Inclusive Louisiana et al v. St. James Parish et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
INCLUSIVE LOUISIANA ET AL. 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 23-987
ST. JAMES PARISH ET AL. 	SECTION: “J”(1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Re-Submitted Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Claims
(Rec. Doc. 108) filed by Defendant St. James Parish, on behalf of itself and the St.
James Parish Council and the St. James Parish Planning Commission (hereinafter
collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs Inclusive Louisiana, Mount Triumph Baptist
Church, and RISE St. James (“Plaintiffs”) opposed the motion (Rec. Doc. 110), and
Defendants filed a reply memorandum (Rec. Doc. 113). Further, the Court held oral
argument on the motion on January 28, 2026. Having considered the motion and
memoranda, the record, the parties’ oral arguments, and the applicable law, the
Court finds that Defendants’ motion should be DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
St. 	James 	Parish, 	one 	of 	the 	original 	nineteen 	parishes 	established 	in
Louisiana in 1807, is located on the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and New
Orleans. Because of its proximity to the river, St. James Parish has attracted
significant industrial development, and it is because of this industrial development
that the stretch of land between Baton Rouge and New Orleans is referred to as
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 1 of 34

2
“Cancer Alley.” In fact, in this roughly-85-mile industrial corridor alone, there are
more than 200 petrochemical plants and refineries, which process approximately 25%
of the United States’ petrochemical products. Public Health on Call, Louisiana’s
“Cancer Alley” Is More Deadly Than Previously Imagined, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
Sch. Pub. Health (Aug. 4, 2025), https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2025/the-shocking-
hazards-of-louisianas-cancer-alley. Due in part to pollutants and toxic emissions from
petrochemical and other industrial facilities, St. James Parish has the fifth highest
cancer incidence rate among Louisiana parishes with 533.5 cases per 100,000 people,1
compared to a national rate of 462.8 per 100,000 in 2022.
In St. James Parish, most of these heavy industrial facilities are located in
majority-black districts; specifically, 28 industrial facilities have been permitted to
build in the 4th and 5th Districts, which are both home to majority-black populations,
while there are only 4 such facilities in all of the other seven districts combined. (Rec.
Doc. 104, at ¶ 373). Furthermore, Plaintiffs claim that the Parish Council has not
permitted an industrial facility to locate in a majority-white part of the Parish for
almost 50 years, while at the same time, the Council has allegedly granted every
request from companies that sought to locate in majority-black districts. Id. Not
coincidentally, according to Plaintiffs, 4th and 5th District residents ranked in the
95th–100th 	percentile 	in 	the 	nation 	for 	Air 	Toxic 	Cancer 	Risk 	based 	on 	the
1 According to the National Cancer Institute, this number is currently on the rise. State Cancer
Profiles, Nat’l Cancer Inst., https://statecancerprofiles.cancer.gov/incidencerates/index.php?stateFIPS
=22&areatype=county&cancer=001&race=00&sex=0&age=001&type=incd&sortVariableName=rate
&sortOrder=default&output=0 (last visited Feb. 6, 2026).
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 2 of 34

3
Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory, while the 3rd District,
which is majority white and has “the lowest rate of industrialization,” ranked in the
34th percentile. Id. at ¶¶ 557–60. The siting of heavy industrial facilities in St. James
Parish forms the centerpiece of this litigation.
Plaintiffs Inclusive Louisiana, Mount Triumph Baptist Church, and RISE St.
James, by and through their members, filed their initial complaint against St. James
Parish, the St. James Parish Council, and the St. James Parish Planning Commission
on 	March 	21, 	2023. 	Inclusive 	Louisiana 	is 	a 	non-profit 	community 	advocacy
organization based in St. James Parish with a goal of protecting the Parish against
environmental harm. Mount Triumph Baptist Church is a local congregation in St.
James Parish whose members claim descent from formerly enslaved people who lived
in St. James Parish. RISE St. James is a faith-based, grassroots organization
advocating for the end of petrochemical industries in St. James Parish. All three
Plaintiffs claim that their members are residents of St. James Parish descended from
formerly enslaved persons whose civil liberties, property rights, and religious rights
are violated by Defendants’ 2014 Land Use Plan (“the Land Use Plan” or “the Plan”)
and actions both before and after its adoption.
Defendants are St. James Parish, the St. James Parish Council, and the St.
James Parish Planning Commission. St. James Parish is a local governmental
subdivision of the State of Louisiana. St. James Parish Council is the legislative body
of the St. James Parish government, and the St. James Parish Planning Commission
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 3 of 34

4
is a municipal body that oversees and implements local land use regulations and
zoning.
Plaintiffs center their allegations on St. James Parish’s adoption of a Land Use
Plan in 2014, but throughout their complaint, they refer to a pattern of land use
practices that long predated the Plan. Prior to 2014, St. James Parish had never
adopted a formal land use plan, and Plaintiffs allege that the 2014 Plan effectively
codified an existing practice of discriminatory behavior toward their neighborhoods.
Further, Plaintiffs assert that the 2014 Land Use Plan was used to protect majority-
white parts of the Parish from industrial development, while steering industry to the
4th and 5th Districts, which are home to populations that are majority black. Chief
among Plaintiffs’ allegations is that the Plan’s designation of large tracts of property
in the 4th and 5th Districts as “residential/future industrial,” in addition to the heavy
industry that Defendants had already permitted to build facilities in these areas,
evinces an intent to industrialize the majority-black districts and erase these
communities. Not coincidentally, according to Plaintiffs, many of these industrial
facilities were built on sites where sugarcane plantations once stood. Further,
Plaintiffs claim that the 2014 Land Use Plan created industrial buffer zones for
white-majority churches but not black-majority churches in the Parish. In their
complaint, Plaintiffs tell the story of how plantations gave way to industrial facilities
that now endanger black residents’ health, negatively impact their quality of life, and
desecrate the unmarked cemeteries of their ancestors.
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 4 of 34

