USA v. Johnson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 24-221
AARON TEROD JOHNSON 	SECTION I
ORDER
Before the Court is defendant Aaron Terod Johnson’s (“Johnson”) motion1 in
limine to preclude inadmissible opinion testimony or, in the alternative, to conduct a
Daubert hearing to determine if opinion testimony falls under a valid expertise. The
government opposed the motion.2 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES
Johnson’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
As is relevant to this motion, Johnson is charged with three counts relating to
sex trafficking or transportation of a minor for purposes of engaging in sexual
activity: sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and
1591(b)(2) (Count 1); coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 2); and interstate transportation of a minor
for criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (Count 3).
On October 3, 2025, the government notified counsel for Johnson that it
intends to introduce the expert testimony of FBI Special Agent James E. Hardie
1 R. Doc. No. 114.
2 R. Doc. No. 123.
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(“Agent Hardie”), who is alleged to be an expert in sex trafficking involving minors.3
The government’s notice explains that Agent Hardie is a member of the FBI’s
“Critical Incident Response Group, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime,
Behavioral Analysis Unit,” and that “[i]n that role, he is responsible for providing
operational support to local, state, federal, and international law enforcement
agencies investigating crimes against children, including sex trafficking.”4 The notice
also explains that Agent Hardie became a special agent in 2001 and that, since that
time, “[h]e has participated in at least 100 sex trafficking investigations” in which he
has “interviewed numerous sex traffickers, victims, and sex buyers.”5 “Based on that
experience,” Agent Hardie has given “presentations and training to law enforcement,
government officials, social service professionals, health care professionals, as well as
the general public.”6
The notice also provides a statement of the expert opinions that Agent Hardie
plans to include in his testimony.7 Specifically, the notice states:
SSA Hardie will testify regarding the methods and techniques of
the management of commercial sex (i.e., prostitution). This will include
testimony 	regarding 	the 	methods 	of 	locating, 	negotiating, 	and
facilitating commercial sex acts with children and adults by traffickers
who are purveyors of commercial sex (colloquially known as “johns” or
“sex buyers”).
SSA Hardie will also testify about the victim characteristics that
traffickers can exploit during the recruitment process. For example, he
will 	testify 	about 	the 	external 	factors 	that 	make 	a 	victim 	more
3 See R. Doc. No. 123-1, at 1–2.
4 See id.
5 Id. at 2.
6 Id.
7 See id. at 2–3.
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susceptible to recruitment, including volatile home situations, (e.g.,
homelessness, instability in the household, sexual or physical abuse,
issues with school, and runaways), and internal factors (e.g., mental
illness, lack of self-esteem, developmental delays, substance abuse).
SSA Hardie will also testify about common factors in victims of
trafficking. He will testify that victims often view themselves as having
agency and control and explain how the perception of control can be
exploited and is often unrealistic and inaccurate. SSA Hardie will also
discuss processes traffickers use to exploit these victim characteristics,
including 	employing 	behaviors 	to 	create 	the 	appearance 	of 	a
romanticized, emotional connection between a trafficker and a victim,
and 	the 	effectiveness 	of 	isolating 	a 	victim 	(e.g., 	emotionally 	or
geographically) as a means of establishing and maintaining control.
Traffickers also foster a trust- and loyalty-based relationship with a
victim that purports to cater to the needs of the victim in an attempt to
indebt the victim to the trafficker and discourage a victim from reporting
a trafficker to law enforcement authorities. Relatedly, SSA Hardie will
testify about victims’ process of disclosing trafficking-related events. For
example, he will testify that, when reliving their trafficking, victims
often express a wide range of emotions. An individual victim’s response
may depend on myriad factors, including the life experiences of the
victim and the nature and circumstances of the victim’s relationship
with the trafficker.8
On October 14, 2025, Johnson filed the present motion in limine to preclude
the government from introducing Agent Hardie’s “so called ‘expert’ testimony.”9 He
argues that Agent Hardie’s proposed testimony is inadmissible because “it is not an
area of any actual expertise,” and that “[i]n effect, what the Government has proposed
to do is elicit testimony from a law enforcement officer wherein the officer testifies
that Mr. Johnson’s behavior is that of a sexual predator.”10 Further, Johnson
8 Id.
9 R. Doc. No. 114, at 1.
10 R. Doc. No. 114-1, at 2; see also (“[T]he government’s ‘expert’ would testify that he
has seen some people behave in a certain way, and those people were sexual
predators. And Mr. Johnson behaved in a similar way to those other people, so he
must be a sexual predator, too. This is not valid ‘expert’ testimony.”).
