In Re: Taxotere (Docetaxel) Eye Injury Products Liability Litigation

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE: TAXOTERE (DOCETAXEL) 	) 	MDL NO. 3023
EYE INJURY 	)
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 	)
)
This document relates to: 	) 	SECTION: “H” (5)
Juanita Anderson, Case No. 2:22-cv-04751 	)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Sanofi’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 546).
For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs 	in 	this 	multidistrict 	litigation 	(“MDL”) 	are 	suing 	several
pharmaceutical 	companies 	that 	manufactured 	and/or 	distributed 	a
chemotherapy drug, Taxotere or docetaxel, that Plaintiffs were administered
for the treatment of cancer, primarily breast cancer.1 Among these companies
are 	Defendants 	sanofi-aventis 	U.S. 	LLC 	and 	Sanofi 	US 	Services 	Inc.
(collectively, “Sanofi”). Plaintiffs allege that Taxotere caused them to sustain
injuries 	to 	their 	lacrimal 	systems, 	including 	punctal, 	canalicular, 	and/or
nasolacrimal duct stenosis, which resulted in excessive tearing, otherwise
known as epiphora.2 Plaintiffs allege claims based on failure to warn and
negligence. Although it has undergone various revisions, as of 2002, the
1 Taxotere is the brand name for the drug docetaxel.
2 For reference, this Court provided extensive background on the injury at issue and
the facts giving rise to this case in its prior Orders addressing preemption. Doc. 583; Doc.
591.
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Taxotere label has warned about “excessive tearing which may be attributable
to lacrimal duct obstruction.”3
Pursuant to Case Management Order No. 16, on March 28, 2024, the
Court identified certain plaintiffs selected by the parties for inclusion in the
bellwether pool, including Plaintiff Juanita Anderson.4 Plaintiff Anderson was
first 	diagnosed 	with 	breast 	cancer 	in 	2007. 	She 	was 	diagnosed 	with 	a
recurrence of breast cancer in August 2013, after which her oncologist, Dr.
Gary Burton, prescribed a chemotherapy regimen consisting of Taxotere and
Cytoxan. Plaintiff Anderson received chemotherapy every three weeks from
September 27, 2013, through December 27, 2013.
On December 2, 2022, Plaintiff Anderson filed her Short Form Complaint
alleging 	that 	she 	“suffers 	from 	chronic 	and 	debilitating 	epiphora 	due 	to
permanent damage to her lacrimal drainage system.”5 On June 16, 2025,
Sanofi filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Plaintiff
Anderson’s claims are time-barred under Louisiana law and that regardless,
Plaintiff Anderson cannot establish the causation element of her claims.6
Plaintiff Anderson opposes.7
3 See Doc. 553-17 at 35.
4 Doc. 255.
5 Doc. 546-7 at 6. In Case Management Order No. 2, the Court ordered plaintiffs to
file a master complaint collectively and short-form complaints individually, which adopted
the allegations in the master complaint. See Doc. 20. A Master Complaint against Sanofi was
filed on May 13, 2022, and Plaintiff Anderson’s Short Form Complaint adopts the allegations
contained therein. Doc. 25 (Master Complaint); Doc. 546-7 (Short Form Complaint).
6 Doc. 546.
7 Doc. 553.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	“if 	the 	pleadings, 	depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”8
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor.9 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”10 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”11 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the non-
movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”12 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
8 Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).
9 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997).
10 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
11 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
12 Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301
(5th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
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necessary facts.”13 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual
dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”14
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Sanofi argues that Plaintiff Anderson’s claims are time-barred under