5
Plaintiffs bring the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allege that Defendants
have violated the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Religious
Land 	Use 	and 	Institutionalized 	Persons 	Act 	(“RLUIPA”), 	and 	the 	Louisiana
Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have maintained a
discriminatory, unequal, and injurious system that deprives Plaintiffs’ members of
their rights via zoning and land use decisions. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and
injunctive relief against Defendants for the alleged violations.
On November 4, 2025, Plaintiffs amended their complaint for the second time,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on seven claims (Rec. Doc. 104). In Claim I,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated the Thirteenth Amendment because
the existing land use system operates as a badge and incident of slavery. In their
second claim, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection guarantee because discriminatory intent undergirds
the Parish’s land use decisions, which create a disparate impact on the Parish’s black
residents. In Claim III, Plaintiffs bring a substantive due process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that Defendants’ land use decisions have infringed
their fundamental rights to bodily integrity and freedom from state-facilitated harm.
In Claim IV, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct has violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982
because the Land Use Plan’s intentional discrimination has negatively impacted
Plaintiffs’ members’ property rights.
Additionally, Plaintiffs bring claims against Defendants under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). In Claims V and VI,
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 5 of 34

6
Plaintiffs assert that the Parish’s Land Use Plan has placed a substantial burden on
their 	members’ 	ability 	to 	practice 	their 	religion 	and 	has 	enabled 	religious
discrimination against black Baptist churches in the Parish. Lastly, in Claim VII,
Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	Defendants 	have 	violated 	the 	Louisiana 	Constitution’s
guarantee of their members’ rights to preserve, foster, and promote their cultural and
historical heritage.
Defendants filed their first Rule 12 Motion to Strike Allegations and Dismiss
Claims (Rec. Doc. 20) on June 16, 2023, which this Court granted in part and denied
in part. Specifically, the Court denied the motion to strike, dismissed Claims V and
VII for lack of standing, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ remaining claims (I–IV and VI) with
prejudice based on prescription. Plaintiffs appealed the decision, and the Fifth Circuit
reversed and remanded on April 9, 2025. First, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs
that their claims were based not on a “single incident” (i.e., St. James Parish’s
adoption of the 2014 Land Use Plan) but rather on a “longstanding pattern and
practice of racially discriminatory land use decisions.” Inclusive Louisiana v. St.
James Par., 134 F.4th 297, 305 (5th Cir. 2025). The court held that Claims I–IV had
not prescribed because Plaintiffs supported these claims with at least two acts that
had occurred within the one-year limitation period, namely Defendants’ August 17,
2022 denial of Plaintiffs’ request for a moratorium on “polluting industry” in the 4th
and 5th Districts, and Defendants’ contemporaneous decision to grant a moratorium
on the solar industry that was requested by some of the Parish’s white residents. Id.
at 306. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Claim VI, which is subject to a four-
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 6 of 34

7
year limitation period, had not prescribed because Plaintiffs cited acts that occurred
in May of 2019 pertaining to land use permits for both Wanhua Chemical US
Operations and Syngas Energy Holding, LLC to support the claim. Id.
More importantly, however, the Fifth Circuit rejected Defendants’ argument
that all of Plaintiffs’ claims ultimately arose from the 2014 Land Use Plan, and to
support this finding, the court provided multiple land use decisions, dating from 1966
through 2022, that Plaintiffs included in their first amended complaint. Id. at
306–08. Furthermore, the court pointed out that even if all of Plaintiffs’ claims did
arise from the Parish’s 2014 adoption of the Land Use Plan, that would not
automatically mean that the claims had prescribed because land use plans are not
“self-implementing,” and therefore, decisions concerning the implementation of that
plan are ongoing. Id. at 308. Finally, the appellate court held that Plaintiffs have
standing to bring Claims V and VII. Id. at 309.
Subsequently, Defendants sought a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court, which was denied. Plaintiffs were then granted leave to supplement
their complaint, and the second amended complaint was filed into the record on
November 4, 2025. On November 18, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion to
dismiss, and the Court scheduled oral argument on the motion for January 28, 2026.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient
facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 7 of 34

8
is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The
factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[D]etailed factual allegations” are
not 	required, 	but 	the 	pleading 	must 	present 	“more 	than 	an 	unadorned, 	the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must
accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
However, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Beavers v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 566 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
A. Thirteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs bring their first claim against Defendants under the Thirteenth
Amendment, arguing specifically that St. James Parish’s land use system and zoning
ordinances represent a “badge and incident” of slavery. Conversely, Defendants
contend that Plaintiffs’ Thirteenth Amendment claim must fail because Plaintiffs
“have not pled any deprivation of rights that is a ‘badge or incident of slavery.’” (Rec.
Doc. 108-1, at 11). Defendants’ argument rests on a definition of “badges and
incidents of slavery” that requires the “subjection of one man to another.” Id. at 11–
12 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)).
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 8 of 34

9
The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1865 after the Civil War. Arguably
one of the most important (if not the most important) amendments, it abolished
slavery and involuntary servitude, except in the case of a person who has been
convicted of a crime, and also included an enforcement clause, granting Congress the
power to pass “appropriate legislation” to achieve the amendment’s purposes. U.S.
Const. amend. XIII. In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the United States Supreme
Court declared that the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment “clothe[d]
Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery in the United States.” C.R. Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. Since 1883,
much ink has been spilled regarding the scope of the phrase, “badges and incidents
of slavery.”
By 1865, “incidents” was already considered a term of art, 	and in the
Thirteenth Amendment context, it referred to “any legal right or restriction that
necessarily accompanied the institution of slavery.” Jennifer Mason McAward,
Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 J. Const. L. 561, 575 (2012). For this
reason, the term was often bound up in “the aspects of property law that applied to
the ownership and transfer of slaves,” as well as the “civil disabilities imposed on
slaves by virtue of their status as property.” Id. “Badges of slavery,” on the other
hand, was largely used in a figurative, rather than a legal, sense until after the Civil
War, and in the United States, it often referred to skin color because certain legal
restrictions associated with slavery were frequently visited not only on enslaved
African Americans, but also on free people of color because of their race. Id. at 576.
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 9 of 34