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contends that Agent Hardie is “biased” and that his opinion is not based on any
“reliable 	criteria 	other 	than 	[Agent 	Hardie’s] 	individual 	experience 	and
perspective.”11 Johnson argues that the determination of whether Johnson is a sexual
predator is “a final determination that is the sole purview of the jury.”12
The government responds that “numerous courts have found Agent Hardie
qualified to be an expert and to provide testimony of the type and scope offered in this
case.”13 It contends that “[a] witness may be qualified as an expert by means other
than via ‘scientific knowledge.’ ‘Specialized knowledge,’ such as law enforcement
authorities with prior experience investigating human trafficking, suffices to qualify
someone an expert.”14 In fact, the government states that “the Fifth Circuit and
district 	courts 	within 	the 	Fifth 	Circuit, 	regularly 	recognize 	the 	use 	of 	expert
testimony to explain the behavior of those accused of sex offenses,” and that Agent
Hardie’s 	testimony 	will 	be 	useful 	to 	assist 	the 	jury 	in 	“contextualizing 	and
understanding” the testimony in this case.15 Because Johnson’s exact arguments
have “failed . . . time and again,” the government asks the Court to “deny Johnson’s
motion without further hearing or argument.”
11 Id. at 2–3; see also id. at 4 (“Hardie has offered no methodology, scientific or
otherwise, for his expert opinion that Mr. Johnson behaved like a sexual predator.”).
12 Id. at 4.
13 R. Doc. No. 123, at 1. The government states that the scope of Agent Hardie’s
testimony is limited to “(1) methods and techniques used in the . . . management and
procurement of commercial sex and (2) common characteristics and factors of victims
of sex trafficking.” Id.
14 Id. at 3.
15 Id. at 4–5 (stating that Agent Hardie’s testimony will assist the jury in assessing
“the victim’s vulnerabilities and any perceived inconsistencies in her testimony and
demeanor”).
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert witness
testimony. It provides that:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not
that:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles
and methods to the facts of the case.
F ED. R. EVID. 702. The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of establishing
its admissibility. See Sims v. Kia Motors of Am., Inc., 839 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir.
2016). “District courts have broad discretion to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony . . . .” First United Pentecostal Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 119 F.4th
417, 425 (5th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Before a district court may allow a witness to testify as an expert, it must be
assured that the proffered witness is qualified to testify by virtue of his ‘knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education.’” United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 179
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting F ED. R. EVID. 702)). “To qualify as an expert, the witness
must have such knowledge or experience in his field or calling as to make it appear
that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth.” United
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States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 524 (5th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the
Supreme Court provided an analytical framework to determine the admissibility of
expert testimony pursuant to Rule 702. This framework applies to both scientific and
non-scientific expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149
(1999); see also Doe (E.M.B.) v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 23-173, 2025 WL 2556106, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2025) (“‘[A]ll types of expert testimony, not just scientific
testimony,’ is permitted under Rule 702.” (quoting United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d
105, 139 (5th Cir. 2012)). As Daubert explains, federal district courts must perform a
screening function to ensure both the reliability and helpfulness of expert evidence.
See 509 U.S. at 589.
The Daubert framework principally consists of a two-part inquiry. See id. at
592; see also Douglas v. Chem Carriers Towing, LLC, 431 F. Supp. 3d 830, 834 (E.D.
La. 2019) (Vance, J.). First, the court must ascertain the reliability of the expert
testimony. Douglas, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 834. Reliable expert testimony reflects expert
knowledge, which encompasses known facts or ideas inferred from known facts,
rather than “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
590 (explaining that the knowledge requirement of Rule 702(a) “establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability”). Expert knowledge derives from reasoning or
methodology that is valid—i.e., it actually supports what it purports to show. See id.
at 590 n.9, 592–93.
