Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
DULCE ROMERO MIRANDA, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 26-3052-JWL
)
JACOB WELSH, Warden, Chase County Jail; )
CHRISTOPHER CHAMBERLAIN, )
Assistant Direct, ICE Field Office; )
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General; and )
Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, )
)
Respondents. )
)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, by which she challenges her detention by immigration officials without a bond
hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the petition in part.
Respondents are ordered either to release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a
bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before April 3, 2026, and they are
further ordered to provide notice to this Court when such relief has been given. The Court
denies petitioner’s requests for other relief.
Petitioner entered the United States in approximately 1998 without authorization,
but she was not detained at that time, and she has resided in the United States since then.
On March 8, 2026, petitioner was detained by immigration officials, and she remains in
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custody in this judicial district. On March 16, 2026, petitioner filed the instant habeas
action; the Court ordered expedited briefing, which has now been completed, and the
matter is therefore ripe for ruling.
To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory and
constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003). Respondents have not argued
that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s claim.
Petitioner was not recently detained as an alien newly arriving in the United States;
rather she had been present in the United States for many years when she was detained.
Petitioner argues that, for that reason, her detention does not fall within the scope of 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention pending removal proceedings, and
under which the Government purports to detain petitioner; but instead is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary release on bond. Petitioner thus claims
that her detention without any consideration of his release on bond violates these statutes.1
In a recent case involving the same issue, this Court rejected the Government’s
interpretation of these statutes in favor of the interpretation adopted by the overwhelming
majority of courts that have addressed the issue, and the Court ordered relief in the form of
1 Petitioner also claims that her detention without consideration of release on bond
violates due process. In light of the Court’s conclusion that petitioner is entitled to bond
consideration under the statues, it need not reach that issue.
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a bond hearing under Section 1226(a). See Galdamez Orellana v. Welsh, 2026 WL 710121
(D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2026) (Lungstrum, J.). Respondents concede that the relevant facts of
the present case are not materially distinguishable from those in Galdamez Orellana, and
they therefore acknowledge that the Court’s prior reasoning would also apply here. Thus,
for the same reasons set forth in the Court’s opinion in Galdamez Orellana, see id. at *1-
3, the Court concludes in this case that the Government may not detain petitioner under
Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and that it may therefore detain petitioner pending a final removal
decision only under Section 1226(a), which allows for release on bond; and that the
Government has therefore violated these statutes by refusing to allow for consideration of
petitioner’s release on bond under Section 1226(a).
In addition, petitioner has not addressed in her traverse the Court’s ruling in
Galdamez Orellana concerning the appropriate remedy for this violation. Accordingly, for
the reasons stated in that opinion, see id. at *3-4, the Court concludes that the most
appropriate remedy for this violation is to require that petitioner be granted a bond hearing
as if detained under Section 1226(a). Accordingly, the Court orders respondents either to
release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), at which petitioner’s suitability for release on bond is considered on its merits,
on or before April 3, 2026.2
2 Respondents have not argued or provided evidence that a hearing could not be
conducted within a short timeframe as requested by petitioner. Nor have respondents
argued that an immigration judge could not conduct a bond hearing for petitioner on the
merits. Although this Court lacks jurisdiction to review an immigration judge’s denial of
release on bond, see Chen v. Dorneker, 2021 WL 5769354, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 6, 2021)
Continued…
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Finally, the Court notes that petitioner has requested an award of attorney fees under
the Equal Access to Justice Act. Any such request should be made by future motion, after
consultation with Government counsel, in accordance with applicable rules.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted in part. Respondents are ordered
either to release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a bond hearing pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before April 3, 2026, and they are further ordered to provide
notice to this Court when such relief has been given. The Court denies petitioner’s requests
for other relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 24th day of March, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
(Lungstrum, J.) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)), it would not be precluded from reviewing an
immigration judge’s refusal to conduct a hearing based the Yajure Hurtado decision by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (just as the Court has done in the present case).
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