10
Immediately after the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification, however, “badges
of slavery” “became more of a term of art that referred to legal restrictions imposed
by states on the civil rights of freed slaves.” Id. at 581. Naturally, the term’s meaning
evolved in a way that reflected “the reality of emancipation . . . and the term was used
to reference ways in which southern governments and white citizens endeavored to
reimpose upon freed slaves the incidents of slavery or, more generally, to restrict their
rights in such a way as to mark them as a subordinate brand of citizens.” Id. at 577–
78. In other words, as states developed new ways to subjugate the people who had
previously been enslaved, the meaning and scope of “badges and incidents of slavery”
necessarily expanded.
As language does, the concept behind this term of art—“badges and incidents
of slavery”—has evolved with the times. For example, in the Civil Rights Cases, the
Court provided concrete examples of what it saw as the incidents of slavery:
“[c]ompulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint of his
movements except by the master’s will, disability to hold property, to make contracts,
to have a standing in court, to be a witness against a white person, and such like
burdens and incapacities.” C.R. Cases, 109 U.S. at 22. When the Civil Rights Cases
were heard in 1883, the concept of the “badges and incidents of slavery” was
interpreted more “literally” because the direct and immediate effects of chattel
slavery were still being felt. As understandings of the lasting effects of slavery in the
United States have developed, however, the meaning ascribed to “badges and
incidents of slavery” has expanded. Most recently, for example, Congress determined
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 10 of 34

11
that “public and private . . . racially motivated violence” constitutes a badge and
incident of slavery, and as a result in 2009, Congress enacted the Matthew Shepard
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act under the authority of the
Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause. Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining
the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 J. Const. L. 561, 564 (2012) (citing National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4702, 123 Stat.
2190, 2835–36 (2009)).
Defendants 	base 	their 	argument 	to 	dismiss 	Plaintiffs’ 	claim 	under 	the
Thirteenth 	Amendment 	primarily 	on 	an outdated concept 	of 	the 	“badges 	and
incidents of slavery.” Specifically, Defendants focus only on the “subjection of one man
to 	another” 	and 	“the 	involuntary 	servitude 	prohibited 	by 	the 	Thirteenth
Amendment.” (Rec. Doc. 108-1, at 13). Based on the legal development of the concept
since 1883, however, the Court finds Defendants’ argument unavailing.
Additionally, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs cannot bring a claim under
the Thirteenth Amendment because it does not create a private right of action.
Plaintiffs respond that they brought their Thirteenth Amendment claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which enables a plaintiff to bring a cause of action against a person
who, acting under color of state law, deprives the plaintiff of constitutional rights. 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants question whether § 1983 is the proper procedural vehicle
for Plaintiffs to use to vindicate their rights under the Thirteenth Amendment and
instead suggest that Plaintiffs must bring a Thirteenth Amendment claim under a
statute that Congress has passed pursuant to the amendment’s Enforcement Clause.
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 11 of 34

12
Both parties cite cases to support their positions, but none of these cases fully resolves
the matter.
For example, Defendants rely on Murray v. Earle to support their claim that
the Fifth Circuit has not determined whether a plaintiff may bring a suit for a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment under § 1983. In that case, the Fifth Circuit
said the following: “It is not altogether clear that there is a private right of action
under § 1983 for violations of the Thirteenth Amendment. . . . However, other circuits
have concluded that state actors may be held responsible for Thirteenth Amendment
violations under § 1983.” Murray v. Earle, 334 F. App’x 602, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 217 n.5 (5th Cir.1997) (“suits attacking the ‘badges
and incidents of slavery’ must be based on a statute enacted under § 2”); Sumpter v.
Harper, 683 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1982) (explaining that § 1983 is “a key
enforcement vehicle for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments”)). The Murray
court did not hold that a plaintiff could validly bring a Thirteenth Amendment claim
under § 1983, but it also did not hold that a plaintiff could not do so.
Moreover, the legislative history of § 1983 suggests that the statute is the
proper procedural vehicle to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment against state actors.
Shortly after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, Congress overrode President
Andrew Johnson’s veto to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as an act “[t]o protect all
Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their
Vindication.” Civil Rights Act of 1866, 39 Cong. ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The first section
of the act became § 1981, which guarantees to “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 12 of 34

13
the United States . . . the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42. U.S.C. § 1981.
Later, after the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, which included § 1983. Civil Rights Act of 1871, Fed. Jud. Ctr.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/civil-rights-act-1871 (last visited Feb. 6, 2026).
The 1871 Act made it possible for plaintiffs to sue state actors for violations of
constitutional rights, whereas § 1981 only reached private conduct. In Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District, the Supreme Court said, “We think the history of the
1866 Act and the 1871 Act . . . indicates that Congress intended that the explicit
remedial provisions of § 1983 be controlling in the context of damages actions brought
against state actors alleging violation of the rights declared in § 1981.” Jett v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989). In sum, Congress enacted § 1981 explicitly
so that people, specifically African Americans and former slaves, could vindicate their
rights 	under 	the 	Thirteenth 	Amendment. 	Based 	on 	this 	history 	and 	the
understanding that § 1983 constitutes an extension of § 1981, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have validly stated a Thirteenth Amendment claim under § 1983.
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under the Fourteenth Amendment
1. Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause guarantees all persons
equal protection under the law and therefore prohibits any state governmental action
that results in the differential treatment of similarly situated individuals. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 13 of 34

