In re: In the Matter of Texas Petroleum Investment Company

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF TEXAS 	CIVIL ACTION
PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY
NO. 24-2344
SECTION: D (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Claimants’ 	Motion 	to 	Bifurcate 	Texas 	Petroleum
Investment Company’s Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability
from Claimants’ Claim for Damages, filed by Claimants George Walcott and Evelyn
Walcott (the “Walcotts”).1 	Texas Petroleum Investment Company (“Petitioner”)
opposes the Motion.2 The Production Group, LLC and David Hayes (collectively
“TPG”) also opposes the Motion.3 	The Walcotts have filed a Reply.4 After careful
consideration of the parties’ memoranda and the applicable law, the Motion is
DENIED.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The 	Court, 	in 	a 	previous 	Order 	and 	Reasons, 	has 	detailed 	the 	factual
background at length in this matter.5 The Court therefore provides the factual
background only as necessary to the instant Motion. This action for exoneration from
or limitation of liability arises out of an April 10, 2024 allision involving the Vessel
1 R. Doc. 73.
2 R. Doc. 74.
3 R. Doc. 75.
4 R. Doc. 77.
5 See R. Doc. 91.
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LA 93956 on the inland waters of Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana.7 The Walcotts
assert the following factual allegations.
On the morning of the incident, David Hayes was operating the Vessel, in
which Blake Evans and George Walcott were passengers.8 Roughly thirty minutes
into their voyage, David Hayes veered the Vessel starboard to make way for an
oncoming vessel.9 David Hayes continued to veer the Vessel starboard, despite
numerous warnings from Blake Evans that the Vessel was heading toward a large
obstruction protruding out of the water.10 The Vessel allided with the hazard, became
lodged on a pylon, and became inundated with water.11 As a result of the allision,
George Walcott suffered numerous bodily injuries, including damage to his neck and
back.12
On September 26, 2024, Petitioner filed a Complaint for Exoneration from or
Limitation of Liability in this Court.13 The Court issued an Order Directing Issuance
of Notice and Restraining Prosecution of Claims on September 30, 2024.14 Two days
later, on October 1, 2024, the Walcotts filed a state court suit in Plaquemines Parish,
Louisiana.15 In the state court suit, George Walcott asserted claims for damages
arising out of the incident aboard the Vessel, and Evelyn Walcott asserted claims for
6 Vessel La 9395 is also referred to as the M/V SYDNEY. See R. Doc. 73-1 at p. 2. The Court will refer
to it as the “Vessel” throughout this Order and Reasons.
7 R. Doc. 73-1 at p. 2.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 R. Doc. 1.
14 R. Doc. 4.
15 R. Doc. 73-1 at p. 2.
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loss of consortium.16 	As a result of the Court’s Order Restraining Prosecution of
Claims, the Walcotts’ state court suit is currently stayed.17
The Walcotts filed the instant Motion to Bifurcate on September 8, 2025,
seeking an Order bifurcating all liability and limitation issues from their personal
injury claims.18 The Walcotts concede that Petitioner “is entitled to proceed without
a jury while this Court adjudicates liability and limitation issues.”19 However, the
Walcotts seek to “bifurcate this case to ensure that the only issue resolved at the May
18, 2026 bench trial are the liability and limitation issues – and to reserve to a jury
in state or federal court of their choosing their claim for damages if limitation is
denied and liability is found.”20
The Walcotts’ Motion is based on two grounds. First, they allege that Fed. R.
Civ. P. 42(b) supports granting the instant Motion, as “[b]ifurcating the issues of
liability / limitation from damages in the case sub judice will achieve efficiency and
judicial economy[,] [and] [t]he liability / limitation issues present largely different
facts and issues than the damages portion.”21 Second, the Walcotts contend that
“bifurcation is the ‘preferred approach, at least within the federal district courts of
the Fifth Circuit, to decide the limitation issues and then allow claimants to return
