Jones et al v. Gusman et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LASHAWN JONES, ET AL 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 12-859
MARLIN GUSMAN, ET AL 	SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
On January 5, 2026, this Court concluded that it was in the interest of justice
to appoint a transition monitor1 to support a seamless transition between the current
Orleans Parish Sheriff and Sheriff-Elect and ensure continued compliance with the
consent judgment.2 The Court ordered the parties to provide the names of any
suggested candidates for the position as well as documentation supporting those
nominations.3 The parties filed their responses4 suggesting candidates for the Court’s
consideration.
Sheriff Susan Hutson also noted her objection to this Court “creating the
additional position of a ‘transition monitor.’”5 Specifically, Sheriff Hutson objects to
the appointment of a transition monitor because she contends that the “broad scope
of authority” granted to the transition monitor is “unrelated to monitoring compliance
with the Consent Judgment” and “goes beyond the purpose and terms of the Consent
1 See R. Doc. No. 1777, at 1.
2 R. Doc. No. 466.
3 R. Doc. No. 1777, at 2.
4 R. Doc. Nos. 1780, 1781, 1784.
5 R. Doc. No. 1781, at 1.
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Judgment.”6 She also argues that the transition monitor’s “excessive authority will
necessarily intrude on [her] authority and the daily operations of the [Orleans Parish
Sheriff’s Office] and OJC,”7 a disingenuous position flatly contradicted by Sheriff
Hutson’s prior complaints to this Court about her transition period. Furthermore,
Sheriff-Elect Woodfork has consistently stated that she does not intend to unduly
burden Sheriff Hutson or her staff and this Court takes her at her word. Yet, it is
Sheriff Hutson’s position that appointment of an additional monitor for purposes of
ensuring a seamless transition “is not necessary.”8
The City of New Orleans also opposes the appointment of a transition monitor
because it “views the appointment of an additional monitor solely for this purpose as
creating an additional financial burden on the City at a time when the City faces a
significant budget deficit.”9
The parties do not contest, nor could they, that this Court may appoint
monitors for the purpose of overseeing compliance with the consent judgment.10 See
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1162 (5th Cir.), amended in part, vacated in part on
other 	grounds, 	688 	F.2d 	266 	(5th 	Cir. 	1982). 	And 	despite 	Sheriff 	Hutson’s
protestations to the contrary, it has become apparent to the Court that appointment
of a transition monitor is necessary to ensure such compliance. For one, as this Court
6 Id. at 1–2.
7 Id. at 2.
8 Id. at 3.
9 R. Doc. No. 1784, at 1.
10 See id., R. Doc. No. 1781, at 1; see also R. Doc. No. 466, at 44–46 (the consent
judgement, in which the parties agreed to the appointment of a monitor “to oversee
implementation of” the consent judgment).
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experienced and as U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael North highlighted at a recent
status conference with the parties,11 Sheriff Hutson has herself indicated multiple
times during her tenure that her compliance with the consent judgment was hindered
by 	the 	significant 	difficulties 	she 	encountered 	during 	the 	period 	that 	her
administration was trying to transition from Sheriff Gusman’s administration.12
Counsel for OPSO conceded as much at the conference held by Judge North.13 The
Court agrees with Judge North that this Court is not “going to let history repeat itself”
by allowing poor transition to prevent OPSO from doing what it is required to do
pursuant to the consent judgment.14
This finding is not unfounded as it pertains to the present transition. After
multiple 	opportunities 	to 	hear 	from 	the 	parties 	and 	Sheriff-Elect 	Michelle
Woodfork,15 it is clear to the Court that there have already been transition-related
11 See R. Doc. No. 1785.
12 R. Doc. No. 1791, at 7–8 (“I cannot help but observe that in my many interactions
with Sheriff Hutson over the last almost four years, whenever we have had issues
with the production of information, going all the way back to May of 2022 . . . there
has been a constant reliance on that fact that she did not have a transition from her
predecessor to herself. And now we find ourselves on the brink of having exactly the
same problem.”); see also id. at 12 (“For years, we have heard . . . your client saying
to the Court that she was having difficulty responding to information consistent with
the requirements of the consent decree because she had been locked out of an
appropriate transition by her predecessor.”).