14
(1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). To state a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, plaintiffs must first establish
that they have been treated differently due to their membership in a protected class.
Mills v. City of Bogalusa, 112 F. Supp. 3d 512, 516 (E.D. La. 2015) (citing Hampton
Co. Nat’l Sur., LLC v. Tunica Cnty., Miss., 543 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2008)). When
a facially neutral state or local law (like the Land Use Plan at issue in this case) has
a 	disparate 	impact 	on 	similarly 	situated 	individuals, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	also
demonstrate that the disparate impact of the governmental action results from
discriminatory intent. Id. To establish discriminatory intent, a plaintiff must show
“that the decision maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and
selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse
effect on an identifiable group.” Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted). When a plaintiff proves that a challenged state action has a
disparate impact based on race and that it was motivated by a discriminatory intent,
the burden then shifts to the defendant, and the state action must survive strict
scrutiny. Lewis v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 806 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2015).
Arlington Heights remains the seminal Supreme Court decision concerning
discriminatory intent and the interplay between land use decisions and the Equal
Protection Clause. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). There, the Court explained that a plaintiff challenging state governmental
action based on disparate impact must also prove discriminatory intent, which
“demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 14 of 34

15
as may be available.” Id. at 266. The Court acknowledged that in what it called rare
cases, “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,” may sometimes
supply the evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. (citing four cases, including Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)). In
most cases, however, a court must examine other evidence to determine whether
discriminatory intent prompted the challenged action, including the following non-
exhaustive list of factors: “(1) the discriminatory impact of the official action; (2) the
historical background of the decision; (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to
the challenged action; (4) substantive and procedural departures from the normal
decision-making process; and (5) contemporaneous viewpoints expressed by the
decisionmakers.” Jackson v. Tarrant Cnty., 158 F.4th 571, 587 (5th Cir. 2025)
(discussing the factors originally outlined by the Supreme 	Court in Arlington
Heights). Under the Arlington Heights framework, disparate impact is the threshold
determination, which means that Plaintiffs must establish that Defendants’ land use
decisions have disproportionately affected black residents of St. James Parish.
The extensive history of land use decisions that Plaintiffs recount in their
thoroughly researched complaint, when taken as true, may very well represent one
of those rare cases in which “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race,” provides sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. If not, though, Plaintiffs
have presented a long list of specific examples from which the Court could infer a
discriminatory intent in Defendants’ zoning and siting decisions. Plaintiffs describe
the Land Use Plan and its effects as a “racial cleansing plan” (Rec. Doc. 104, at 77),
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 15 of 34

16
and throughout the second amended complaint, they attempt to demonstrate how
current land use practices in St. James Parish are directly traceable to those that
were established and entrenched under slavery.
They have also alleged an extensive historical practice, which they claim the
“2014 	Plan 	codified 	and 	distilled 	into 	an 	ordinance,” 	of 	“steering 	industry 	to
predominantly black parts of the Parish and protecting predominantly white parts .
. . .” Id. at ¶ 283. To support this allegation, Plaintiffs offer multiple facts, but one
which stands out is that of the eleven (11) facilities currently operating in St. James
Parish that are required to report their emissions to the EPA’s Toxic Release
Inventory, nine (9) are located in the 4th and 5th Districts, both of which are
historically and predominantly black. Id. at ¶ 268. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that
St. James Parish has made land use decisions that have a disparate impact on black
residents even after a 2003 EPA Report gave the Parish notice that cancer and
mortality rates, which have been linked to pollutants released by heavy industrial
plants, were significantly higher for black residents in the Parish. Id. at ¶ 269. The
disproportionate number of petrochemical and heavy industrial facilities in majority-
black parts of the Parish constitutes clear evidence of the disparate impact of
Defendants’ land use decisions and also allows the Court to infer discriminatory
intent.
Further, Plaintiffs painstakingly show that Defendants have made land use
and siting decisions which negatively impact the majority-black 4th and 5th Districts,
while simultaneously extending protections to predominantly white areas of the
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 16 of 34

17
Parish. For example, the Land Use Plan that the Parish adopted in 2014 changed the
zoning of “large swaths of property in the 4th and 5th Districts” from agricultural use
to industrial, and “[m]ost glaringly, the 2014 Plan also provided for two-mile buffer
zones separating an industrial site from tourist plantations, schools, and Catholic
churches—with most of the concentric buffers concentrated in the majority white part
of the Parish.” Id. at ¶ 285. However, the Land Use Plan did not extend the same
protections to the “predominantly Black churches and active schools within the 4th
and 5th Districts.” Id. at ¶ 286. More recently, the St. James Parish Council approved
a moratorium on solar farms that was requested by white Parish residents, while
simultaneously 	denying 	a 	request 	for 	a 	moratorium 	on 	the 	siting 	of 	new
petrochemical facilities that has been urged by black residents since 2019. In the
second 	amended 	complaint, 	Plaintiffs 	have 	amply 	alleged 	disparate 	and
discriminatory impact of Defendants’ land use decisions.
Next, the Supreme Court explained in Arlington Heights that one factor to
consider in determining discriminatory intent is the historical background of the
challenged decision. Here, however, we are dealing not with a single discrete decision
but with what the Fifth Circuit acknowledged is a “longstanding pattern and practice
of racially discriminatory land use decisions.” Inclusive Louisiana, 134 F.4th at 305.
Because Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint focuses on this pattern and practice,
the Court must consider the historical background of land use decisions in St. James
Parish 	more 	generally, 	while 	also 	focusing 	on 	more 	recent 	actions 	taken 	by
Defendants.
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 17 of 34

