faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline.’” Ezell v. Hininger, 2024 WL 1109057, at *2 (10th Cir. 2024)
(unpublished) (citing Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 936 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). 	“Factors to be considered include the officers’ reasonable perceptions of the
threat and the ‘relationship between that need and the amount of force used’ and efforts to temper
such force.” Blake, 2024 WL 5087805, at *3 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).
The Court has viewed the videos submitted as exhibits to the Report. The videos do not
support Plaintiff’s claims. 	The videos reflect that a designated negotiator was used to attempt
negotiations with Plaintiff prior to the use of force. Negotiator Kim Converse asked Plaintiff to
cuff up. Plaintiff is singing with his head and face covered and does not respond to her. She asks
if he is okay with the use of force and he continues to sing and refuses to talk to her. After a few
minutes she states to the camera that negotiations failed at 10:01 a.m.
Officers then approach Plaintiff and state that they are giving him his last opportunity to
cuff up. Plaintiff briefly raises his arms with his back to them, and then puts his arms down. They
fire rounds from the pepperball gun and Plaintiff does not respond. The Officers continue to ask
Plaintiff if he will cuff up. They fire another round and Plaintiff coughs and starts singing again.
Plaintiff states that this is a first, he’s never been hit with these before, and that they “stung.”
Plaintiff continues singing and walking around the fenced area. Plaintiff states to the officers that
it is nothing personal and he’s making a statement. Plaintiff asks if there is going to be a “round
two or what are we doing?” Plaintiff asks if they are “going again” and laughs. The officers state
that they are giving Plaintiff another opportunity to cuff up. 	Plaintiff moves back and forth,
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ducking down and up to avoid the pepperballs, and more are deployed. Plaintiff then states that
he will cuff up. The officers tell him to go to the door/gate to cuff up, but Plaintiff doesn’t move
to the door. The officers state that they will deploy again if Plaintiff does not come over to them
to cuff up. They deploy a few more rounds and Plaintiff does not go to the door. Plaintiff has his
face covered so officers tell him to move to the right to be cuffed up. They tell him to keep moving
backwards to cuff up. They deploy more and Plaintiff finally goes to the door to cuff up.
As the officers escort Plaintiff from the exercise yard he begins singing again. 	They take
him to the shower to decontaminate. While showering, Plaintiff appears to be joking with others
about the incident and laughing. He is then taken to be assessed by medical staff. While being
assessed by the nurse, Plaintiff is joking with the officers about the incident 1 and he tells the nurse
he’s good. An officer takes photos of Plaintiff.
Courts have held that a plaintiff’s refusal “to obey direct orders given multiple times”
supports a clear need for force. 	Pittman v. Roetker, 2025 WL 753630, at *4 (D. Colo. 2025).
“[P]risoners cannot be permitted to decide which orders they will obey, and when they will obey
them.” Id. (quoting Redmond, 882 F.3d at 938 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In
Moody v. Cory, the Court considered the use of a pepperball gun and found that plaintiff’s
allegations were insufficient to state a federal constitutional violation and that the facts suggested
that force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Moody v. Cory, 2010
WL 147268, at *4 (D. Kan. 2010). The Court stated that “Plaintiff’s own allegations indicate he
was banging on his door, his behavior caused a team of officers to come to his cell to quell the
disturbance, and he did not verbally respond when told to cuff up. Under these circumstances, the
use of some physical force can hardly be considered repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id.
1 In his memorandum at Doc. 22, Plaintiff claims that after the incident he was “patronizing staff because he knew
they intended to hurt him and he wasn’t going to show they did.” (Doc. 22, at 7.)
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Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the disciplinary report he received for disobeying orders and
threatening or intimidating. See Doc. 11–12. 	The disciplinary report provides that when asked to
return to his room, Plaintiff:
replied that he was not cooperating and had already wrapped his
head and face to keep from getting OCS spray in his eyes. Everyone
else was removed from yard and Cheatham still refused to come out
of the yard. He had pulled wires off the fencing on the top of the
cage and wrapped the wires around his fingers so he could be ready
when the SORT members came in on him.
Id. at 1. The report provides that Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty. Id. at 4, 12. 	See Wilson v.
Wilcox, 2018 WL 1304532, at *6 (D. Colo. March 13, 2018) (“Because the disciplinary
determination is inconsistent with some of Mr. Wilson’s allegations . . . the factual findings in the
disciplinary determination control, both under Heck and consistent with the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.”) (citing Martinez v. City of Albuquerque, 184 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 1999)).
