Porter v. Tynes et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TOMARCUS PORTER CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-2871
JOHNATHEN TYNES, ET AL. SECTION: D (4)
ORDER and REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider the Honorable Judge [sic]
Ruling, filed by plaintiff, Tomarcus Porter.1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Porter seeks reconsideration of the Court’s September 29, 2025 Order and
Reasons, in which the Court overruled Porter’s objections, adopted, in part, the
United States Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and denied Porter’s
Motion for Declaratory Judgment.3 The Court determined that Porter’s Motion for
Declaratory Judgment was procedurally improper under the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Novinger4 because a declaratory judgment
can only be sought by one of the pleadings listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), such as a
complaint, and not by filing a motion.5 The Court explained that Porter does not seek
1 R. Doc. 52.
2 In the interest of judicial economy, and because the factual and procedural history of this case was
set out in great detail in the Court’s September 29, 2025 Order and Reasons (R. Doc. 47), the Court
will limit its recitation of the factual and procedural background to matters relevant to the instant
Motion.
3 R. Doc. 52 at p. 1. See R. Docs. 13, 36, 37, 42, & 47.
4 96 F.4th 774, 780–81 (5th Cir. 2024).
5 R. Doc. 47 at pp. 14–16.
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injunctive relief or a declaratory judgment in this matter, and instead seeks an award
of damages.6
The Court further found that, even if Porter’s Amended Complaint could be
broadly construed as seeking injunctive relief or a declaratory judgment and his
Motion for Declaratory Judgment was construed as a summary judgment motion
pursuant to Novinger, his Motion must still be denied.7 The Court reasoned that,
under Novinger, it would be appropriate to construe Porter’s Motion for Declaratory
Judgment as a motion for summary judgment, but that Porter failed to comply with
the requirement in the Court’s Local Rules that a motion for summary judgment
“must be accompanied by a separate and concise statement of the material facts
which the moving party contends present no genuine issue.”8 The Court further
found that the defendants’ Opposition brief to the Motion for Declaratory Judgment
suggested that there were contested issues of material fact that preclude summary
judgment in this matter.9 As such, the Court concluded that Porter’s Motion for
Declaratory Judgment must be denied, even if it was construed as a motion for
summary judgment.10
Three weeks later, on October 20, 2025, Porter filed the instant Motion,
seeking reconsideration of the Court’s September 29, 2025 Order and Reasons.11
Porter seems to assert that his failure to seek injunctive relief in his Amended
6 Id. at pp. 15–16 (citing R. Docs. 21 & 21-2).
7 R. Doc. 47 at p. 17.
8 Id. at pp. 17–18 (quoting Rule 56.1 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana) (citation modified).
9 R. Doc. 47 at p. 18.
10 Id.
11 R. Doc. 52.
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Complaint amounts to excusable neglect and harmless error on his part, and that he
“is now moving to secure the Declaratory Judgment and alter the Declaratory
Judgment.”12 Porter points out that the defendants timely filed an opposition to his
Motion for Declaratory Judgment on July 21, 2025, asserting that the Motion should
be denied because Porter did not seek declaratory relief in his Amended Complaint.13
Plaintiff also points out that he filed an Amended Complaint on April 25, 2025,14 that
the defendants were served with a summons and a copy of the Amended Complaint
on June 13, 2025,15 but that they failed to respond to the Amended Complaint.16
Porter also references a motion for summary judgment that he filed on July 14,
2025,17 and claims that a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants is not properly
before the Court because he was not properly served with a copy of the motion.18
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Although not addressed by Porter, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that,
“because the denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order, the
trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems
sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or
clarification of the substantive law.”19 This Court has held that, “the correct starting
12 Id. at p. 1, ¶ 3.
13 Id.
14 See R. Doc. 21.
15 See R. Doc. 28.
16 R. Doc. 52 at p. 1, ¶ 2 & pp. 2–3, ¶ 5.
17 Id. at p. 1, ¶ 1. See R. Doc. 34. The Court notes that Porter’s Motion for Summary Judgment was
dismissed without prejudice as premature on October 21, 2025. R. Doc. 49.
18 R. Doc. 52 at p. 2, ¶ 6.
19 Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other
grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Bon Air
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point for evaluating whether interlocutory orders should be altered is set forth in Rule
54(b) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].”20 Rule 54(b) provides, in pertinent
part, that any order “that adjudicates fewer than all the claims,” such as this Court’s
September 29, 2025 Order and Reasons, “may be revised at any time before the entry
of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”21
This Court, however, has further explained that, “[t]he general practice of
courts in this district has been to evaluate motions to reconsider interlocutory orders
under the same standards that govern Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend a final
judgment.”22 “A motion to alter or amend a judgment filed pursuant to Rule 59(e)
serves the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact
or to present newly discovered evidence.”23 A district court has “considerable
discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case in response to a motion for
reconsideration under” Rule 59(e).24 This Court has consistently held that, “[a]
moving party must satisfy at least one of the following four criteria to prevail on a
Rule 59(e) motion: (1) the movant demonstrates the motion is necessary to correct
manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; (2) the movant
presents new evidence; (3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest
injustice; and, (4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling
Hotel v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 1970), abrogated on other grounds by Little, 37 F.3d
1069).
20 Namer v. Scottsdale Insur. Co., 314 F.R.D. 392, 393 (E.D. La. 2016) (citing McKay v. Novartis Pharm.
Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 2014)).
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
22 Namer, 314 F.R.D. at 393 (citing authority).
23 Id. (quoting Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989)) (citation modified).
24 Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 174.
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law.”25 According to the Fifth Circuit, “[r]econsideration of a judgment after its entry
is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.”26
Porter has failed to show that reconsideration of the Court’s September 29,
2025 Order and Reasons is appropriate to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to
prevent manifest injustice, nor does Porter direct the Court to any newly discovered
evidence or an intervening change in the controlling law.27 Instead, Porter seems to
simply disagree with the Court’s ruling. That, however, is not a sufficient basis for
this Court to grant the extraordinary remedy of reconsidering and reversing its prior
ruling. While the Court has the authority to reconsider and reverse its prior decision
“for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an
intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law,”28 the Court finds no
sufficient reason exists to do so. The Court therefore finds that Porter’s Motion does
not meet the standards set forth by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and must be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
25 Namer, 314 F.R.D. at 395 (quoting Jupiter v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-0628, 1999
WL 796218, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 1999) (Vance, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Castrillo
v. American Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., Civ. A. No. 09-4369, 2010 WL 1424398, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr.
5, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing authority); Dorgan v. Foster, Civ. A. No. 04-0221, 2006 WL 2457118, at *2
(E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2006) (Roby, M.J.) (citing Gregg v. Weeks Marine, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-1586, 2000
WL 802865, at *2 (E.D. La. May 26, 2000) (Vance, J.)).
26 Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004).
27 Namer, 314 F.R.D. at 395.
28 Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 185.
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Motion to Reconsider the Honorable Judge [sic] Ruling, filed by Tomarcus Porter,29
is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 5, 2026.
______________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
29 R. Doc. 52.
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