Whiticar v. Parish Hospital Service District for the Parish of Orleans, District A

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LETHORNIA J. WHITICAR, JR. 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 24-1287
PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE
DISTRICT FOR THE PARISH OF
ORLEANS, DISTRICT A D/B/A
NEW ORLEANS EAST HOSPITAL
ET AL.
SECTION: “J”(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 43) filed by
Defendants Louisiana Children’s Medical Center d/b/a LCMC Health (“LCMC”) and
Parish Hospital Service District for the Parish of Orleans, District A d/b/a New
Orleans East Hospital (“NOEH”). Plaintiff Lethornia J. Whiticar filed an opposition
to the motion. (Rec. Doc. 48). Defendants filed a reply. (Rec. Doc. 53). Having
considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the
Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is an employment dispute involving alleged retaliation under § 1981 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. (Rec. Doc. 28). Plaintiff Lethornia J. Whiticar, Jr., an
African American male, alleges that he began his employment with Defendants in
August 2018. (Rec. Doc. 48, at 2). Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor was Karl Warner,
a Caucasian male. (Rec. Doc. 32). Mr. Warner’s immediate supervisor was Danielle
Case 2:24-cv-01287-CJB-DPC Document 59 Filed 01/09/26 Page 1 of 7

2
Willis, an African American female. (Rec. Doc. 28, at 3). Ms. Willis was the Chief
Financial Officer and Chief Administrative Officer at NOEH. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 24, 2023, he reported to Brion
Stanford, Director of Human Resources for NOEH, that he believed he was being
racially discriminated against by Mr. Warner. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff claims that he
reported Mr. Warner’s behavior to Mr. Stanford alone and in person. (Rec. Doc. 43-3,
at 27:16–19). On February 12, 2023, Ms. Willis demoted Plaintiff from the position of
Chief Engineer to Engineer I. (Rec. Doc. 48-2, at 4; Rec. Doc. 43-2, at 3). Ms. Willis
claims that she demoted Plaintiff solely due to his poor job performance as Chief
Engineer. (Rec. Doc. 43-2, at 4).
On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana against NOEH alleging raced-based employment discrimination
and retaliation under § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and seeking, among other
things, back pay, front pay, benefits, medical expenses, compensatory damages
arising from his mental anguish, and attorney’s fees. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 6–7). On
February 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint adding LCMC as a
Defendant. (Rec. Doc. 18, at 2).
On March 11, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.
(Rec. Doc. 22). On June 11, 2025, this Court granted the motion in part, dismissing
Plaintiff’s discrimination claim but allowing Plaintiff to amend his complaint to
clearly allege his retaliation claim. (Rec. Doc. 27, at 10). On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff
filed 	his 	second 	amended 	complaint 	providing 	additional 	facts 	to 	support 	his
Case 2:24-cv-01287-CJB-DPC Document 59 Filed 01/09/26 Page 2 of 7

3
retaliation claim. (Rec. Doc. 28). On July 15, 2025, Defendants filed a second Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim (Rec. Doc. 29), a motion which the Court denied
on August 6, 2025. (Rec. Doc. 32).
Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 43) on
November 25, 2025. Plaintiff filed their opposition.1 (Rec. Doc. 48). Defendants filed
their reply. (Rec. Doc. 53).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994). When evaluating whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, a
court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide
Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The
1 Defendants initially set their Motion for Summary Judgment for submission on December 10, 2025. (Rec. Doc.
43). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s opposition was due no later than December 2, 2025. E.D. La. L.R. 7.5 (2025).
However, on December 2, 2025, this Court extended the submission date for Plaintiff’s opposition after the Court
granted in part Plaintiff’s opposed Motion for Extension of Deadlines (Rec. Doc. 44), allowing Plaintiff to file his
opposition no later than December 9, 2025 (Rec. Doc. 51). After filing his opposition on December 9, 2025,
Plaintiff twice sought to untimely bolster his opposition by filing a Motion for Leave to Supplement Plaintiff’s
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 52) on December 12, 2025
and a Motion for Leave to Supplement Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment with the Sworn Declaration of Shanel Bartholomew (Rec. Doc. 55) on December 16, 2025. Defendants
filed oppositions to each of these motions. (Rec. Doc. 54; Rec. Doc. 57). The Court denied both motions, deciding to
consider Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the timely filed briefs. (Rec. Doc. 58). However, even if the
Court had allowed Plaintiff to supplement his opposition, the Court finds that it would not have changed the
outcome here.
Case 2:24-cv-01287-CJB-DPC Document 59 Filed 01/09/26 Page 3 of 7

