Johnson v. Offshore Service Vessels, L.L.C. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DANIEL JOHNSON 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 24-2257
OFFSHORE SERVICE VESSELS, L.L.C., ET AL. 	SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	plaintiff 	Daniel 	Johnson’s 	(“plaintiff”) 	motion1 	for
reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)(6).
Plaintiff asks this Court to reconsider its order2 bifurcating the trial into separate
liability and damages phases and its order3 denying his request for appointed
counsel.
With respect to the Court’s decision to bifurcate the trial, plaintiff states that
he “did not fully understand the procedural or substantive implications of bifurcation”
when 	his 	then-attorney 	conveyed 	his 	non-opposition4 	to 	bifurcation.5 	Having
researched the issue pro se, plaintiff is now concerned that bifurcation “could
prejudice his ability to present a complete picture of his injury and loss,” because he
could be “restrict[ed] [in] the presentation of medical, vocational, and economic
1 R. Doc. No. 87.
2 R. Doc. No. 67.
3 R. Doc. No. 86.
4 See R. Doc. No. 65, at 3 (confirming conference with lead counsel for plaintiff and
that there is no opposition to the motion to bifurcate trial).
5 See R. Doc. No. 87, at 4.
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evidence.”6 Plaintiff asks this Court to reconsider its order bifurcating trial because
“his earlier non-opposition to bifurcation was not an informed or voluntary waiver,
but the result of counsel’s actions while still representing him.”7
The Court bifurcated the trial in the above-captioned matter after discussing
bifurcation 	with 	the 	parties’ 	counsel 	at 	the 	pretrial 	conference8 	and 	careful
consideration of the unopposed motion9 to bifurcate trial filed by defendants Offshore
Service 	Vessels, 	L.L.C. 	and 	Martin 	Davis. 	Independent 	from 	plaintiff’s 	non-
opposition, the Court found “it would be convenient and economical” to bifurcate
trial.10
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) states, in relevant part, that “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a
separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or
third-party claims.” The Fifth Circuit has stated that “[a] motion to bifurcate is a
matter 	within 	the 	sole 	discretion 	of 	the 	trial 	court,” 	which 	it 	“will 	not
reverse . . . absent an abuse of that discretion.” Nester v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.3d 151,
162 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting First Tex. Sav. Ass’n v. Reliance Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 1171,
1174 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992)).
6 Id. at 5.
7 Id. Plaintiff also informs the Court that “it would have been procedurally improper
for him to file any motion opposing bifurcation at the time it was entered because he
was still represented by counsel.” Id.
8 See R. Doc. No. 64, at 1 (“The Court and the parties discussed the possibility of
bifurcating the trial.”).
9 R. Doc. No. 65.
10 See R. Doc. No. 67, at 1.
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Even considering plaintiff’s opposition and the arguments raised in his motion,
the Court finds bifurcation of the trial in this matter into separate liability and
damages phases is appropriate as it promotes convenience, judicial economy, and
efficiency. The Court therefore denies plaintiff’s motion to reconsider its decision to
bifurcate the trial.
As for Johnson’s request that the Court reconsider its denial of his request to
appoint counsel, the Court finds, as it previously found, that plaintiff is not entitled
to appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) because he is not
proceeding in forma pauperis in this matter.11 See Day v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 24-
512, 2024 WL 6051481, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 2024) (“On June 17, 2024, [the
plaintiff’s] request to proceed in forma pauperis was dismissed as moot [because] he
paid, on June 14, 2024, the full filing and administrative fees. Consequently, [the
plaintiff] is not entitled to the appointment of counsel pursuant to the provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).”); Byrd v. Lindsey, 736 F. App’x 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2018)
(“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a trial court is permitted to appoint counsel in in
forma pauperis proceedings.”).
Although plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its decision by attempting to
demonstrate that he can satisfy the factors that courts consider when deciding
whether “exceptional circumstances” justify appointment of counsel, see Byrd, 736 F.
11 See R. Doc. No. 1.
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App’x at 467, he has not shown that he is entitled to appointment of counsel pursuant
to § 1915(e).12
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion13 is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this
order by regular and certified mail to plaintiff at 315 Amesbury Drive, Apt. 109,
Lafayette, LA 70507.
New Orleans, Louisiana, November 21, 2025.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12 The Court sympathizes with plaintiff and is mindful of plaintiff’s limitations with
respect to representing himself pro se. See, e.g., R. Doc. No. 87-3, at 5–7 (explaining
plaintiff’s results with respect to tests assessing his reading recognition, reading
comprehension, math calculation, and math reasoning). Although the Court declines
to appoint counsel or formally “facilitate volunteer counsel” as plaintiff requests, see
R. Doc. No. 87, at 2, the Court suggests that plaintiff explore alternative pro bono
legal services. See, e.g., United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana,
Legal 	Services 	Information, 	https://www.laed.uscourts.gov/pro-se/legal-services-
information.
13 R. Doc. No. 87.
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