The Martinez report developed as a means “to ascertain whether there is a factual as well
as a legal basis for [a] prisoner’s claims.” Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1007 (10th Cir. 1987). The
report “is treated like an affidavit, and the court is not authorized to accept the factual findings of
the prison investigation when the plaintiff has presented conflicting evidence.” Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 493 n. 3 (10th
Cir. 1983)). Thus, at this point in the proceedings the Court does not use the Report to resolve
conflicts of fact. See Swoboda v. Duback, 992 F.2d 286, 290 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In determining
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, the district court may not look to the Martinez report, or any
other pleading outside the complaint itself, to refute facts specifically pled by a plaintiff, or to
resolve factual disputes.”). However, the Tenth Circuit has held that “[w]here the video evidence
blatantly contradicts a material fact allegation, we may disregard that allegation in favor of what
is actually depicted on the video.” Blake v. Wallace, 2024 WL 5087805, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 12,
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2024) (unpublished) (citation omitted). 	In light of the Report, the Court is considering dismissal
of this matter for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has already filed a response to the Report, despite
the Court’s order to refrain from doing so until the Court had an opportunity to review the Report.
The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to supplement the response that he filed and to show
good cause why his Eighth Amendment claim should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IV. Motions
The Court’s M&O provides that “[n]o motion or other document addressed to the
Complaint shall be filed until the Court has reviewed the Martinez Report and entered an order
screening the Complaint.” (Doc. 6, at 9.) Despite the Court’s order, Plaintiff has filed multiple
documents, including seven motions, a response, a supplement, and a memorandum in support.
A. Motion for Plaintiff to Receive a Personal Laptop With Legal Affair Access Only
(Doc. 15)
Plaintiff asks the Court to order EDCF to provide him with “a personal laptop with limited
access to conduct his legal affairs only.” (Doc. 15, at 1.) Plaintiff claims that he currently does
not have a law library tablet to conduct legal research. Id. He also states that he would like the
laptop to have access to ChatGPT. Id. Plaintiff indicates that he would only use the laptop for his
legal work and if he abuses it they can confiscate it. Id. at 1–2. He also asks that the laptop have
access to allow him to have video conferences with any future attorney that might represent him.
Id. at 2.
Plaintiff’s motion seeks injunctive relief. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving
party must demonstrate four things: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that
the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of
the equities tip in the movant’s favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. Little v.
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Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010). “[A] showing of probable irreparable harm is the
single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Dominion Video
Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). A preliminary
injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).
A preliminary injunction is appropriate only when the movant’s right to relief is clear and
unequivocal. Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005).
A federal court considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief affecting the
conditions of a prisoner’s confinement must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on
public safety” and on prison operation. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Finally, a mandatory preliminary
injunction, such as the one sought by Plaintiff, which requires the non-moving party to take
affirmative action, is disfavored and therefore requires the moving party to make a heightened
showing of the four factors above. Little, 607 F.3d at 1251. Because preliminary injunctions and
TRO’s are drastic remedies—“the exception rather than the rule—plaintiffs must show that they
are clearly and unequivocally entitled to relief.” Adrian v. Westar Energy, Inc., No. 11-1265-KHV,
2011 WL 6026148, at *3 (D. Kan. 2011) (citations omitted).
“State inmates do not have a federal constitutional right to possess computers or access the
internet.” Duenes v. Wainwright, 2017 WL 6210904, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2017) (citations
omitted). 	“The federal courts that have considered the issue of a right to use a computer have
reasoned that, because prisoners have no federal constitutional right to possess a typewriter, they
logically do not have a constitutional right to a computer.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 F.3d
39, 40 (2d Cir. 1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1989); American Inmate
Paralegal Assoc. v. Cline, 859 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Prison inmates have no constitutional
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right of access to a typewriter.”); Lehn v. Hartwig, 13 F. App’x 389, 392 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding,
in a section 1983 action, “If prisoners have no constitutional right to a typewriter, they certainly
do not have one to a computer”); see also Robinson v. Joya, 2010 WL 1779885, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
2010) (stating, in a section 1983 action, “No court has found that prisoners have a constitutional
right to possess personal computers, or items that are similar to personal computers, in their
cells.”).