Louisiana law.15 At the time her claims arose, Louisiana Civil Code article
3492 provided a one-year liberative prescription period for delictual actions,
including products-liability cases.16 Ordinarily, “prescription commences to
run from the day injury or damage is sustained.”17 Under Louisiana law,
however, “there is a firmly rooted equitable-tolling doctrine known as contra
non valentem agere non currit praescriptio, which means ‘[n]o prescription runs
against a person unable to bring an action.”’18 “The doctrine tolls prescription
under any of four ‘exceptional circumstances,’ one of which is ‘where the cause
of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff,’ termed the
‘discovery rule.’”19
13 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
14 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
15 The parties do not dispute that Louisiana law governs Plaintiff Anderson’s claims.
16 Bruno v. Biomet, Inc., 74 F.4th 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing LA. CIV. CODE art.
3942 (2023)). In 2024, Article 3492 was replaced by an otherwise identical statute providing
for a liberative prescription of two years. See 2024 La. Acts 423 (H.B. 315). The two-year
period, however, was “given prospective application only” and applies only to claims “arising”
after July 1, 2024, the statute’s effective date. Id. Since Plaintiff Anderson’s claims arise from
her 2013 treatment from Taxotere, the one-year prescriptive period applies.
17 Bruno, 74 F. 4th at 623 (citation modified).
18 In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods. Liab. Litig., 995 F.3d 384, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2021)
(quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776, 786 (5th Cir. 1963)) (alterations
in original).
19 Bruno, 74 F. 4th at 623 (quoting In re Taxotere, 995 F.3d at 390–91).
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Before proceeding with the analysis, a brief review of the relevant dates
is required. Plaintiff Anderson testified that she began having symptoms of
tearing shortly after beginning chemotherapy in September 2013. She reported
her symptoms to Andrea, Dr. Burton’s assistant, who told her that her tearing
was a side effect of chemotherapy that would eventually “go away.”20 Following
the 	completion 	of 	chemotherapy 	in 	December 	2013, 	Plaintiff 	Anderson
continued to experience excessive tearing. While she testified that her tearing
is continuous, she also stated that it is sporadic and intermittent.21 Although
Plaintiff Anderson continued to see her regular eye-care provider in the years
following her chemotherapy, she did not seek treatment specifically for her
tearing condition.
While the record does not reflect the exact date that Plaintiff Anderson
first contacted her attorneys, she testified that she did so at some point in the
fall of 2020. On November 23, 2020, Plaintiff Anderson signed authorization
forms permitting the release of her medical records to her attorneys, who
ultimately referred her to Dr. Brian Vekovius, an oculoplastic surgeon. On
December 6, 2021, Dr. Vekovius diagnosed Plaintiff Anderson with “lacrimal
epiphora due to insufficient drainage,” and Plaintiff Anderson underwent
probing and irrigation.22 Less than a year later, on December 2, 2022, Plaintiff
Anderson filed a complaint in this matter. 23 At a follow-up appointment on
20 See Doc. 553-1 at 1.
21 See Doc. 546-5 at 207–08.
22 Doc. 553-6 at 10.
23 Doc. 546-7.
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January 6, 2022, Dr. Vekovius additionally diagnosed punctal stenosis and
recommended she have a snip punctoplasty.24
Plaintiff Anderson filed her Short Form Complaint on December 2, 2022.
Her claims are timely, therefore, if prescription began on or was suspended
until December 2, 2021. The Court’s prescription analysis proceeds in two
steps. First, the Court must determine the date at which Plaintiff Anderson’s
claims accrued, i.e., the date that prescription would ordinarily commence.25
If, based on that date, Plaintiff Anderson’s claims appear to have prescribed,
the Court then considers whether contra non valentem otherwise suspended
prescription.26
a. When Plaintiff Anderson’s claims accrued
The parties dispute when Plaintiff Anderson’s claims accrued. Article
3492 provides that prescription begins to run “from the day injury or damage
is sustained.”27 “[D]amages are said to be sustained ‘when [the damage] has
manifested itself with sufficient certainty to support accrual of a cause of
action.’”28
24 Doc. 553-6 at 13.
25 See Bruno, 74 F. 4th at 623; see also Jenkins v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 689 F.
App’x 793, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2017) Generally speaking, “[i]f the face of the petition shows that
the prescriptive period has already elapsed, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that
suspension, interruption or renunciation of prescription has occurred.” In re Taxotere
Docetaxel Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No., No. 16-2740, No. 16-17039, 2020 WL 1815854 (E.D.