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The test for determining reliability is flexible and can adapt to the particular
circumstances of the testimony at issue. Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d
581, 585 (5th Cir. 2003). Daubert itself provides an inexhaustive list of factors. See
509 U.S. at 593–95. These factors include: (1) whether the technique in question has
been or can be tested; (2) whether the technique has been subject to peer review and
publication; (3) the error rate of the technique; (4) the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (5) whether the technique has
been generally accepted in the scientific community. Bocanegra, 320 F.3d at 384–85.
A court enjoys “broad latitude” to apply these or other factors that it determines to be
“reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149, 153;
see also United States v. Moore, No. 20-29, 2022 WL 834381 (D. Alaska Mar. 21, 2022)
(“Depending on the type of expertise and particular subject of the testimony, these
factors may or may not assist in assessing reliability.”).
At the second step, the district court must ensure that the expert testimony
would be helpful to the trier of fact. See Douglas, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 834. Helpful
expert testimony is relevant beyond the sense that all evidence must be relevant
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 401. See Bocanegra, 320 F.3d at 584. Helpful
expert testimony is relevant also in the critical sense that it must “fit” the purpose
for which it is employed. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. Expert testimony fits when
the reasoning or methodology underlying it “properly can be applied to the facts in
issue” because such reasoning or methodology has a “valid scientific connection to the
pertinent inquiry.” See id. at 592–93.
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In addition to fit, expert testimony must be helpful insofar as it provides
insight beyond that which the jury could glean for themselves. See Peters v. Five Star
Marine Serv., 898 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1990). If “the jury could adeptly assess [the
evidence] using only their common experience and knowledge,” then expert testimony
would be unnecessary and therefore properly subject to exclusion. See id.; see also
Vogler v. Blackmore, 352 F.3d 150, 155 n.5 (5th Cir. 2003).
To determine the admissibility of expert testimony pursuant to Rule 702,
courts apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and are not bound by the
rules of evidence—except those rules concerning privileges and Rule 403. See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10. However, a court’s gatekeeping role does not supplant
the adversarial process—cross-examination and presentation of contrary evidence
are the appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible testimony. See Douglas,
431 F. Supp. 3d at 835. Likewise, “questions relating to the bases and sources of an
expert’s opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its
admissibility and should be left for the jury’s consideration.” United States v. Hodge,
933 F.3d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Even if expert testimony is
admissible pursuant to Rule 702, courts must also consider whether the testimony is
admissible in accordance with the other applicable rules of evidence, especially
Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; Douglas, 431 F. Supp. 3d
at 835. The district court must bear in mind that “while [it] must act as a gatekeeper
to exclude all irrelevant and unreliable expert testimony, the rejection of expert
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testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293,
330 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal alterations omitted).
III. 	ANALYSIS
a. 	Scope of permissible testimony
As a threshold matter, the Court will address the apparent misunderstanding
between the parties as to the scope of Agent Hardie’s testimony. On one hand, the
government paints Agent Hardie’s testimony as more general and describes it as
including: “(1) methods and techniques used in the . . . management and procurement
of commercial sex and (2) common characteristics and factors of victims of sex
trafficking.”16 Whereas 	Johnson 	maintains 	that 	Agent 	Hardie 	plans 	to 	testify
specifically to his “expert opinion that Mr. Johnson behaved like a sexual predator.”17
Having reviewed the statement of Agent Hardie’s anticipated testimony, the Court
finds his testimony includes opinions of a general nature rather than opinions specific
to this case, Johnson, or Minor Victim.18
However, to be clear, the Court agrees with Johnson that Agent Hardie may
not testify that “Mr. Johnson behaved like a sexual predator” or that he “must be a
sexual predator.” This testimony would be tantamount to Agent Hardie providing
legal opinion and usurping the role of the jury, which is impermissible.