Plaintiff is not alleging that a laptop or tablet containing his legal materials was taken from
him. Instead, he seeks to be provided with a laptop for future use. See Vreeland v. Vigil, 2021
WL 229288, at *4–5 (D. Colo. 2021) (addressing the return of a tablet that plaintiff had used since
2016 and which contained the plaintiff’s research and draft pleadings). Plaintiff has failed to show
that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not provided with a laptop. See Bell v. Washington,
2023 WL 6438597, at *5 (6th Cir. 2023) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Bell’s motion for an injunction requiring prison officials to permit him to purchase and possess a
laptop and accessories for litigation purposes and to email legal documents. Bell had not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or that he would suffer irreparable harm. By
the time that Bell sought an injunction, he had prepared and filed many documents, including his
response to the summary-judgment motion.”); see also Hedgespeth v. Bartow, 2009 WL 3617485,
at *2 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (denying injunctive relief where “plaintiff has not alleged that irreparable
harm will occur if defendant Watters does not provide him with a laptop”); Hay v. Davis, 2020
WL 8678306, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (denying injunctive relief and finding no irreparable harm
where plaintiff—who suffers from osteoarthritis and swelling in his hand that make writing at
length difficult and uncomfortable—has no “constitutional right to be provided a personal laptop
with voice recognition software and a printer with paper”).
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Plaintiff has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is denied the requested
relief. Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
B. Motion to Strike and Plaintiff’s Objection to the Witness Statement #9 Anthony
Hopkins (Doc. 17)
Plaintiff states that he objects to the witness statement #9 Anthony Hopkins and asks the
Corut to strike #9. 	(Doc. 17, at 1.) 	Plaintiff argues that Officer Hopkins states that he stepped
back from the fence to be sure Plaintiff was not able to grab the barrel of the weapon. Id. Plaintiff
claims that the statement is not based on personal knowledge, contains hearsay, is conclusory, and
lacks foundation. Id. Plaintiff claims that the video will show that his hands were up and his back
was facing the shooters. Id. He also claims that there was a fenced wire cage separating him from
the officers and therefore there was no way Plaintiff could grab the gun. 	Id. 	Plaintiff asks the
Court to strike the statement. Id. The Court is granting Plaintiff an opportunity to respond to the
Report, including affidavits submitted with the Report. The motion is denied.
C. Response to Martinez Report (Doc. 18)
In his response, Plaintiff takes issue with the statement in the Report that “Plaintiff had a
weapon (wire from the fencing wrapped around his fingers) and plaintiff threatened staff if they
entered his exercise area.” (Doc. 11, at 5,) Plaintiff claims that this statement is used as a reason
for the use of force and that he “wasn’t armed with weapons and told [Officer] Cobb long before
the incident that he wasn’t trying to fight the officers and catch more time” and that he “picked up
the wires located on the ground and handed them to Officer Cobb.” (Doc. 18, at 1.)
The Report indicates that Plaintiff had the wire around 7:40 a.m. when he was refusing to
be restrained and returned to segregation. 	(Doc. 11, at 5.) 	The Report cites Exhibits 2, 5
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(Attachment A), 12, and 14. Id. Plaintiff has not disputed that he had the wire earlier in the day.
Plaintiff should address this in his Response.
Plaintiff also controverts the assertion in the Report that Plaintiff did not seek medical care
after the incident. (Doc. 18, at 1.) Plaintiff claims that he put in sick calls regarding sharp pains
in his back and foot. Id. Plaintiff claims that he was not ordered to cuff up once his hands were
up, and the officers starting shooting both times when his hands were up. (Doc. 18, at 2.)
Plaintiff also controverts Officer Hopkins’s statement that he stepped back from the fence
to be sure that Plaintiff was not able to grab the pepperball gun. (Doc. 18, at 2.) Plaintiff claims
that his back was toward the officers with his hands up and the fence had wire squares that would
not allow him to grab the gun. Id.
The Court is granting Plaintiff another opportunity to respond to the Report and to show
good cause why his Eighth Amendment claim should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
D. 	Motion for Objection Under Rule 56(c)(4) to the “Contact Chrono Report”
Submitted by the Defendants in the Martinez Report (Doc. 19)
Plaintiff claims that the “Contact Chrono Report” submitted with the Martinez Report is
irrelevant to the incident on July 4, 2025. 	(Doc. 19, at 1.) 	Plaintiff claims that he believes the
document was provided to “distract the courts from the relevant task and attempt to persuade the
court in a negative direction.” Id. Plaintiff states that he objects to the admission of the Contact
Chrono Report. Id.