La. Apr. 7, 2020) (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has recognized, however, that “[t]here
is some question as to whether this burden-shifting rule applies at a motion for summary
judgment.” In re Taxotere, 995 F.3d at 389.
26 Bruno, 74 F. 4th at 623.
27 LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (1983).
28 Jenkins, 689 F. App’x at 795 (alterations in original) (quoting Cole v. Celotex Corp.,
620 So.2d 1154, 1156 (La. 1993)).
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Sanofi contends in its Motion that Plaintiff Anderson’s claim accrued,
and prescription began to run, when Plaintiff Anderson first experienced
tearing during her 2013 chemotherapy treatment. Plaintiff Anderson responds
that because (1) tearing is not her alleged injury and (2) the injury that she
actually alleges (i.e., permanent damage to her lacrimal system) is progressive,
Sanofi has not carried its burden of proving the date at which her claim
accrued. Plaintiff Anderson further contends that in 2013, she was not aware
that she had a permanent injury and appears to take the position that her
claims did not accrue until she received a definitive diagnosis.
Plaintiff Anderson’s argument, however, conflates the first step of the
prescription analysis with the second. The Fifth Circuit has made clear that a
plaintiff’s knowledge is irrelevant to the initial inquiry, which focuses solely on
when injury or damage was sustained under the statute.29 “In cases where
injury or damage is not immediately apparent, ‘prescription will begin to run
when the damage is sustained. However, contra non valentem will suspend the
running 	of 	the 	prescriptive 	period 	until 	the 	claimant 	knows 	or 	should
29 In re Taxotere, 995 F.3d at 389–90 (It is important that Article 3492’s prescription
provision does not incorporate equitable-tolling principles . . . . Without a ‘date of discovery’
provision in the prescriptive statute, we look to when the injury was sustained to determine
when the prescription period began to run.”); See also Averette v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms.
Inc., No. 13-05968, 2014 WL 1246851, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 2014) (noting that under the
doctrine of contra non valentem, “in cases involving latent injury, the cause of action accrues
when damages are first suffered, but the prescription period does not run until such time as
a reasonable plaintiff would become aware of the connection between her injured condition
and the defendant’s tortious actions”); Grenier v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 243 F.3d 200, 208 n.2
(5th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he district court failed to differentiate the question of when
damages occurred from the question of when the plaintiff became aware of the damages,” and
that, “[a]s we understand Louisiana law, the first question determines when a cause of action
accrues; the second determines when a tolled prescription period begins to run”).
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reasonably know that he has suffered damages.’”30 Further, under Louisiana
law, 	“[t]he 	commencement 	of 	prescription 	does 	not 	. 	. 	. 	wait 	for 	the
pronouncement of a victim’s physician or of an expert.” 31 Rather, “[a] cause of
action accrues when damages are first suffered.”32 Thus, “the crucial date for
the prescriptive period is the date of injury and not the date of diagnosis.”33
Here, Plaintiff Anderson does not dispute that she experienced excessive
or persistent tearing as alleged in her Short Form Complaint at some point
during the course of her chemotherapy and that she continues to experience
excessive 	tearing 	to 	this 	day.34 	Accordingly, 	at 	the 	earliest, 	statutory
prescription would have commenced in 2013—when Plaintiff Anderson could
have first realized symptoms and sustained damages stemming from her use
of Taxotere.35
30 Landry v. NuVasive Inc., No. 6:16-cv-00192, 2018 WL 1321972, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar.
14, 2018) (quoting Brown, 52 F.3d at 527).
31 Jenkins, 689 F. App’x at 796 (quoting Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295,
300 (5th Cir. 1999)).
32 Id. (quoting Grenier v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 243 F.3d 200, 204 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001)).
33 Id. (quoting Crosby v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 89-4882, 1991 WL 194724,
at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1991)).
34 Plaintiff Anderson testified that she experienced tearing during and after chemo.
See Doc. 546-5 at 122. Her Plaintiff Fact Sheet also states that her tearing began “around
December 2013.” Doc. 546-3 at 35.
