Kirk v. Shoffner et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
TOMMY-LEE KIRK,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK SHOFFNER, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-1291-JWB-BGS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
FOR DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Tommy-Lee Kirk filed this action pro se1 . In conjunction with his federal court
complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed without prepayment of fees, which is a
motion requesting leave for Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Doc. 3. After review of
Plaintiff’s complaint, however, the Court recommends to the District Court that Plaintiff’s claims
be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I. 	Standard of Review for IFP Complaints
When a Plaintiff proceeds IFP, the court may screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). The court “shall dismiss” an in forma pauperis case “at any time if the court determines
that … the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). “When a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, a court has a duty to
review the complaint to ensure a proper balance between these competing interests.” Mitchell v.
1 Plaintiff proceeds pro se. The Court construes his filings liberally and holds him to a less stringent standard
than trained lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991). But the Court does not assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant. Id., at 1110.
Case 6:25-cv-01291-JWB-BGS Document 5 Filed 01/08/26 Page 1 of 8

2
Deseret Health Care Facility, No. 13-1360-RDR-KGG, 2013 WL 5797609, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 30,
2013). The purpose of § 1915(e) is “the prevention of abusive or capricious litigation.” Harris v.
Campbell, 804 F. Supp. 153, 155 (D. Kan. 1992) (internal citation omitted) (discussing similar
language contained in § 1915(d), prior to the 1996 amendment). Sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(d)
may be appropriate when “on the face of the complaint it clearly appears that the action is frivolous
or malicious.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Henriksen v. Bentley, 644
F.2d 852, 854 (10th Cir.1981)).
In addition, the court also has an obligation to ensure it has subject matter jurisdiction to
hear and resolve the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). The court may raise the issue
sua sponte. See 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise jurisdiction when authorized.
Pfuetze v. Kansas, No. 10-1139-CM-GLR, 2010 WL 3892243, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2010), aff'd, 420
F. App'x 854 (10th Cir. 2011). When it becomes apparent that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking,
the court must dismiss the case regardless of the stage of the proceeding. Fish v. Kobach, 189 F.
Supp. 3d 1107, 1124–25 (D. Kan. 2016). The court has a duty to raise and resolve issues of subject
matter jurisdiction, even if no party has objected to the exercise of jurisdiction. Wachovia Bank v.
Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 305 (2006). To determine whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court looks to the face of the complaint. Penteco Corp. v. Union Gas Sys., Inc.,
929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991).
A pro se Plaintiff’s complaint must still “set forth the grounds of plaintiff’s entitlement to
relief through more than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Fisher v. Lynch, 531 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1260 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110
Case 6:25-cv-01291-JWB-BGS Document 5 Filed 01/08/26 Page 2 of 8

3
(holding that a plaintiff need not precisely state each element, but must plead minimal factual
allegations on those material elements that must be proven)). “In other words, plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to state a claim which is plausible – rather than merely conceivable – on its face.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). See also Bemis, 500 F.3d at 1218 (stating that
factual allegations in the complaint must establish “above the speculative level” that plaintiff is
entitled to relief).
The Court’s relaxed scrutiny of the pro se plaintiff’s pleadings “does not relieve [him] of the
burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall, 935 F.2d
at 1110. A pro se plaintiff’s pleading conclusory statements is insufficient to state a claim because
no special legal training is required to “recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury[.]” Id. See
also Olson v. Carmack, 641 Fed. App’x. 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2016). If this Court finds, after construing
the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, the court is compelled to recommend that the action be dismissed.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Claims and Factual Allegations
On December 19, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Tommy-Lee Kirk filed a Complaint against Frank
Shoffner, identified as the Chief Executive Officer of Credit Union of America; Sam Grove,
identified as the Chief Financial Officer of Credit Union of America; and Credit Union of America
itself. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his civil rights, property rights, and contractual
interests, and he seeks both monetary and injunctive relief.
Most of the following facts come from Plaintiff's Complaint and attached exhibits. The
Court also reviewed the state court docket on the eCourt public access portal in the action styled
Credit Union of America v. Tom L Kirk, et al., Case No. SG-2024-CV-002339 (Sedgwick County District
Court). For § 1915 screening purposes, the Court accepts the Plaintiff's allegations as true and
Case 6:25-cv-01291-JWB-BGS Document 5 Filed 01/08/26 Page 3 of 8

4
construes all reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff. See Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217-18.
In December 2024, Credit Union of America filed a petition to foreclose a mortgage in the
District Court of Sedgwick County. 2 The petition alleges that in August 2019, defendants Tom Kirk
and Chantel Kirk executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $100,000 in favor of Credit
Union of America, which was secured by a mortgage on real property. The petition further alleges
that the mortgage was properly recorded in June 2022 and that Credit Union of America is the party
entitled to enforce the note and mortgage. The Kirks defaulted on the loan by failing to make
required monthly payments beginning in June 2023, resulting in an accumulation of debt.
The exhibits attached to the complaint include a published Notice of Sheriff’s Sale arising
from the state court action. According to the notice, Credit Union of America obtained a judgment
involving title to the mortgaged property. A sheriff’s sale of the property was scheduled for August
6, 2025, pursuant to Kansas law. The notice also reflects that the sale was to occur under an order
issued by the Sedgwick County District Court and was subject to statutory redemption rights and
court approval. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the state-court proceedings occurred but
challenges its validity and effect. Beginning in May 2025, Plaintiff began sending a series of
documents to Credit Union of America and its officers by certified mail. These documents allegedly
included notices of lien, opportunities to cure, “affidavits of truth,” and demands for response. The
state court docket is also rife with similar filings. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants failed to respond
to these notices and that their silence constituted acceptance of Plaintiff’s stated terms and
conditions.
2 The action is styled Credit Union of America v. Tom L. Kirk, et al., Case No. SG-2024-CV-002339, which the
Court has previously reviewed.
Case 6:25-cv-01291-JWB-BGS Document 5 Filed 01/08/26 Page 4 of 8

