ACE American Insurance Company et al v. Gray Insurance Company

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ACE 	AMERICAN 	INSURANCE
COMPANY 	& 	ACE 	PROPERTY 	AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
VERSUS
GRAY INSURANCE COMPANY
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-489
SECTION: "D" (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Demand Against
Furmanite 	America 	(“Furmanite”), 	which 	was 	filed 	by 	Defendant, 	The 	Gray
Insurance Company (“Gray”).1 Plaintiffs, ACE American Insurance Company and
ACE Property and Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, “Chubb”) oppose the
motion.2 For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
I. 	Background
In October 2015, an explosion at a gas-processing plant in Gibson, Louisiana,
caused four deaths and multiple injuries.3 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line, LLC (or
one of its affiliates) (collectively, “Transco”) owned and operated the plant.4 At the
time of the explosion, Furmanite and Danos and Curole Marine Contractors, LLC
(“Danos”) were performing maintenance work at the plant.5 Lawsuits ensued against
1 R. Doc. 45.
2 R. Doc. 46.
3 R. Doc. 1, ¶ 7.
4 Id.
5 Id. ¶ 8.
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Transco, Danos, and Furmanite, among others, relative to the deaths, injuries, and
property damages that resulted from the explosion.6 Chubb insured Furmanite as its
first-named insured. Chubb covered Transco and Danos as additional insureds.7 The
underlying litigation is over, but insurance and indemnity disputes remain.
The insurance and indemnity obligations among the potentially liable parties
are complex and subject to dispute. For present purposes, it suffices to say that Chubb
paid certain defense costs and partially funded certain personal injury settlements
on behalf of the employers of dead or injured workers and the plant owner or
operator.8 Chubb filed the instant lawsuit seeking to recover certain of its defense
and indemnity costs via subrogation and breach-of-contract claims against Gray.9
Gray now seeks to maintain a third-party action against Furmanite based on
contractual indemnity and insurance claims.10 Chubb, however, maintains that no
such third party claim is available because its lawsuit arises from Gray’s failure to
defend and indemnify Transco such that Gray’s third-party claims against Furmanite
“are 	not 	derivative and lack 	substantive 	merit.”11 Chubb 	also 	maintains 	that
preclusion and estoppel bar Gray’s third-party demand because the Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal has already considered and rejected Gray’s theory.12
6 Id. ¶ 9.
7 The parties dispute whether Chubb covered Gray as an additional insured.
8 Id.
9 Id. ¶¶ 25–33.
10 R. Doc. 45-1 at 1–2.
11 R. Doc. 46 at 5.
12 See R. Doc. 46 (citing Dupre v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 2017 CA 0152
(La. App. 1 Cir. Dec. 21, 2017)); see also R. Doc. 36-2 (copy of decision).
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II. 	Procedural Posture
The deadline set by the District Court for amendments to pleadings expired on
May 12, 2025.13 In October 2025, the law firm of Flanagan Partners LLP moved to
enroll as additional counsel of record on behalf of Gray.14 That same month, Gray
moved to continue the trial date and non-lapsed deadlines.15 The request for a
continuance stated that it was to allow counsel sufficient time to become familiar with
the case and prepare to litigate certain complicated issues.16 The motion was granted,
and an amended scheduling order issued on December 19, 2025.17 Given that the
amendment deadline had expired in May, this deadline was not continued.
Between October and December 2025, Gray moved forward toward filing its
third-party demand against Furmanite. On November 4, 2025, Gray sent a demand
letter to Furmanite.18 On December 9, 2025, Gray notified Plaintiffs of its intent to
seek leave to file a third-party demand against Furmanite and inquired whether
Plaintiffs opposed the motion.19 Gray followed up on its inquiry on December 12,
2025, and again on December 17, 2025.20 On December 19, 2025, Plaintiffs notified
13 R. Doc. 16.
14 R. Doc. 37.
15 R. Doc. 38.
16 Id.
17 R. Doc. 40.
18 R. Doc. 45-2.
19 R. Doc. 45-3 at 3.
20 Id. at 1–2.
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Gray that they opposed the motion for leave to file third-party demand.21 Gray filed
the instant motion for leave to file third-party demand on December 31, 2025.22
II. 	Analysis
A. Rule 16(b)(4)
When, as here, a party’s request to file a third-party pleading is beyond the
scheduling order deadline, the moving party must establish good cause to extend that
deadline under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). S&W Enterprises, L.L.C. v.
SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535–36 (5th Cir. 2003). Factors
relevant to good cause include: (1) the explanation for the motion’s untimeliness; (2)
the proposed pleading’s importance; (3) prejudice in allowing the pleading; and (4)
the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. Jackson v. Gray, 345 F.R.D.
597, 607 (E.D. La. 2024) (discussing amendment of pleadings and citing Fahim v.
Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008) andSw. Bell Tel. Co. v.
City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 2003)).
These factors weigh in favor of concluding that good cause exists to modify the
scheduling order. True, the deadline for amendment of pleadings expired in May
2025. But Gray retained supplemental counsel in October 2025 because of the
complexity of the case. Once supplemental counsel enrolled, the potential third-party
demand was pursued expeditiously. Gray also suggests that Chubb’s positions in the
21 Id. at 1.
22 R. Doc. 45.
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litigation (including the position23 that Gray is not an insured) have given rise to its
potential third-party demand.24 Finally, if Gray’s position on the merits is correct,
Gray’s third-party claim is an important potential component of the litigation.