18
Broadly, Plaintiffs have traced the Parish’s current land use patterns directly
to slavery and the plantation system; by doing so, they have explained how some
districts ended up with a majority-white population, while others were populated by
a majority of black residents. In the nineteenth century, St. James Parish was home
to multiple sugarcane plantations along the Mississippi River, and the wealthy white
owners of these plantations enslaved thousands of men, women, and children. (Rec.
Doc. 104, at ¶¶ 32–33). The federal government confiscated roughly 96,000 acres of
former plantations in Louisiana and planned to apportion and redistribute the land
under the Freedmen’s Bureau, but when Lincoln was assassinated, Andrew Johnson
became President and returned most of this land to its former owners. Id. at ¶¶ 70–
84.
However, Plaintiffs point out that in 1872, “a group of formerly enslaved people
managed to pool their resources and purchase property on the West Bank of the
Mississippi River where they established the settlement of Freetown.” Id. at ¶ 84. In
similar 	ways, 	emancipated 	people 	in 	St. 	James 	Parish 	established 	several
settlements—among them Welcome, Burton Lane, and Chatman Town—that were
located near the former plantations where they had been enslaved. Plaintiffs allege
that this “piecing off of small strips of property, or leasing cabins and houses on the
plantations, was due in no small part to the fact that the plantation owners needed a
nearby labor supply.” Id. at ¶ 165. The white residents who had owned plantations
and slaves prior to the Civil War generally retained their land, and their political
power, after the War, and
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 18 of 34

19
For the next 93 years, the local government in St. James Parish, still
controlled by the white political establishment who in many cases had
direct ties and allegiance to large plantation owners, chose to exercise
its constitutional power by not enacting zoning or land use rules to
classify areas for industrial use, so as not to limit or constrain the
Parish’s large landowners in the use of their property.
Id. at ¶ 180. In this way, Plaintiffs describe a land use pattern that quite literally
originated in slavery.
Plaintiffs have also detailed the specific sequence of events leading up to
multiple challenged actions, but the Court will focus on one example in particular:
the adoption of the Land Use Plan in 2014. Plaintiffs claim that St. James Parish
only decided to adopt a Land Use Plan, after not having one for most of its history, to
prevent industrial facilities from locating in majority-white districts of the Parish, or
as they put it, “to protect the interests of white residents.” Id. at ¶ 280. Specifically,
Wolverine Terminals Corporation and Petroplex International both sought to build
oil storage facilities in majority-white parts of St. James Parish. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants hurriedly adopted the 2014 Land Use Plan and used it to deny these
companies’ land use applications. Further, this Land Use Plan codified the practice
of directing heavy industry to the majority-black 4th and 5th Districts, as both of the
districts 	were 	the 	only 	ones 	that 	included 	a 	zoning 	designation 	for
“Residential/Future Industrial” property.2
2 In oral argument, counsel for Defendants claimed that the Planning Commission chose to zone the
4th and 5th Districts as “future industrial” because the residential populations in these districts was
declining and because of these districts’ river frontage. Conversely, Plaintiffs pointed out that the
majority-white 3rd District was also located along the Mississippi River until the Parish was
redistricted a couple of years ago.
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 19 of 34

20
Addressing another Arlington factor, Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants
have departed from their normal procedural sequence, i.e., the Land Use Plan, in that
the “Parish Council granted every single request from companies seeking to locate in
majority Black parts of the Parish, at times violating its own Land Use Ordinance to
do so.” Id. at ¶ 373. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have, on more than one occasion,
overlooked deficiencies and omissions in applications filed by facilities seeking to
build in the 4th and 5th Districts. Plaintiffs also point specifically to procedural
deviations in the Parish’s handling of South Louisiana Methanol’s plan to construct
a plant “between two historic Black communities—Welcome and Freetown—in the
Parish’s 5th District, under a mile away from Mount Triumph Baptist Church, and
on the site of several former plantations: St. Amelie, St. Claire, St. Prisca, and J.S.
Webre,” particularly when compared to the Council’s treatment of Wolverine’s
application to locate in a majority-white district of the Parish. Id. at ¶¶ 375, 385.
Lastly, Plaintiffs discuss the legislative history surrounding both the adoption
of the 2014 Land Use Plan and other siting decisions at length. In their opposition to
the instant motion, they focused primarily on a 2022 amendment to the Land Use
Plan to enact a moratorium on solar farms. In 2021, two solar power companies
expressed interest in building solar farms in St. James Parish’s 6th District. Plaintiffs
acknowledge that like the 4th and 5th Districts, the 6th District is majority black,
but they distinguish the 6th District by explaining that it is “surrounded by majority
white 	populations” 	and 	therefore 	benefits 	from 	protections 	extended 	to 	these
communities. Id. at ¶ 336. The two solar power companies wanted to bring clean
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 20 of 34

21
energy production to St. James Parish, but according to Plaintiffs, white residents
objected and shared their concerns with the Parish Council. The residents suggested
that the Parish conduct studies concerning the “economic and environmental impacts
of solar in St. James Parish” before allowing the construction of solar farms Id. at ¶
339.
The Council later repealed the moratorium in November of 2023 but still voted
to deny SJ Louisiana Solar’s application to build a solar farm in Vacherie. Plaintiffs
explain that the Council voted 4-3 to reject the project despite the fact that, according
to Plaintiffs, residents who supported the project far outnumbered those who opposed
it, and Plaintiffs allege that the decision was made because a majority-white area of
the Parish would have been affected. The Council stated that one reason they rejected
the solar farm application was that it would displace valuable farmland. Council
Member Vondra Etienne-Steib pointed to what she saw as a double-standard because
displacing valuable farmland had not been a concern when heavy industries sought
to locate in the 4th and 5th Districts. Toward the end of this Council meeting, and
after the vote on SJ Louisiana Solar’s application had been conducted, Council
Member Courtney Long said that the decision not to approve the application “came
down to the area that it’s in.” He went on to mention that the Parish was divided and
speculated 	that 	had 	SJ 	Louisiana 	Solar 	attempted 	to 	locate 	“around 	the
predominantly Black community,” the application would have been approved. It is
also important to note that Plaintiffs discuss the Council’s reaction to solar farms to
emphasize that black residents’ requests for a moratorium on hazardous industry in
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 21 of 34