Indeed, “an expert may never render conclusions of law.” Reitz v. Woods, 85
F.4th 780, 788 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
16 R. Doc. No. 123, at 1.
17 R. Doc. No. 114-1, at 4.
18 See R. Doc. No. 123-1, at 1–2.
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Likewise, “an expert may not tell the jury what conclusion to reach—that is for the
jury to decide.” Doe (E.M.B.) v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 23-173, 2025 WL 2556106, at *4
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2025) (internal alterations omitted). The U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas addressed the tension between these principles and
expert testimony on sex trafficking in Doe (E.M.B) v. G6 Hospitality, LLC:
The issue then becomes how to delineate between a general discussion
of human trafficking, which may help the jury better understand the
complexities of human sex trafficking and is therefore admissible, and
reaching a conclusion as to whether [the alleged victim] was a victim of
human trafficking, whether [the defendant] participated in a venture,
or 	whether 	[the 	defendants] 	knew 	or 	should 	have 	known 	of 	sex
trafficking, which would usurp the role of the jury.
Id. (internal alterations omitted). The court in Doe reconciled these “competing
interests” by holding that sex trafficking experts
may 	testify 	about 	human 	trafficking 	in 	general, 	which 	includes
discussing the general features of human trafficking schemes, but may
not offer an opinion on whether [the alleged victim] was a victim of
human trafficking, whether [the defendants] participated in a venture,
or 	whether 	[the 	defendants] 	knew 	or 	should 	have 	known 	of 	sex
trafficking. 	Nor will 	the 	experts 	be 	permitted to 	characterize 	the
individuals associated with [the defendants] as sex traffickers.
The court reasoned that “[t]his delicate balance will allow the experts to educate and
inform the jury on the subtleties of human trafficking, which meets the helpfulness
requirement of Rule 702, without directly offering a legal conclusion.” See id. (internal
alterations and quotations omitted). It further stated that “[w]hat [it] wishes to avoid
is allowing the experts to apply the facts of this case to their general standards, which
would be tantamount to the experts telling the jury what conclusion to reach.” Id.
(internal alterations omitted).
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Although Doe arose under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–95, and involved hotel defendants rather than an
individual defendant, the Court is persuaded that the scope of permissible expert
testimony regarding sex trafficking articulated by the Doe court is informative for the
instant case.
The 	Court 	finds 	support 	for 	this 	conclusion 	in 	the 	cases 	cited 	by 	the
government to support that “Agent Hardie qualifies as an expert based on his
specialized knowledge and that his proposed testimony would assist the jury, is not
unduly prejudicial, and does not constitute an impermissible characterization of the
defendant.”19 The cases cited by the government in this respect all involve testimony
by Agent Hardie regarding sex trafficking—including the behavior of trafficking
victims, how traffickers often recruit victims, the various ways in which traffickers
and victims interact, how traffickers maintain control over their victims, etc.—in
general terms, rather than testimony linking his general knowledge to the specific
facts of the case. See, e.g., United States v. Vines, 9 F.4th 500, 505 (7th Cir. 2021)
(“[Agent] Hardie merely provided expert testimony as to sex-trafficking victim
behavior in general that could cast light on the testimony of other witnesses, but did
not tell a jury whom to believe.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Warren, 774 F.
App’x 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[Agent] Hardie, who acknowledged that he had no
information regarding the facts of [the defendant’s] case, testified generally about
19 R. Doc. No. 123, at 6 (collecting cases in which Agent Hardie’s testimony regarding
sex trafficking was held admissible as expert testimony).
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human trafficking.”); see also id. (“[W]e find no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s allowing [Agent] Hardie to testify broadly about the typical human trafficking
experiences of its victims and the common behaviors of traffickers.” (emphasis
added)); United States v. Bell, No. 17-20183, 2022 WL 1014497, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
5, 	2022) 	(“[Agent] 	Hardie 	will 	likewise 	give 	generalized 	testimony 	that 	helps
contextualize the alleged sex trafficking victims and those who controlled them.”
(emphasis added)); Moore, 2022 WL 834381, at *3 (“The government [states] that it
intends to call Agent Hardie as one of its first witnesses and that Agent Hardie ‘is not
familiar with the facts of this case and will be providing educational testimony
without reaching an opinion about this specific case.’”).