16 Id. at pp. 2–3.
17 R. Doc. 4.
18 R. Doc. 73-1.
19 Id. at p. 5.
20 Id.
21 Id. at p. 7.
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to state court if they so desire’ with a right to jury trial on their damages claim.”22
Thus, according to the Walcotts, their Motion should be granted.23
Petitioner opposes the Motion but concedes that “the Court has the authority
to grant the Walcotts’ claim for bifurcation.”24 While acknowledging that the Court
has the authority to do otherwise, Petitioner argues that the Court should follow Fifth
Circuit jurisprudence demonstrating that the Court “is certainly empowered to hear
and decide the whole case, damages included.”25 Thus, Petitioner avers that “even if
the Court accedes to [the Walcotts’] motion and grants bifurcation at least in this
venue, [the Walcotts] would not be entitled to a jury trial on the damage claim.”26
TPG 	likewise 	opposes 	the 	Motion.27 	TPG 	contends 	that 	“[l]iability 	and
damages in this case are not so distinct. The allocation of fault among [the] alleged
tortfeasors will directly shape the damages inquiry. Bifurcating this case, especially
22 Id. (quoting In re Athena Const., LLC, Civil Action Nos. 06–2004, 06–2366, 2007 WL 1668753, at *6
(W.D. La. June 6, 2007)). Before addressing the merits, the Court addresses the statement that
bifurcation is the “preferred approach” of courts within the Fifth Circuit. The Walcotts correctly quote
this language from a 2007 order from a court in the Western District of Louisiana. With that said, the
Court points out that that language is not in line with Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. Indeed, the
Fifth Circuit has cautioned that bifurcation should be used sparingly and that courts should not
bifurcate claims unless the issue to be tried separately is “so distinct and separate from the others
that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.” See McDaniel v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 987 F.2d
298, 305 (5th Cir. 1993). And recently, the Fifth Circuit has stated that “[t]o be clear, bifurcation is a
case-specific inquiry that is not the usual course and must be considered within the facts and context
of each case. A one size fits all approach will not do.” Sims v. City of Jasper, Texas, 117 F.4th 283,
292 n.3 (5th Cir. 2024)(citation modified). The Fifth Circuit further clarified that “[w]hatever
might be said of bifurcation generally, it still requires an individualized, case-specific inquiry that
must be approached with trepidation. Thus, the propriety of bifurcating one case is not
necessarily indicative of the propriety of bifurcating another.” Id. at 294 n.6 (citation modified).
23 R. Doc. 73-1 at p. 11.
24 R. Doc. 74 at p. 4.
25 Id. (“TPIC concedes the Court has the authority to grant the Walcotts’ claim for bifurcation.
However, the jurisprudence also suggests granting a bifurcation request in a Limitation Action is
discretionary with the Court and this Court is certainly empowered to hear and decide the whole
case, damages included.”).
26 Id.
27 R. Doc. 75.
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when multiple parties with multiple crossclaims are involved, would not serve
limitation’s purpose.”28 TPG further alleges that bifurcation “could very well require
the parties to duplicate discovery efforts and re-litigate issues already properly before
this Court. Keeping all claims here, however, ensures continuity, efficiency, and
fairness.”29 As a final matter, TPG claims that “to the extent that the Walcotts seek
a federal jury on damages, no such right exists in this admiralty proceeding, as
[Petitioner] correctly notes in its opposition.”30
The Walcotts, in Reply, assert that Petitioner’s “[o]pposition neither alters the
jurisprudential landscape and preferred approach to bifurcation in the Fifth Circuit;
nor provides good cause for denial of Claimants’ Bifurcation Motion.”31 The Walcotts
further contend that TPG’s “Opposition likewise misses the mark on bifurcation.”32
Thus, according to the Walcotts, their Motion to Bifurcate should be granted.33
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides that “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to
expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate
issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims. When ordering a
separate trial, the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.”34 The decision
to bifurcate “‘is a matter within the sole discretion of the trial court.’”35 A “district
28 Id. at p. 2.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 R. Doc. 77 at p. 2.
32 Id. at p. 4.
33 Id. at p. 5.
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
35 Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1293 (5th Cir. 1994)(quoting First Tex. Sav. Ass'n v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 950 F.2d 1171, 1174 n. 2 (5th Cir.1992)).