22
majority-black districts has largely fallen on deaf ears, while white residents’
concerns about clean energy have influenced the Council’s decisions.
In seeking to have Plaintiffs’ claims dismissed, Defendants emphasize what
the Supreme Court has held concerning equal protection claims based on disparate
impact. Defendants rely on Arlington Heights and City of Memphis v. Greene for the
proposition that proof of a “racially motivated discriminatory intent is a necessity for
an equal protection claim.” (Rec. Doc. 108-1, at 15). Defendants are correct. However,
the instant case is distinguishable from both Arlington Heights and City of Memphis.
Arlington Heights involved a land use application to build low- and moderate-income
housing in a suburb of Chicago, which would have required the Village of Arlington
Heights to rezone the parcel of land. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 254. The Court
found that the denial of the rezoning request did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection for several reasons. First, while the
Court acknowledged that the land use decision likely had a disparate impact on racial
minorities, the parcel of land at issue had always been zoned for single-family homes,
so there was “little about the sequence of events leading up to the decision that would
spark suspicion.” Id. at 269. Next, the Village had followed its normal procedures in
making the land use decision, and the Court mentioned the fact that the commission
held two additional hearings regarding the land use proposal. Id. at 269–70. Finally,
the Court concluded that the legislative history of the decision “focused almost
exclusively” on zoning considerations, leading to a finding that the decision had not
been motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 270.
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 22 of 34

23
Unlike the instant case in which Plaintiffs challenge a longstanding practice
and policy of land use decisions, Arlington Heights dealt with a single land use
application which would have required the Village to rezone a parcel of land. Here,
on the other hand, Plaintiffs challenge land use decisions made before and after the
Land Use Plan was enacted, in addition to challenging the enactment and
amendments to the Land Use Plan itself. Plaintiffs have not simply alleged a few
facts to support an inference that Defendants have made these decisions with a
discriminatory purpose, but instead, they have filled 739 paragraphs and 174
pages with these allegations. Arlington Heights is certainly instructive here, but
it operates as a counterpoint rather than an analogue.
The same is true of City of Memphis v. Greene. Like Arlington Heights, City of
Memphis involved a single land use decision. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100,
102 (1981). There, the plaintiffs brought a class action to challenge the city’s decision
to close a street that ran from a majority-black neighborhood directly through a
majority-white neighborhood and provided a direct route to the city center. Id. at 102–
03. The white residents requested that the city close the street to reduce traffic
through the residential area and to preserve the safety and tranquility of the
neighborhood. Id. at 104. Plaintiffs in that case did not bring a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment but instead claimed that the City of Memphis had violated
§ 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment; however, the case did require a
determination of discriminatory intent. Id. at 102. The Court held that the city was
motivated by legitimate, non-discriminatory motives, namely safety and tranquility,
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 23 of 34

24
id. at 119, and that the decision was not a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment,
id. at 129. Further, the Court determined that the inconvenience faced by residents
of the predominantly black area of the city who would lose access to the road was
minimal and merely a “routine burden of citizenship” because they could take an
alternate route without adding time to the trip. Id. Again, in City of Memphis, the
Court considered a single, discrete land use decision, whereas Plaintiffs in the instant
case challenge a policy and practice that they claim has been ongoing for decades.
More importantly, however, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the difference
between having to take an alternate route and living in the immediate vicinity of
heavy industrial facilities proven to cause deleterious health effects could scarcely be
more pronounced.
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations of differential treatment, disparate impact, and
discriminatory intent concerning St. James Parish’s Land Use Plan and Defendants’
zoning and citing decisions are far too numerous to recount here, but suffice it to say
that the second amended complaint is replete with them. Particularly at the motion
to dismiss stage, and accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the Court concludes
that Plaintiffs have more than sufficiently pleaded a plausible claim to relief under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
2. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiffs 	also 	bring 	a 	claim 	against 	Defendants 	under 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment for violation of substantive due process, for which Plaintiffs seek
injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that by siting heavy industrial facilities
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 24 of 34

25
in predominantly black districts of the Parish, Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’
“fundamental right to bodily integrity including protection from harms undertaken
by private actors that are made possible by state action.” (Rec. Doc. 104, at ¶ 698).
Defendants rely on a Section H decision, Petroplex International v. St. James Parish,
in which Judge Milazzo addressed Petroplex’s challenge to the Parish’s Land Use
Plan 	as 	arbitrary, 	capricious, 	and hence 	violative 	of 	substantive 	due 	process.
Petroplex Int’l v. St. James Par., 158 F. Supp. 3d 537, 540 (E.D. La. 2016). There, the
Court found in favor of the Parish and concluded that the Land Use Plan was
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 542.
First, it is important to note that Petroplex’s holding is not binding on this
Court, but much more importantly, the facts of Petroplex are not analogous to the
instant case, and therefore, the comparison is inapposite. As explained, Petroplex
challenged the Land Use Plan for substantive due process violations on the grounds
that the Plan was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 540. In contrast, the Plaintiffs in
this case claim that the Land Use Plan violates substantive due process protections
by infringing on a fundamental right, namely the right to bodily integrity and
freedom from bodily harms that are facilitated by state action, both of which the Fifth
Circuit recently recognized as fundamental rights. Sterling v. City of Jackson, Miss.,
159 F.4th 361, 373, 386 (5th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “the right to bodily autonomy
has long been a cognizable right under the Fourteenth Amendment” and that the
court was adopting “state-created danger as a viable theory” in the circuit).
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 25 of 34

