USA v. Claus

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTER DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-155
CHRISTIAN CONRAD CLAUS 	SECTION: D (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Government’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Claim of
Right Defense.1 Defendant Christian Conrad Claus has filed a response in opposition
and the Defendant has filed a Reply.2 After careful consideration of the parties’
memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court DEFERS ruling on the
Motion until trial.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
The Government filed a Motion in Limine to Preclude Claim of Right Defense.4
The Government states that it is “concerned that the defendant will seek to advance
a claim of right defense to the fraud counts (Counts 1, 2, and 3)” of the Indictment,
which the Government urges “would constitute an appeal for jury nullification
because the claim of right defense is legally impermissible and conflicts with the
elements of mail and wire fraud.”5 The Government contends that “the defendant
may intend to argue that if he honestly believed the paintings were stolen and were
1 R. Doc. 122.
2 R. Doc. 132 and R. Doc. 143, respectively.
3 The Factual and Procedural Background of the case has been set out in a previous Order and Reasons
from this Court and is adopted here. See R. Doc. 149.
4 R. Doc. 122.
5 R. Doc. 122-1 at p. 1.
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worth the claimed amount, then he cannot be guilty of fraud even if he intended to
deceive the insurer,” which, it argues, constitutes a legally impermissible defense and
would result in juror confusion and unfair prejudice that sustained objections cannot
cure.6 The Government advises that it plans to put on evidence regarding “a variety
of 	misrepresentations 	concerning 	Zeton’s 	insurance 	claim 	of 	reportedly 	stolen
valuable paintings.”7 It states that it intends to argue that the police report prepared
by Defendant is a material misrepresentation because “it omitted facts such as the
defendant’s true interactions, relationships, and communications with Zeton”8 and
that such misrepresentation is material because Zeton’s insurer “would likely deem
it important” and, further, a “reasonable person would attach importance to it in
deciding how to proceed, or if the defendant knew (or should have known) that the
recipient would likely deem it important.”9
The Government asserts that it “is well-established that claim of right is no
defense to mail or wire fraud” because “[s]uch a defense offends the principle that a
victim is defrauded when ‘he has lost .. his chance to bargain with the facts before
him.’”10 The Government emphasizes that the Fifth Circuit rejected such a defense
in it’s decision in United States v. Dotson,11 in which it held that “it would be no
defense to argue that [a defendant], at worst, was merely trying to accelerate what
he believed was a legally meritorious” claim.12 The Government further relies on
6 Id. at p. 1.
7 Id. at p. 2.
8 Id. at pp. 2-3.
9 Id. at p. 3 (quoting Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114, 131 (2025)).
10 Id. at p. 4.
11 407 F.3d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 2005).
12 R. Doc. 122-1 at p. 6.
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numerous out-of-circuit cases that a claim of right defense is improper in an
insurance fraud prosecution.13 As a result, the Government requests
[T]hat 	this 	Court 	issue 	an 	order 	precluding 	the 	defendant 	from
employing 	a 	claim 	of 	right 	defense, 	including 	the 	preclusion 	of
argument, references, or inferences to the effect that a person’s belief
that he or another person is entitled to, or has a valid claim to, money
means that the person cannot have intended a scheme to defraud.14
The Defendant opposes the Motion.15 The Defendant argues first that he has a
constitutional right “to present a complete defense.”16 The Defendant states that he
is also under no obligation to disclose his defense strategy to the Government prior to
trial and that the Government, in its Motion, “mistakenly claims that for Mr. Claus
to present his own knowledge and state of mind at the time of the offense would be
jury nullification.”17 The Defendant then asserts that the “Supreme Court has made
clear that 	a 	criminal 	defendant 	alone ultimately 	controls 	the 	defense 	that 	is
presented through his testimony, as well as the goals of his representation.”18 The
Defendant argues that he “must be able to defend his position that he did not have
the requisite specific intent” because “he believed the insurance claim itself was
legitimate, the paintings were stolen, and the valuations were accurate.”19 The
Defendant maintains that such a defense “is not an impermissible ‘claim of right’
defense; it is a direct challenge to the Government’s proof of intent.”20 The Defendant