35 Plaintiff Anderson is correct to the extent that she argues that the relevant date is
the date she sustained a “cognizable injury,” not necessarily the date she sustained any
Taxotere-related symptoms. See Jenkins, 689 F. App’x at 796. To determine what constitutes
a “cognizable injury,” the Court must look to the allegations in Plaintiff Anderson’s Short
Form Complaint. See In re Taxotere, 995 F.3d at 389–90. Although Plaintiff Anderson
contends that tearing is different than the permanent injury which she alleges, Plaintiff
Anderson’s Short Form Complaint, which adopts the allegations in the Master Complaint,
alleges that she suffered suffers from “chronic and debilitating epiphora due to permanent
damage to her lacrimal drainage system” as well as “daily disruption” because of excessive
tearing, or epiphora, and that she continues to suffer from “persistent tearing and
disfigurement.” Doc. 546-7 at 6; Doc. 26 at 1, 3, 18.
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b. Whether 	contra 	non 	valentem 	tolled 	prescription 	of
Plaintiff Anderson’s claims
The dispositive question is whether prescription was suspended by the
discovery rule under the doctrine of contra non valentum.36 “Tolling pursuant
to contra non valentem ends, and the prescriptive period begins, on ‘the date
the injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts upon which his
cause of action is based.’”37 Stated another way, the Court must determine
whether Plaintiff Anderson acquired “actual or constructive knowledge” of the
alleged connection between her injuries and Taxotere prior to December 2,
2021, that is, one year before she filed suit.38
“Constructive knowledge is whatever notice is enough to excite attention
and 	put 	the 	injured 	party 	on 	guard 	and 	call 	for 	inquiry.”39 	Even 	so,
“constructive knowledge requires more than a mere apprehension something
might be wrong.”40 But “when a plaintiff suspects something is wrong, he must
seek out those whom he believes may be responsible for the specific injury.”41
In this inquiry, reasonableness is assessed in light of the plaintiff’s “education
and intelligence.”42
Sanofi first argues that contra non valentum does not apply because
Plaintiff Anderson failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the cause
36 See Crochet v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 804 F. App’x 249, 252 (5th Cir. 2020).
37 Jenkins, 689 F. App’x at 796 (quoting Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 2003-C-1030 (La.
02/06/04), 865 So.2d 49, 55).
38 Crochet, 804 F. App’x at 252–53 (citing Campo v. Correa, 2001-0646 (La. 6/21/02),
828 So. 2d 502, 510).
39 Campo, 828 So.2d at 510–11.
40 Bruno, 74 F. 4th at 624 (citation modified).
41 Id. (citation modified).
42 Id. (citation modified).
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of her injuries. It further contends that regardless, Plaintiff Anderson had
actual knowledge of her claims no later than November 23, 2020, when she
signed the above-mentioned medical authorization forms. Plaintiff Anderson
counters that she inquired into her symptoms with her oncologist, that she
reasonably relied on her oncologist’s assertion that her tearing would go away,
and that her failure to further inquire into the issue with an eye specialist was
therefore reasonable. Reiterating her prior arguments, Plaintiff Anderson
contends that she did not realize she had a permanent injury related to her
Taxotere use until Dr. Vekovius diagnosed her with punctal stenosis and
advised 	her 	that 	surgery 	could 	alleviate 	her 	symptoms 	at 	her 	follow-up
appointment.
Although Sanofi appears to take the position that a plaintiff’s retention
of 	an 	attorney 	is 	dispositive, 	the 	Louisiana 	Supreme 	Court 	“has 	not
pronounced a strict, bright-line rule stating that, when a party hires an
attorney, such an event is dispositive proof of the party’s knowledge that he
has sustained a legally compensable injury.”43 Rather, “[t]he hiring of an
attorney is evidence, within an entire evidentiary record, which a trial court
considers when making a factual determination of when a party had actual or
constructive knowledge of their injury.”44
Nevertheless, considering the facts of this case, the Court finds that at
the latest, Plaintiff Anderson had actual or constructive knowledge of her
claims as of November 23, 2020—the date she signed authorization forms
43 State v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 20-00685 (La. 6/30/21), 347 So.3d 684, aff’d on reh’g,
(La. 6/1/22), 339 So.3d 1163, 1170–71.