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judge must weigh a variety of facts, such as whether one trial or separate trials best
will serve the convenience of the parties and the court, avoid prejudice, and minimize
expense and delay.”36
“Separation 	of 	issues, 	however, 	is 	not 	the 	usual 	course 	that 	should 	be
followed.”37 The Fifth Circuit has “cautioned district courts to bear in mind before
ordering separate trials in the same case that the ‘issue to be tried [separately] must
be so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without
injustice.’”38 “‘In sum, courts must consider the justifications for bifurcation in
relation to the facts of the individual case, giving particular consideration to the
avoidance of prejudice, in order to determine if a separate trial is appropriate.’”39
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Court declines to bifurcate the trial in this matter. “‘The party moving for
bifurcation has the burden to demonstrate that judicial economy would be promoted
and that the non-moving party will not suffer prejudice.’”40 Analyzing the Rule 42(b)
36 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2388 (3d ed. Sept.
2025 update).
37 McDaniel, 987 F.2d at 304.
38 Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 115 (E.D. La. 1992)(Feldman,
J.)(quoting Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1964)).
39 Matter of Cooper Marine, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-2778 c/w NO. 25-730, 2025 WL 3022214, at
*2 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 2025)(Fallon, J.)(quoting Laitram Corp., 791 F. Supp at 114–15).
40 Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Company, CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-14536, 2022 WL 2467675, at *2
(E.D. La. July 6, 2022)(Lemelle, J.)(quoting Wesco Ins. Co. v. Tauler Smith LLP, Case No. CV 19-08171
PA (SKx), 2020 WL 4369496, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020)); see also Fucich Contracting, Inc. v.
Shread-Kuyrkendall and Associates, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-2885, 2020 WL 5232423, at *2 (E.D.
La. Sept. 2, 2020)(Ashe, J.)(“The party moving for bifurcation has the burden to demonstrate that
judicial economy would be promoted and that the non-moving party will not suffer prejudice.”)(internal
quotation marks omitted).
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factors in turn – convenience; avoiding prejudice; and expedition and economy – the
Court finds that the Walcotts have not met their burden.41
A. 	Convenience
Bifurcating this trial would not promote convenience. As an initial matter, the
Walcotts vaguely describe how bifurcating this trial would promote convenience. In
their Reply brief, they advance that “damages are a completely distinct issue from
limitation, liability, and apportionment of fault. Claimant, George Walcott, has
already undergone one major spinal fusion surgery and may very well require
another. His damages involve a different universe of evidence than the issues of
liability.”42 The Walcotts fail to offer further explanation as to how convenience would
be advanced via bifurcation. Instead, the Walcotts largely reiterate that bifurcation
is the “preferred approach” of courts within the Fifth Circuit without any application
to the current matter.43 Without more, as it pertains to promoting convenience, the
Court cannot say that the Walcotts have carried “its burden of proving this is an
exceptional case warranting bifurcation under Rule 42.”44
41 Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
42 R. Doc. 77 at pp. 4–5.
43 R. Doc. 73-1 at p. 7. Alternatively, Petitioner avers that “[i]f, as claimants [] suggest, the damage
phase is severed and the stay order lifted so the case could proceed in State Court, all the defense
parties would have to file responsive pleadings in that venue. Scheduling conferences would be
convened, various deadlines, cutoffs and trial date selected, all things that have already been done in
this Court. Hardly a model of judicial efficiency.” R. Doc. 74 at p. 3. Likewise, TPG argues that
“[b]ifurcating this case, especially when multiple parties with multiple crossclaims are involved, would
not serve limitation’s purpose. Instead, it could very well require the parties to duplicate discovery
efforts and re-litigate issues already properly before this Court.” R. Doc. 75 at p. 2.
44 Meador v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Insurance Company, CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-2378,
2020 WL 1332952, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2020)(Morgan, J.).
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B. 	Avoiding Prejudice
“‘Prejudice is the Court's most important consideration in deciding whether to
order separate trials under Rule 42(b).’”45 Yet the Walcotts fail to address how they
would be prejudiced by the denial of their motion or whether Petitioner and TPG
would not be prejudiced by bifurcation of the trial. 	Instead, they merely reiterate
that bifurcation is the “preferred approach” among federal courts within the Fifth
Circuit.46 As noted, that statement, standing alone, is not supported by Fifth Circuit
precedent.47 Since the Walcotts fail to mention any potential prejudice to Petitioner
and TPG, the Court cannot say that the Walcotts have met their burden under Rule
42(b). Further, as discussed in more detail below, the Court sees no likelihood in jury
confusion in trying these claims—which are not complex—at the same time.