Rule 56 deals with summary judgment motions. 	This case has not passed screening,
Defendants have not been required to answer, and Defendants have not filed a motion for summary
judgment. 	The Court did not rely on the Contact Chrono Report in reviewing the Report and
issuing this Memorandum and Order. 	The motion is denied.
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E. Supplement (Doc. 20)
Plaintiff has filed a supplement to his response to the Report. (Doc. 20.) He attaches an
“Exhibit 2” in support of his response. 	Id. at 2. 	His Exhibit 2 is two handwritten sentences
providing “AAR. Discuss positive results and multiple staff negotiating and staff remaining
patient. Work to improve amount of pepperball used for force.” Id. 	Plaintiff claims that these
statements were part of the documented Report 2026-08-001 and are contrary to Warden Easley’s
position that Officer Hopkins’s use of 55 shots was not excessive. Id. at 1.
F. Motion to Expedite Summary Judgment (Doc. 21)
Plaintiff seeks to expedite summary judgment in this matter, claiming there are no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 21, at
1.) Plaintiff then sets forth his description of the incident as captured on video. Id. at 1–4. Plaintiff
claims that no discovery is needed because the incident was captured on video. Id. at 4. Plaintiff
states that he “wishes to dismiss those from the case who this court deems had no personal
participation.” Id.
This case has not passed screening and any request for expedited summary judgment is
premature. Plaintiff is being given an opportunity to respond to the Report and to show good cause
why his Eighth Amendment claim should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff’s
motion is denied as premature.
G. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22)
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 22.)
Plaintiff cites case law in support of his motion for summary judgment and includes the same
“Exhibit 2.” Id. at 9. As set forth above, the motion is being denied as premature. Plaintiff should
include any arguments in his response to the Report ordered in this Memorandum and Order.
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H. Motion to Courts for Permission to Obtain a Copy of the “use of force video”
and/or Remove Protective Order/Seal (Doc. 23)
Plaintiff seeks to obtain a copy of the use of force video to enable him to obtain counsel.
(Doc. 23, at 1.) He claims that he is currently acting as his own lawyer. Id. 	He also wants to
make the video public to provide awareness of what transpired on July 4, 2025. Id. at 2. Plaintiff
also requests a hearing on the matter if possible. Id.
The motion to file the videos under seal and conventionally provides that “[i]n the last part
of the video, plaintiff’s clothing is removed. This should not be made a part of the public filing for
that reason. Plaintiff will be allowed to view the videos, but not possess the thumb drive for
security reasons.” (Doc. 12, at 2.) The Court granted the motion at Doc. 12. (Doc. 14.) Therefore,
Plaintiff should request assistance from staff to view the videos. Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
I. Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 25)
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, alleging that the KDOC is retaliating against him
by freezing the funds in his inmate account. The claims in this case relate to a single instance of
an alleged use of force at LSCF. Plaintiff is no longer housed at LSCF and any claim he believes
he has regarding his inmate account or retaliation are unrelated to the claim in this case. Plaintiff
should raise this claim in a separate action after he has exhausted his administrative remedies on
the claim. The motion is denied.
J. Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 26)
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendants for their failure to
respond to his motion for summary judgment. 	(Doc. 26, at 1.) 	As set forth above, Plaintiff’s
motion seeking summary judgment is denied as premature. 	The Court’s M&O ordered KDOC
official to submit a Martinez Report and provides that “[i]f the Complaint survives screening, the
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Court will enter a separate order setting an answer deadline. 	Therefore, any answer deadline
provided in the docket entry for the waiver of service is not controlling.” 	(Doc. 6, at 8.) 	The
M&O also provides that “[n]o motion or other document addressed to the Complaint shall be filed
until the Court has reviewed the Martinez Report and entered an order screening the Complaint.”
Id. at 9. Therefore, no answer has been ordered and Plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment
is denied as premature. Plaintiff is not entitled to a default judgment and his motion is denied.
V. Response Required
Plaintiff is given an opportunity to respond to the Report and to show good cause why his
Eighth Amendment claim based on excessive force should not be dismissed. Failure to respond
by the Court’s deadline may result in dismissal of this action without further notice for failure to
state a claim. Plaintiff is directed to refrain from filing anything other than the response ordered
in this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until May 14, 2026, in which
to respond to the Report at Doc. 11, and to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim should not be dismissed for the reasons stated
herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions (Docs. 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, and
26) are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated April 15, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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