44 Id. at 689.
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releasing her medical records to counsel. Louisiana courts have considered the
fact that a plaintiff has “consulted an attorney and, at that same time,
specifically signed a medical authorization form,” as evidence that the plaintiff
was “clearly aware of the injuries upon which suit was later filed.”45
Moreover, here, Plaintiff Anderson’s own testimony confirms that she
had knowledge of her claims:
Q: Okay. So, when you signed this as of November 23rd, 2020, you
had already contacted the Hotze Runkle Law Firm, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You had already hired them, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you already thought that you had a legal claim at that
point, correct?
A: Yes.46
. . .
Q: Okay. Was there any point in time after hiring them that you
thought, I don’t have a legal claim?
A: No.47
Plaintiff Anderson argues that her contact with the law firm creates a
genuine issue of material fact, relying on the following testimony:
Q: Okay, so when you signed this authorization and hired the
Hotze 	Runkle 	Law 	Firm 	in 	the 	fall 	of 	2020, 	you 	had 	an
appointment with Dr. Burton that same fall, in August of 2020.
Did you ask Dr. Burton at that appointment about this lawsuit?
A: I might’ve spoken to Andrea about it.
Q: Do you think you spoke to Andrea about it?
45 Id. at 1182 (McCallum, J., concurring) (citing Guitreau v. Kucharchuk, 99-2570 (La.
5/16/000), 763 So.2d 575).
46 Doc. 546-5 at 193.
47 Id. at 193–94.
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A: I can’t remember.
Q: Okay.
A: But if I would’ve talked to someone, it would’ve been Andrea.
Q: Okay. Do you—do you think that you told Andrea, hey, I’m going
to file a lawsuit from one of the drugs that you guys gave me, what
do you think about that?
A: No, I didn’t say that.
Q: Why didn’t you ask her about it?
A: I don’t know.
Q: Had you already made your decision at that point you were
going to file a lawsuit?
A: No. I just -- no. I just don’t remember telling her that I did, that
I was. I don’t remember that.
Q: You didn’t want her opinion on it?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A; She was—I don’t know. Let me just was it like that, I don’t
know. I wasn’t already going to—when I read and tell what it was
about, I just called.
Q: You just called the lawyers?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay.
A: To speak with someone.48
The Court finds that, at best, this testimony establishes only that
Plaintiff Anderson had not decided to file suit—not that she did not know that
she could have done so. As such, it does not create a genuine issue of material
fact 	as 	to 	Plaintiff 	Anderson’s 	actual 	or 	constructive 	knowledge. 	This
conclusion is further supported by Plaintiff Anderson’s testimony that she
always assumed—based on representations made by her oncologist—that her
tearing was at least related to chemotherapy.
48 Doc. 553-2 at 3.
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The Court acknowledges that in some cases, prescription may be tolled
until a plaintiff receives a diagnosis, and that “‘[t]he law does not impose upon
a 	layman 	the 	obligation 	to 	self-diagnose 	a 	. 	. 	. 	condition,’ 	and 	‘mere
apprehension by plaintiff that something was wrong is not sufficient to start
prescription.’”49 	Even 	so, 	“[i]gnorance 	of 	the 	probable 	extent 	of 	injuries
materially 	differs 	from 	ignorance 	of 	actionable 	harm, 	which 	delays
commencement of prescription.”50
Finally, Plaintiff Anderson argues that 	she retained her attorneys “in
the summer of 2020, in the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic,” and that
she “reported in multiple psychiatric therapy sessions throughout 2020 and
2021 that she was traumatized by the deaths of her family and friends,
including the deaths of her sister and cousin from contracting COVID while in
the hospital.”51 Plaintiff Anderson therefore contends that “the extraordinary
global circumstances during 2020 and 2021 should also be considered in
determining 	whether” 	she 	“should 	have 	subjected 	herself 	to 	a 	medical
environment to obtain a diagnosis earlier.”52 That argument, however, must
be rejected.