26
Defendants 	specifically 	argue 	that 	the 	Court 	should 	dismiss 	Plaintiffs’
substantive due process claim because Plaintiffs failed to plead that Defendants lack
a rational objective for the Land Use Plan. Rational basis review was the proper level
of scrutiny to apply to the land use decisions at issue in Petroplex. However, Plaintiffs
in this case assert a substantive due process violation related to a fundamental right;
accordingly, strict scrutiny would apply. Defendants have not presented any other
arguments, other than their reliance on Petroplex, in support of their motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, and therefore, the Court has no
basis to dismiss this claim at the pleading stage.
C. Property Rights of Black Citizens Under 42 U.S.C. § 1982
As with Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim, Defendants seek to dismiss the
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because they claim that “[a]t best, the Complaint
suggests an adverse impact on Black residents in Districts 4 and 5 (which is denied)
but does not establish or allege a ‘racially discriminatory motive on the part of the
[Parish] Council.’” (Rec. Doc. 108-1, at 22). The Court disagrees with this assertion,
and as discussed more thoroughly in regard to Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts related to Defendants’
discriminatory intent, and therefore, have stated a claim under § 1982 that is
plausible on its face.
D. Preservation of Cultural Origins Under the Louisiana Constitution
The Louisiana Constitution recognizes the “right of the people to preserve,
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 26 of 34

27
foster, and promote their respective historic linguistic and cultural origins.” La.
Const. 	art. 	XII, 	§ 	4. 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	Defendants 	have 	violated 	their
constitutional right to cultural preservation through a “policy, practice, and/or
custom of land use . . . that has already resulted in the destruction and desecration
of cemeteries and burial sites of people once enslaved on the plantations in St. James
Parish.” (Rec. Doc. 104, at ¶ 734). Further, Plaintiffs argue that the land use system
has negatively impacted “other sites with enormous historic and cultural value to
Black communities like churches, schools, homes, and neighborhoods, and continues
to threaten such places.” Id. at ¶ 736.
Defendants seek to have this claim dismissed for the following reasons: (1) the
claim has prescribed based on a one-year prescriptive period; (2) Plaintiffs do not have
a valid property right on which to base their claim; (3) Plaintiffs’ claim concerns
“burial sites that are located on the property of third-parties (Formosa), not land
owned by the Parish”; and (4) the constitutional provision focuses primarily on
cultural preservation vis-à-vis language rights. (Rec. Doc. 108-1, at 24). In their
opposition, Plaintiffs have responded to each of these arguments.
First, Plaintiffs point out that they are seeking injunctive relief, specifically to
enjoin the Parish from developing the land where burial sites are located, so that the
one-year prescriptive period Defendants assign to this claim would not apply. Next,
Plaintiffs assert that they do have a valid property interest on which to base their
claim, an argument that will be dealt with fully in the next section. Third, because
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief concerning future harm traceable to the Land Use
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 27 of 34

28
Plan and zoning/siting decisions, the ownership of the property where the burial sites
are located is not an issue. Finally, Defendants cite sources that explain the
legislative intent behind Article XII, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution, which
was to preserve and protect Acadian French culture. Id. at 22–23. Plaintiffs respond
by saying, “the interpretation the Parish proposes [for this constitutional provision]
is itself discriminatory as it would violate the basic constitutional requirements of
equal protection and non-discrimination.” (Rec. Doc. 110, at 29).
Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning their claim under the Louisiana Constitution
are ultimately more persuasive, and the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
E. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) with the goal to provide “religious exercise [with] heightened
protection from government-imposed burdens.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714
(2005) (discussing the history of Congress’s attempts to enhance the protection of
religious exercise, in line with Supreme Court precedents, which culminated in the
passage of the RLUIPA). RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq., creates a cause of
action whereby a plaintiff may bring a claim against a state or other “governmental
entity created under the authority of a State” when that entity substantially burdens
religious exercise. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc-2 (creating a cause of action), 2000cc-5
(defining “government”). Relevant to the instant suit, the statute specifically targets
any land use regulation imposed by a state or one of its political subdivisions “that
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 28 of 34

29
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a
religious assembly or institution,” unless the land use regulation can survive strict
scrutiny. § 2000cc(a) (“Substantial Burden” clause). Furthermore, RLUIPA provides
that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner
that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a
nonreligious assembly or institution” or that “discriminates against any assembly or
institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.” § 2000cc(b)(1)–(2)
(“Discrimination and Exclusion” clause).
RLUIPA provides that a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case for the
government’s violation of the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA, § 2000cc-2(b), and
then the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the challenged land
use regulation serves a compelling governmental interest and that it is the least
restrictive means of doing so, id. (outlining burden of persuasion), 2000cc(a)(1)
(describing government’s burden under strict scrutiny). Congress also specified that
RLUIPA’s provisions “shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious
exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the
Constitution.” § 2000cc-3(g). Plaintiffs in this case have brought claims under both
the “Substantial Burden” and the “Discrimination and Exclusion” clauses of RLUIPA,
so the Court will deal with each of these claims in turn.
1. RLUIPA Substantial Burden Claim
First, all Plaintiffs in the case allege that Defendants “have implemented land
use regulations in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 29 of 34