13 See id. at 13.
14 Id.
15 Counsel for OPSO argued at the hearing before Judge North that it was improper
for the Court to “accept pleadings from non-part[y]” Sheriff-Elect Woodfork. See R.
Doc. No. 1791, at 9. But the Court is not blind to the fact that OPSO is in a period of
transition between Sheriff Hutson and Sheriff-Elect Woodfork. Moreover, the Court
does not construe the correspondence from counsel for Sheriff-Elect Woodfork as
“pleadings.” See R. Doc. No. 1778-1.
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difficulties as it pertains to the transfer of information that is necessary for
compliance with the consent judgment.16 And, having spoken with the monitors, the
Court is not convinced that the current administration is free from fault in that
regard.
With respect to the City’s objections, the Court expects that the appointment
of the transition monitor will not result in additional costs. If the Court were not to
appoint a transition monitor, monitors already appointed by the Court, including
Chief Monitor Margo Frasier and Monitor Tommie Vassel, would be needed to
perform the same, necessary transition-related monitoring.17 Both of those monitors
have other job duties which make it more difficult to expend the time necessary to
resolve transition issues. The fact that the transition monitor to be appointed is
located in New Orleans will also serve to reduce potential costs incurred as a result
of transition-related monitoring.
The Court reiterates that the goal has always been to maintain a constitutional
jail. Nothing in this order is intended to infringe on Sheriff Hutson’s authority or
impede her ability to perform the duties of her office. The Court concludes that this
appointment will not be overly burdensome to Sheriff Hutson and that it will only
assist OPSO in its efforts to comply with the consent judgment. To the extent that
Sheriff Hutson’s objection is to the concept of appointing a monitor, the Court notes
16 Id. at 6–7; see also R. Doc. No. 1778.
17 Perhaps intuitively, the transition monitor will be paid less than the Chief Monitor.
As the Court stated in its order appointing a transition monitor, the appointment
“will reduce the time now being expended by Chief Monitor Margo Frasier and
Tommie Vassel relative to transition issues.” R. Doc. No. 1777.
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that the parties previously agreed to the appointment of monitors,18 each of which
have 	specialized 	knowledge 	suited 	for 	assisting 	compliance 	with 	the 	consent
judgment. For these reasons, the Court overrules the parties’ objections.19 Having
evaluated the candidates proposed by the parties, and in consultation with Chief
Monitor Margo Frasier, Monitor Tommie Vassel, and U.S. Magistrate Judge North,
IT IS ORDERED that Danny Murphy (“Mr. Murphy”)20 is hereby appointed
as transition monitor. He is tasked with facilitating a seamless transition between
Sheriff 	Hutson 	and 	Sheriff-Elect 	Woodfork, 	which 	includes 	facilitating 	the
communication 	of 	requested 	information 	to 	Sheriff-Elect 	Woodfork, 	such 	as
information related to financial documents, payroll, staff assignments, and contracts.
Mr. Murphy will report to Chief Monitor Margo Frasier as well as the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this appointment is effective immediately
and will terminate once Sheriff-Elect Woodfork takes her oath of office in May, 2026.
18 See R. Doc. No. 466, at 44–46.
19 The Court notes that Sheriff Hutson also objected to the Court’s order appointing
a transition monitor “to the extent it orders prospective relief without making the
necessary findings under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the [Prison Litigation Reform
Act].” See R. Doc. No. 1781, at 3. Although the Court recognizes that the “caselaw is
unclear as to whether the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement applies to
court monitoring,” Braggs v. Dunn, 483 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1167 (M.D. Ala. 2020), the
Court agrees with those courts which find that monitoring merely “aids the prisoners
in obtaining relief” and, therefore, is not prospective relief subject to § 3626(a)(1)(A).
See, e.g., id.; Carruthers v. Jenne, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2002). Even
still, it seems to the Court that the present transition monitor appointment would
satisfy the PLRA’s need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement were the Court to
consider the question. See Braggs, 483 F. Supp. 3d at 1168 (finding that the defendant
department of corrections’ history of “failure to comply with the remedial orders in
this case” justified appointment of a monitor pursuant to § 3626(a)(1)(A)).
20 R. Doc. No. 1780-1.
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New Orleans, Louisiana, January 22, 2026.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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