13 Id. at pp. 6-8.
14 Id. at p. 9.
15 R. Doc. 132.
16 Id at p. 2 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).
17 Id. at pp. 2-3.
18 Id. at p. 3 (citing McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 421-24 (2018).
19 Id. at p. 4.
20 Id.
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contends that the authorities cited by the Government in its Memorandum “are both
completely distinguishable and dispositive of its argument — in favor of Mr. Claus”
because they relate to factual scenarios where the defendant might be claiming that
he himself is entitled to the funds that are the subject of the fraud prosecution.21 The
Defendant emphasizes that any defense that “he lacked the necessary fraudulent
intent because he believed the claim itself was genuine and the representations were
truthful or immaterial” and that such argument is relevant to a claim of good faith,
which is a complete defense to mail fraud.22 Lastly, the Defendant asserts that the
Government’s Motion “invades the province of the jury on intent and materiality”
because “intent, knowledge, and materiality are quintessential jury questions in
fraud cases.”23 The Defendant emphasizes that he must be able to argue “that the
alleged omissions were not materially deceptive, and that the insurer’s decision-
making 	rested 	upon 	independent 	evidence.”24 	In 	Reply, 	the 	Government
straightforwardly clarifies that
the government’s motion does not seek to prevent the defendant from
contending he believed the paintings were valuable and stolen. Indeed,
the motion does not seek to preclude the defendant from taking any
position on a factual issue. . . Instead, the government seeks to prevent
the defense from misleading the jury on the law by suggesting that the
charged fraud offenses legally require disproving that the defendant
believed the paints were valuable and stolen. 	Put another way, the
defense should not suggest that, under the law, ‘a person’s belief that he
or another person is entitled to, or has a valid claim to, money means
that the person cannot have intended a scheme to defraud.’”25
21 Id. at p. 6.
22 Id. at pp. 6-8 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Diamond, 430 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1970)).
23 Id. at p. 9.
24 Id. at pp. 10-11.
25 R. Doc. 143 (emphasis in original).
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II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Government seeks to prevent the Defendant from making any argument
or presenting any evidence related to a defense of claim of right.26 The Defendant,
while seemingly recognizing that a claim of right defense is impermissible,27 argues
that such a wholesale preclusion would infringe upon his constitutional right “to
present a complete defense.”28
During a status conference in this matter,29 the Court reviewed the parties’
respective positions on this issue. Specifically, the Court read the Government’s reply
brief as quoted above.30 The Court further advised that it intended to issue an Order
advising that, to the extent the Government’s motion seeks to prohibit the defendant
from “misleading the jury on the law by suggesting that the charged fraud offenses
legally require disproving that the defendant believed the paintings were valuable
and stolen,”31 the motion is granted. Further, the Court advised that it intended to
include in the order to the extent the Governments motion seeks to “bar a defense
fully, including through asserting [the defendant’s] own personal knowledge at the
time of the offense that speaks to specific intent,”32 the Court denies the motion.
Finally, the Court advised that it will instruct the jury on the law and as appropriate,
will instruct the jury during the trial that it is only to follow the law that is given to
26 R. Doc. 122.
27 See R. Doc. 132 at p. 4. (“That is not an impermissible ‘claim of right’ defense; it is a direct challenge
to the Government’s proof of intent.”)
28 R. Doc. 132 at p. 2 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).
29 See R. Doc. 179.
30 See supra, n. 25.
31 R. Doc. 143.
32 R. Doc. 132 at p. 3.
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it by the Court, and not any law argued by a party. After the discussion as set forth
above, the Government advised that such an order fully addressed the issue it raised
in its motion. The Defendant further advised that such an Order fully addressed its
concerns raised in its opposition.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion33 is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as set forth herein.
New Orleans, Louisiana, June 12, 2026.
______________________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
33 R. Doc. 122.
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