4
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing
out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element
of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the moving party
meets this burden, the non-moving party “must go beyond the pleadings and
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little, 37 F.3d
at 1075 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor
of 	the 	nonmoving 	party, 	but 	a 	party 	cannot 	defeat 	summary 	judgment 	with
“conclusory allegations” or “unsubstantiated assertions.” Id. (citations omitted). A
court ultimately must be satisfied that “a reasonable jury could not return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Delta, 530 F.3d at 399 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	Defendants 	retaliated 	against 	him 	for 	reporting
discriminatory behavior. (Rec. Doc. 28, 5–6). To prove a retaliation claim, Plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case by showing that “(1) he engaged in a protected
activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link existed
between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores
Texas, L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422, 436–37 (5th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). If successful,
the burden shifts to the employer to provide a “legitimate, nonretaliatory reason” for
the adverse employment action. Id. at 437 (citations omitted). If the employer
Case 2:24-cv-01287-CJB-DPC Document 59 Filed 01/09/26 Page 4 of 7

5
satisfies this burden, then the employee “bears the ultimate burden of proving that
the employer’s proffered reason is not true but instead is a pretext for the real . . .
retaliatory purpose.” Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors of S. Univ., 656 F. App’x 30, 32 (5th
Cir. 2016) (quoting McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff must “produce substantial evidence indicating that” Defendants’ reasons are
pretextual and “that the protected activity was the ‘but for’ cause of the retaliation.”
Id. at 33 (quoting Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2014)) (citations
omitted).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence to
establish the causation element of his prima facie case. To establish causation,
Plaintiff “must demonstrate that the decision maker had knowledge of the protected
activity.” Tureaud v. Grambling State Univ., 294 F. App’x 909, 914 (5th Cir. 2008).
“If the decisionmakers were completely unaware of the plaintiff’s protected activity,
then it could not be said (even as an initial matter) that the decisionmakers might
have been retaliating against the plaintiff for having engaged in that activity.”
Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 883 n.6 (5th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff does not dispute that Ms. Willis, the ultimate decision-maker in his
demotion, was unaware that he reported the alleged racial discrimination to Mr.
Stanford. In his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he reported the alleged racial
discrimination to Mr. Stanford in person and only to Mr. Stanford:
Q: Where did this take place?
A: In Brion’s office.
Case 2:24-cv-01287-CJB-DPC Document 59 Filed 01/09/26 Page 5 of 7

6
Q: Was anyone else present?
A: No.
(Rec. Doc. 43-3 at 27:16–19).
Plaintiff presents no evidence that he informed anyone else about this meeting.
In his signed declaration, in addition to denying that Plaintiff ever reported alleged
racial discrimination, Mr. Stanford swears that he “never informed anyone at
LCMC,” including Ms. Willis or Mr. Warner, “that Plaintiff complained of or reported
any race-based discrimination.” (Rec. Doc. 43-4, at 5). In her sworn declaration, Ms.
Willis denies that she had any knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged report to Mr. Stanford.
(Rec. Doc. 43-2, at 4). Plaintiff presents no evidence that Mr. Stanford, or anyone else,
notified Ms. Willis of his alleged complaint. It cannot be said that Ms. Willis demoted
Plaintiff for his alleged reporting of unlawful activity when she did not know that
Plaintiff allegedly reported the activity in the first place. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim fails at the prima facie stage.
Even if Plaintiff could establish causation, Defendants have a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for demoting him, namely Plaintiff’s poor job performance as
Chief Engineer, and Plaintiff has failed to produce the substantial evidence necessary
to prove that this reason was pretextual for retaliation. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Defendants have satisfied their Rule 56 burden and that summary judgment in
their favor is warranted.
Case 2:24-cv-01287-CJB-DPC Document 59 Filed 01/09/26 Page 6 of 7

7
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Rec. Doc. 43) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of January, 2026.
____________________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:24-cv-01287-CJB-DPC Document 59 Filed 01/09/26 Page 7 of 7