30
exercise.” (Rec. Doc. 104, at ¶ 714). In their opposition to Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, and in their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs explain that under the
Code Noir in Louisiana, “plantation owners were legally required to set aside land for
burying the people they enslaved.” (Rec. Doc. 110, at 27; see also Rec. Doc. 104, at
¶¶ 53, 594–605). Plaintiffs specifically designate three of Defendants’ acts that “have
burdened Plaintiffs’ members’ ability to pray upon the unmarked cemeteries of
enslaved ancestors by permitting the construction of industrial facilities upon these
cemeteries.” (Rec. Doc. 104, at ¶ 714). Plaintiffs first point to Defendants’ adoption
and implementation of the 2014 Land Use Plan, which was amended in 2018 and
again in 2022, because this Plan created industrial zones in Districts 4 and 5 of St.
James Parish, which are districts “that contain unmarked cemeteries of enslaved
people.” Id. Next, Plaintiffs allege that the Planning Commission’s and Parish
Council’s permission for Formosa to build a petrochemical plant on at least three
specific 	unmarked 	burial 	grounds 	imposed 	a 	substantial 	burden 	on 	Plaintiffs’
religious 	exercise. 	Finally, 	Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	the 	St. 	James 	Planning
Commission’s “land use approval of South Louisiana Methanol” also imposed a
substantial burden by siting the plant “upon areas that are likely to contain several
unmarked cemeteries.” Id.
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants rely on RLUIPA’s definitions of “land
use regulation” and “claimant” to challenge Plaintiffs’ Substantial Burden claim.
RLUIPA defines a “land use regulation” as follows:
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 30 of 34

31
[A] zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that
limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land . . . if the
claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other
property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire
such an interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs do not meet the definition
of “claimants” under the statute because they have not alleged an ownership or other
property interest in the land at issue in the case.
Conversely, Plaintiffs assert that only two properties are actually at issue in
the 	case: 	the 	Formosa 	and 	South 	Louisiana 	Methanol 	(“SLM”) 	properties.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs claim that in their second amended complaint, they have
sufficiently alleged a valid property interest in the Formosa and SLM properties.
Specifically, Plaintiffs claim a type of property interest that has been recognized by
Louisiana courts. For example, Plaintiffs cite to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
decision in Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., in which the plaintiffs sued the defendant
for emotional distress after the defendant drilled oil wells on property where the
plaintiffs had buried their family members, thereby desecrating the cemetery.
Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., 197 So. 222, 223 (La. 1940). The Louisiana Supreme
Court concluded that “once real estate is set apart and used for a final resting place
of the dead, the owner cannot thereafter make another use of it inconsistent with that
to which it was devoted.” Id. at 228. Throughout the opinion, the court emphasized
the sacred nature of land where people are buried and stated that “[r]egardless of the
laws and rules relating to the ownership and control of real property, when a plot of
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 31 of 34

32
ground is set apart for cemetery purposes, and burials are made in the land, the
ground changes its character in the minds and feelings of the community.” Id. at 229.
The court also pointed out that through the defendant’s activities on the plot
of land it leased, the “consecrated ground, which was destined for the peaceful
slumber of the dead, was transformed into an industrial site, to be exploited for
material gain.” Id. at 228. Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiffs had “another
species of interest or form of title . . . not within the recognition of the [Civil] Code,”
id., thereby allowing them to recover not only for damages to their particular family
members’ burial sites, but for damages to the cemetery plot as a whole, id. (“These
plaintiffs have an interest not only in the particular spots where their relatives are
buried, but also a sentimental interest, at least, in the cemetery as a whole . . . .”).
On the other hand, Defendants rely on Humphreys to support their proposition
that only when “a plot has been ‘dedicated’ for cemetery purposes at some point in
time” does it take on the nature of “an irrevocable covenant running with the land.”
(Rec. Doc. 108-1, at 26 (citing Humphreys, 197 So. at 226)). In Humphreys, the court
responded to the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs had no right of action
because the land “was never dedicated by the owner of the land to use for cemetery
purposes, according to the forms and requisites prescribed by law” by looking to
specific pieces of evidence. Id. at 538–39. However, rather than discussing all of the
cases cited by the defendant, the court stated, “It suffices to say that it is settled in
this state and at common law that the vital principle underlying dedication is the
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 32 of 34

33
intention to dedicate, and, so far as the owner is concerned, the dedication is made
when such intent on his part is unequivocally manifested.” Id. at 226.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege that “plantation owners were legally
required to set aside land for burying the people they enslaved, . . . that graves were
often marked by trees to identify them for loved ones and descendant communities,
and preserved by laborers and farmers.” (Rec. Doc. 110, at 27). These allegations are
more than sufficient to create a plausible claim that these pieces of land were
“dedicated” as cemeteries for their ancestors, cemeteries which have since “been
transformed into an industrial site, to be exploited for material gain.” However, even
absent these specific and well-researched allegations, the fact that the plantation
owners buried the bodies of the people whom they enslaved on these plots of land
seems sufficient to constitute an intention to dedicate. Therefore, the Court agrees
that Plaintiffs have a property interest in the plots of land at issue—the unmarked
cemeteries of enslaved people on the Formosa and SLM plots—to assert a plausible
claim under the RLUIPA’s Substantial Burden clause.
2. RLUIPA Discrimination and Exclusion Clause
The second claim under RLUIPA has been brought against Defendants by only
one Plaintiff, Mount Triumph Baptist Church. Specifically, Mount Triumph alleges
that Defendants have implemented land use regulations that protect Catholic and
majority-white churches from industrial development through required buffer zones,
but that also permit such development in the immediate vicinity of majority-black
churches with no such protection. Because Defendants have not specifically moved to
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 33 of 34

34
dismiss this claim, the Court does not feel the need to discuss this claim, other than
to say that Mount Triumph has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Re-Submitted Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss Claims (Rec. Doc. 108) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of February, 2026.
____________________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:23-cv-00987-CJB-JVM Document 118 Filed 02/09/26 Page 34 of 34