USA v. Johnson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 24-221
AARON TEROD JOHNSON 	SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Aaron Terod Johnson (“Johnson”) was charged in a three-count
superseding indictment with sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1591(a)(1) and 1591(b)(2) (Count 1), coercion and enticement of a minor to engage
in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 2), and interstate
transportation of a minor for criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(a) (Count 3).1 At the close of the government’s case during trial, Johnson orally
moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
29(a), which this Court denied. On December 10, 2025, Johnson was convicted as to
Counts 1 and 2 and acquitted as to Count 3.2
Shortly thereafter, on December 24, 2025, Johnson timely filed the motion3 for
judgment of acquittal and new trial, pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
29 and 33, now before the Court. The thrust of his motion is that the government’s
evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite
1 See generally R. Doc. No. 51.
2 See R. Doc. No. 169.
3 R. Doc. No. 173.
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mens rea with respect to Minor Victim’s age.4 The government filed a response5 in
opposition, in which it argues that it presented ample evidence demonstrating that
Johnson believed and had “actual knowledge” of Minor Victim’s age.6 Having
considered the motion and the parties’ arguments, the Court denies Johnson’s
motion.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
a. Rule 29
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 allows a defendant to move for
“judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain
a conviction.” F ED. R. CRIM . P. 29(a). “A defendant may move for a judgment of
acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the
court discharges the jury, whichever is later.” F ED. R. CRIM . P. 29(c).
“Moving for a judgment of acquittal is considered to be a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Zamora-Salazar, 860 F.3d 826, 831 (5th
Cir. 2017). When the challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
conviction, “the question is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotations
4 See R. Doc. No. 173-1, at 3–4.
5 R. Doc. No. 174.
6 Id. at 1, 8–9. The government notes, correctly, that it was not necessary to prove
actual knowledge as to Count 1. See id. at 10 (“Though the government proved the
defendant’s actual knowledge of the victim’s age, the evidence far exceeded the
government’s burden with respect to Count One (sex trafficking).”). The government
rather was only required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson recklessly
disregarded Minor Victim’s age or that he “had a reasonable opportunity to observe”
Minor Victim. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a); (c).
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omitted) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); United States v. Akula,
No. 21-98, 2024 WL 363348, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2024) (Africk, J.). “The same test
applies whether the Government’s case depends on direct or entirely circumstantial
evidence.” U.S. v. Mitchell, No. 10-284, 2012 WL 1118599, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 3,
2012) (Vance, J.).
“To uphold the conviction, there is no requirement that the evidence exclude
every possible ‘hypothesis of innocence.’” Zamora-Salazar, 860 F.3d at 832. Indeed,
“[a] jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.” Id. 	The
court must determine “whether the jury made a ‘rational decision,’ not ‘whether the
jury correctly determined guilt or innocence.’” Id. The reviewing court does not weigh
the evidence or make credibility determinations. See id.; United States v. Burch, No.
24-40540, 2025 WL 1898363, at *1 (5th Cir. July 9, 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-5897,
2025 WL 3260254 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2025) (“[The court] do[es] not reweigh evidence or
second guess the jury’s credibility choices.”).
A review of the sufficiency of the evidence is “highly deferential” to the jury’s
verdict, and all reasonable inferences and credibility choices are to be made in
support of conviction. United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 835 (5th Cir. 2014); see
also United States v. Bates, 850 F.3d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 2017); Akula, No. 21-98, 2024
WL 363348, at *2. “If the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to support its
verdict, the verdict must be upheld.” Zamora-Salazar, 860 F.3d at 832.
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b. Rule 33
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) states that “[u]pon the defendant’s
motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of
justice so requires.” F ED. R. CRIM . P. 33(a). Any motion for a new trial grounded on
any reason other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 14 days after
the verdict or finding of guilty.” F ED. R. CRIM . P. 33(b)(2).
“Broadly speaking, Rule 33 is exercised in two situations.” United States v.
Crittenden, 46 F.4th 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Hoffman, 901
F.3d 523, 552 (5th Cir. 2018)). “One is when error infects the trial—perhaps the
erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, inflammatory comments by a lawyer,
or faulty jury instructions.” Id. (citing Hoffman, 901 F.3d at 552–54). “A new trial
request can . . . be based on procedural problems with the trial if they caused a
miscarriage of justice.” Hoffman, 901 F.3d at 552.
“The other is when the court believes the evidence weighs ‘heavily against the
verdict.’” Crittenden, 46 F.4th at 296 (citing United States v. Robertson, 110 F.3d
1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1997)). Unlike in the Rule 29 context, where the evidence must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a court deciding whether to grant
a new trial on this second ground may “weigh the evidence and may assess the
credibility of the witnesses during its consideration.” United States v. Ramos-
Cardenas, 524 F.3d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Crittenden, 46 F.4th at 296–97.
However, “the judge cannot entirely usurp the jury’s function and set aside the verdict
merely because the court would have ruled the other way.” Crittenden, 46 F.4th at
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297. To be sure, “[a] judge’s power to grant a new trial based on a different assessment
of the evidence must be exercised with caution and invoked only in exceptional cases.”
Id. (internal citations omitted)).
The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that “[o]rdering a new trial is no small
matter” and has held that “for a district court to disturb a jury’s verdict and order a
new trial, the evidence must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it
would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.” United States v. Meyer, 63
F.4th 1024, 1039 (5th Cir. 2023); see also Crittenden, 46 F.4th at 297 (quotation
omitted) (“If the Court reaches the conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the
weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted, the court
may set aside the verdict and grant a new trial . . . .”). “Motions for new trial are
disfavored and must be reviewed with great caution.” United States v. McRae, 795
F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2015).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Considering the evidence introduced at trial, which the government thoroughly
presented in its response7 and which the Court hereby adopts, the Court finds that
the jury’s verdict with respect to Counts 1 and 2 was rational and sufficiently
supported by the evidence and must be upheld. See Zamora-Salazar, 860 F.3d at 832.
The Court is not persuaded by the evidence Johnson points to in his motion that he
believes is contrary to the verdict nor the evidence that Johnson states was not
7 See R. Doc. No. 174.
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presented and was necessary to sustain the verdict.8 Notwithstanding this evidence,
the Court finds that based on all the evidence presented at trial, a “rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime[s] beyond reasonable doubt,”
including, specifically, the elements of Counts 1 and 2 regarding Johnson’s mens rea
with respect to Minor Victim’s age. See id. (“A jury is free to choose among reasonable
constructions of the evidence.”).
Likewise, the Court cannot conclude that the evidence presented at trial,
including the evidence that Johnson highlights in his motion, “preponderate[s]
heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the
verdict stand.” Meyer, 63 F.4th at 1039. Consequently, the Court finds that Johnson’s
motion for judgment of acquittal and new trial fails whether analyzed pursuant to
Rule 29 or Rule 33.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Johnson’s motion9 is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 14, 2026.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8 See R. Doc. No. 173-1, at 3–4.
9 R. Doc. No. 173.
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