Again, considering Agent Hardie’s proposed testimony as contained in the
government’s notice, the Court has no reason to anticipate that Agent Hardie will
testify impermissibly. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, the Court holds that Agent
Hardie is not permitted to testify to or opine on any specific facts of this case or
comment on the credibility of Johnson or of any other witness. Cf. Moore, 2022 WL
834381, at *3 (holding that “Agent Hardie shall not give expert testimony about or
opine on any specific facts of this case or comment on the credibility of the defendant
or of any other witness”).
b. 	Qualifications, Reliability, and Relevance
Having reviewed Agent Hardie’s qualifications and extensive experience,20 the
Court finds that Agent Hardie is qualified to render the proffered opinion testimony.
20 R. Doc. No. 123-1, at 1–2.
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Cf. United States v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that the
government’s witness “was qualified as an expert based on his experience” as the
“director of a center that provides services for runaways and high-risk adolescent
victims and that specializes in serving victims of sexual exploitation.”). This decision
aligns with those of other courts that have found Agent Hardie to be an expert in sex
trafficking involving minors. See, e.g., Bell, 2022 WL 1014497, at *2 (finding Agent
Hardie was qualified as an expert in sex trafficking); Warren, 774 F. App’x at 782
(“The district court did not abuse its discretion by qualifying Hardie as an expert
witness. 	Hardie 	had 	extensive 	experience 	investigating 	human 	trafficking,
particularly sex trafficking involving children, and through his work he interviewed
hundreds of individuals involved in sex trafficking.”); United States v. Jackson, No.
16-54, 2017 WL 2362351, at *2 (D.S.C. May 31, 2017) (“The court has reviewed the
education, work experience, training, certifications, and other relevant information
pertaining to Agent Hardie, and finds that he is qualified to offer expert opinion
testimony in this [sex trafficking] case.”). The Court finds no support for Johnson’s
suggestion that Agent Hardie’s specialized knowledge is not a valid area of expertise
or that his extensive experience cannot render him an expert pursuant to Rule 702.
See F ED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify . . .”); id. (“. . . the expert’s scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . .” (emphasis added)).
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With respect to reliability, Johnson puts much weight on his argument that
Agent 	Hardie’s 	testimony 	cannot 	satisfy 	the 	Daubert 	reliability 	factors.21 But
Johnson must remember that the Daubert factors are not an exhaustive list of
prerequisites, and, in some cases, the Court may exercise its “broad latitude” to
determine reliability of testimony based on only some or none of these factors, as is
appropriate for the particular type of expertise or subject of the testimony in this case.
See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149, 153; see also Moore, 2022 WL 834381, at *2 (“Depending
on the type of expertise and particular subject of the testimony, [the Daubert] factors
may or may not assist in assessing reliability.”).
Based on Agent Hardie’s qualifications, and like the other courts have found
with respect to Agent Hardie’s background testimony regarding sex trafficking, the
Court finds Agent Hardie’s testimony is reliable. Accord Jackson, 2017 WL 2362351,
at *4 (finding Agent Hardie’s background testimony was reliable and stating that
“[c]ourts have allowed police detectives and officers to be admitted as experts under
Daubert, even where the focus is on their vocational knowledge and experience”);
Moore, 2022 WL 834381, at *4 (finding Agent Hardie’s testimony was reliable);
United States v. Edwards, No. 16-103, 2017 WL 4159365, at *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 19,
2017) (same); Bell, 2022 WL 1014497, at *3 (finding Agent Hardie’s “generalized
21 See R. Doc. No. 114-1, at 4 (“[Agent] Hardie has offered no methodology, scientific
or otherwise, for his expert opinion that Mr. Johnson behaved like a sexual predator.
As there is no methodology to speak of, there is certainly no peer review or publication
of the nonexistent methodology. As such, this Honorable Court certainly cannot
consider the error rate of any methodology, or the controls in place to test the
standards of any methodology.”).
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testimony” was reliable even though he had not personally examined the victims in
the case); cf. Sting Soccer Operations Grp. LP v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
15-127, 2016 WL 4094980, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2016) (“A witness’ experience,
studies, and education, combined with a review of the relevant materials can provide
a reliable basis for expert testimony.”).