As just stated, Plaintiff Anderson need not have obtained a diagnosis for
the Court to find that she had actual or constructive knowledge sufficient for
the prescriptive period to commence. In any event, the COVID-19 pandemic is
not relevant to whether the discovery rule under the doctrine of contra non
49 Crochet, 804 F. App’x at 255–56 (alterations in original) (quoting Cordova v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 66,585, (La. 7/23/1980), 387 So. 2d 574).
50 Guitreau, 763 So.2d at 580.
51 Doc. 553 at 12.
52 Id.
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valentum applies. Instead, it pertains to the first circumstance in which the
doctrine may toll prescription, that is, “[w]here there was some legal cause
which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting
on the plaintiff's action.”53 While “[a] pandemic could fall under this category .
. . [,] the mere occurrence of a catastrophe does not suffice to invoke the maxim
contra 	non 	valentem.”54 	“Rather, 	‘the 	impossibility 	of 	acting 	must 	be
absolute.”’55
In Fleury v. Sodexo, another section of this Court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that the COVID-19 pandemic tolled prescription under the theory of
contra non valentum.56 This was so because “[w]hile COVID-19 ‘impacted the
manner by which courts and law offices conducted business,’ this did not mean
‘that courts were completely shut down, preventing any access to them.’”57
Further, while the Court acknowledged that Louisiana did statutorily “extend
legal deadlines, including prescription,” it reasoned that the plaintiff's claims
were not subject to those suspensions.58 Finally, the Court found persuasive
the fact that the plaintiff was not a pro se litigant: “[e]ven if COVID-19 made
it more difficult to commence a lawsuit, [the plaintiff] was represented by
counsel who could have easily filed the complaint electronically.”59
53 Fleury v. Sodexo, Inc., No. 21-2373, 2022 WL 17532295, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2022)
(Vance, J.) (quoting Fontenot v. ABC Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 960, 963 (La. 1996)).
54 Id. (citation modified).
55 Id. (quoting Felix v. Safeway Ins. Co., 15-0701 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/15), 183 So. 3d
627, 633).
56 Id. at *4–5.
57 Id. at *4.
58 Id.
59 Id. at *5.
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Here too, Plaintiff Anderson has failed to show that COVID-19 made it
impossible for her to pursue her claims. Plaintiff Anderson has not shown (and
does not attempt to argue) that the extension of deadlines during the pandemic
would have been applicable to her case.60 And like the plaintiff in Fleury,
Plaintiff Anderson was represented by counsel who could (and ultimately did)
file an electronic complaint.
Accordingly, the Court finds that (at the latest) Plaintiff Anderson had
actual or constructive knowledge as of the date she signed authorization forms
on November 23, 2020, and the one-year prescriptive period commenced on
that date. Because Plaintiff Anderson did not file suit until December 2, 2022,
her 	claims 	are 	prescribed. 	The 	Court 	therefore 	need 	not 	reach 	Sanofi’s
alternative 	argument 	that 	Plaintiff 	Anderson 	has 	not 	shown 	sufficient
evidence supporting the causation element of her claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Sanofi’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
546) is GRANTED. 	Plaintiff Anderson’s claims are 	DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
60 The statute states that “[a]ll prescriptions, including liberative, acquisitive, and the
prescription of nonuse, abandonment periods, and all peremptive periods shall be subject to
a limited suspension or extension during the time period of March 17, 2020, through July 5,
2020; however, the suspension or extension of these periods shall be limited and shall apply
only if these periods would have otherwise expired during the time period of March 17, 2020,
through July 5, 2020. The right to file a pleading or motion to enforce any right, claim, or
action which would have expired during the time period of March 17, 2020, through July 5,
2020, shall expire on July 6, 2020.” LA. REV. S TAT. § 9:5829.
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New Orleans, Louisiana this 2nd day of July, 2026.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:22-md-03023-JTM-MBN Document 640 Filed 07/06/26 Page 16 of 16