USA v. Johnson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 22-110
XAVIER JOHNSON 	SECTION: “P” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Continue Restitution Hearing (R. Doc. 98) filed by the
United States of America and unopposed by the defendant, Xavier Johnson, wherein the
Government seeks to continue the restitution hearing, which is currently set for February 9, 2025,
because the Government only very recently received evidence concerning the amount of restitution
owed, necessitating time to review that evidence.
In July 2025, Mr. Johnson pled guilty to carjacking and felon in possession of a firearm.1
On December 2, 2025, he was sentenced to 132 months’ and 120 months’ imprisonment, to run
concurrently, followed by concurrent terms of five and three years of supervised release.2 During
the sentencing, the Court stated that restitution was mandatory to the two victims of the carjacking,
J.F. and T.C., pursuant to the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A. The Court, however, deferred ordering the amount of restitution owed to each victim.
As to J.F., the U.S. Probation Office had not received any information regarding the amount of his
losses, so J.F.’s losses were not ascertainable at the time of sentencing.3 As to T.C., the Final
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) contained information regarding the amount of T.C.’s
losses, but Mr. Johnson requested a hearing to review the documentation supporting what was
1 R. Doc. 68.
2 R. Doc. 92.
3 R. Doc. 80 ¶ ¶ 20–21.
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contained in the Final PSR. Thus, the Court set a restitution hearing for February 10, 2026—70
days after the sentencing—for a final determination of each victim’s losses.4 Now, having just
received copies of J.F.’s medical records, the Government requests a continuance of 30 days.
The Government’s request for a 30-day continuance implicates Title 18, United States
Code, Section 3664(d)(5), which maintains a 90-day post-sentencing “deadline” for the final
determination of restitution. Section 3664(d)(5) states:
If the victim’s losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior to
sentencing, the attorney for the Government or the probation officer shall so inform
the court, and the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s
losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.5
But “[i]t is settled law that ‘a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline [in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(d)(5)] nonetheless retains the power to order restitution—at least where, as here, the
sentencing court made clear prior to the deadline’s expiration that it would order restitution,
leaving open (for more than 90 days) only the amount.’”6
Here, this Court explicitly stated during the sentencing hearing that restitution was
mandatory pursuant to the MVRA, and its discourse concerning restitution during that hearing
indicates that it had every intention of ordering restitution for both victims at the sentencing but
was precluded from doing so due to the lack of information as to the amount owed to J.F. and to
Mr. Johnson’s request to review the documentation supporting the amount owed to T.C.7 Thus, at
4 R. Doc. 92.
5 (emphasis added).
6 United States v. Gurrola, 898 F.3d 524, 542 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605,
611 (2010); United States v. Bell, 514 F. App'x 423 (5th Cir. 2013)).
7 See Dolan, 560 U.S. at 608, 621 (affirming decision that sentencing court had authority to order restitution
after § 3664(d)(5)’s 90-day deadline expired when, at the sentencing hearing, the sentencing court was
aware that restitution was “mandatory” but found there was “insufficient information on the record” at the
time of sentencing regarding “possible restitution payments that may be owed” and stated that defendant
could “anticipate that such an award will be made in the future”).
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the sentencing hearing, the Court “made clear” that it is ordering restitution, “leaving open . . .
only the amount.”
Further, in United States v. Dolan, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that § 3664(d)(5) “seeks
speed primarily to help the victims of crime,” as the MVRA’s primary substantive purpose is “to
ensure that victims of a crime receive full restitution.”8 Thus, where a restitution hearing is held
past the statute’s 90-day deadline because of a delay in the receipt of information regarding the
amount owed to the victim, that “late” hearing is nonetheless furthering the purpose of the statute.
Accordingly, even though the date for a final determination of J.F.’s and T.C.’s losses will occur
past § 3664(d)(5)’s “90-day deadline,”
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and the restitution hearing in this matter
is CONTINUED from February 10, 2026, to March 10, 2026, at 10:00 a.m.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of February 2026.
______________________________________
DARREL JAMES PAPILLION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8 560 U.S. 605, 612–13 (2010).
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