The Court also finds that Agent Hardie’s testimony is relevant to the issues in
this case and will be helpful to the jury. The “culture and dynamics of sex trafficking
are ‘not the subject of common knowledge.’” United States v. Jenkins, No. 21-4447,
2024 WL 4891180, at *6 (4th Cir. Nov. 26, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1973 (2025)
(quoting United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also United
States v. Pires, 138 F.4th 649, 667 (1st Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-5411, 2025 WL
2824416 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2025) (“Common sense, along with our precedent, dictates that
the intricacies of the sex-trafficking industry and the typical dynamics between pimps
and prostitutes fall well outside the understanding of the average juror.”). Agent
Hardie’s testimony will assist the jury in understanding the behaviors and dynamics
of trafficking victims and traffickers as well as assist it in assessing the credibility of
the witnesses. See Pires, 138 F.4th at 667 (holding that expert witness’s testimony
about “typical sex-trafficking patterns and common dynamics between sex traffickers
and their victims” was relevant because it “illuminated how [the defendant’s]
romantic relationship with [the victim] could be part of a seduction technique” and
“helped the jury assess [the victim’s] credibility”); Warren, 774 F. App’x at 782
(finding relevant Agent Hardie’s testimony in a case involving sex trafficking of a
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minor that included “defining a variety of terms used in the human trafficking
subculture, 	how 	traffickers 	often 	recruit 	victims, 	the 	various 	ways 	in 	which
traffickers and victims interact, how victims interact with each other, how traffickers
maintain control over their victims, the rules that many traffickers impose on their
victims, the use of online advertisements, the challenges victims face in getting away
from 	traffickers, 	and 	the 	sense 	of 	loyalty 	a 	victim 	sometimes 	develops 	for 	a
trafficker”); Vines, 9 F.4th at 505 (“Hardie’s testimony in this case was based on his
expertise as to sex trafficking which would benefit a jury in understanding the
behavior of trafficking victims.”).22
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has “allowed . . . the use of expert testimony to explain
the behavior of those accused of sexual offenses” as well as to “determine the
credibility” of witnesses. United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 158 (5th Cir. 2006);
Anderson, 560 F.3d at 281 (finding that the “expert testimony on pimping patterns
and the pimp-prostitute relationship was relevant because it might have shed light
22 Of course, some of Agent Hardie’s testimony may be relevant only if evidence of
certain concepts or dynamics are before the jury such that Agent Hardie’s testimony
would aid the jury’s understanding of the case. Cf. Moore, 2022 WL 834381, at *3 (“As
to the conditional relevancy of specialized jargon . . . . Agent Hardie’s expert
knowledge of terminology used in sex trafficking or prostitution is not relevant unless
there will be evidence that the specific terminology has been used in this case. If the
terminology was not used in this case, then there is no need for an expert to help the
jury understand it.”); Warren, 774 F. App’x at 782 (“Much of Hardie’s testimony
related directly to aspects of the victim’s testimony and aided the jury in better
understanding some of the concepts and events described by the victim and in
assessing the victim’s credibility. Without Hardie’s testimony, the jury would have
had no way of determining whether the victim’s experiences were common, unique,
or implausible.”). From the Court’s current understanding of the evidence in this case,
Agent Hardie’s testimony is likely to be relevant and fit the facts in issue.
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on critical issues in the case” and “could have helped the jury to determine the
credibility of the government’s prostitute-witnesses” (internal quotations omitted)).
For these reasons, the Court makes a preliminary determination that Agent
Hardie’s testimony is admissible.23 Furthermore, after reviewing the above-cited
caselaw, the Court finds that a pre-trial Daubert hearing is unnecessary. Cf.
Edwards, 2017 WL 4159365, at *2 (holding that a pretrial Daubert hearing was
unnecessary because “the proposed expert testimony . . . does not involve a new
scientific theory or novel idea”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Johnson’s motion24 in limine is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, November 13, 2025.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
23 Included in this preliminary determination is that the “probative value” of Agent
Hardie’s testimony is not “substantially outweighed” by the risk of unfair prejudice.
See FED. R. EVID. 403. However, the defense may make application to the Court
outside the presence of the jury if it has Rule 403 objections to specific testimony
elicited at trial. Accord Moore, 2022 WL 834381, at *4.
24 R. Doc. No. 114.
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