O'Neill v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
MATTHEW ALEXANDER O’NEILL,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-1262-DDC-BGS
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION FOR DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Matthew Alexander O’Neill filed this action pro se. 1 In conjunction with his federal
court complaint (Doc. 1), he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which the Court
granted under contemporaneously filed Order. After review of Plaintiff’s complaint, however, the
Court recommends to the District Court that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and/or for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
I. 	Standard of Review for IFP Complaints.
When a Plaintiff proceeds IFP, the court may screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). The court “shall dismiss” an in forma pauperis case “at any time if the court determines
that … the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). “When a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, a court has a duty to
review the complaint to ensure a proper balance between these competing interests.” Mitchell v.
1 Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally and holds him to a less stringent
standard than trained lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The Court does not, however, assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant. Hall,
935 F.2d at 1110.
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Deseret Health Care Facility, No. 13-1360-RDR-KGG, 2013 WL 5797609, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 30,
2013). The purpose of § 1915(e) is “the prevention of abusive or capricious litigation.” Harris v.
Campbell, 804 F. Supp. 153, 155 (D. Kan. 1992) (internal citation omitted) (discussing similar
language contained in § 1915(d), prior to the 1996 amendment). Sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(d)
may be appropriate when “on the face of the complaint it clearly appears that the action is frivolous
or malicious.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Henriksen v. Bentley, 644
F.2d 852, 854 (10th Cir.1981)).
In addition, the court also has an obligation to ensure it has subject matter jurisdiction to
hear and resolve the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). The court may raise the issue
sua sponte. See 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise jurisdiction when authorized.
Pfuetze v. Kansas, No. 10-1139-CM-GLR, 2010 WL 3892243, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2010), aff'd, 420
F. App'x 854 (10th Cir. 2011). When it becomes apparent that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking,
the court must dismiss the case regardless of the stage of the proceeding. Fish v. Kobach, 189 F.
Supp. 3d 1107, 1124–25 (D. Kan. 2016). The court has a duty to raise and resolve issues of subject
matter jurisdiction, even if no party has objected to the exercise of jurisdiction. Wachovia Bank v.
Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 305 (2006). To determine whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court looks to the face of the complaint. Penteco Corp. v. Union Gas Sys., Inc.,
929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991).
In determining whether dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a plaintiff’s
complaint will be analyzed by the Court under the same sufficiency standard as a Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir.
2007). In conducting this analysis, the Court will accept as true all well-pleaded facts and draw all
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reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of a plaintiff. See Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036,
1039 (10th Cir. 2006).
While a complaint generally need not plead detailed facts, it must give the defendant
sufficient notice of the claims asserted by the plaintiff so they may provide an appropriate answer.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Monroe v. Owens, 38 Fed. App’x. 510, 515 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
This requires that a complaint contain three minimal pieces of information: (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, (2) a short and plain statement of
the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, and (3) the relief requested. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a).
Because the court will liberally construe the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff, the court should
“reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail … despite
the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor
syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall, 935 F.2d at
1110. The court cannot, however, become an advocate for the pro se plaintiff. Id.
A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must still “set forth the grounds of plaintiff’s entitlement to
relief through more than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Fisher v. Lynch, 531 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1260 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110
(holding that a plaintiff need not precisely state each element, but must plead minimal factual
allegations on those material elements that must be proven)). “In other words, plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to state a claim which is plausible – rather than merely conceivable – on its face.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). See also Bemis, 500 F.3d at 1218 (stating that
factual allegations in the complaint must establish “above the speculative level” that plaintiff is
entitled to relief).
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The Court’s relaxed scrutiny of the pro se plaintiff’s pleadings “does not relieve [him] of the
burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall, 935 F.2d
at 1110. A pro se plaintiff’s pleading conclusory statements is insufficient to state a claim because no
special legal training is required to “recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury[.]” Id. See also
Olson v. Carmack, 641 Fed. App’x. 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2016). If this Court finds, after construing the
allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court is compelled to recommend that the action be dismissed.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Claims and Factual Allegations.
Plaintiff’s Complaint names the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) as the sole
Defendant herein. (Doc. 1.) He generally alleges that the FBI has interfered and/or infringed on his
constitutional right to keep and bear arms in violation of the Second Amendment by maintaining his
name in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”), which makes it
impossible for him to pass a background check required to purchase a firearm. He also contends
that this infringement constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. (Id., at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants, in their official capacity as
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, acted under color of federal law, applying policies
that curtain and unduly hinder the exercise of his constitutional right.” (Id., at 9-10.) That stated,
Plaintiff does not name as Defendants any individual agents in any capacity. Rather, he has sued
only the FBI as a federal agency. (See generally id.)
Plaintiff has pointed to no provision in the NICS or any other federal act, code, regulation,
or statute that would provide him with this avenue for relief against the FBI as an arm of the federal
government. Courts in the Tenth Circuit have specifically held that the FBI is immune to suit under
the “long-established legal principle that, ‘[a]bsent waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal
Government and its agencies” – including the FBI – from suit.” Smith v. WCDTF, No. 23-1738-
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SBP, 2024 WL 4124973, at *12 (D. Colo. July 9, 2024) (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475
(1994) (citations omitted)). See also Flute v. United States, 808 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2015)
(plaintiff “must identify some statutory text that expressly and unequivocally waives sovereign
immunity”); Gaylord v. U.S. Dept. of Army, No. 20-4058-DDC-ADM, 2020 WL 12947403, n.2 (D.
Kan. Dec. 8, 2020).
“Waivers of sovereign immunity cannot be implied; they must be express and unequivocal.”
Smith v. WCDTF, 2024 WL 4124973, at *12 (emphasis added) (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192
(1996)).
Without a clear waiver of sovereign immunity, a court has no
jurisdiction over a claim against the United States, its agencies, or its
officers. 	United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). 	‘It is
axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent
and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.’
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). 	And while the
Supreme Court has recognized an implied private action for damages
against individual federal officers who are alleged to have violated a
citizen’s constitutional rights in certain contexts, see Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity from damages
claims for alleged constitutional violations on behalf of itself and its
agencies. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485-86; id. at 484 486 (expressly declining
‘to expand the category of defendants against whom Bivens-type actions
may be brought to include not only federal agents but federal agencies
as well’) (emphasis in original); Hatten v. White, 275 F.3d 1208, 1210
(10th Cir. 2002) (Bivens action may not be brought against federal
agencies or agents acting in their official capacities) (citing Meyer, 510
U.S. at 483-86); Dahn v. United States, 127 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir.
1997) (“The United States and its agencies are not subject to suit under
Bivens.”) (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484-85; Hartje v. FTC, 106 F.3d
1406, 1408 (8th Cir. 1997)).
Id. Thus, “[a]s [U.S.] Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent confirms, there is no direct action
for damages against federal agencies.” (Id.)
For this reason, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not
state a valid claim upon which relief may be granted and/or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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IT IS ORDERED that a copy of the recommendation shall be sent to Plaintiff via certified
mail. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed R. Civ. P. 72, and D. Kan. Rule 72.1.4, Plaintiff shall
have fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of these proposed findings and recommendations to
serve and file with the U.S. District Judge assigned to the case, any written objections to the findings
of fact, conclusions of law, or recommendations of the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s
failure to file such written, specific objections within the 14-day period will bar appellate review of
the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the recommended disposition. See Moore v.
United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Dated December 11, 2025, at Wichita, Kansas.
/s/BROOKS G. S EVERSON
Brooks G. Severson
United States Magistrate Judge
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