5
In the complaint’s statement of claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to answer
what he characterizes as a “conditional acceptance of a bill” and violated his civil rights by depriving
him of property without due process, breached contractual duties, and engaged in conduct
actionable under various federal statutes and constitutional provisions cited in the complaint.3
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for millions of dollars against the individual Defendants and Credit
Union of America, as well as relief related to the foreclosure.
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s
claims be dismissed.
III. 	Analysis
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must confirm the existence of subject-
matter jurisdiction before addressing the merits of a case. See Kline v. Biles, 861 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th
Cir. 2017); accord Deloge v. Davis, No. 21-8025, 2021 WL 6143719, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2021)
(holding that when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim because of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, it must dismiss the claim without prejudice). This obligation applies at the
screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909
(10th Cir. 1974) (“A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at
any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.”). When
jurisdiction is lacking, dismissal is required.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court does not have jurisdiction to review
decisions of a state court or any claim “inextricably intertwined” with claims decided by a state
court. See Mounkes v. Conklin, 922 F. Supp. 1501, 1508-10 (D. Kan. 1996) (explaining the doctrine,
3 Plaintiff does not clearly identify specific causes of action but instead provides offhand references to federal
statutes and constitutional provisions. He also, in a conclusory fashion, asserts general claims for civil rights
violations, breach of contract, and violations of the False Claims Act. The Court need not attempt to hunt
through his pleadings to discern what claims he intends to assert because, for the reasons to follow, the Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Case 6:25-cv-01291-JWB-BGS Document 5 Filed 01/08/26 Page 5 of 8

6
deriving from District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) and Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)). This doctrine “prevents the lower federal courts
from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court
judgments rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005)). The doctrine applies “where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable
state-court decision to a lower federal court.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 466.
As mentioned earlier, Plaintiff’s complaint does not clearly lay out what claims he is
asserting. He lists general grievances with the foreclosure process and provides offhand references
to various federal statutes and constitutional amendments. The Court will not attempt to make out
claims for him or hunt through his pleadings to discern viable causes of action. In many instances,
these defects would lead to a recommendation of dismissal under Rule 8. However, generally
federal courts “satisfy itself of its subject-matter jurisdiction before it considers the merits of a case.”
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 575 (1999). And here, the Court finds that it does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s complaint.4
Here, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff's claims because they arise out of the
mortgage foreclosure action. Plaintiff alleges that the promissory note he signed was fraudulent and
that his property was seized as a result. Doc. 1, at 4. However, those issues were already litigated
and decided in the underlying state court action, which has already been brought to a final judgment.
The sheriff’s sale notice reflects that the sale was specifically to “satisfy the judgment” entered in the
state-court case. See Bear v. Patton, 451 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the Rooker-
4 Given the undefined and unclear causes of action in the complaint, the Court will refer to Plaintiff claims
generally which encompass all claims he is intending to assert.
Case 6:25-cv-01291-JWB-BGS Document 5 Filed 01/08/26 Page 6 of 8

7
Feldman doctrine applies even when the accounting and distribution of the proceeds of the sheriff’s
sale remain).
Moreover, the claims related to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s property interests and related
fraudulent collection activity all flow directly from the state-court foreclosure action and the orders
entered in that case. The state court proceedings resulted in a final judgment rendered before these
federal proceedings commenced. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 460. All of Plaintiff’s claims are
“inextricably intertwined” with claims decided by the state court. Plaintiff attempts to present his
claims as sounding in fraud or civil rights violations, but they all relate back to his misgivings about
the state court decision. Under Rooker–Feldman, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide claims alleging
injuries caused by state court judgment. Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims
be dismissed without prejudice.
For the reasons explained above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the
District Judge dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii)
because the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear his claims.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED to the District Court that Plaintiff’s complaint
(Doc. 1) be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
IT IS ORDERED that a copy of the recommendation shall be sent to Plaintiff via certified
mail. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed R. Civ. P. 72, and D. Kan, Rule 72.1.4, Plaintiff shall
have fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of these proposed findings and recommendations to
serve and file with the U.S. District Judge assigned to the case, any written objections to the findings
of fact, conclusions of law, or recommendations of the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s
failure to file such written, specific objections within the 14-day period will bar appellate review of
the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the recommended disposition. See Moore v.
United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991).
Case 6:25-cv-01291-JWB-BGS Document 5 Filed 01/08/26 Page 7 of 8

8
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Dated January 8, 2026, at Wichita, Kansas.
/s/ B ROOKS S EVERSON
Brooks G. Severson
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 6:25-cv-01291-JWB-BGS Document 5 Filed 01/08/26 Page 8 of 8