Chubb has not identified a specific risk or concrete prejudice that would
outweigh the other factors. The initial continuance of the trial date militates against
the potential prejudice. Further, at least on this record, it appears that the parties’
disputes as to the merits and viability of Gray’s claim are primarily legal such that
the third-party demand will not dramatically expand the scope of discovery. Thus,
Gray’s proposed pleading satisfies Rule 16(b)(4).
B. 	Rule 14(a)(1)
Rule 	14(a)(1) 	allows 	a 	third-party 	complaint 	only 	when 	the 	third-party
defendant “is or may be liable to” the principal defendant for all or part of the claim
against it.
The objective of Rule 14 is to avoid the situation that arises when a
defendant has been held liable to plaintiff and then finds it necessary to
bring a separate action against a third individual who may be liable to
defendant for all or part of plaintiff's original claim. When the rights of
all three parties center upon a common factual setting, economies of
time and expense can be achieved by combining the suits into one action.
§ 1442 Purpose and Construction of Rule 14, 6 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1442 (3d ed.).
“In determining whether to allow a third-party complaint, courts consider several
factors which include avoiding circuitous actions, promoting judicial efficiency,
23 It is unclear when this position was first taken. See R. Doc. 45-1.
24 R. Doc. 45-1 at 7.
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obtaining consistent results, avoiding possible prejudice against other parties, the
unreasonableness 	of 	the 	delay, 	and 	the 	lack 	of 	substance 	of 	the 	third-party
complaint.” Aaron v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., No. CV 22-09, 2022 WL 2315802, at *3
(E.D. La. June 27, 2022). Thus, if a third-party claim is within the bounds of Rule
14(a)(1) and does not pose undue prejudice or complication, leave should be granted.
See 6 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1443 (3d ed.).
The parties dispute whether the proposed third-party demand satisfies the
core requirement of Rule 14—i.e., whether Furmanite can be liable to Gray in whole
or in part for Chubb’s claim against Gray. Gray maintains that Chubb’s lawsuit
triggers Furmanite’s indemnity obligations to Gray based on the language in Section
9 of the Danos-Furmanite Master Services Contract (“MSC”).25
As outlined by Gray:
Section 	9 	of 	the 	Danos-Furmanite 	MSC 	requires 	Furmanite 	(as
“Contractor”) 	to 	indemnify 	members 	of 	“Company 	Group” 	(which
includes Danos and its insurer, Gray) for all claims “on account of
personal injury, illness, disease or death caused by, arising out of, or in
any way incidental to and in connection with the performance of the
work” that are asserted by the Contractor Group, defined to
include, among others, any of Furmanite’s insurers, contractors,
subcontractors, employees, and agents.26
It is undisputed that Chubb is one of Furmanite’s insurers. Chubb maintains,
however, that Section 9 indemnification arises only when Chubb makes a claim
25 Id. at 2–3. Further, Gray argues, Furmanite’s contractual obligation to provide
Gray with “full insurance protection” under Section 8 of that agreement is broader
than the indemnity obligation. Id. at 4.
26 R. Doc. 45-4, ¶ 6 (emphasis supplied).
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against Gray in Chubb’s capacity as Furmanite’s insurer. Thus, Chubb maintains,
Gray’s indemnity claim fails because Chubb brought the instant lawsuit solely in its
capacity as Transco’s subrogee. Gray reads Section 9 more broadly. Under Gray’s
reading, Chubb is a member of the “Contractor Group” because it is Furmanite’s
insurer, but that does not limit the scope of the resulting indemnification obligation
to claims made by Chubb in that capacity.
The Court need not adjudicate the merits of Gray’s position at this stage. Rule
14 requires only that a third-party defendant “may be liable” on a claim derivative of
the first-party demand. The rule does not demand that courts conclusively adjudicate
the merits of a third-party claim before allowing it to be filed. Here, Gray’s proposed
pleading and the arguments in briefing suggest that Furmanite may owe Gray
indemnity for Chubb’s claims. That plausible claim is enough to satisfy Rule 14.
Although framed as an attack on whether there is an adequate connection between
the first-party and third-party claims under Rule 14, Chubb’s position ultimately
reflects a merits-based argument about contract interpretation. Whether Chubb’s
interpretation prevails is a matter for another day. Allowing the third-party claim to
be filed in the first instance will promote judicial efficiency and avoid the potential
prejudice that may result if litigation proceeds without Furmanite’s participation,
Similarly, the parties’ dispute as to the effect the Dupre case does not bar Gray
from pleading its third-party claim. Chubb may re-urge its position once the pleading
is operative, at which point “the procedural safeguards are surer” than they are at
this stage. See Medarc, LLC v. Aetna Health Inc., No. 3:20-CV-3646-N-BH, 2022 WL
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743520, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2022) (discussing amendment and quoting
Smallwood v. Bank of Am., No. 3:11-CV-1283-D, 2011 WL 4941044, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 17, 2011)). No undue prejudice or complication will result from allowing the
pleading and delaying a full adjudication of that pleading’s merits.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for leave (R. Doc. 45) is GRANTED and
that the proposed pleading (R. Doc. 45-4) be filed in the record.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of January, 2026.
EVA J. DOSSIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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