C. 	Expedition and Economy
Bifurcation will not expedite or economize this case. The Walcotts invoke
Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. M/T American Liberty48 for the proposition that the
trial should be bifurcated.49 The Court finds Archer Daniels distinguishable. As
explained by another Section of this Court:
The Archer Daniels court granted bifurcation in a case involving a
tanker 	that 	crashed 	into 	several 	vessels 	and 	injured 	multiple
crewmembers. In that case, a tugboat assisted a tanker in her turn to
sea, but the tanker lost control/engine power and allided with another
vessel and two barges. This allision injured several dockworkers and
caused the two barges to break loose and travel downriver. These loose
45 Matter of Cooper Marine, Inc., 2025 WL 3022214, at *3 (quoting Laitram Corp., 791 F. Supp at 115).
46 R. Doc. 77 at p. 4.
47 See supra note 22.
48 Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. M/T American Liberty, CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-10525 C/W 19-10925,
19-11813, AND 19-12748, 2020 WL 1889123, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2020)(Vance, J.).
49 R. Doc. 73-1 at p. 10.
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barges and the tanker then allided with an elevator grain facility,
damaging another vessel as well as a fleet of stationary barges. The
district 	court 	bifurcated 	liability 	from 	damages 	because 	it 	would
economize and expedite the proceedings. That court bifurcated the
damages trial because damages issues would involve separate and
potentially complicated questions, such as the economic complexities of
large property-loss claims. Therefore, bifurcating the case could enable
the Court to decide the core issues driving the litigation expeditiously,
and may eliminate the need for a trial of some or all damages issues as
a result of settlements or rulings on the merits.50
The case at bar is different from Archer Daniels. Here, there are two personal injury
claimants – George Walcott and Evelyn Walcott. While this matter does have
competing crossclaims like Archer Daniels, such claims are not so complex as to
warrant bifurcation. And unlike Archer Daniels, this matter does not involve multiple
limitation petitioners. Moreover, Archer Daniels was a consolidation of four limitation
actions. This matter, in turn, involves one limitation petitioner. Thus, the Court finds
Archer Daniels easily distinguishable, as the instant matter is not so complex as to
necessitate bifurcation.
Further, the Court notes that the issues of liability, causation, and damages
will involve substantial amounts of overlapping evidence, thereby making bifurcation
impermissible. “Bifurcation of issues of limitation and damages is not appropriate
when 	evidence 	will 	inevitably 	overlap 	with 	regard 	to 	the 	issues 	of 	damages,
causation, and liability.”51 In analyzing whether a limitation petitioner may limit its
liability, courts undergo a two-step process.52 “‘First, the court must determine what
50 Matter of Cooper Marine, Inc., 2025 WL 3022214, at *4 (citation modified).
51 In re Bertucci Contracting Co., LLC, Civil Action Nos. 12–664, 12–697, 12–1783, 12–1912, 12–1914,
2015 WL 114174, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2015)(Barbier, J.)(citation modified).
52 Id.
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acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused the accident. Second, the
court must determine whether the shipowner had knowledge or privity of those same
acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness.’”53 To prove negligence under the
first prong, claimants must “demonstrate that there was a duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, breach of that duty, injury sustained by plaintiff, and a
causal connection between defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury.”54 Here, the
Walcotts’ claims will proceed accordingly. The evidence they will present pertaining
to damages, such as George Walcott’s physical injuries, will significantly overlap with
the issues of causation and liability. Therefore, bifurcation is improper.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Walcotts are not
entitled to bifurcation under Rule 42(b). The Fifth Circuit is clear that “[s]eparation
of issues . . . is not the usual course that should be followed.”55 The Court therefore
declines to undercut precedent, especially considering the Walcotts’ failure to meet
their burden under Rule 42(b). Bifurcation is denied.
53 Id. (quoting Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10 (5th Cir.1976)).
54 In re Cooper/T. Smith, 929 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1991).
55 McDaniel, 987 F.2d at 304.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claimants’
Motion 	to 	Bifurcate 	Texas 	Petroleum 	Investment 	Company’s 	Complaint 	for
Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability from Claimants’ Claim for Damages 56 is
DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 6, 2026.
______________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
56 R. Doc. 73.
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